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Translated from the Italian by Lynn Westwater
Belief is a notoriously ambiguous term, but the principal meanings listed by dic-
tionaries can be grouped in two general categories. On the one hand, “belief ” re-
fers to a mental state which either takes the form of assent to propositions or the 
form of faith in somebody; on the other hand, the word designates the objects of 
the assent, that is, the propositions or notions that are believed, implicitly or ex-
plicitly. “Worship” refers to an assemblage of ritual practices which have as their 
object and justification sacred entities and make it possible to communicate 
with those sacred entities, to utilize their powers and to render them homage, 
thus reaffirming their preeminent position in the believers’ consciousness. 
Beliefs that are associated, directly or indirectly, with worship are called “re-
ligious,” and it is exclusively these beliefs that will be the focus of this article. 
Both the relationship between the two meanings of “belief ” and the use 
itself of this term as a universal descriptive category, however, raise considerable 
problems. Moreover, of the pair “worship/belief,” which is the more important 
Editor’s Note from Original Translation: The reader should be aware that the original 
Italian text speaks of “credenze e culti,” which we have chosen to translate as “belief 
and worship,” because the English word “worship” has a wider usage than “cult” and 
does not have the pejorative connotation that “cult” sometimes acquires. We have 
also chosen to render the word “belief ” in the singular for the title, since that signals 
a more abstract discussion of the notion ( Janet Hoskins, editor).
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and unifying term? Is worship an aspect of belief, or is belief an aspect of wor-
ship? We will begin by examining the question of the legitimacy of the term 
“belief.”
THE CATEGORY “BELIEF”
This problem has recently been addressed by two scholars, W. C. Smith (1979) 
and Rodney Needham (1972). W. C. Smith’s thesis can be summarized as fol-
lows: of the two principal meanings of belief, that is, “assent to propositions” and 
“faith,” only the latter is universally applicable to religious phenomena. Smith 
maintains in fact that it is improper to use “belief ” as a synonym for “faith”: 
in our modern culture the true meaning of “belief ” is a mental state of assent, 
which lacks certainty, and is even doubtful, about propositions. Inversely, it is 
erroneous to consider faith as a species of superbelief, that is, Thomistically, 
as an essentially cognitive power that allows people to believe in propositions 
which seem incredible to natural reason. “Faith” should be understood in the 
sense it carries in the Old and New Testaments, in the Koran and in Brahmanic 
literature, or in the Buddhist canon: as action and not as intellection, as an at-
titude (of reverence, acceptance, testimony, commitment, fidelity) toward the 
transcendent. Contrary to belief, this attitude does not even raise the issue of 
the reality of its object and for this reason it is incompatible with doubt. In sum, 
like the Arabic iman and the Hebrew he’min (from which our amen derives), 
“faith” means “saying yes,” responding affirmatively to a divine offer, to a revela-
tion upon which the intellect never dwells because it never casts the revelation 
in doubt.
W. C. Smith is certainly right in emphasizing (as Fustel de Coulanges and 
especially William Robertson Smith had before him) that the modem West-
ern tendency to reduce religion to belief in certain propositions is completely 
exceptional. This tendency has become stronger in modern times owing to the 
hegemony of scientific rationalism, but it began to manifest itself as soon as 
Greek philosophy took hold of Christianity and converted it, so to speak, to 
itself. Quite early on, Christianity—in contrast with all other organized reli-
gions (and a fortiori with those not organized)—insisted on the necessity that 
believers adhere to a creed and maintain orthodoxy, which was judged to be 
more important than “orthopraxis.” This tendency reached its peak in Thomis-
tic philosophy in which scientia is superior to fides, at least from the subjective 
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point of view (Summa Theologica, II–I, 67, 3 ad 1), and in which fides itself is 
defined as “cognoscitivus habitus” (Summa Theologica, II–II, 1, 1) or “habitus men-
tis . . . aciens intellectum assentire non apparentibus” (Summa Theologica, II–II, 4,1). 
We can therefore concede to W. C. Smith that the centrality that belief (in its 
intellectual, propositional dimension) has assumed in the Western religious tra-
dition makes us risk thinking that adherence to a system of beliefs (instead of, 
for example, a system of laws, as in Judaism and Islam, or a ritual system, as in 
Hinduism and in Greek and Roman religions) may have the same importance 
in all religions. But recognizing this fact does not mean accepting the confusion 
that W. C. Smith creates between “absence of creed” and “absence of belief,” nor 
his thesis of a radical separation, indeed incompatibility, between “faith” and 
“belief ” (that is, between the two meanings of the word “belief ” as commonly 
understood). 
In reality, faith in the sense of acceptance, fidelity, commitment—we could 
say, in a word, “subjection”—as found in the Koran or in the Bible, presupposes 
belief in certain propositions. For instance, what meaning would a relationship 
of subjection to God have if God were not explicitly conceived of as a lord and 
master who requires, like all lords and masters, precisely subjection and fidelity? 
It is therefore clear that, far from being a primary attitude, and independently 
of belief, as W. C. Smith maintains, the faith of the Koran and of the Bible 
is the correlate of beliefs relating to the properties of God. And it is precisely 
because the belief exists that God is a “lord” that the necessity of accepting him 
and being faithful to him are emphasized, rather than the necessity of knowing 
him in an intellectually correct way. W. C. Smith himself is forced to admit that 
faith presupposes certain notions; but he maintains that these notions should 
not be considered beliefs, either because they are considered secure knowledge, 
or because they are not conscious. The first thesis is only valid if one agrees with 
Plato’s contrast (Republic, books V–VII) between belief as opinion, character-
ized by doubt, and knowledge, characterized by certainty. Such a contrast can 
certainly be found in the Koran, but this proves only that in the language of that 
book, the cognitive relationship with God cannot be designated with the word 
zanna (“belief ” in the sense of “opinion,” “knowledge whose truth is in doubt”), 
and does not prove that our term “belief ” (in the sense of “thing held to be true”) 
is not applicable to that relationship. Mistakenly, W. C. Smith gives our term a 
narrower meaning than that which it in effect has: so doing, he ignores the fact 
that the term covers the entire spectrum from “subjective certainty” to “doubtful 
assent.” As for his other thesis, according to which no unconscious adherence to 
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a notion can be defined as “belief,” it slights the difficulty of tracing a clear bor-
der between reflexive and unreflexive representations (which many, moreover, 
put in the category of belief; see Hampshire 1983: 150), and therefore between 
propositional and non-propositional meaning. In practice, Smith arbitrarily as-
similates “belief ” to “creed.”
He rightly insists on the fact that Islamic, Biblical, or Brahmanic faith is 
more performative than cognitive, but he seems to believe, wrongly, that the 
performative aspect is incompatible with the declarative one (see Austin 1975). 
This prevents him from recognizing not only the intellectual aspect of “faith,” 
but also the pragmatic, performative aspect of belief. In effect, he does not 
see that, by making belief propositional—sincere and convinced adherence to 
a creed—the principal criterion of membership in a Church, post-ancient or 
modern Christianity has given belief an illocutionary dimension, not a propo-
sitional one. This dimension is particularly evident in the conventional, public 
expression of belief that is required in rites of passage and aggregation, such as 
baptism, confirmation, and so forth, or in rites of abjuration forced on heretics. 
All this indicates that the external but also internal expression of belief in a 
proposition is, in Christianity, an actual act of worship, with illocutionary effects.
W. C. Smith also maintains that while religious beliefs vary widely from 
religion to religion, their notions of faith are extraordinarily similar. This would 
demonstrate that they all reflect a single, identical reality, the reality, that is, of 
faith. Not belief, but faith would thus be the appropriate category with which 
to define and understand the religious phenomenon in its universality. But 
W. C. Smith characterizes faith in, as usual, an extremely vague and ethno-
centric way, especially because he turns the phenomenon into a fundamentally 
personal fact. According to him, the institutional and intellectual aspect of all 
religions is none other than a “manifestation” of personal faith, or furnishes faith 
with the context and language in which it can express itself. But it is sufficient 
to know religious practices first-hand, especially in non-scriptural religions, to 
realize that things are much different than Smith maintains, using exclusively 
textual forms of knowledge as his guide. 
The majority of the faithful carries out rites and follows religious laws be-
cause, they say, it has always been done so, because it has been so for as long 
as the world has been the world (namely because religion is an institutional, 
traditional matter), not because they feel moved by the “faith” described by 
W. C. Smith. And it would be ingenuous not to recognize that, even in the 
religions that give central importance to faith, this faith is acquired as a habitus 
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and not as a spontaneous tendency, a natural property immediately available to 
the individual.
Needham (1972) arrives at conclusions that are more extreme than Smith’s. 
According to him, the word “belief ” does not designate an objectively identifi-
able mental state. On the contrary, the idea of this state would be the reifica-
tion of a use that is almost exclusively limited to modern European languages. 
Needham arrives at this conclusion because no precise empiric criteria exist 
with which to recognize a distinct mental state that may be called “belief.” In 
fact, this supposed mental state is not shown by somatic signs like those that al-
low the identification of rage, joy, anguish, and so on. Moreover, belief is not one 
of those phenomena whose universality can be deduced a priori from the fact 
that they are necessary for every possible social form. Not being able to demon-
strate either a priori or a posteriori that belief is a real characteristic of human 
experience, nothing remains, Needham holds, but to consider it as a flatus vocis, 
valid only inasmuch as it is a communicative convention of certain languages.
Let us take, for instance, the pairs of expressions “I believe in God” / “I do 
not believe in God,” “I believe what he says” / “I do not believe what he says,” 
“I believe he will come for tea” / “I do not believe he will come for the tea.” 
Needham (1972: 121–122) asserts that these pairs have only their grammatical 
form in common and correspond neither to a class in the Aristotelian sense nor 
to a “family” of phenomena in the Wittgensteinian sense (see 1953). One could 
object however that they do in fact share a common element: the credit granted 
or not granted to a person (God, the person who promised to come to have tea, 
the person who says something to me) and, additionally or alternatively, the 
credit granted or denied by an assertion (“God exists,” “he is worthy of faith,” 
“I will come for the tea”). Let us observe moreover that the presence or absence 
of this “credit” is not deduced from its linguistic expression, but from the fact 
that the speaker is ready to act in conformity with what he or she says: ready to 
prepare tea for someone, to follow the dictates of divine law, and so forth. The 
true criterion for identifying belief is not therefore linguistic, but pragmatic. It 
is thus not with arguments based on analysis of linguistic expressions that one 
can prove that “belief ” is a mere flatus vocis, a breath of air.
Clearly, one cannot automatically deduce from the fact that a person carries 
out the rituals prescribed for the cult of a god that this person believes in that 
god. In order to explain ritual behaviors or any other behavior it is not neces-
sary to invoke a specific belief. It suffices to presuppose that the behaviors are 
traditional ones and that the idea of questioning them does not even arise, or 
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is inhibited by fear of a social sanction. But this reasoning does not at all prove 
that there exists no belief which is the correlate of those behaviors, much less 
that it is useless or erroneous to invoke the notion of belief in the description 
of those behaviors. Indeed, one can carry out a rite without believing in the god 
to whom it is directed, but not without believing in the value of following the 
tradition that demands the rite’s performance, or in the value of avoiding “scan-
dal,” and so forth. Every action, from this point of view, presupposes a “belief,” 
that is, subjective adherence of some sort, some sort of personal reckoning on 
the part of the one who acts.
In conclusion, only in strongly individualistic cultures like ours is there in-
sistence on the obligation to make explicit those beliefs on the basis of which we 
act and to believe in the propositions handed down by tradition or sanctioned 
by an organization (the Church, but also the party, the State, the military, etc.). 
In most societies, individual adherence to the collective patrimony of ideas is 
not obligatory and is not considered necessary to the functioning of the ritual 
system. It is therefore not legitimate to assume that these ideas are also, neces-
sarily, “beliefs” sensu stricto. But neither is it legitimate to infer from that that 
they are never such or, worse, that the mental state “belief ” does not exist and 
is only an arbitrary linguistic usage of Western scholars. On the contrary, the 
ethnographic experience—that is, in-depth and continued contact with people 
and situations in cultures different from our own—teaches us that people gener-
ally believe that is, they have faith, albeit sometimes with a certain ambivalence, 
both in fundamental ideas of their culture and in persons (gods, priests, parents, 
tutors) from whom these ideas come and who are their guarantors. These two 
forms of faith are inseparable in that they are the two faces of the communica-
tive process of which communal life consists. It is therefore legitimate to use 
the notion of belief as a universal category, keeping in mind, however, that the 
strict sense of belief as assent to propositions does not cover the whole field of 
religious meanings.
INTELLECT AND SYMBOL
What are the distinctive features of religious beliefs, that is, of those beliefs that 
are related to worship? This question generally receives two types of answers. 
According to some, religious representations are born of the same rational im-
pulse that is found at the roots of both science and common sense: the impulse 
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to explain events, to control them, and to render them predictable. From this 
point of view, religious beliefs form the explicative theories of traditional cul-
tures, and ritual activities provide the practical application of those beliefs. Ac-
cording to others, religious representations and actions have motivations en-
tirely different from those of science or common sense: they should instead be 
related to artistic expression and communication or to moral phenomena (in a 
broad sense), whose value is based on their social and psychological effects, not 
on their explicative power. The first group of answers goes by the name of “intel-
lectualist theory,” the second by that of “symbolist theory” (see Skorupski 1976).
The first and most famous formulation of intellectualist theory is indebted 
to E. B. Tylor (1871), who asserts that magical and religious beliefs differ from 
one another and from science not because they reflect different forms of thought 
(as Lévy-Bruhl will maintain), but because their premises, and therefore their 
content, are different. These differences are in turn due to differences in the con-
crete possibilities of observation and inquiry, as well as to differences of interest. 
What strikes and therefore interests primitive man most deeply, according to 
Tylor, are two phenomena: the contrast between life and death, and the contrast 
between dream-states and waking. The fact that absent people may be dreamt 
of because they are distant or dead suggests that every person, and by extension 
every living being, possesses a spiritual double, capable of separating itself from 
the body and outliving it. From this stems the belief in spiritual beings, which 
offers the possibility of explaining not only dreams and the difference between 
a living body (inhabited by the spirit) and a dead body, but also all the manifest 
phenomena that are inexplicable in the empirical terms of common sense.
The thesis that systems of religious belief are just theories which, introduc-
ing “invisible” entities, help overcome the limitations on possibilities of ex-
planation offered by observation and common sense is the cornerstone of the 
sophisticated reformulation of intellectualist theory furnished by Robin Horton 
([1967] 1970). According to Horton, differences between the intellectual pro-
cedures of modern science and those of traditional religious thought are in large 
part “idiomatic,” not substantial, and therefore more apparent than real. It is 
not possible to discuss here all eight of the characteristics which, according to 
Horton, religious theories and scientific theories share. It will suffice to hint 
at a few. He maintains, for instance, that religious explanations, precisely like 
scientific ones, try to make diversity into unity, complexity into simplicity, dis-
order into order, anomaly into regularity. These reductions are made possible in 
both intellectual activities by Correspondence-Rules which make it possible to 
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translate events that seem like ordinary experience into events within a theo-
retical schema. For example, an increase in temperature is translated into an 
increase in the movement of molecules. Analogously, an illness is translated into 
a divine punishment in order to explain it and act on it. “God” is therefore a 
principle of explanation like the “molecule”: they differ only in that the former 
is a personal entity while the latter is impersonal.
This argument and others of Horton’s are valid only insofar as they recog-
nize the obvious fact that all manifestations of intellectual activity have certain 
formal properties in common. To think undoubtedly means to reduce the com-
plex to the simple, the multiple to the one, and so forth. But contrary to what 
Horton claims, these generic properties of thought are at too general a level to 
explain the characteristics of religious belief. Let us give an example. Lévy-Bruhl 
(1910) maintains that religious beliefs have a characteristic that, from the point 
of view of our logic, represents a paradox: a thing can be simultaneously identi-
cal to itself and identical to a completely different thing. According to Horton, 
these paradoxes are analogous to those produced by the Correspondence-Rules 
between theory and experience. The solution to the paradox, in science as in 
religion, lies in recognizing that “the ‘is’ of Correspondence-Rule statements is 
neither the ‘is’ of identity nor the ‘is’ of class-membership. Rather, it stands for 
a unity in-duality uniquely characteristic of the relation between the world of 
commonsense and the world of theory” (Horton [1967] 1970: 133).
There is no doubt that some of the paradoxical cases pointed out by Lévy-
Bruhl can be explained in the way Horton proposes. But others cannot be 
because they entail identifications not between entities of different orders 
(observation and theory), but between entities of the same order, both of which 
are concrete. In such cases, the violation of the rule of non-contradiction seems 
to be due to the postulate according to which terms associated metonymically or 
metaphorically count as equivalents in ritual operations. For instance, the knife 
that has wounded is identical to itself but also to the wound that it inflicted, and 
the knife can thus be treated as the wound’s equivalent so as to sustain belief in 
the capacity of the rite to nullify the wound by destroying, let us suppose, the 
knife. This example also demonstrates that we cannot adequately account for 
beliefs by making them into simple theories: they are often intelligible only as 
justifications for ritual actions.
Furthermore, many representations do not have the goal of reducing the 
complexity and confusion of experience to the simplicity and clarity of theory, 
but on the contrary shroud social relations and certain phenomena in darkness 
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and mystery so as to legitimize them or protect them from criticism. Horton’s 
approach does not take into account this ideological, mystifying aspect of re-
ligious representations and actions. His approach overlooks moreover the fact 
that religious theories are not born, as are scientific ones, of a concern with sup-
plying a unitary explanation of natural phenomena in general. Their principal 
preoccupation is constituted by events of human interest and, more particularly, 
unusual or negative events like illnesses, misfortunes, and so on. This is one 
of the principal reasons why religious forces and powers are conceived of an-
thropomorphically and sociomorphically. As Bergson notes ([1932] 1974), the 
cause must be related to the effect, and hence must be human and social like 
the latter. Only when the theoretical interest goes beyond the immediate sphere 
of human events or human interest do we begin to invoke causes that are natu-
ral and impersonal like the effects they must explain. Horton instead provides 
an unconvincing explanation of the contrast between the personal character 
(spirits, divinities, etc.) of concepts in religious theories and their impersonal 
character (atoms, molecules, etc.) in scientific theories.
This contrast would be attributable to different experiences of what con-
stitutes order par excellence. In societies that produce religious theories, rela-
tionships among persons would appear ordered and predictable to the highest 
degree; therefore, in this case, the theoretical language would give preference 
to social metaphors, and the principles of explanation and conceptual order-
ing of nature would take a personal form. In societies that produce scientific 
theories, on the other hand, human relations would appear chaotic, and this 
would explain why the experience of order is linked primarily to things and not 
persons. But this explanation conflicts with that upheld by various scholars who 
have studied the passage from religious belief to science in the ancient world. 
Vernant (1969), for instance, has maintained that the social and spatial order of 
the Greek πόλις (which was certainly not paradise) provided the model for its 
mathematical cosmos. The transference of social ordering to nature can, on the 
other hand, be interpreted, in opposition to Horton, as proof that even in tra-
ditional societies it is nature that appears as the paradigm of order. Indeed, this 
naturalization or reification of social order has the effect of giving it an immuta-
ble and necessary aspect, which it would otherwise not have (see Weber [1922] 
1968). Whereas Horton sees a theoretical use of society to explain nature, we 
can then see a pragmatic use of nature to justify society.
As for the differences between systems of religious belief and modern sci-
ence, Horton explains them not in terms of content, but in terms of behavior 
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with respect to theories. The scientist’s attitude is “open” and critical, because 
he is conscious of alternative theories; the religious person’s attitude is instead 
“closed”: every challenge to established ideas is seen with horror, as a risk of 
chaos which produce profound anxiety. The religious person’s attitude would be 
the correlate of the absence of theoretical alternatives in traditional societies. 
Horton uses this to explain various aspects of the religious mentality: the magi-
cal attitude toward words (if there is not an awareness of the fact that the same 
objects have different names in different languages, people believe that words 
have an intrinsic link with that which they designate and may therefore be 
used to influence); the lack of reflexivity (and hence of disciplines like logic and 
philosophy); the tendency to rationalize, with ad hoc explanations, events that 
contradict a theory, instead of criticizing the theory and if necessary abandoning 
it, and so forth.
But even here Horton’s arguments are often less than convincing: for in-
stance, contrary to what he suggests, many traditional societies are multilingual 
and in any case aware of the existence of different languages; the magical use of 
language cannot therefore be explained by the lack of awareness of alternative 
designations of the same objects. Analogously, the very political and cultural 
fragmentation itself that is characteristic of traditional societies creates aware-
ness of alternative conceptions of the world, an awareness reinforced in many 
areas of the world by the secular presence of universalist religions like Islam, 
Buddhism, or Christianity. The same defensive attitude of the believer with re-
spect to theories is found, as Horton (1982) was forced to admit in flesh-and-
blood scientists, who are often quite different from the ideal scientists portrayed 
by the Popperian philosophy of which Horton is a follower. 
In conclusion, the intellectualist theory of religious belief has the merit of 
individuating in religious belief general properties of intellectual activity that 
are also found in science and a properly cosmological-explicative aspect which 
should not be underestimated. But the theory seems unable to account ade-
quately for the specific characteristics of religious belief and, even less, for those 
found in worship, which is reduced to activity of an instrumental, almost tech-
nological, sort.
Turning now to the second group of theories of worship and of religious 
belief, we should note that the “symbolist” position was initially formulated by 
W. R. Smith (1889) and especially by Durkheim and his school, who reclaimed, 
contrary to the intellectualism of Tylor and Frazer, the social—and thus the his-
torically determined—character of thought in general and of religious thought 
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in particular. Religious beliefs are social facts which have social motivations and 
cannot therefore be seen as simple theoretical constructions of “natural” reason 
which remains identical over time and is modified only by the quantity and the 
quality of available information.
In his first attempt to individuate the specific character of religious phenom-
ena, Durkheim (1899) defines them not on the basis of specific content or logic, 
but on the basis of the relationship that exists between religious phenomena and 
the individual. He defines them, that is, on the basis of their implicitly or explic-
itly obligatory character. Religious phenomena share this character with those 
juridical and ethical phenomena, but whereas the latter imply obligations only 
on the plane of behavior, the former also imply obligatory representations—be-
liefs. This definition is obviously debatable, because it is impossible to separate 
obligatory representation from obligatory actions in law and in ethics.
Durkheim ([1912] 1965) subsequently proposed a definition that takes into 
consideration the common denominator of all the contents of religious repre-
sentations: these contents concern the sphere of the sacred, that is, those things 
that seem eminently respectable and important to a society. But what is emi-
nently sacred and important for the members of the society if not the society it-
self ? From here stems his bold conclusion: it is not the literal, apparent meaning 
of religious beliefs that can explain their specific character, but their hidden and 
profound meaning, which relates to the society itself. Religious representations, 
whatever their form, personal or impersonal, natural or artificial, are allegories 
of the social world, its reified symbols, which allow its reproduction by acting 
powerfully on individual consciousnesses. This action is carried out predomi-
nantly in actions within the cult, that is, in rituals that inculcate beliefs and 
consolidate their force while at the same time reviving social forms and, more 
profoundly, the social bond itself.
Durkheim’s attempt to reduce all aspects of religious representations to a 
social content and in particular to social morphology is debatable (see Needham 
1963). This reduction is utterly useless for establishing the validity of the the-
ory’s principal point: that religious beliefs receive much of their force and their 
raison d’être from their social function. In order to explain this fact, it suffices to 
recognize that they are socially constitutive because socially shared. Durkheim’s 
theory that religious beliefs symbolize society is necessarily true only in the 
sense that there is a component of “self-referentiality” in every symbolic act. 
The force of these symbolic acts is the force of the community that shares them 
and imposes them on successive generations; it is the force itself of the act of 
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sharing, that actually constitutes society. It is therefore not surprising that sym-
bolic acts may evoke society. But this evocation must, paradoxically, be distorted, 
must become unrecognizable, because if the intersubjective act—which lies at 
the foundation of religious representations and, through them, of society as it is 
constituted—were perceived, the consequent recognition of the representations’ 
conventional character would render them vulnerable to criticism and would 
therefore undermine them. In order to conserve their constitutive force, social 
representations must remain indisputable, and therefore acquire the character of 
things: they must become, like them, unchangeable and transcendent with re-
spect to the subject. Fundamental social values and, in the final analysis, the very 
power of society to constitute these values and to constitute itself, are therefore 
reified and alienated.
Here Durkheim’s analysis extends those of Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, 
but like those, and like the “symbolist” positions in general, his analysis en-
counters a series of difficulties. Indeed, these analyses postulate a state of “false 
consciousness” which is utterly paradoxical: the true content of religious be-
liefs seems to need to be at one and the same time recognized (“symbolized”) 
and not recognized (“reified”) by consciousness. These analyses do not explain, 
however, how a thing can be at one and the same time recognized and missed; 
nor do they explain how it might be possible for analysis, using the fictitious 
form of representations, to arrive at the representations’ real content. Who 
guarantees that the analysis might not become arbitrary as soon as it goes 
beyond the literal content of the representations? Who guarantees that in-
stead of “real content,” the analyst not extract nothing but products of his own 
imagination?
Various solutions or remedies have been sought for these problems. 
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1952) and his followers, for instance, have attempted to 
avoid them by radically distinguishing, in contrast to Durkheim, function from 
signification. According to them, religious representations would have social 
effects but would not necessarily signify social realities. In any case, the thorny 
problem of meaning could be left aside because the true task in analyzing these 
representations would be to identify their function. But the difficulty of this 
convenient approach is that generally we cannot account for the function of 
representations without taking into consideration their content. In other words, 
the problem of symbolism, chased out through the door, returns through the 
window. Moreover, in the matter of signification (which Radcliffe-Brown links, 
without further elaboration to “cosmology”), literalism does not lead very far 
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from, or leads back to, the intellectualist position, since religious beliefs are pre-
sented superficially as explanations.
Other scholars think that it is necessary to confront head-on the issues con-
nected with symbolism and the mental states linked to it, despite all the difficul-
ties and risks they entail, In particular, it is a matter of recognizing the difference 
that exists between propositional and non-propositional forms of signification. 
The propositional forms are linked to the discursive, argumentative use of lan-
guage and are the correlate of consciousness. The non-propositional forms make 
up a much more vast and complex domain, principally connected with the use 
of visual, auditory, olfactory, and even gustatory symbols, which have as a corre-
late the unconscious or semi-conscious apprehension of signifying relations. As 
in language, signification here consists of a putting into relations, and therefore 
of the perception of equivalences and contrasts. But this is a matter of relations 
that are not codified in the same measure and in the same way as linguistic 
signs: in them analogic, and not digital, codes are dominant (see Bateson 1972; 
Barth 1975). The problem raised by these classes of signs is that it is not possible 
to analyze them in a properly “objective” way. In fact, part of their very nature is 
to make possible and even encourage an indefinite number of interpretations. 
The analyst thus ends up being implicated; and the process that allows an ana-
lyst to discriminate between his or her subjective reactions and those of the so-
cial group studied cannot be led back to methods reproducible at will. He or she 
can make recourse only to indirect proofs of the interpretations of these signs-
behaviors normally linked to them, social effects, associations of signs of one 
type with those of another type, and, more generally, the whole context. One 
thing is certain: in this field it is not the verbal exegesis offered by informants 
that can provide a secure guide to the effective meaning of signs that function 
analogically (or through other figures of rhetoric). In fact, there is a profound 
difference, and at times near incommunicability, between the propositional and 
non-propositional levels of signification. 
These developments lead to the criticism and modification on several points 
of the symbolist position in the form given it by Durkheim. The first of these 
points regards the radical contrast between collective and obligatory represen-
tations, which are, according to Durkheim, characteristic of religion, and the 
individual and optional representations, which would be characteristic of the 
profane sphere. How is it possible to distinguish clearly the public and conven-
tional meaning from the individual meaning in the inchoate and barely codified 
symbolism that is characteristic of a significant part of religious symbolism? 
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Where does public interpretation begin and private end? And is not the dis-
tinction itself deforming, beyond a certain point, if one of the fundamental 
conditions of the social efficacy of symbolism lies precisely in the various and 
indefinite character of its effects on individuals? For the same reason, how is it 
possible to leave analysis of the properly psychological aspect of symbolism out 
of analysis of its social aspect?
This last question leads to a more general objection to the excessive sociocen-
trism of the Durkheimian explanation of religion. Recognizing with Durkheim 
that the efficacy of beliefs and ritual actions has a social, conventional origin 
and, ultimately, that the sense of reality associated with these beliefs in con-
sciousness and actions has this same origin does not mean having to conclude, 
as he does, that their motivations and functions must be found exclusively in the 
logic of social functioning. It is not by chance that a significant number of reli-
gious theories attempt to explain, justify, and make tolerable (often creating the 
illusion of control) phenomena like death, illness, bad luck, and other impon-
derable elements of existence. It is misfortune, as everyone knows, that makes 
one religious. Religion does not console the suffering only under our skies. As 
Weber noted, one of the fundamental preoccupations of religion is theodicy. We 
must therefore recognize that religious belief also has its roots in defensive reac-
tions against phenomena of finiteness and suffering and, in particular, against 
the anxiety that they cause.
To this point of view, illustrated by such thinkers as Spinoza and Bergson, 
Freud and Malinowski, some object that it is not anxiety that produces religious 
beliefs, but religious beliefs that produce anxiety (see Radcliffe-Brown 1952). 
This is because, in creating positive and negative prescriptions, such religious 
beliefs simultaneously create the fear of violating them. This objection is based, 
however, on the confusion of two types of anxiety: the primary anxiety, which 
certain tendencies and practices make controllable and tolerable, and the sec-
ondary anxiety, much less severe, which is born from the fear of incurring super-
natural sanctions on those beliefs and practices. It should not be ruled out that 
sometimes the anxiety linked with transgression may be due to anticipation of 
a return to the primary anxiety. 
In short, there is not a radical contrast between sociology and psychology, 
nor between personal meaning and public meaning, but rather a movement of 
reciprocal determination. Without collective mediation, personal fantasies lack 
reality because they are incommunicable or, if they are communicable, they are 
not accepted as real. But, reciprocally, collective representations derive part of 
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their efficacy and persuasive force from their capacity to strike the most inti-
mate chords of individuals, to satisfy their desires in an imaginary form, to calm 
their fears, helping them in this way to live. Religion is thus not simply pre-
scriptive, a system of beliefs and obligatory practices: it is also, and above all, a 
system of communication, a place where motivations, fantasies, interpretations, 
and individual projects meet and are realized. Without the energy that these 
aspects provide the system, it could not exist; but without the system which 
realizes them socially, creating the context in which they can communicate with 
one another, they would not exist either.
RITUAL, WORSHIP, AND SACRED BEINGS
The communicative role of religion is realized above all in the system of prac-
tices in worship, not only because they provide the concrete contexts in which 
communication occurs, but also because they incorporate the implicit or un-
conscious notions that are not reduced nor even reducible to the propositional 
form of beliefs sensu stricto. A significant part of worship consists of rituals: but 
what is a “ritual”? The many uses of the term “ritual” can seemingly be grouped 
in two principal classes. The term refers, on the one hand, to formal behaviors, 
with communicative and operative ends; on the other hand, it refers to fictional 
equivalents of real actions. Examples of the first class of rituals are behaviors of 
courtesy, good manners, ceremonies of installation of political and religious au-
thorities, the ceremonial of the court, weddings, baptisms, and so forth; exam-
ples of the second class are the so-called “ritualizations” of aggressive behaviors, 
ritual revolts (quite common during New Year’s festivities, or when political and 
religious offices become vacant), and other imitations of ordinary or transgres-
sive behaviors. 
The principal trait common to both classes is evidently the symbolic char-
acter of the actions they include. But there are many other classes of symbolic 
actions: what justifies the association of these two classes? Fundamentally, their 
constitutive character: these symbolic actions—in contrast, for example, with ac-
tions that have an exclusively aesthetic character—are not limited to symboliz-
ing, but bring into existence what they symbolize, because it does not exist except 
symbolically. Let us consider, for example, a marriage ritual. This ritual consists of 
gestures and visual symbols, which represent the passage of a couple from an un-
married state to a conjugal state and the correlative transformations (of relations 
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between the two families, of the relationship of the bride and groom with other 
people, and so forth). And thus, by social convention this representation effec-
tively produces what it represents: the bride and groom become husband and 
wife, their families enter into a relationship of affinity, from now on the husband 
and wife cannot be courted, and so on. Analogously, the ritual use of language 
is performative: when a justice of the peace (or a priest) says, at the prescribed 
point in the marriage ritual, “I pronounce you husband and wife,” he brings into 
existence what he pronounces. The same thing happens when a judge says “the 
defendant is acquitted.” In these cases, saying is doing (see Austin 1962).
The constitutive character (see Kantorowicz 1946) or performative character 
as it is also called, is equally evident in rituals that provide the fictional equiva-
lent of a real behavior. A custom of the inhabitants of the Andaman islands 
furnishes an example of this type of ritual: when a group wants to make peace 
with an enemy group, it pretends to attack that group and dances, armed, a 
war dance, which ends only when every dancer has violently shaken, first from 
the front, then from behind, every member of the enemy group, which on this 
occasion remains completely passive (see Radcliffe-Brown 1922: 134–35). The 
representation of war here produces peace—that is, the opposite of what is rep-
resented. Symbolization is performative in this case too, but it becomes such 
through negation. The performative effect is obtained by putting the truly sym-
bolic character of the action at the forefront, that is, by emphasizing the fact that 
the symbol of something is different from the thing itself. The representation of 
war is a war that is no war; it is a pretend war. It can thus represent (and con-
ventionally produce) the transition from actual war to peace. In short, there are 
two ways to produce reality by conventional definitions, such as marriage, peace, 
and so forth, through entities which are themselves conventional as symbols: 
directly or inversely, by a direct affirmation or by a negation, either postulating 
that the symbol is identical to what it symbolizes (the representation of two 
people as husband and wife transforms them into husband and wife) or that the 
symbol is of a reality different from what it symbolizes, in effect, contrary to it.
Naturally these two procedures can be combined, and the above-mentioned 
Andaman ritual provides the proof of this. For while one of the two sides that 
carry out the ritual symbolizes peace through a negation of the conflict, the 
other side symbolizes peace by exaggerating its characteristics: it remains in fact 
completely passive. Analogously, in numerous rituals the social order is repro-
duced by combining its direct enunciation in an extreme (and hence “formal”) 
form with its indirect enunciation through a fictitious disorder a Saturnalia or 
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a carnival. The combination allows the ritual action to be given a dialectical 
form perfectly fitting to symbolize and produce the transformations that are the 
principal concern of all rituals. Indeed, as was noted long ago by Van Gennep 
([1909] 1960), the majority of rituals have to do with passages: from childhood 
to puberty or an adult state from an unmarried state to a married one, from life 
to death, from the status of a commoner to that of king or priest or knight, from 
the old year to the new, and so forth. 
Another common characteristic of all rituals is their fundamentally ludic na-
ture. That is, they feature actions that constitute an imaginary order, which exists 
in creative tension with the real order either because these actions represent a 
more ordered, quasi-utopistic form of the real order or because, on the contrary, 
they represent an alternative to it. Obviously, the first case corresponds to a con-
siderable portion of the rituals which consist of “formal” actions, that is, of ac-
tions which, in contrast to ordinary actions, make clear their form, communicate 
this form, and say: “look, we are acting according to the rules that constitute this 
action, and therefore it is valid.” Although these rules are first and foremost con-
stitutive of the characteristic order of the ritual, and as such are not necessarily 
applicable to ordinary actions as well, their apperception in the course of the rit-
ual has repercussions on daily life, since the ritual is also a model or a metaphor 
of the everyday world. For instance, rituals of coronation have their own rules, 
but they likewise represent the ideal relationships between king and subjects, 
between political and religious power, and so on, which should be found, if in a 
more diffuse and less ordered form, in everyday life. Analogously, a ritual such 
as the Catholic mass expresses ideal relationships between God and the faithful 
which it is difficult to find in daily life. The artificial order of the ritual is thus a 
“game,” a simulated event which makes it possible to strengthen consciousness 
of the forms and values that must (or should) guide ordinary actions. But on 
the other hand, the self-constitutive character of ritual forms allows them an 
opposite kind of functioning: the ritual can be a reward or a consolation for the 
chaos of ordinary life, to which ideal values cannot seem to be applied. Relations 
between the ideal order of the ritual and the order of everyday life are thus com-
plex and ambiguous, with aspects of contrast and aspects of agreement.
Even more complex and ambiguous are relations between ordinary life and 
those rituals which, inasmuch as they are fictitious imitations of prohibited 
behaviors, allow an imaginary satisfaction of the desire to transgress order as 
well as allowing the production of forms that are alternative to the order. These 
forms can in certain situations be adopted into everyday life: then the feast 
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becomes revolution. But ordinarily, the subversive character of these rituals is 
only fictitious: through them one pretends to invert, destroy, and contest the 
established order, but given that this is done as make-believe, nothing happens 
but to reestablish indirectly the order itself. In these rituals in any case, the same 
creative aspect of the game is more important than its role as a model, which 
instead dominates in “formal” rituals. 
These facts indicate that the ritual—beyond constituting specific situations 
and transformations by virtue of stipulations of an almost juridical character—is 
constitutive in a more general and profound sense. In the final analysis the ritual 
contributes to constituting the social community that performs it, to creating 
a communicative field, and more generally a relational field, among its par-
ticipants. This is particularly true for those societies in which the community 
reaches its greatest compass in the moment of the execution of rituals and does 
not exist beyond this execution. Moreover, whereas language constitutes the 
community by making it possible to communicate propositions, ritual consti-
tutes it, at a more profound level, by making possible a communication which 
for the most part is not propositional.
The ritual is not necessarily religious. It is only so when it is believed that the 
source and ultimate guarantee of its constitutive power are situated not in social 
convention, but in transcendent entities, personal or impersonal. The constitu-
tive effect of the ritual is then attributed to the intervention of these entities, 
which means that a religious ritual can be recognized by the fact that it always 
includes procedures for establishing proper relations with these entities. Why 
do a significant portion of rituals assume the character of worship? Why do the 
powers of social convention and human action in the rite become reified and 
personified? An adequate response to these questions can be given only by a 
theory of religious action, which cannot be elaborated here. But it is permissible 
to assume that belief in sacred entities as conditions for the efficacy of the ritual 
is due at least in part to the convergence of two facts (see Valeri 1985a).
1) The ritual is lived as an objective order, not constituted by any subject or by 
any empirical relationship since, ultimately, it is constitutive of everybody. 
Inasmuch as it is the ultimate author, the ritual must therefore remain with-
out author—a principle developed to its extreme consequences by Brah-
manic speculation, which holds the sacrificial ritual to be an objective order 
that embraces and constrains gods and men alike (see Levi 1898) or must 
have an author who is himself transcendental. In this, the situation of the 
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ritual is similar to that of language, that is, to the other institution that is 
highly transcendental because highly constitutive of society. It is not there-
fore by chance that many gods (beginning with Yahweh) are personifications 
of the power of the magic word—personifications, that is, of language and of 
rite at the same time.
2) Reflection leads to the abstraction of various types of authority, of various 
aspects of the constitutive power of ritual. These types are distinct from con-
crete ritual actions, but they preserve the objective character common to all 
of them. They thus appear transcendental, like the ritual itself. And since 
these types of authority distinguish types of actions, they are inevitably rep-
resented as actors—that is, they are personified. Personification is not how-
ever always present, nor is it present in equal measure in religious thought. 
Personal or not, these reified types participate in the constitutive character of 
ritual. In addition to their generically constitutive character, they have a spe-
cific one, with respect to the actions and relations of which they are models.
The gods and other sacred entities are, in short, objects of worship because they 
are its transcendental subjects. These subjects are the result of a process of ra-
tionalization and reflection, which explains why beliefs themselves which have 
a propositional form, may be found above all in theological discourse, whereas 
non-propositional forms of signification may abound in ritual action, which 
utilizes means that are non-discursive and more particularly musical, choreo-
graphic, gestural, and so forth—means that are by their nature rich with unre-
flective or unconscious associations.
Belief and ritual constitute, therefore, the two levels, in part complementary, 
in part antagonistic, of any system of worship. The level of belief represents the 
attempt to justify rationally the constitutive power of ritual, but this power is al-
ways richer than the belief and thus cannot be completely reduced to it. From this 
power of ritual springs the visceral anti-ritualism of religions that privilege belief, 
and its correlate, faith as an interior and subjective relationship with the divinity. 
FORMS OF WORSHIP AND BELIEF
Worship is therefore a process of communication between men and sacred enti-
ties which has constitutive, that is, conventional, effects. Naturally, it also has 
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non-conventional effects, but it is the conventional effects that distinguish wor-
ship from other types of action, since those non-conventional effects are com-
mon to all actions. The constitutive effects of worship involve both the relations 
between sacred entities and men (that is, between the objects and subjects of 
worship), and the status of each. In fact, it is only in and only through worship 
that the relationship between gods and men becomes a true relationship, that 
is, subject to rules and stipulations of an almost juridical nature (as with the 
famous “pact” between Yahweh and the Israelites). It is not by chance that law 
is often born of worship and that, as in ancient Rome, the juridical nature of 
the relations among men is the counterpart of the juridical nature of relations 
between men and their gods (see Dumézil 1970).
As for the constitutive effects of worship on those who participate in it as 
“subjects” or “objects,” it may suffice to mention the fact that everywhere gods 
need worship, honor, and even the life and energy with which human recogni-
tion provides them. Abandoned, deprived of worship, gods become insignificant 
and can even die. If instead they are objects of worship, they reward—or should 
reward—those who honor them by producing the requested corporal or social 
transformations. Explicitly or implicitly, the center of gravity of worship is al-
ways constituted by these transformations, and more generically by the desire 
for “salvation”—material or spiritual—of the human participants. These partici-
pants are often subdivided into two classes: those who commission a particular 
cultic event and the ritual specialists (priests, mediums, or shamans) who carry 
it out and function as intermediaries between the divinities and those who turn 
to them. Beyond those who directly commission the ritual, spectators or indirect 
beneficiaries also attend, providing the real audience.
Communication between gods and men in worship thus includes processes 
of communication among men: between commissioners of the ritual and ritual 
intermediaries, between ritual intermediaries and the audience, between com-
missioners of the ritual and the audience. Therefore, toward the goal of setting 
up a typology of worship phenomena, it is necessary to take into consideration 
not only their aims, the messages transmitted, and the modalities of their trans-
mission, but also the relations among the various interlocutors in the process 
of ritual communication so much the more since relations of co-variation exist 
among components of worship. For instance, when a god has a predominantly 
moral character, the preaching, that is, the direct teaching of the audience by 
the god through a human intermediary (whether priest or prophet) becomes a 
prevailing element of worship (see Weber [1922] 1968). This is due to the fact 
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that in such a case worship consists above all in paying homage to the god by 
obeying his moral imperatives, and it is thus necessary that these imperatives be 
reaffirmed and the audience be persuaded to follow them. The ritual intermedi-
ary is then more spokesperson of the god to the audience than spokesperson of 
the audience to the god. In extreme cases, there are forms of worship in which 
one ceases to ask anything of the god explicitly and leaves the initiative to con-
cede or not concede what the god, in his omniscience, knows is desired.
But it is only in the worship of impersonal entities or personified abstrac-
tions like the homeland, the nation, the flag—which have as their explicit aim 
the reconstruction of corresponding social groups—that communication with 
the audience predominates over communication with the sacred entity, to which 
one often turns with non-verbal signs precisely because this entity is not con-
ceived as an actual person. Instead, where the god provides above all a guarantee 
of the “magical” efficacy of ritual operations, emphasis is put on communication 
with him rather than with the audience. The ritual intermediaries also turn, al-
beit indirectly, to the human spectators when these spectators are able to judge 
the correctness of the procedures put in play in order to communicate with the 
god. But often the knowledge that allows evaluation of these procedures is ac-
cessible only to ritual intermediaries, either because it is a privilege of theirs or 
because it is too difficult (the use, for instance, of special languages—like San-
skrit, Pali, Latin, Slavonic, classical Arabic, and so forth—is frequent in wor-
ship). However, even when excluded from more complex (particularly verbal) 
aspects of communication with the god, the audience still always remains a 
necessary interlocutor: it must at least be made to know that the rite is being 
carried out. In this sense, every act of communication between gods and men 
presupposes at least implicitly an act of communication among men.
There are two possible aims in communication with sacred beings: either to 
produce a conjunction between them and a human situation or, on the contrary, 
a separation. Depending on the case, and particularly on the points of view, the 
proximity of sacred powers can in fact be either beneficent or maleficent. Let 
us consider for instance the case of an ordinary man who mistakenly enters a 
place in which a god is present. He becomes contaminated by divine power and 
consequently he risks contaminating other people and things as well. This forces 
him to interrupt his ordinary activities and relationships. So that he may regain 
these, he needs to persuade or force the god to distance himself from him. The 
ritual acts that have this goal are called rites of desacralization. We speak of rites 
of purification when the conjunction with the sacred power is supposed to have 
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as an effect a state of impurity. Finally, rites of exorcism distance those powers 
conceived as intrinsically maleficent, such as demons, spirits of the dead, and so 
forth. While these ritual acts remedy the maleficent connections, others—that 
is, ritual proscriptions or taboos—prevent them by signaling the incompatibility 
among different classes of beings and in particular between sacred beings and 
profane beings. 
Ordinarily, contact with sacred entities is dangerous and is therefore avoid-
ed, except by those people—priests or ascetics—who consecrate themselves 
permanently to the god, simultaneously separating themselves, at least in part, 
from the social world. But in moments that are rendered extraordinary by cir-
cumstances or by the calendar, such contact is instead actively sought. At these 
times, one turns to divinities, seeking to persuade or force them to intervene in 
theirs spheres of competence, but then sending them away when the desired 
effects have been obtained. 
The means employed to distance the gods or bring them near are substan-
tially the same: they consist of operations effected on or with verbal and non-
verbal signs. Verbal operations take the form of prayers, orders, exhortations, 
and so forth. Non-verbal operations are the most rich and complex: they utilize 
dances, musical pieces, perfumed or colored substances, sacred images (statues, 
paintings, etc.), gifts, immolations, and so forth. Some of these means serve to 
influence only the gods, others only the human participants, but most influ-
ence both. In effect, what influences men also influences divinities conceived 
anthropomorphically. We should note that the transformations of the human 
participants’ mental and physiological state are not a mere side effect of the use 
of communicative means applied exclusively to transform the state and disposi-
tion of the gods, but are explicitly recognized conditions of the efficacy of the 
ritual. The participants must indeed transform themselves in order to enter into 
contact with the god by purifying themselves, exciting themselves (sometimes 
with drugs), or by fasting and practicing other privations that modify their or-
dinary mental state. Men and gods can therefore encounter each other only 
by converging. Rites of worship thus have the task of provoking a complex of 
sensations and associations in which the person encounters, in the alteration of 
his or her experience, the divine modifier.
By combining the aims of worship with the verbal and non-verbal means 
that it employs, scholars have created typologies such as “prayer,” “sacrifice,” “vo-
tive offering,” “libation,” “deification,” “inspiration” (that is, the possession of a 
human intermediary by a spirit or god), and so forth. The use of these terms 
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creates the risk of reification: sacrifice or prayer are discussed, without taking 
account of the fact that these terms can be utilized only to refer to phases or 
aspects of an always-complex process of communication between men and gods 
and at the same time between men and men. For instance, it is rare for there to 
be a sacrifice without prayer, that is, without a verbal rite specifying the reasons 
for the manual rite, as well as the commissioners of the rite and those to whom 
it is addressed. Prayer in a reciprocal way almost always involves non-verbal 
correlates (a respectful attitude, the use of special gestures or garments, offer-
ings, and so forth). And analogously, sacrifice almost always involves a divining 
aspect, since the sacrificial body (from whose bowels or from whose behavior 
the will of the god, or his answer to a problem, is deduced) is the meeting-point 
between human messages and divine messages. This conjunction is also realized 
by the bodies of the medium and of the shaman: from this point of view, sacrifi-
cial rites and rites of possession can appear equivalent and be used in alternation 
or in combination.
Notions such as sacrifice, possession, and deification are therefore useful 
only insofar as they define certain positions in a communicative structure, in 
the circulation of constitutive messages (and therefore also of forces) among the 
various human and divine participants. This structure forms the only true unity 
in the study of worship. Reciprocally, it is in this structure, which is realized 
concretely in every culture and every situation, that these terms must find their 
definition. The same is true for the definition of human and divine participants. 
The former, as we have seen, can be subdivided into those commissioners of the 
ritual, intermediaries, and audience, depending on the position they assume in 
the process of communication within worship. The commissioner provides the 
motivation for the process and the material means to realize it (but is at times 
helped by those who are invited); intermediaries provide their knowledge and 
even their bodies (which can act—in a complementary or redundant way with 
respect to the bodies of sacrificial victims and with respect to material objects 
such as images or fetishes—as a meeting-point between human and divine); the 
audience acts as witness and contributes to rendering the ritual event socially 
efficacious, spreading word of its success and perpetuating its memory.
The divine participants in ritual can be classified on the basis of numerous 
parameters, deducible from the acts in which they appear, as well as from the 
beliefs of which they can be, as we have seen, the explicit object. For instance, 
sacred beings can be classified in terms of the function of the social units that 
worship them. Thus various deities—domestic deities, deities of clans, ethnic or 
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state deities, deities of corporations, of localities, etc.—are distinguished from 
one another. And it is immediately evident that a certain solidarity and thus 
analogy exists between the human and divine interlocutors in worship: the god 
(or saint) of the artisans is himself an artisan, the god of a lineage is often an 
ancestor, the god of a domestic group is often a personification of the hearth, 
and so forth. It is not uncommon, moreover, for every individual to have a deity 
which is exclusively his, a δαίµων that he alone may worship, which guarantees 
by this his individual existence.
In addition to their relationships with the human participants in worship, 
sacred entities are defined by their relationships with the material world, that is, 
by their tangible manifestations. Deities are always conceived anthropomorphi-
cally in the sense that they respond to words, they have a will, they have human 
desires and needs, and they have a sex (or they combine the two sexes). It is not 
therefore by chance that in places of worship, deities may often be represented 
by anthropomorphic images and anthropomorphic elements, and even by men 
in whom they are incarnated or whom they enter for some period of time. Such 
manifestations make the similarity between gods and men tangible and thus 
legitimize the use of purely human means (language, gifts, and so forth) to 
communicate with gods and influence them. But the gods are not only human 
(and therefore fundamentally comprehensible): they are also transcendent with 
respect to the human, and from this point of view they are not human. This 
is one of the reasons for which non-anthropomorphic manifestations of the 
gods—as mountains, animals, plants, substances, and, at times, their combina-
tion in “fetishes”—are often important in worship. The use of “natural” mani-
festations of the gods, insofar as it reflects the alterity and opacity of the divine, 
is thus related, by a paradox that is only seemingly so, to the radical prohibition 
on images professed by Islam, Judaism, and by some forms of Protestantism.
In conclusion, all theological typologies are encompassed by a fundamental 
contrast: the contrast between polytheism and monotheism. Polytheism seems 
to be the correlate of forms of social and conceptual consolidation which accen-
tuate the combination and mediation of heterogeneous principles rather than 
the use of a homogenized hierarchical structure. The tendency towards hierar-
chical homogenization is manifested instead in henotheism (that is, in the cult 
of a single god whose existence does not exclude that of other gods, which are 
often reduced to its manifestations: see Evans-Pritchard 1956; Horton [1967] 
1970) and even more so in monotheism. Insofar as it puts a society of gods 
into relation with a society of men, polytheism always presupposes that the 
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relationship of the individual with the gods will be socially mediated. Monothe-
ism, to the contrary, favors a personal relationship (which often escapes social 
control as well as “external”—that is, public and formalized—forms of worship) 
between the human individual and a god who is conceived as a superindividual: 
endowed with free will, autonomous, containing the principle of his existence 
within himself, and so forth. Naturally, between these two tendential extremes 
(represented, let us say, by the polytheism of West Africa and the monotheism 
of Protestant Europe), a whole range of complex interrelations develops among 





Translated from the Italian by Nicholas DeMaria Harney
In contemporary sociology, the word “caste” means two different things: a rigid 
form of class or the component unit of a “caste system” that exists only in Indian 
society.1
For some scholars the first meaning covers all rigid forms of inequality and 
social “stratification”; for others, the stratification of classes, even if rigid, is a 
phenomenon different than the hierarchy established by castes. The latter is not 
reducible to mere inequality and the lack of vertical mobility but involves groups 
of status whose ritual and economic functions are related systematically and 
consciously justified by an ideology that subordinates the parts to the whole.
The choice to use an expansive or narrow concept of caste puts into play 
some fundamental problems in sociology.
CASTE: A CULTURAL OR STRUCTURAL PHENOMENON?
The comparative character of sociology justifies the use of the “expansive” con-
cept of caste for some scholars (F. G. Bailey, G. D. Berreman, Fredrick Barth). 
The concepts of this science must have a universal applicability, not just regional 
applications. The specific knowledge of a society or civilization is considered 
1. The translator thanks Mario Motti for his advice on translation.
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to be cultural facts and these facts do not belong to social structure. The so-
ciologist from a comparative standpoint is dealing only with social structure; 
therefore the concepts he employs must be independent of cultural particularity 
(Berreman 1967: 45).
From here arises the dilemma: Is caste a phenomenon of Indian culture or a 
more general phenomenon of social structure?
Ignoring the ideology of caste and arbitrarily abstracting some traits of the 
social organization, these scholars do not hesitate to lean toward the second 
alternative. According to them, everything in the Indian caste system is spe-
cific to Indian civilization; it’s “cultural” (and therefore unimportant) and not 
“structural.”
One could object to this point of view on the grounds that the ideology is 
not only the culturally variable rationalization of the “social structure” but an 
integral part of the latter and cannot be arbitrarily separated from it. The com-
parative sociologist claims to access a point of view totally free from ideological 
presuppositions. But, by ignoring the ideologies and the values of the societies 
studied, one is likely to substitute them with one’s own ideology and values.
As we shall see, the method that isolates “economic” and “social” structures 
and gives them privileged explanatory power depends on an ideology that con-
siders the economic sphere as dominant in every society. But to say that the 
economic and social structures, artificially isolated from their ideological con-
text, are intelligible “objectively,” means to attribute to our “economistic” values 
a universal applicability and thus project our modern society on the society 
of caste. It means, moreover, considering the ideology—i.e., the values on the 
basis of which the humans act within a caste—not as social facts but as illusions 
of conscience or even rationalizations.
For this reason, we believe the dualism between cultural and structural is 
false.
CASTE AS THE LIMIT OF CLASS
The ambiguity of the modern definitions of caste are already found in Max 
Weber, who considers it, as noted by E. R. Leach (1960: 1–2), both as a cul-
tural phenomenon and as a structural phenomenon, and therefore fails to real-
ize what is particularly Indian in this institution. Weber (1922) has, however, 
recognized the essential distinction in India between “class” and “status group” 
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(Stand), between “economy” and “honor,” but for him the caste system is a result 
of a conjunction between “status groups” and “ethnic communities.” The lower 
status groups are tolerated because they are indispensable on the economic level. 
Caste society seems therefore fundamentally heterogeneous. But, while stating 
that the conjunction between status and ethnic group constitutes a Gemeinschaft, 
a political “community,” Weber does not explain its systematic organization and 
juxtaposes the ethnic aspect—that of the division of labor and that of the hier-
archy—thus superimposing a European and “historical” point of view (different 
ethnic origin of various castes) on the indigenous and sociological one.
For Weber, moreover, the difference between Stand and caste depends only 
on a culturally different rationalization of the social structure: a status group is 
a caste when its separation from other status groups is guaranteed not so much 
by laws and conventions, as by ritual rules that relate to contact and impurities 
(cf. Dumont 1966: 308).
The scholar who has formulated in the most clear way the definition of 
caste as a special form of social class is A. L. Kroeber, for whom caste “at least 
potentially, are present in every society. However, caste differ from social classes 
for the fact that they emerged in social conscience to such a point that custom 
and the law try to separate them from each other in a rigid and permanent 
manner” (Kroeber 1930: 254). Kroeber partially returns to Weber’s definition 
when he adds that a caste is “an endogamous and hereditary subdivision of an 
ethnic unit occupying a position of superior or inferior rank, or social esteem, 
in comparison with other such subdivisions” (1930: 254). However, he does not 
distinguish, as Weber does, between status and class. Accepted by W. L. Warner 
and his successors, Kroeber’s definition is the basis for those who believe that 
caste is, ultimately, a rigid form of class.
The inability to render an account of what is characteristic of the concept 
of caste depends ultimately on a quite vague definition of class (see Leach 
1967: 5–16). To Berreman, for example, class systems “define the rank of their 
members according to their individual attributes and behaviors” (1968: 334). 
Caste is instead an institution that classifies people as a function of their group 
membership ascribed by birth—i.e., (as in the definition of Kroeber) in heredi-
tary groups. But it is difficult to understand the difference between a society of 
classes and a caste-based society, when Berreman says, “That a caste system is a 
hierarchy implies that it is a system of differential evaluation, differential power 
and rewards and differential association; in short, a system of institutionalized 
inequality” (1968: 334). The hierarchy of castes does not therefore appear to 
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be very different from class inequality. The difference would not be in the rela-
tions between groups, which would appear to be of the same nature in the two 
types of societies but rather in the recruitment of the members of these groups. 
Membership in a caste is inherited, in a class it is granted to members for their 
individual attributes and merits.
On the contrary, the opposition between caste (class without vertical mo-
bility) and a true class, characterized by this mobility, allowed several scholars 
to identify the rigid system of race relations in the South of the United States 
with the Indian caste system because both were characterized by the inability 
of the groups to come into contact through marriage or commensality, etc. (see 
Warner and Davis 1939: 219–45).
But is it sufficient to identify a  set of particular traits (endogamy, taboo 
of commensality, etc.) to characterize the identity of two social systems? The 
Indian caste system is precisely that, a system, and as such must be compared 
with other systems (see Dumont 1966: 311). The same traits can have opposite 
functions in two different systems. In addition, the integrity of an indigenous 
social system, its ideological legitimacy, must be considered as an element of 
comparison. In the racial system in the Southern United States, black people 
do not consider that system to be legitimate; on the contrary they fight against 
it. In India, the traditional relationship between  lower and higher individuals 
does not necessarily imply an inequality of power that coincides with their hier-
archical difference; furthermore, both share values and a common vision of the 
caste system that justifies in their eyes their relative position. Their relationships 
change orientation only when, with the modern transformation of caste, the 
global system is questioned. Status competition then tends to become class con-
flict, but only because the caste system itself has become contested. The lower 
castes challenge not so much the higher castes but the caste system itself (see 
Leach 1960: 6–7).
THE CASTES AND ETHNICALLY PLURALIST SYSTEMS
While maintaining that the caste system does not differ from a system of social 
stratification, Berreman associates it with “ethnic and cultural pluralism.” Caste 
society would be a system of  integration among different ethnic groups that 
would preserve their difference, while they would lose that difference within 
a system of classes. In this way, Berreman recalls one of the components of 
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Weber’s definition, developing a more refined theory of cultural communica-
tion: the borders between castes prevent cultural circulation, and therefore each 
caste or each ethnic group would have its own institutions, its own culture, or its 
own particular way of interpreting the same culture.
On the other hand, the absence of common values would characterize both 
the “pluralist” society and the caste society: this would mean that these socie-
ties must be held together by power more than consensus. Therefore, on the 
one hand, these societies integrate distinct groups without modifying them 
culturally and without incorporating them, and indeed they work to build in-
stitutional and cultural frontiers to perpetuate the differences, specifically those 
related to occupational specialization; on the other hand, the dominant group 
maintains the system by means of exerting coercion. Thus, more than caste in-
terdependence, cultural and institutional independence should be emphasized, 
as well as the political dependency of lower castes on higher castes (Berreman 
1968: 333–36).
Two principles are therefore essential to define a caste system, according to 
this theory: 1) all caste systems are kept together by the relative power of each 
caste and by the fact that the sanctions are held in the power of the dominant 
group. This is due to the cultural, ideological, and institutional heterogeneity of 
the castes; 2) in caste societies roles are undifferentiated or “added together.”
Class systems would instead be characterized more by consensus than by the 
power of a dominant class, and the roles would be distinct.
In regard to the first principle, if it is true that power relations are important 
in a caste system, it is also true that hierarchical relationships are conceptually 
(and largely also factually) distinct from relations of power. Hierarchy is instead 
ignored by the theory we described, and it is considered incomprehensible or 
nonexistent as an autonomous principle. The caste system thus appears simply 
as a perversion of the system of classes.
With regard to the principle of status summation, it is precisely the corollary 
of the preceding principle and affirms that the hierarchical relationships coin-
cide with those of power. Those who possess a high status from a ritual point of 
view tend to have at the same time high status from an economic, political, and 
social point of view. For Barth, this principle allows him to define a caste system 
“structurally,” “as a system of social stratification” rather than as an ideological 
and cultural system (1960: 145). It would be typical of traditional nonhomoge-
neous and multiethnic (or pluralist) societies and would be functionally linked 
to a complicated system of division of labor in an essentially nonmonetary 
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economy. Only with this definition would it be possible, according to Barth, to 
compare caste in the Indian subcontinent with elsewhere.
We can note that the concealment of the fundamental distinction between 
hierarchy and power appears in the expression “status summation” itself. Social 
or ritual status is put on the same level as economic and political status. In real-
ity, only the status called “social” by Barth would be definable as status in a strict 
sense, while so-called political and economic statuses should be considered in-
stead as “roles.”
As it has been noted by Louis Dumont, Barth’s formula is in any case socio-
centric because it presupposes the combination of features that are distinct only in 
modern society, while the Swat Pathan system—of which Barth writes—is charac-
terized by nondifferentiation rather than by status summation (Dumont 1967: 30).
In conclusion, when comparing a system of classes to a caste system, as an open 
system (Popper’s sense) opposed to a closed system, theorists of social stratifica-
tion define the caste system as an inegalitarian perversion of the class system and 
they provide a sociocentric interpretation of it (modeled mainly on the system of 
racial relations in America), which ignores the ideology and values typical of the 
Indian system, and the fundamental distinction between hierarchy of status and 
the differential distribution of political and economic power. This interpretation 
has much in common with the Marxist theory of “Eastern despotism,” according 
to which a dominant group incorporates within a despotic organization of politi-
cal power communities that are autonomous and without relations of economic 
and social complementarity (the “village community”) (cf. Dumont 1975: 41–48).
CASTE, AS AN INDIAN PHENOMENON
The above discussion has made it apparent for us the necessity to understand 
the specificity of the Indian caste system instead of starting from a putatively 
expansive definition large enough to allow for comparison, but in reality, one 
that is unduly reductionist and ethnocentric. This is not to dispel the difference 
but to understand it: this is the only starting point possible for a comparison.
To understand the caste system, we must therefore begin from its “ethno-
graphic” definition.
1)  The caste (jāt, jāti) is a group to which one belongs by birth and that is 
characterized, in principle, by endogamy. This means that the membership 
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criterion is ascriptive and not modifiable for an individual. Because caste is 
endogamous, parents have the same caste and the same status and therefore 
filiation never leaves the possibility for a choice between membership in the 
maternal or paternal group, as it happens instead in hierarchical systems 
characterized by anisogamy (i.e., marriage between groups of different sta-
tus). For this reason, kinship relations are always horizontal and egalitarian 
in terms of caste, while nonparental relationships are always hierarchical (see 
Leach 1960: 8). That is, marriage is between equals—i.e., between people 
who may have social relationships without major restrictions.
2)  Every caste has a defined position in the hierarchy, this position can be 
changed for an entire group but not for individuals, unless someone is ex-
pelled from his caste and thus loses his status. Brahmins (the priestly caste) 
are at the top of the hierarchy of status and they are the focus the entire caste 
system.
3)  The separation and hierarchical position of castes are expressed by symbols 
of purity and impurity. Members of higher castes are more pure than those 
of lower castes and are at risk of losing their purity if they associate with 
lower castes in the context of food, sex, and ritual (this implies the exclusion 
of exogamy and commensality and a precise breakdown of ritual roles of 
each caste).
4)  Castes are linked to the division of labor: they are associated with traditional 
occupations and have rights and duties in a precise system of prestations and 
counterprestations.
The ethnographic criteria may be modified or multiplied according to the re-
gional variations or the degree of differentiation of a caste system in a territorial 
unit but the underlying principles remain the same and can be reduced to a 
minimal definition, given by C. Bouglé (1908) and taken up by Dumont (1966: 
64): the caste system consists of separate hereditary groups connected together 
through: 1) a gradation of status, or hierarchy, 2) rules of separation, 3) the divi-
sion of labor and the interdependence that results from this.
To define the caste system is therefore necessary to explain what is hierar-
chy, what are the rules of separation (ritual, marriage, and food), and what is 
the ideology that established the opposition of the pure to the impure; how 
is hierarchy distinguished from and articulated to the political power; what 
is the system of the division of labor and the system of prestations and 
counterprestations.
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The concept of hierarchy
According to Louis Dumont (1966: 269) the fundamental principle of the caste 
system is the disjunction between religious status and power. This disjunction is 
not between two categories put on the same level but implies that one is subject 
to the other. It is therefore a hierarchical disjunction, in which power is subju-
gated to a more fundamental principle that subordinates and legitimates it, giv-
ing it a meaning that it does not possess on its own. Without this subordinating 
disjunction, it is not possible to speak of a  true and proper caste system. For 
example, Dumont excludes the possibility of using caste to understand Ceylon 
because in that society  the representative of the principle of power, the king, 
is at the top of the hierarchy. The absence of disjunction between hierarchical 
religious status and political power is found where Buddhism has given the king 
both religious and political prerogatives. The king is in fact considered to be a 
“living Buddha” or “destined to be Buddha” (bodhisattva) and an “emperor of the 
world” (cakkravartin) (see Heine-Geldern 1956). In this way, Buddhism tries to 
reconcile the contradiction between the practice of morality and religion and 
the necessity of politics and use of force.
On the contrary, since the time of the Brāhmana (800–500 bc?), Hinduism 
has radically separated religion and politics, giving the latter its own sphere of 
action, but subject to religion through the Brahmins. The two activities are dis-
tinct but complementary; the Hindu theory of hierarchy defines a social holism 
in which the human activities are inscribed, each in the place where it belongs 
in the scale of values, polarized in inherited categories (and therefore excluding 
individual choice). The social hierarchy therefore corresponds to the hierarchy 
of values as it is established by a religious ideology that justifies a social holism 
articulated in complementary functions.
The total vision  is religious (see Dumont 1966: 92) but does not exclude 
partial visions, corresponding to specific activities, which do not necessarily 
have a religious character. Thus, the “rational” activities (economy, politics, etc.) 
find a place in the sphere that is assigned to them by the global system but must 
remain hierarchically subordinate to it, and to its representatives in society: the 
Brahmins.
Therefore, the subordinating disjunction connected to the hierarchy allows 
the differentiation of activities and at the same time integrates them in a uni-
fied framework, in the system of values of the society. In this way, two comple-
mentary types of reflection developed in India: one contained in the literature 
of dharma (religious law), the other in the literature of the artha (the laws of 
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politics and the economy, of “rational acquisition”). Indeed, with the Arthaśāstra 
(the doctrine of the artha) India developed before Europe a “Machiavellian” 
theory of the state.
The hierarchical ideology ensures that there is no contradiction be-
tween  the religious point of view and the rational one. Each one is perfectly 
legitimate in its own sphere and can therefore remain separate while preserv-
ing, thanks to the hierarchical bond, a relationship to the whole. Hierarchy is 
defined therefore as a “gradation principle of the elements of a set in relation 
to the whole” (i.e., by means of putting each element in relation to the whole) 
(Dumont 1966: 92). At the end, this is a familiar concept in European classical 
tradition and antiquity in particular (see Finley 1973: 44), but the Indian caste 
system systematically translates it into social activity, and makes it a sociological 
as well as a logical principle.
The moral hierarchy therefore does not have the individual as subject but 
the social totality itself. The social articulation and unity is not the mechanical 
result of conflicts or transactions between individuals or groups (classes) that 
act on the basis of the principle of individualistic competition. For the ideology 
of hierarchy, social totality is the prerequisite, not the result, of the relationships 
between differentiated groups. Modern ideology implies instead the idea of the 
autonomy of the individual and of groups, overriding conceptually the impor-
tance of their relationships: global society is therefore the product of their inter-
action (contractual or conflictual). On the contrary, for the hierarchical ideology 
groups arise from differentiation from the totality, which is an organic prerequi-
site and not a mechanical result. Relationships precede, conceptually and on the 
level of values, the things put in relationships; then justice consists of putting 
the various social functions in their place, where they can exert their activities: 
priests as representatives and guarantors of the ultimate values and purpose of 
the society as a whole, are therefore at the top of the hierarchy but they cannot 
exercise the power, which could contaminate their moral purity.
The ideal of justice in modern ideology is totally different: starting with the 
individual and with the assumption that all individuals are equal by nature and 
have the same value, justice has the purpose of achieving this equality socially. 
Hence the primacy of politics,  which is conceived as the activity for which 
individuals and groups compete to gain control of resources and the systems of 
production and distribution: in short, for the control of the power.
Symptomatically, caste society subordinates political activity and its repre-
sentatives. If the Brahman is at the apex of society, he does not, as such, control 
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power, which is instead reserved for the king. On the other hand, the king is 
subject to the Brahman and the values that he represents in his activity. Without 
the guarantee and the moral legitimacy of the priest, political power does not 
have a relationship with the social entirety. Hence the need for “mechanisms to 
transform power into status” (Dumont 1975: 20): for example, the gift to the 
Brahmins. This gift may seem like a confirmation that status superiority cor-
responds to economic privileges: actually it indicates that the Brahmin has no 
direct access to resources or right to them. He can only give his own “prestige” 
in exchange for riches that allow him to live. Reciprocally, he who has wealth 
can cede his riches to acquire prestige. But without the disjunction between hi-
erarchy and status—tied to moral prestige—and power—tied to the control of 
resources—this exchange would have no meaning. The inferior ritual activities 
are therefore complementary but distinct, compared to the superior activities: they 
complete each other because they do not exist independently from exchange, 
which allows them to remain separate.
The Brahmin can remain so (separate) only because he is pure: his purity 
allows him contact with religious order, contact that benefits the society as a 
whole. But, purity can be realized socially only if the impure activities, altogether 
necessary for existence, are assumed by social groups that are considered impure 
just because they practice them. Purity and impurity are therefore not given 
separately: hierarchy implies complementarity, not just exclusion. From our in-
dividualistic point of view it is revolting that pure activities are reserved for 
certain individuals and impure actives are reserved for others; but from the In-
dian point of view it is not individuals that count but the relationships that they 
represent and that allow for their continuity. For the principle of the reciprocity 
of functions, the Untouchable is as indispensable as the Brahman: one and the 
other earn prestige conducting their hereditary functions. There is not there-
fore subjective ethics but an ethics of status; there are no universal obligations 
because there is no “universal” man. Instead, there are priests, princes, farmers, 
or servants (Dumont 1975: 23). On the other hand it seems that there is a cer-
tain relationship between the caste system and the theory of transmigration, at 
least for certain variants of the Hindu ideology. Being born into one caste rather 
than another, and subsequently to have more or less pure functions, has then a 
religious meaning. The caste into which one is born in reincarnation depends 
on the behavior in past lives. The principle of membership in a caste by birth is 
therefore embedded itself in the moral order that presides over the system (see 
Dumont 1966: 77 and 79; 1975: 32).
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This ideology appears to us as scandalous because we ignore the distinction 
between hierarchy and power. Hierarchy is a conceptual and ritual order bound 
to only certain spheres of existence: in the political and economic sphere rela-
tionships can be different or even inverse to those ritual relations, even if the 
priority of the hierarchy makes it possible, as we have seen, that complementa-
rity establishes itself between the two spheres. From the hierarchical point of 
view, a lower caste may hold the political and economic power, while a higher 
caste may be forced to depend on this level of lower caste members. This pos-
sibility is indeed inscribed into the principle of the hierarchy itself, which re-
stricts the control of power and wealth to a subordinate sphere. But, even if the 
hierarchically superior caste is economically dependent on the lower caste, its 
superiority is recognized in the sphere of rituals.
What are hierarchically structured are therefore the functions and social 
activities—and the men associated with these activities—and relations of power 
are not the global order of society: they also represent an order, a form of or-
ganization. But this order is considered secondary, subordinate to the religious 
order, it organizes the relations between individuals and groups in a different 
way and as a function of a different “sense.” Both orders are legitimate on the 
condition that each remains limited to its sphere of competence.
In conclusion, at the base of the caste system there is an ideology of inter-
dependence and  relativity: of functions, of spheres of activity, and of groups 
that represent and perform them. The essential value is this interdependence, 
because there are no privileged units that are considered as elements forming 
the whole, and from which and for which the whole is produced.
For us, jealously faithful to an ideology that makes “individual man consid-
ered as universal” (Dumont 1975: 22) the reference point of fundamental values, 
it is impossible to admit the relativity of perspectives and values, and it is impos-
sible to admit that a relationship sustained by specific laws at a certain level, will 
modify itself to another level, in its structure, laws, and “meaning.” Even more, 
we are unable to admit that each level has its place, its meaning, and its relations 
with the other levels in an overall system that justifies the society as a whole by 
giving a partial validity to each of its aspects and its spheres. And yet this is the 
profound meaning of caste hierarchy and its ideology. When we reduce it to a 
fiction or a rationalization of the level that for us subordinates all the others, 
namely that of power relations, we unconsciously censure. We risk ignoring the 
fact that in every society men act and think according to their own values, which 
we cannot consider irrelevant without running the  risk of substituting them 
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with our own values and political ideology. The relationship between the power 
of the politico-economic sphere and the religious sphere is, in the caste system, 
exactly opposite to that which is in force in our system of social classes. It is 
therefore impossible to assimilate directly or covertly one system to another: the 
comparison can only oppose the two systems and recognize that their superfi-
cial similarity derives from having arbitrarily isolated relations of power that 
are the only aspect of the caste system directly accessible to our ideology. But, 
when considered within the system to which it belongs, and by the principles of 
which we have tried to briefly outline, this aspect reveals itself to be completely 
different from how it appears to theorists who believe that caste is the limit case 
of class, and reducible to the latter.
Purity and impurity as symbols of hierarchy
The holism proposed for the ideology of caste is not political or economic but 
religious. As such, it does not subordinate nature to man but puts them both 
in relationship to each other. In particular, the basic phenomena  of organic 
life have a symbolic value for social life because they permit the expression of 
the distinctions between castes. The three fundamental principles that, accord-
ing to Célestin Bouglé, are the basis for the caste system can be reduced to the 
sole principle of opposition between pure and impure. In fact, his opposition 
involves hierarchy (the superiority of pure over impure), separation (pure and 
impure have to be maintained separate), and the division of labor (pure and 
impure occupations are distinct but complementary) (see Dumont 1966: 65).
Dumont has shown that the opposition between pure and impure contains 
the very essence of hierarchy because consequentially it follows that the whole 
consists of the necessary coexistence of two opposites. The maximum opposition is 
dualistic: on the one hand the purest category, Brahmin, which uses in a pure 
way certain species (for example, the products of the cow); on the other hand, 
the “Untouchable,” which uses them in the impure way (for example, using the 
cow in a way that involves its death: either tanning its skin, or consuming its 
meat, etc.). But this opposition also implies that both of the behaviors are needed, 
that both are necessarily part of the system: “There would be no Brahmin if they 
did not have at their disposal specialists that allow them to avoid the impure” 
(Dumont 1975: 29). The unity is therefore made possible by an opposition. In 
terms of logic, the holistic hierarchy is distinguished radically by a Hegelian 
type holistic dialectic. The opposition that governs the first is noncontradictory; 
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the second is dominated instead by the principle of contradiction and the over-
coming of contradictory terms, and their distinction.
The conceptual opposition between the pure and impure is transferred to 
the system of social relations: all men suffer from temporary states of impurity 
and menstruation, childbirth and death are particularly important examples of 
it. The inscription into the social sphere of these states justifies the impurities or 
the relative purity of the castes. In fact, those who have the task of carrying the 
corpses, or to wash their dirty clothes, etc. are permanently in contact with the 
impurities. Transferred in the social system of the division of labor, the transi-
tory impurities of some (as its effects remain in the private sphere) thus become 
the permanent impurities of others. In almost the whole of India, the funerary 
priest (the barber in the South) and the washerman are therefore particularly 
impure. On the contrary, some activities involve the absence of impurities or the 
immediate purification: for example, the king is never impure because he can-
not be prevented from his activities; the Brahamin student, contrary to other 
categories of people, is made impure only by the death of very close relatives 
because, intrinsically pure, he is much less affected by the impurity of death (see 
Dumont 1966: 73; Orenstein 1968).
If the relationship with certain natural/organic phenomena produces impu-
rities, the relationship with other natural entities, such as water, the five prod-
ucts of the cow (urine, excrement, etc.), is purifying. This hierarchical ideology 
of purity was formulated since the third century bc and was used to render ac-
counts of the caste system that have gradually developed later. The other criteria 
of social separation are theoretically traceable to the symbolism of the pure and 
the impure. However, the multiplication of criteria of hierarchical segmentation 
produces a certain relativity: every judgment of status formulated according to 
certain criterion is able to “amalgamate a caste with all those who share the 
same rules, opposing it to all others” (Dumont 1966: 81).
But the criteria are not always congruent. It is necessary then to evaluate not 
only the position  of each caste segment in relation to a certain criterion of 
segmentation but also the relative value of each of the criteria,  from whose 
combination results a caste ranking in a single linear series that comprises all 
the castes in a given territory. From this, then, a certain indeterminacy can be 
seen: each caste will tend to consider its own status in a different way than 
how it is considered by others. On the other hand, hierarchy does not exclude 
competition and mobility (see Srinivas 1966: 4). The vertical mobility implies 
that the members of a caste try to make themselves recognized as a higher 
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status by adopting the purity rules connected to the latter. Therefore, at both 
the local and pan-Indian level there is a constant process of “promotion” that 
explains the spread of Brahmin ideology, and ultimately of the caste system 
(“sanskritization”). M. N. Srinivas defines the sanskritization as the process by 
which a low-status caste, or a non-Hindu tribal group, abandons its customs, its 
rituals, its ideology, and its way of life, to adopt the behaviors of the higher caste, 
from a Hindu perspective. If it is a tribal group, it becomes Hindu and integrates 
itself as caste into a defined position within the hierarchical system; if it is al-
ready Hindu, it asserts a claim to a status, expressed in terms of behavior that is 
generally not recognized by the community earlier than one or two generations.
The rise of a group in the hierarchy involves descent of another but it does 
not change the hierarchy of status. Only their assignment is modified  (see 
Srinivas 1966: 6–7; Cohn 1971: 134–41).
Hierarchical segmentation and its paradoxes: Varna and caste
So far we have spoken of caste as the base unit of a hierarchical system based 
on its own ideology. Now we must demonstrate the relationship between this 
system and the specific groups, and, in particular, how the system realizes the 
segmentation between units of different orders.
Four levels must be taken into consideration.
The smallest unit is the exogamic group, the birādari, “band of brothers.” 
The members  of this group of relatives are generally stratified generational-
ly: those of the generation of Ego are “brothers,” those of the generation of the 
father of Ego are of the “fathers,” etc. Especially in caste of medium or lower 
rank the birādari is a compact group: its members meet, for example, on the oc-
casion of rites of passage. The heads of the component families of the birādari 
attend the meetings (panchāyat) that resolve conflicts between its members. The 
territorial extension of the birādari depends on the dispersion or the concentra-
tion of its population, and is generally linked to the occupation of the caste to 
which it belongs. In northern India, the middle-ranking farmers’ castes or those 
of Chamar (“people of the leather,” Untouchables) tend to organize themselves 
in birādari whose members are located in only one or a few villages, while the 
birādari caste of artisans or servants (potters, blacksmiths, and washermen) are 
generally dispersed among a greater number of villages. For the higher castes, 
especially over the last two centuries, the birādari instead has gradually lost its 
importance.
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The birādari are part of a group, called jāti (subcaste), which is the funda-
mental unit of the system. This is an endogamus group, which sets the limits 
within which the birādari exogamous may contract marriage. While the birādari 
is mostly a group of agnates, the jāti is a group defined by bonds of affinity and 
cognates. Often it has its own name,  its own divinity, an origin myth, and a 
position in the hierarchical system. It can also have its own rules of behavior, its 
own costumes, etc.
Different jāti are considered in turn members of a caste (jāt) that is not a 
group itself but a general category, with a name, a hierarchical position, and a 
traditional occupation. This category allows members of different subcastes to 
be able to recognize their own position in the hierarchy at the regional level and 
no longer just the local level (even if the criteria are in fact much more compli-
cated) (Cohn 1971: 115–16; 125–26).
In turn,  castes identify themselves in one of the four categories (Varna 
“colors, species”) that put them in relation to the more general articulation of 
hierarchy and to the entire pan-Indian world.
The Varna system is above all important because it allows for the social mo-
bility of the jāti. When a group aspires to a higher status it obviously cannot 
merge with another jāti that already has this status (that would mean marriage 
with the members of that jāti, conflicts, etc.) but it can claim to be a member of 
different Varna from the one that has traditionally been attributed to it, without 
changing the group boundaries (see Lynch 1969).
The four Varna are, in the hierarchical order: 1) the Brahmins, or priests; 
2) the Kshatriya, or warriors; 3) the Vaiśhya, or merchants; 4) the śūdra, or 
servants, the people that count for little. The Untouchables are not covered 
by this four-part division and do not have  a common label (today, they are 
called Harijan “sons of God”).
In Vedic literature, the division in Varna is generated by a principle of di-
chotomous opposition. The first dichotomy opposes Ārya and non-Ārya (i.e., 
Dasyu, identified with the Untouchables). The Ārya are dichotomized into the 
“twice-born” (the first three Varna) and the “once born” (Śūdra). The “twice-
born” are divided into Brahmins and Kshatriya, on the one hand, and Vaiśhya, 
on the other hand. Brahmins and Kshatriya, in the end, oppose each other. This 
division into four units is justified by the myth  of Purusha Sukta, according 
to which the Brahmins were born from the mouth of primordial man, the 
Kshatriya from his arms, the Vaiśhya from his thighs, and the Śūdra from his 
feet. The Laws of Manu (I, 87–91; see Bühler 1886) assign to each Varna his 
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duties: the Brahmins study and learn the Veda, sacrifice, give and receive alms; 
to the Kshatriya the duties are protection of the people, donation, the offering 
of sacrifices, the study of the Veda; to the Vaiśhya, the raising of livestock, trade, 
agriculture, offering of sacrifices, and the study of the Veda; finally to the Śūdra, 
just one occupation: to serve the other three Varna.
The complementarity between  Varna is  partially similar to that between 
castes. Thus, for example, the Kshatriya or Vaiśhya can order the sacrifice but 
only the Brahmin can perform it. The king is then deprived of the priestly func-
tion:  here we find the fundamental disjunction between religious status and 
political power.
The homology between the system of Varna and that of caste (jāt), however, 
should not hide the differences and especially the problems present in their rela-
tionship. In Vedic literature the Brahmin is essentially the sacrificer, while in the 
Hindu period and in the caste system he is characterized by purity. Above all, 
the theory of Varna and the theory of castes imply two different types of clas-
sifications and reveal a difficulty in the transition from a conceptual view of hi-
erarchy to the hierarchy of real groups. Castes are hereditary: classification puts 
the emphasis on the birth. In the theory of Varna, on the contrary, the emphasis 
is on function, so that original non-Kshatriya dynasties have often acceded to 
the status of Kshatriya assuming the real function (rather, according to some, no 
dynasty after the end of Nanda, which existed between 345 and 321, was ever of 
Kshatriya origin). This demonstrates that the Varna must not be interpreted as 
hereditary groups, like caste, but as functional categories.
The relationship between Varna and caste has been the subject of conflicting 
interpretations, none of which are satisfactory. Comparing of the points of view 
of Stanley Tambiah and Louis Dumont is particularly interesting and instruc-
tive because it brings into play the very definition of hierarchy and the difficul-
ties we face when we try to render an account of this concept.
Dumont favors, as we have seen, the hierarchy of castes, which is expressed 
in terms of pure and impure. The classification in Varna appears then only simi-
lar to the one of the castes. Tambiah, instead, seeks to relate more directly the 
two systems and to imply that castes follow from Varna. Second, for Tambiah 
only the classification in Varna is actually hierarchical because these categories 
are generated by a principle of segmentation in which a dichotomous level of 
the higher order incorporates the level of lower order (1973a: 196). Instead, the 
castes are ordered in rank through the classificatory procedure of overlapping 
between different classes.
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The model considered by Tambiah is, in fact, that of the Laws of Manu 
(chapters three and ten), a model that explains the linear hierarchy of different 
groups of castes by means of mixed unions (i.e., between Varna and between dif-
ferent castes) that would be the source of every caste. Given the different value 
attributed to hypergamous unions and hypogamous unions, and to primary and 
secondary marriage, a certain number of categories sorted in ranks are drawn, 
that Tambiah identifies as jāti or their analogs. The formative rules of this or-
der reflect the rules of purity.
However, one could argue against Tambiah that it is not possible to relate 
directly the model abstracted from the Laws of Manu with an ideology derived 
from the sociological study of caste society. But, the fundamental problem con-
cerns the notion of hierarchy. Tambiah starts from a “logical,” universal defini-
tion of hierarchy as a classificatory procedure: in essence, from the definition of 
the hierarchy as inclusion between classes. With this definition one can con-
sider hierarchical only the classification in Varna. The castes are ordered accord-
ing to a different method, which cannot be considered as truly hierarchical. But 
does this “logical” definition of hierarchy correspond to the Indian definition?
Apparently, Dumont uses an inverse process: he starts from the Indian for-
mulation of hierarchy. This formulation considers the rank of castes in terms of 
purity and impurity. However, when Dumont gives a general formulation of the 
concept of hierarchy, he can only use the concept of inclusion between classes: 
“A hierarchical relationship is a relation between larger and smaller, or more 
precisely between that which encompasses and that which is encompassed” (1967: 
33). However, it is obvious that if one applies this definition to hierarchy ex-
pressed in terms of pure and impure, and indicates that the term superior (pure) 
incorporates the inferior (the nonpure), we have a contradiction from a logical 
point of view. The two notions of hierarchy must remain well distinguished: 
otherwise one should admit that A includes non-A, i.e., its opposite. But in 
terms of logical class, pure and nonpure, being opposites, are at the same level of 
generality: one cannot be incorporated in the other without creating the follow-
ing paradoxes: (a) a class is a member of itself (i.e., the pure is a member of the 
class “pure,” given that this is at the same time the incorporating and the class of 
Brahmins); (b) a class is considered as an element between the items classified 
as its nonmembers (i.e., the class of nonpure is not not-pure).
The same paradoxes are found when one moves from the general formula 
of hierarchy to the hierarchy of  concrete groups:  if the groups are distinct 
ritually and matrimonially, how can one say that the hierarchical relationship 
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is a relationship of inclusion? It is true, instead, that castes are “hierarchized” 
according to a process of overlapping between different characters (which is 
not necessarily the same as the ones considered by the Laws of Manu). The 
hierarchy as “incorporating” concerns only the functions associated with the 
groups: one cannot change from the function to the group without radically 
changing the notion of hierarchy. This term seems to therefore have different 
and not always consistent meanings: Dumont’s attempt to summarize every-
thing into a general formula of hierarchy (inclusion) is not free from serious 
difficulties.
Therefore, the caste hierarchy is rather a linear graduation than a hierarchy 
of “classes.” Either on the classification level or on the ritual level, the inferior 
rank is not incorporated in the superior one but is merely complementary to it. 
The linear hierarchy thus has two distinctive characters: it is defined by enu-
meration and it is more international than attributive.
The hierarchical enumerations are a typical characteristic of Indian culture. 
A “global society” is defined entirely by the enumeration of all the groups that 
compose it. The inherent contradiction in this process is noted by Dumont him-
self: the whole and the parts, the incorporating and the embedded, are put on 
the same plane in the series (see Dumont 1957: 142, 150, and 152 for some 
examples).
The hierarchical model for inclusion, apart from the difficulties it encounters 
when translating into the hierarchy of concrete groups, or stops arbitrarily at a 
term that one decides is the end, regresses infinitely because it is not possible 
to think without the contradiction of a final class that includes all of the oth-
ers and at the same time itself (cf. above). But the caste system must necessarily 
be conceived of as a totality (otherwise it cannot be conceived of as a hierarchy), 
and then as a finite order. It is therefore forced to the aporia of the class that 
incorporates all of the others and itself simultaneously, and therefore from a 
concrete representation of hierarchy in which the whole and the parts are on 
the same plane, and in which the hierarchical position of each element depends 
on its position in the order of its enumeration. The entirety is then conceived 
as linear and  it is finished by an opposition between two absolute and ideal 
extremes: the pure and the impure, precisely. The criterion for hierarchy is then 
given by the position of a segment between the two segments that represent the 
conceptual extremes, rather than by the level of generality in which it is placed 
in the inclusive pyramidal representation of hierarchy. The latter level, however, 
is preserved as symbolic level by the functions that correspond to each segment. 
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Caste ideology is the synthesis of the two forms of hierarchy: the lower caste is 
the segment that, while remaining socially distinct in terms of “purity” is con-
ceptually included within and subordinated to the upper segment. The logical 
paradoxes involved in this synthesis explain how, in practice, and to a certain 
level of conceptualization of social reality, the definition of caste hierarchy as a 
function of their interrelation prevails. McKim Marriott has shown the impor-
tance of this aspect, stressing that interdependence and occupational specializa-
tion of castes and in particular the performance around food are the key criteria 
to explain the hierarchical configuration of a territorially limited caste system. 
To determine the hierarchical order, the obligation (the caste characteristic that 
depends on its pure or impure way of life) is less important than the type of 
relationship that exists between the castes: and therefore one needs to know 
from whom and to whom each social category accepts from or gives to different 
categories of food (fried, boiled, raw) or water from a well; with whom one can 
smoke the same pipe, which degrees of impurities the lower castes produce and 
by which means it is transmitted, etc. The criteria vary regionally (see Marriott 
1959).
The division of labor and economic power
Caste is traditionally linked to a trade, even though it is not a craft guild. Not 
all of its members work in the trade, nor all those who work in the trade belong 
to the caste in question (see statistics in Blunt 1931). What is important is the 
status of relative purity of a trade: then equally pure trades, or nearly equal, can 
replace or complement the traditional status of a caste. Above all, certain trades 
are neutral from the ritual point of view and, therefore, may be undertaken by 
different castes. The most important “neutral” activity is agriculture and its exer-
cise is reputable for all the respectable castes (only the highest caste may not use 
the plow): in fact, the relationship between agricultural occupations and castes 
is the most fluid. After all, in an economy that is predominantly agricultural, it 
is clear that the occupation of the majority of the population cannot be other 
than agricultural
Also in the Indian modern economy there is a certain correlation between 
status hierarchy and occupation: the Untouchables are in lower status occupa-
tions (carriers, unskilled labor, etc.). In the definition of the status of a caste, 
its functional specialization is crucial because it puts it in relation to activities 
or states of impurity or purity that for other castes are only temporary. Rituals 
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then characterize most of the trades: the hierarchy of castes is also a function of 
the hierarchy of the trades that they practice. The traditional, symbolic association 
to a certain trade restricts the real occupational choices of a caste, and it is still 
used to express its hierarchical position. Also the division of labor is dominated 
by the opposition between pure and impure and has a hierarchical dimension: 
one cannot isolate a “pure” economic dimension as it does not make sense in 
traditional society.
The subordination of the economic aspect to the ritual aspect is also found 
in the system of prestations and counterprestations in the economy, closed and 
natural, of a multicaste village. The same etymology of the term often designat-
ing this system (jajamānī) evokes a religious aspect. Jajmān (patron), in opposi-
tion to prajā (dependent), is a term that is derived from the Sanskrit vajamāna, 
which means “sacrifer”: “he who has a sacrifice performed” (see Dumont 1966: 
129). The jajamānī is a clientilistic system, based on a network of personal re-
lationships and centered on those that have land ownership. In this system, 
each one has privileges and duties in the distribution of resources, products, and 
services, which depend on one’s hierarchical position.
The division of labor is therefore articulated to a network of personal he-
reditary relationships: every family has a family of specialists for each task. Pr-
estations and counterprestations are not regulated by the market but by cus-
tom. Compensation is given immediately for each exceptional or occasional 
prestation but is distributed throughout the year for the continual and regular 
prestations. The system is very complicated, and has important regional vari-
ations. W. H. Wiser (1936) has given a detailed description of its operation 
in a village of northern India. One can distinguish the following categories of 
partners:
1)  Dependent workers (for example, a blacksmith, barber, water carrier, wash-
erman) who provide permanent services in exchange for fixed allocations in 
grains, received twice a year, after the harvest;
2)  Dependent workers with ceremonial functions (for example, on the occasion 
of weddings, funerals, etc.) who receive a customary prestation each time 
that they offer their services;
3) Permanent and “unfree” agricultural labor, paid by the day or month;
4)  Manufacturing artisans paid in kind by a customary proportion of the com-
modity, which they treat on behalf of their patron;
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5)  Artisans and sellers paid in cash at prices fixed by custom, which is different 
for different status categories (Brahmin, for instance, pays less for the same 
amount of milk).
The latter category of people is not constituted by dependent workers.
The jajamānī system has been the subject of major debates. According to 
Wiser, it is an egalitarian system, because it is based on reciprocity of the func-
tions and prestations: leaving aside the lowest castes,  for the others, the rule 
applies that every member of any caste is—depending on the occasions—patron 
and dependent, provider of a good and a service and the recipient of another 
good or service.
In reality, egalitarian reciprocity applies partially only for the castes that are 
in an intermediate hierarchical position. Wiser’s assessment does not take ac-
count of the control  of the land,  which is unequal. Reciprocity is hierarchi-
cal (Dumont 1966: 134–35). The system ensures that “land owners” receive the 
services of specialists and of the labor force, and to the latter guarantees rights 
on the products of the soil. Some (Beidelmann 1959) consider the jajamānī sys-
tem as a system of “exploitation,” but it has been observed (Orenstein 1962) that 
the well-to-do and dominant families have incontrovertible obligations toward 
their employees and, on the other hand, they depend on the “poor” because they 
must have recourse to the ritual services of the latter.
The traditional client relationships imply that certain economic roles are an 
inalienable privilege of lower groups, and that the dominant caste is forced to 
depend on them, without the power to change the traditional relations for its 
own benefit (by, for example, the mechanism of the market): “exploitation”  is 
only possible when the dominant group can decide on its own terms the condi-
tions of exchange (see Leach 1960: 5).
The caste system is “unfair” to the Western observer, for which the measure 
of justice is the individual conceived as universal, and not what contributes to 
the perpetuation of the social whole. In the caste system, justice is in the hier-
archy. It is a system in which the activities and the rewards of each are interde-
pendent since they are oriented toward the whole, and this is the hierarchical 
collectivity, which is regulated intentionally (as a function of an ideology) and 
not automatically, as in the individualistic economy of the market.
We have found that the fundamental principle of hierarchy is the disjunc-
tion between status and power. This results from the fact that the dominant 
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political and economic role (which in the theory of Varna is reserved for the 
Kshatriya) can belong to any caste that actually has the force. The distinction 
between dominant castes (who control the land) and castes who have access to 
land and its products only in relationships of dependency to the dominant castes 
is therefore essential, because it allows one to introduce the political dimension 
into the caste system. The political and economic power, however, is divorced 
from status hierarchy: the dominant caste is not necessarily the higher caste in 
the hierarchy. In the political and economic sphere, relations of power have their 
own laws, they can change: hierarchy, based on the system of values, does not 
change. The autonomy of the power is, however, subordinate; it is a sphere of 
limited action. Also, it must be put in relation to the social whole, ultimately to 
values, and therefore subject to the principle of hierarchy, mediated by the caste 
that, as we have seen, represents the totality. Even in the economic sphere, the 
caste that has the strength must therefore be legitimized by its relations with 
the status categories, and with the Brahmin in particular, whose sponsorship is 
necessary.
We can certainly ask to what extent this relationship to the religious hierar-
chy changes actual relations. In reality it adds to meaning, but it does not change 
fundamentally. However, the problem raised by the study of the caste system 
is just this: what is the relative value of ideology and political and economic 
relations in the society? All in all, the importance given to one or the other 
dimension is always a function of an ideology, a system of values. This brings 
us back to the problem of the comparison: one cannot compare the economic 
and social structures without taking into account the values with which they 
exist in society. The desire to isolate political-economic structures as intelligible 
by themselves, regardless of indigenous consciousness, is itself an ideological 
phenomenon that emanates from certain values. It implies that our economic 
and political values have a universal applicability because they enable us to un-
derstand any type of system that we decide to isolate as a concrete society. The 
exemplarity of the study of the caste system consists in revealing the absurdity 
of such a claim. There are no criteria of absolute and scientifically based value 
that allow for the understanding of any social system and its related ideology. 
When sociologists suggest similar criteria, at least as far as India is concerned, 
they project their own ideological system, which itself is in need of justifica-
tion. Certainly, sociology cannot be only “inclusive,” it must also be “explana-
tory.” The exemplary nature of the problem of castes also demonstrates that 
the “understanding” of an ideological system is necessary for its “explanation.” 
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The latter is sought above all in the political-economic dimension, but the ex-
tension to the totality of the system of the principles of explanation of this 
dimension is a mistake, not only because it involves a refusal to consider the 
facts of consciousness and values as a part of reality but also because it is a 
product of the  ideology of the observer; consequently, it is nothing else than 
a value judgment opposite to the value judgment of indigenous consciousness. 
The “comprehension” is also a manner, therefore, to draw the borders between 




An adequate definition of the concept of “ceremonial” would require discussion 
of at least three other terms: “ritual,” “religion,” and “symbol.” All these notions 
are used in an imprecise and elastic way in the anthropological and historical 
literature because a universally accepted theory of the phenomena that they 
designate is still lacking. For a long time, the terms “ritual and “ceremonial” were 
used as synonyms, or nearly so, with a certain preference for “ceremonial.” In 
more recent years they have been distinguished among some scholars, but most 
of them criticize this distinction, especially the content attributed to each term, 
and prefer to utilize the notion of “ritual,” giving it an extremely broad meaning.
From 1922, with the analysis of ceremonies of the aborigines of the Anda-
man Islands (Bay of Bengal), A. R. Radcliffe-Brown set the terms of debate, 
distinguishing three levels of social behavior: 1) the “moral customs” by means of 
which relations among individuals are regulated by principles of “good” or “bad” 
conduct; 2) the “utilitarian” activities in which a goal is obtained through some 
“technical” means, interpretable in terms of “rationality,” and finally; 3) “cer-
emonial” activities, which have no utilitarian end and which are distinguished 
by moral customs because they stand in no immediate relation with the effects 
that the action of one person has on another person. For Radcliffe-Brown, cer-
emonial is a means of maintaining social order. Influenced by Émile Durkheim 
and A. F. Shand, he thinks this order depends on an accord among the senti-
ments of the members of a group, that is, on an organized system of emotional 
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tendencies polarized around certain objects that have social value. “Ceremonial” 
is the instrument with which these collective emotional states are produced, and 
without which they could not exist (Radcliffe-Brown 1922).
Ceremonies that constitute a ceremonial system are therefore symbolic acts, 
expressive of social structure, and as such are not intelligible in terms of relations 
among means and end—hence in “rational” terms. The theory of Radcliffe-
Brown implies that it is impossible to distinguish—as he himself notes—be-
tween ceremonial, art, play, dance, etc. All these behaviors, insofar as they are 
social, are fundamentally the same thing and it is arbitrary to separate them 
conceptually. The term “ceremonial” thus has an extremely broad significance. 
From ceremonial Radcliffe-Brown distinguishes partially only magic, which for 
him has a nonsocial or anti-social dimension.
The successors of Radcliffe-Brown have attempted to distinguish various 
categories of ceremonial, almost always utilizing “ritual” and “ceremonial” as 
synonyms. They are preoccupied above all with opposing the various categories 
of rituals in terms of belief. Certain formalized behaviors (etiquette, for exam-
ple) can be defined as ceremonials or rituals, but are not associated with reli-
gious beliefs. Thus S. F. Nadel (1954: 99) feels the need to distinguish between 
a general sense of the term “ritual” (that is, “extremely formalized action”) and 
a religious sense.
Establishing that certain expressive behaviors are “irrational” and others 
only “nonrational” (as Pareto had shown), Monica Wilson (1957: 9) has sought 
to give content to the distinction between “ritual” and “ceremonial.” For her 
“ritual” is a religious action whose end is to obtain benefits from a supernatural 
power. Symbols and concepts would be used in ritual, subordinating them to 
“practical” ends (abundant harvests, success, recovery, etc.). “Ceremonial” would 
instead be an elaborated and conventional form of expression of feelings, not 
limited to religious occasions.
Jack Goody (1961), for his part, proposes a tripartite classification among 
ritual, religion, and ceremonial, which moves away from those of his predeces-
sors. “Ritual” is a category that designates a formalized behavior (a “custom”) in 
which the relation between end and means is irrational or nonrational. Magic 
is an example of this, since, according to Goody, it has a pragmatic end which 
its procedures do not lead to. His category “religion” instead corresponds to the 
category “religious ritual” of Nadel and to the category “ritual” of Wilson: it 
is a behavior that has as its addressee a personalized, mystic power. Religious 
behaviors can be irrational (for example, according to Goody, many forms of 
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sacrifice and prayer) or nonrational (for example, certain feasts). The definition 
of “ceremonial” is negative: it designates a “category of ritual” that is neither 
religious nor magical, that neither presupposes the existence of supernatural 
powers nor has practical ends; it can, however, have certain “ends”—the (ideo-
logical) points of view of actors—and certain “latent functions” from the point 
of view of the observer. Examples: the ceremony of civil matrimony, ceremonies 
of “settlement” in politics, and so forth. 
That which for Radcliffe-Brown was a collection of phenomena of its own 
nature, the “meaning” of which consisted in expressing and perpetuating the 
social structure, is for Goody a series of distinct phenomena, founded on di-
verse “beliefs.” In particular, he rejects the idea that religion is definable simply 
as a reflection of the social structure, since it requires an illusion: the belief in 
supernatural beings. Ritual and ceremony, on the other hand, do not neces-
sarily imply this illusion and therefore have quite little in common with reli-
gion and the “sacred,” by contrast with what Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown 
thought.
Max Gluckman (1962) has elaborated a more complicated classification 
than that of Goody, in which the opposition between ritual and ceremonial has 
a meaning related to that given it by Wilson. Like Radcliffe-Brown, Gluckman 
gives to the term “ceremonial” a very broad meaning, namely: every organi-
zation of action which is not specifically technical or recreational, and which 
expresses social relations by means of particular behaviors that symbolize them. 
At the heart of the category “ceremonial” he distinguishes between “ceremoni-
ous” behavior and “ritual” behavior. “Ritual” refers to mystic notions not derived 
from experience and therefore from those of “common sense.” Without mystic 
notions, ceremonial behavior is “ceremonious.” Thus, for example, the parade 
for the anniversary of the October revolution is for Gluckman a “ceremonious” 
behavior, while the procession of Corpus Christi is “ritual.” Both, however, have 
common functions from the social point of view.
The opposition between “ceremonious” and “ritual” permits Gluckman to 
formulate the following hypothesis: 1) the more important the segregation of 
roles in the social structure and less important the recourse to “ritual,” the less 
“mystical” ideas are linked with ceremonial behaviors; 2) the more roles are un-
differentiated and superimposed, the more recourse to ritual is necessary in or-
der to separate them. 
The opposition between “ritual” and “ceremonious” behavior is therefore, 
in reality, the opposition between two phases of social evolution: on one side 
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Gluckman puts tribal societies in which roles (for example, those of the father, 
the uncle, the chief, the priest, etc.) are confused within the same person or 
undifferentiated, and must therefore be separated in a fictitious way on certain 
ritual occasions so as to avoid and resolve eventual conflicts between roles and 
produce an equilibrium that is sanctioned by belief in a “prosperity” ensured by 
the ancestors or the gods; on the other side he puts modern societies, in which 
roles are separated in reality, though often in permanent conflict, and exercised 
in distinct spheres of social life and in relation to different individuals in each 
one. However even in modern society there are situations and institutions in 
which the networks of relations intersect and become confused and in which 
therefore recourse to the ceremonial sometimes becomes necessary. A study by 
Elizabeth Bott, cited by Gluckman (1962), shows that in the city of London, 
when the network of kinship relations in a family tends to coincide with the 
network of relations of neighborhood, friendship, and work, the roles of hus-
band and wife tend to be ceremonially distinct, or [defined] in terms of “cus-
tom.” That, in turn, permits the conjugal relationship—which otherwise risks 
being “submerged” in the others—to be kept distinct.
Ceremonial—religious or not—tends to appear above all in moments in 
which an individual passes from one role to another (for example: matrimony, 
investiture in a political or administrative task) and must therefore be “sepa-
rated” symbolically from his or her preceding role and “aggregated” to the new 
role; or when the passages concern the calendar of a whole society (ceremonies 
of passages from one year to another, etc.). These ceremonials presuppose “spec-
tators,” who are members of the social group which represents itself or modifies 
its own internal relations or its relations with the individual who passes from 
one role to another.
According to the theory represented by Gluckman, two aspects therefore 
characterize ceremonial: 1) it distinguishes, using particularly impressive sym-
bols, the categories that risk appearing confused in social life; 2) it represents by 
means of metaphors associated with social relations that which those relations 
ideally ought to be and the values that they imply. In this way, by “dramatizing” 
the social structure, ceremonial acts upon real relations so as to modify or read-
just them (cf. Nadel 1951).
Ceremonial phenomena therefore are “theatrical” phenomena and are not 
fundamentally different from aesthetic ones, even if they have a more directly 
social dimension than artistic phenomena in modern society. With ceremonial, 
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society stages itself, representing its values, its lines of fission and its contradic-
tions. The actor in a ceremony legitimates his status by “playing” his part according 
to a prescribed model and in a symbolic situation: this holds whether for the ritual 
installation of a sacred king or a priest, or for the “ceremonious” (Gluckman) or 
“ceremonial” (Wilson) behavior of anyone who gives or receives a greeting, takes 
off his hat, or carries food to his mouth with a fork instead of a knife.
If formally and functionally “ceremonial” and “ritual” are therefore the same 
thing, why distinguish them? The authors cited above justify the distinction 
in terms of belief: ritual or religious ritual imply belief in a supernatural sanc-
tion; they refer to mystic notions “not verified by experience.” Ceremonial would 
instead be only nonrational and would do nothing but “dramatize” the social 
structure.
But it is easy to counter that even ceremonial behavior implies emotions and 
mixed notions, as well as recourse to a “mystique,” which is not lesser than that 
of “primitive” religious rituals. In ceremonial, notions like that of “charisma,” 
attributed, for example, to a person who has a certain status, are expressed in 
a more or less conscious way (similarly for the notion of the opposition of the 
sexes and above all for the mixed and emotional ideas of “honor,” “shame,” and 
“appearance”). R. H. Lowie even thinks that ceremonial behavior may reflect 
some “essentially nonrational nature of man,” an “end in itself,” justified by the 
need for aesthetic satisfaction and social stability (cf. Lowie 1930: 314).
The classificatory distinctions and subdistinctions therefore risk losing sight 
of the fact that we are in the presence of a unitary phenomenon. In fact, any 
social behavior entails a relationship to norms: as such it has a “ritual” or “sym-
bolic” or “ceremonial” dimension, whatever one wants to call it, which com-
municates the relationship to those norms and the position within the social 
system of the one who is acting. From this point of view, every form of com-
munication, even spoken language, has a “ritual” dimension. But if it is true that 
the opposition between sacred and profane does not coincide with that be-
tween “ritual” and “pragmatic” (by contrast with what Durkheim and his school 
claimed), it is therefore also true that one cannot limit oneself to formulating 
a definition that ignores ideological differences between the various levels of 
ritual communication. In no society are all systems of communication put on 
the same level and considered equivalent. The ideological code in which each 
type of “communicative” behavior is inscribed must therefore be considered 
part of this behavior.
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The opposition between “sacred” and “profane,” between “religious” and 
“nonreligious,” is pertinent in many societies and gives rituals a value and a 
different status. No believer would be disposed to admit that the ritual of the 
mass is a phenomenon of the same nature as that which consists in removing 
one’s hat in a house. The two phenomena are conceptualized in a different way 
and have a different significance for a social subject. Naturally both forms of 
behavior are associated with vague and even mystical notions; they are not 
explained and accepted in “rational” terms. However, in terms of conscious-
ness, they are lived and valued differently: they signify and communicate in a 
different way.
The code chosen for social communication is therefore an important ele-
ment of the message; it communicates something in and of itself. In this sense, 
unless one decides that religion is a negligible form of “rationalization” of the 
social structure and is not a pertinent object of sociology, it is necessary to in-
troduce some distinctions into the vast field of “ritual.”
In every ritual situation, communication among the real “actors” happens by 
referring to an imaginary “actor,” but one who serves to sanction the content of 
the communication and gives it a specific form. In religious ritual, communica-
tion among real actors takes place in an indirect way—that is, it passes through 
god, or an ancestor—who is the imaginary receiver and emissary in the com-
municative process. By communicating with god, men communicate in reality 
among themselves. The reference to the imaginary even exists in nonreligious 
ritual, but communication happens directly among real persons; it does not pass 
through god. The imaginary intervenes as a sanction and a guarantee of the con-
tent of communication and of the position of everyone in the channels within 
the system of communication, but it is a more abstract and less personalized 
entity whose function is only regulative.
Imaginary entities of this type are “honor,” “shame,” “appearance,” “tradi-
tion,” “opportunity”: they are vague notions with which men hurry to justi-
fy their nonreligious ritual behavior. Let us propose to identify this last with 
“ceremony.”
The notions that intervene in ceremonial ideology all have something in 
common: they refer to social prestige, to recognition of the intrinsic value of a 
person or group; they confer a legitimacy on their status, their titles, their roles. 
In order to indicate this legitimacy, many societies utilize the notions of “honor” 
or equivalent notions, all of which for convenience we will call “honor.” Since 
this notion is familiar to us but we use it in a vague way, we will be able, by 
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clarifying it, to understand the presuppositions of ceremonial behavior by start-
ing from our own experience.
THE NOTION OF HONOR AND CEREMONY
The notion of honor utilizes the ideal personality that a society associates with 
individual roles, and with the individual in general, as a yardstick for judging the 
value and rank of everyone (cf. Peristany 1965). This is characteristic of societies 
or of sectors of social life in which personal relationships predominate. When 
relationships are personal, they tend to take a codified, ceremonial form and to 
be sanctioned by honor or by dishonor. Honor expresses itself by means of pride, 
which is authorized by possession of a certain status, by a certain social identity, 
and more generally by the correct use of rules that govern behaviors in which 
symbolic content is preponderant.
But the pretension to honor and status must be ratified by the community; it 
requires a consensus. This consensus can be constantly up for discussion, and so-
cial approval can diminish and with it honor—the prestige that accompanies it. 
Honor, “appearances,” “fame” are hence always submitted to the tribunal of pub-
lic opinion. Anyone who pretends to honor must show himself worthy of it by 
complying with prescribed forms of behavior, indeed accentuating them; from 
this comes the importance of the “point of honor.” The dependence of honor on 
consensus and public opinion makes it such that it can be acquired and lost, so 
that every pretension to honor and status implies necessarily a faith in whoever 
already possesses that status and that honor. Honor is then acquired by being 
made lost to someone else: one’s own honor implies the dishonor of others. As 
Julian Pitt-Rivers has noted, the emblematic personality of the code of honor 
is Don Juan, who seeks honor in its defiance or acquisition by dishonoring oth-
ers through their women (in Peristany 1965: 33). The man of honor is one who 
insults his fellow creature with impunity and who is not himself insulted with 
impunity: he is in perpetual defiance; he is always on stage. In Renaissance Italy 
the offender acquired honor that he had removed from the offended: “to take 
away” honor meant “to remove it for oneself“ (cf. Bryson 1935: 85).
In its extreme forms, this competitive ideology implies an individualism 
which, however, is always moderated by the necessity of taking stock of public 
opinion, by the necessity of following a code and of representing it in its own 
act—of acting “ceremonially.” The insult, the “denial of honor,” and so forth, 
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therefore follow minute codes, which cannot be violated with impunity without 
provoking dishonor.
In some societies, honor and its connected ceremonials have a less mobile 
and personal character. Personal honor would have to legitimize precedence but 
it is precedence that gives personal honor, since no one can challenge anyone 
who precedes him in the hierarchical order, at least to acquire the necessary 
power. The king, for example, is above challenges to honor; he cannot be dis-
honored. The affirmation of the king’s honor is one of the themes and principal 
objectives of all ceremonies of the court.
In societies wherein hierarchy is hereditary or more fixed, defiance of honor 
is limited to persons who belong to the same social rank. In relationships of 
inequality, honor is created and perpetuated by ceremonies of acceptance on the 
part of the inferior, of the precedence of the superior one. Honor then consists 
in “sticking to one’s proper place,” in being legitimately, by common consensus, 
in a certain position of status.
The necessity of the challenge, or its hereditary character, assures a certain 
permanence to the hierarchical distribution of honor. This permits it to function 
at a political level. Anyone who has honor can in fact, without losing it, violate a 
certain number of rules of honor if no one can either succeed in contesting him 
in a challenge or “putting him to shame.” Honor therefore requires the power to 
keep it. But at the same time honor gives power, because it permits the one who 
has it to violate certain rules without being disapproved of. There are rules for 
violating rules, and these rules are fundamentally “political.” The political enters 
into conflict with honor, and therefore only the man of honor—the man who 
does not risk losing his honor—can utilize it.
Hence a conflict, but also a complementarity, between honor and power, 
which explains why political power is often exercised by means of control of 
ceremonies. One is then dealing with a power that expresses itself through per-
sonal charisma, in which norms appear as facts of experience: the honor of a 
person is seen, felt, manifested. The ceremony of honor is expressed in fact, as 
Pitt-Rivers has noted, by means of a corporeal symbolism: honor is an “aura,” 
which circles the body of the man of honor and defines an inviolable, “sacred” 
space; the head of the man “honored,” the man “of respect”—symbol of his 
individuality—is the place of maximum concentration of his “sacredness,” of 
his personal charisma, his “personality.” Ceremonies frequently involve his head, 
which is uncovered and bowed; the man of high status walks “at the head,” “at 
the fore”; he is “at the head” of a social group, and so forth. The installation of 
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an individual in a position of honor is made by means of rituals focused on his 
head: the imposition of a crown, of a headdress, etc. The head of a person of rank 
cannot be touched with impunity; in Polynesia it is the object of a particularly 
rigorous taboo.
In all these ceremonies there is at play not so much reference to a “god” who 
transcends social relations as the “divinization” of one of the partners in the rela-
tionship: the partner in whom the legitimacy of power and honor—and thus its 
sanction—is manifested as a fact of experience. If the touch of the French and 
English kings cured scrofula, the touch of the Polynesian chiefs produced sick-
ness or death. In all these ceremonies, status is ratified by means of a test (Does 
charisma exist or not? Does the individual who carries out a task carry it out 
legitimately?), which directly concerns the persons and their powers, without 
which the relationship would need to pass through a third, imaginary person 
(a god).
It is naturally difficult to draw a clear distinction between “religious” rituals 
and “nonreligious” rituals. Even in Europe, attempts to lead ceremonies of honor 
back into the bosom of religion and to sanction the human hierarchy in divine 
terms have not been lacking. In one and the same society, two different ritual 
languages can coexist and interfere with one another. But in relations in which 
the ideology of honor dominates, there is only one god, one sacred thing: the 
person and his value, his charisma. Everyone possesses a bill of honor, of fame: 
everyone is therefore, in his way, a “person.” But this can be so for him only inso-
far as he “represents” his own honor, his own value, on occasions and in relation-
ships in which it is put to the test; and only insofar as he incarnates in his own 
behavior an ideal and normative personality accepted by society—insofar as he 
transforms the rules that govern society through deeds that assume a symbolic 
value in others’ experience. The person is then a person. The “ceremonial” ideol-
ogy, the ideology of honor and of fame, divinizes the man without necessarily 
referring to an imaginary god who is not already incarnate in the man himself.
SOME CEREMONIES
We may now seek to show through some examples how all the behaviors called 
“ceremonial” are more or less narrowly tied to the ideology of “honor,” “fame,” 
and “glory,” and reflect it in their structure. From what has been said up until 
now, it emerges that the existence of ceremonial behaviors is more likely in 
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hierarchized societies in which a competition for honor and rank exists. The 
examples that follow illustrate this thesis.
Hierarchy is often manifested in linguistic “ceremonial” forms, that is, in 
forms in which the lexical or stylistic choice depends on the hierarchical context 
and rules of social interaction. Linguistic behavior must then be expressive of 
the range and relationship of each partner: it is thereby “ceremonial.” One of the 
most impressive examples of the ceremonial functioning of the linguistic is of-
fered by the Javanese language, in which sometimes “the simplest conversation 
seems to be a grand ceremony” (Geertz 1960: 254).
In Javanese there exist three linguistic levels: ngoko, madya, and krama, called 
“stylemes” by Clifford Geertz. Every styleme is characterized by its own lexical 
forms. Furthermore, there are “honorific” terms, partially independent of the 
lexical triads of the three stylemes. These terms refer to persons, parts of the 
body, objects of property, human actions. They are utilized, in general, in ngoko 
and in krama. The rules are quite complicated, but suffice it to say that a Javanese 
person can choose among at least six linguistic levels:
l) the lowest level;
2) the lowest level with honorifics at an inferior level;
3) the lowest level with honorifics at a superior level;
4) the middle level;
5) the superior level;
6) the superior level with honorifics at a superior level.
For example, the phrase “will you eat rice now?” is executed this way at level 6): 
menapa spanjenengan baḍe ḍahar sekul samenika?; and this way at level 1): apa 
kowé arep mangan sega saiki? 
The linguistic choices depend on the relative social position of the speakers, 
the place in which they are speaking, the occasion, the subject of their conversa-
tion, their sex, their age, their occupation, their wealth, the family to which each 
of the speakers belongs, and finally their attitudes and individual idiosyncrasies. 
Roughly speaking, ngoko is spoken among rural people or among any persons 
who share intimate relations and the same status among them, or by a person 
of an elevated rank when speaking with a country person. It is the first form 
learned by children, but it is utilized only up to a certain age when addressing 
their parents. Madya is used among city people who do not have relations of 
friendship, and sometimes by city people when they speak with strangers of 
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their same class or with their superiors. Krama is used among aristocrats who 
do not have intimate relations. Honorifics are used by differentiating even more 
minutely the social position of the speakers and their relations.
The system is extremely complicated, but it permits the status and “honor” 
of everyone to be expressed. It also permits challenges to status, the inflicting of 
offense or dishonor by using inappropriate forms. It thus has an important “cer-
emonial” dimension because it communicates not only at the semantic level, but 
also at the “pragmatic” one. Every linguistic exchange confirms or restructures 
hierarchical relations among speakers, communicates their “honor.”
Language is also used ceremonially in other societies, but not necessarily 
at the lexical level. Among the Māori (New Zealand) speeches are the prin-
cipal component of hui, that is, of all ceremonial gatherings that happen in 
marae (“temples,” gathering places) on occasions of matrimony, funerals, inau-
gurations, acts of submission, arrivals of guests, etc. The hui are “ceremonies of 
encounter” in which the status and honor of groups that meet one another are 
expressed and put to the test in a challenge that consists of oratorical duels and 
prestations of gifts (cf. Salmond 1975). The main preoccupation of Māori is 
the acquisition and preservation of mana (prestige, honor, etc.). The hui permits 
everyone’s mana to be manifested and occasionally modified. The greater the 
distance between groups that meet one another, the more perfectly executed, 
formalized, and complicated the ceremony must be. The crucial moment is 
an oratorical challenge between the two parties. Speeches must follow precise 
rules: if they are violated, the orator and his group lose “face.” Sometimes the 
challenge is manifested in a more direct way, with a feigned violent attack (wero) 
against a person of high rank who enters into the ceremonial ring.
The orators are specialists who know myths, genealogies, and so forth, but 
they are also consummate actors. The public judges them, attributes honor and 
prestige to them, confirms or lowers their rank.
In the ceremonial sequence there are moments in which what counts is 
fidelity to traditional texts and rules, and others in which the sequence of argu-
ments to be treated is prescribed but the way of treating them is not. The per-
sonal mana of the orator can then manifest itself more easily. But in both cases 
language functions as a ceremonial, because it does not have as its principal 
function communication at the semantic level. What counts is not what is said, 
but how it is said. The mode of speaking and the choice of arguments express 
the pretension to a certain status, which the orator seeks to have legitimated 
by the public. Ceremonial is essentially a game in which the rules are used in 
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order to make the adversary lose. According to Anne Salmond, there are three 
possible strategies: 1) to make use of the option, permitted by the rules, which 
is most appropriate to the situation of encounter (social distance among par-
ties, unforeseen events, etc.). The choice of one possibility rather than another 
is indicative by itself of a certain judgement of rank relative to the parties and 
of the value of each of them; 2) to oblige the adversary to violate a rule. For 
example: an orator can utilize certain songs that the adversary had intended to 
use in his speech and which, once his turn has come, he will no longer be able 
to use. Being short of material, he risks having violated the prescribed sequence 
and being “shamed”; 3) deliberately violating a ceremonial rule, but with such 
brilliant results as to steal away the applause of those present. He who shows 
himself to be above the common rules is greatly honored.
The case of the Māori shows that ceremonial has the same structure as a 
game: it carries a challenge and a regulated conflict, but the adversaries utilize 
the rules by obtaining honor and prestige and by drawing dishonor and shame 
down upon their adversaries. Ceremonial expresses and sanctions status, but at 
the same time makes possible its modification.
Classic examples of ceremonial behavior, in which the challenge and acqui-
sition of honor are closely associated, include the potlatch of the Indians of the 
northwestern coast of North America (Canada). It consists of ceremonies in 
which groups of persons, as numerous as possible, are invited to attend a feast 
wherein the host affirms a pretension to status or assumes hereditary privi-
leges. The assumption of the title of status or privilege is validated by the guests 
who receive gifts commensurate with their status. If the gifts are insufficient 
or poorly distributed, then a consensus is not created and the host “loses face.”
Some potlatches are given at critical moments of existence: on occasions of 
birth, adoption, accession of a child to puberty, matrimony, death. Another type 
of potlatch is that given in the guise of reparation for ritual errors; to “save face” 
when events of bad luck occur which diminish the prestige of a group or an in-
dividual (the overturning of a canoe, wounding of a member of the family, birth 
of a deformed son, etc.). A third type of potlatch, the most important, consists 
of competitive ceremonies, of rivalry or vendetta, in which an individual or a 
group seeks to make an adversary lose face by crushing him under the weight 
of prestations.
Potlatch is essentially an exchange of goods in which value is measured by 
a “monetary unity”: the blanket. It is also accompanied by oratorical contests. 
However, as in language utilized ceremonially, information is not transmitted at 
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the semantic level, and thus the exchange transcends its economic function and 
expresses the status of those who participate in it. What is ceremonially com-
municated are not just words and objects but, by means of words and objects, 
relations among members of society.
Boas defines potlatch as “the method of acquiring rank” (1966: 77). As has 
been seen, in order to obtain rank it is necessary to accumulate wealth so as to 
distribute it among the greatest possible number of persons. Wealth gives honor, 
but only insofar as it is ceded to others. The life of a Kwakiutl is a “career” in 
which names, privileges, and titles successively change and, above all, one makes 
“a name” as a generous man. From adolescence boys compete among themselves 
in the system of gifts and counter-gifts, and are incited by their parents to beat 
their rivals. Individuals, clans, chiefs, and tribes seek to “crush” one another re-
ciprocally (one of the ceremonies is called precisely “crushing the name of the 
rival”), according to complex ceremonial rules. The recipient of a gift cannot 
refuse it, but must instead reciprocate after a certain amount of time with one 
hundred percent interest, if he does not want to “lose face.” Every prestation is 
therefore a challenge, but certain prestations have a directly competitive and 
conflictual character. In this case a rival is invited (with his clan or tribe) to 
a feast, and they are given a great number of blankets. The guest must accept 
them, but cannot do so before having placed on the heap of blankets an equal 
quantity plus interest of one hundred percent. A similar procedure is utilized 
when a canoe is given to an adversary. In both cases the challenged must vali-
date his own rank and his own name by responding adequately to the challenge: 
otherwise he loses and it is the adversary who increases his status.
The most complex form of challenge is the acquisition of a copper plate. 
Copper plates are used along the whole north Pacific coast, divided into two 
sections: on the bottom there is a part in the form of a “T,” and on the top an 
engraved part (the “face”) with a figure that represents the emblem of owner-
ship. The copper plate represents the value of an enormous quantity of blankets: 
it is worth as much wealth as was spent on the feast in which it was obtained. 
The more times it has been sold, the greater its value; one copper plate that bore 
the significant name “all plates were ashamed to look at it” was worth 7,500 
blankets.
The capacity to acquire a copper plate is therefore a sign of great distinction. 
Copper plates are always sold to rivals and often to enemy tribes. Not accepting 
the acquisition of it equals a recognition of the incapacity to pay for it, and this 
casts a shadow over the “name” and “honor” of the tribe or clan.
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Rivalry has its strongest expression in the destruction of property. Potlatch 
is thus an exchange of destructions, or of goods destroyed, which proceeds until 
one of the rivals abandons the match and recognizes himself as beaten, as infe-
rior: his name “is broken,” that of the victor is raised.
The challenge to break a copper plate is one of the most feared. A chief can 
break one of them and give the fragments to the rival. If he wants to keep his 
prestige intact he must in turn break a copper plate of equal or superior value, 
and offer it to his adversary with the fragments received shortly beforehand. The 
adversary can then pay him again with the destroyed copper plate. If, however, 
the challenged one tosses his copper plate into the sea, he acquires a superior 
prestige, for he shows himself so rich as to disdain compensation. He who suc-
ceeds in acquiring all the fragments of a destroyed copper plate on one of these 
occasions, and thereafter the dispersed bits in the exchanges, can reconstruct it 
and thus give to it an immense value since each destruction immediately sym-
bolizes passages of enormous quantities of wealth.
On other occasions, potlatch is associated with exchanges of direct offenses 
to throw discredit onto the rival: during the feast, the guest is put beside the 
hearth and risks being roasted by flames that leap out of the enormous quanti-
ties of fish oil that the challenger puts on the fire. The challenger provokes the 
challenged with songs, which tease the challenged and proudly exalt the chal-
lenger’s own ancestors and his own clan. Finally he offers an enormous spoon 
full of oil to the guests: if they accept it and drink the contents, he recognizes 
himself as having been beaten; if he refuses it, the competition continues.
If some particulars surrounding the development of potlatch have been 
given, it is because the institution perfectly illustrates all aspects of ceremonial: 
the acquisition of honor by means of a challenge and of the defeat of the rival; 
the idea that the challenge allows one to put the contenders to the test and to 
reveal their intrinsic value, thus justifying their pretenses to honorability, their 
relative rank; the role of the spectators and of public opinion, which functions 
by judgements; the necessity for the chiefs to make a continual display of their 
value, of their wealth, of being good actors always on the scene, of “representing” 
and incarnating certain ideal personalities.
It does not seem, on the other hand, that potlatch has a true and proper re-
ligious dimension or that this is even important. The ancestors and the gods can 
intervene, but as emblems, as motives for pride and challenges among the living. 
The latter can sometimes impersonate ancestors, by wearing masks of them, but 
only because the man of rank must incarnate the ideal personality symbolized 
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by his ancestor. Legitimately wearing the mask means being a person, giving 
proof of a value equal to that of the ancestor. In the ceremonial of potlatch, the 
“mystical” sanction is immanent in the human relationship: it is the charisma, 
the honor of the parties, recognized by a public whose approval was won by 
force of gifts, not by that of the gods. The “gods” of a ceremonial are the men 
who are “gods” for other men.
* * *
The opposition between “ceremonial” and “religious ritual” remains an ideal be-
cause it is difficult to find, in the majority of cases, a “pure” type of ceremonial 
or religious rite. The intermixing of the two forms of ritual is frequent; they are 
distinguished more by their conceptualization in certain cultures than by a radi-
cal difference in their procedures. To fail to recognize this ideological difference 
in societies in which it appears important would mean precluding understand-
ing of the specific characters of numerous ritual behaviors and the ideology of 
“honor” and “prestige,” which puts the accent on the intrinsic value of persons 




Cosmogonic myths and order
Translated from the Italian by Sarah Hill and revised by Alice Elliot
You deep thinkers
ask yourself in your own hearts,
what base did he stand on when he set up the worlds?
— Rig Veda 10.41
COSMOLOGY AND COSMOGONY
“Order,” as Nicola Abbagnano (1993: 638) says, is “any relationship between 
two or more objects that may be expressed by a rule.” But as a phenomenon 
of consciousness, order cannot be reduced to this definition. The fact that our 
sense of order turns on relations that—at least in theory—can be described with 
rules does not mean that the formulation of these rules is necessary to order. 
We feel ourselves in the presence of order whenever we are able to anticipate 
future experience to some degree based on past experience. This capacity for 
anticipation exists in practice, that is, it is embodied in certain activities and 
cannot be easily separated from these. Indeed, at its most extreme it is insepara-
ble from them, as shown, for example, by the ultimate irreducibility of aesthetic 
1. Doniger O’Flaherty 1981: 40.
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knowledge to discursive knowledge, or of the sense of order that derives from 
listening to a piece of music to that which derives from its translation into rules 
of composition. 
Whether or not they exist in the form of rules, two types of relations are 
fundamental to the experience (and idea) of order: serial relations (the relation 
between before and after) and relations between parts of a whole (and there-
fore also between the whole and its parts).2 The first type is obviously prepon-
derant, given the intrinsically temporal nature of our experience, in which one 
thing follows another, one thing produces another, and given that our actions 
and our own personal identity exist in a form of succession.3 This preponder-
ance, this immediate evidence of the relations between before and after as the 
source of intelligibility, explains why in pre-scientific cultures cosmology, that 
is, the description of the order of the world in its widest expanse, for the most 
part takes the form of “cosmogony.” In other words, in contrast with scientific 
cosmologies, which explain the order of the world legislatively (invoking the 
constant operation of eternally valid laws), mythical cosmologies explain it 
narratively—as the result of a process. While for science order is necessary 
because it is eternal, for myth it is contingent because it has not always been 
there, and therefore will not always be there. Rather than the atemporal intel-
ligibility of the law, myth prefers the temporal intelligibility of experience. 
But it should be added that this contrast is only relative. “Myth” and “science” 
are ideal notions that are often difficult to discover as such in reality.4 Many 
cosmogonies have surprisingly “scientific” aspects to them, and science is not 
2. A third type of relations of order—rank—seems to me to be fundamentally 
reducible to the second type. 
3. We see ourselves as identical to that which we were only inasmuch as we are its 
closest approximation (cf. Nozick, 1981: 36–37). In other words, among the various 
temporal chains that constitute our experience, we recognize one which we identify 
with the “I.”
4. I do not intend to discuss here what myth is—if indeed a class or family of 
phenomena that might all be brought back to a useful definition of “myth” even 
exists. Suffice it to say that myth is understood here as a traditional narration with 
explanatory and legitimating values. Myth is authoritative and therefore only those 
who are authorized can give voice to it: its use is rarely free. In other ways, myth is 
not differentiated from other forms of traditional and even nontraditional narration 
(given that traditional elements exist even in the most apparently revolutionary 
narrations). Its fundamental intelligibility and its authoritative nature connect it 
instead—horribile dictu—to history or at least to the “monumental history” of which 
Friedrich Nietzsche spoke. 
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immune to myth, particularly when it makes itself cosmogonic (cf. Feyerabend 
1975: 295–309). It should also be said from the outset that if mythical cos-
mologies are narrative because they are dominated by order as series, no nar-
rative is reducible purely and simply to this order. Its own dominance requires 
that it subsumes other principles of order, and form complex interweavings 
with them. 
MYTHICAL IMAGES OF ORIGINS
The majority of cosmogonies situate two contrasting but complementary prin-
ciples at the origins of the cosmos. These can be found excessively close to one 
another—and must then be distanced—or excessively distant, in which case 
they must be brought closer together. The final result is identical: an optimal 
combination of conjunction and separation, which is precisely the fundamental 
principle of the order of the world.
The two principles are often either the sky and the earth,5 or the sky and 
the ocean,6 or salt and fresh water.7 These couples almost always have a sexual 
connotation. That is, they exemplify the opposition of male and female, which is 
a principle of order and at the same time is generative in an extremely general-
ized way. In this sense, the origin is not only the cosmos’ initial state but also its 
most general principle: the relation of the parts to the whole is temporalized. 
Or, more precisely, it is temporalized if the process that follows the original 
state manifests, at least in part, the sexual principle. Otherwise, sexual duality is 
positioned at the beginning as the premise of a negation. For example, the cas-
tration of Uranus in the Hesiodic cosmogony (Theogony, vv. 177–82) constitutes, 
among other things, a negation of the purely sexual principle of creation and 
so announces the kingdom of Zeus, the sovereign who creates and maintains 
the order of the cosmos with more varied means than mere sexuality. In short, 
it is already evident that myth temporalizes relations of inclusion and logical 
5. Widespread across the entire world, for example among the Māori of New Zealand 
(Best 1976: 83–87), in eastern Indonesia (Roeder: 1948: 99–101), in Japan (Aston 
1972: 1–2), and in Mesopotamia (Bottéro and Kramer 1989: 471–87).
6. See Eliade (1959: 479, 487–9); Williamson (1933, I: 33, 48, 78 [Samoa], 55 [Tonga], 
18 [Fakaofo]). 
7. A very important motif in Mesopotamia, for obvious reasons (Bottéro and Kramer: 
1989: 656). 
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negation and that it is not merely reducible to the relation between before and 
after, as it exists in experience. We will return to this point.
These originary couples differ from one another by virtue of the degree of 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of the terms that constitute them. The greatest 
degree of heterogeneity is found in the couple sky/earth, a lesser degree in the 
couple sky/ocean (which seem to be the mirror images of one another), and 
the least in the couple salt water/fresh water (two forms of the same substance 
rather than two different substances). Aside from the representation of the ini-
tial state as an irreducible sexual duality, what emerges is the idea of a monism 
founded on a more abstract principle—represented by water, an element with-
out a form of its own but for this very reason capable of assuming every possible 
form and at the same time the fertile element par excellence.8
Because of the sky’s apparent curvature, and because of the horizon’s circu-
larity, sky and earth, water above and water below are often conceived as the two 
halves of a spherical cosmos.9 From here to conceiving of the cosmos explicitly 
as an egg, and thus as a generative “sphere,” is a short step, and one which 
has been made in almost every region of the world (See Eliade 1959: 479–82; 
Williamson 1933, I: 19). The cosmic egg constitutes the point of greatest unity 
of the two sexual halves of the cosmos—a unity that implies, ultimately, their 
dissolution. A less extreme solution is the representation of the beginning as an 
androgyne (Eliade 1959: 481), one that does not abolish the sexual distinction, 
but renders it a priori impossible to turn coitus into the representation of unity. 
Correlatively, the process of generation is desexualized: the androgyn procreates 
through extraction of the non-sexual parts of its own body—namely, through 
dismemberment. But the gigantic body from whose dismemberment the cos-
mos derives is not necessarily characterized by androgyny, as the Scandinavian 
myth of Ymir (ibid.) or the Indian myth of Puru a (the Man) demonstrate 
(Doniger O’Flaherty 1981: 29–31).
At this point, it should be clear that the various representations of ori-
gins form not separate types, but rather a family of phenomena with unsta-
ble boundaries, and thus often coexist (and not just as possibilities) within the 
8. Note the similarity between this idea of originary water—well represented in 
Mesopotamia—and the cosmology of Thales, according to which the ultimate 
reality is water (Diogenes Laertius, Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers, I: 27).
9. For example, in Chinese and Japanese mythology (Aston 1972: 1–2).
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same culture. Since these types all have common dimensions, it is sufficient to 
accentuate one of them to the detriment of the others to transform one repre-
sentation into another. For example, if I accentuate unity a little with respect to 
duality, the opposed terms are transformed—from sky and earth they become 
two forms of water. A further accentuation of unity leads to the desexualiza-
tion of the opposites, or of the form of their union (from coitus to androgyny). 
Ultimately, duality and sexuality disappear altogether—as in various versions of 
the cosmic egg theory. These transformations are not just theoretical stratagems: 
they contribute to making the coexistence of different images in the same cul-
ture or the passage from one image to another recognizable over the course of 
time. The accentuation of unity to the detriment of duality—and accentuation 
of dismemberment (and, more generally, of creation) to the detriment of pro-
creation—is historically documented in Mesopotamia and its sphere of cultural 
influence, as well as in Vedic and Brahmanic India. 
The representations that I have so far considered are all concrete—exten-
sions to the entire cosmos of phenomena that are sufficiently general to assume 
a certain explanatory weight at the global level. But mythic cosmogonies are 
capable of abstraction. For example, in Polynesia the origin of the cosmos is 
often situated in a generic “Darkness” or “Silence” (denoting the absence of ac-
tivity) or even in “Nothing” (Williamson 1933, I: 3, 19–22; Best 1967, I: 58–60). 
Elsewhere, the initial state is characterized by the symmetry and reversibility of 
the relations of cause and effect—symptoms of the intrinsic unthinkability of 
an ultimate cause. 
Particularly vivid examples are found in the hymns of the Rig Veda: “From 
Aditī (the female creative principle) was born Dak a (the male creative princi-
ple) and from Dak a Aditī was born” (Rig Veda 10.72.3–4). The Creator creates 
water and water creates the Creator (Doniger O’Flaherty 1981: 26). Puru a 
(the Man), the primordial man, is dismembered in order to create everything, 
including those who sacrifice him. “From him (man) Virāj was born, and from 
Virāj came the Man” (ibid.: 30). The gods, who receive the sacrifice, make sac-
rifices to the gods—and to the sacrifice itself. “In the late Veda, the father is 
expressly identified with the son” (ibid.: 27). The world of beginnings is char-
acterized by the most total logical circularity: Man presupposes Man; the gods 
presuppose the gods; the sky and the earth presuppose the sky and the earth; 
heat presupposes heat; every origin is a derivative and every derivative an origin. 
Perhaps Russell read the Rig Veda, or perhaps his path crossed that of the wise 
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Indians in the dark wood where all paths of thought inevitably end up.10 At that 
point some fall silent, others recount myths. Still others ask themselves, like 
Putouarey: “And what if the myth were the truth? Ah! My reason tells me no, 
and no again, a thousand times no . . . of course, I don’t believe. But I doubt, and 
my doubt is in favor of the myth” (Larbaud [1924] 1991: 207).
COSMOGONIC PROCESSES
Representations of beginnings are ultimately inseparable from representations 
of the cosmogonic processes that follow them. As I have indicated, if the point 
of departure is a state of separation, a mediation is necessary. This takes a variety 
of forms. For example, if the sky and the earth are originally separated, the sky 
will have to unite with the earth to make it fertile, and then to be separated 
from it so that their offspring may grow (Williamson 1993, I: 41–45). Or, if the 
initial state is the separation of sky and ocean, they will need to be mediated by 
fishing the earth from the bottom of the ocean,11 or by throwing stones or sand 
from the sky.12 Or else the celestial gods will stir up the ocean with a stick, and 
islands will develop from the brackish foam that remains attached to the stick.13
But the most common cosmogonic process is one of differentiation by sepa-
ration and division. We are speaking here of the obvious correlate of every rep-
resentation of the beginning of the cosmos as a unity of that which is normally 
and presently divided: the sexes, the sky and the earth, the earth and the water, 
fresh water and salt water and, later on, gods and men, the king and his subjects, 
social classes, “us” and “them.” In such a case, cosmogony is nothing more than 
the manifest inversion of its latent conceptual presupposition: the diminution 
or obliteration of differences necessary for thinking about origin. The world is 
10. The original Italian is a play on words on the first lines of Dante’s Inferno: “Forse 
Russell lesse il Rig Veda o forse il suo cammino si è incrociato con quello dei 
saggi indiani nella selva oscura dove tutti I cammini del pensiero inevitabilmenta 
finscono.” —Ed.
11. By a divine fisherman, like Maui and others in Polynesia (Williamson 1993, I: 
32–41), or by a bird that descends from the sky and dives into the sea, bringing back 
sand from its depths (Eliade 1959: 488). 
12. Which is often conceived, it should be remembered, as a stone vault (cf. Williamson 
1933, I: 77). 
13. Cf., for example, the Japanese Nihongi (Aston 1972: 10–12). 
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unmade mentally in order to be remade through narrative. Only in this way can 
it acquire meaning within a way of thinking where the deed is the paradigm of 
meaning.
The originary cosmos can divide itself spontaneously (thus demonstrating 
the immanence of a certain generative principle, for example procreation), but, 
more often, it resists all attempts to break its unity. This resistance thereby pro-
vides proof of the superiority of the force that finally trumps it—hence guaran-
teeing the existence of the differentiated world. For example, in a famous Māori 
myth, Tane (the personification of the tree) manages to separate Rangi (Sky) 
and Papa (Earth) by pushing with his feet against the former and with his head 
against the latter (Schrempp 1992: 58). Or, in the even more famous Hesiodic 
myth, Cronus castrates Uranus (Sky) to detach him from Gaia (Earth). The 
stronger the originary unity, the stronger the motif of dismemberment—espe-
cially when unity is represented by a single body rather than two united bod-
ies. Thus, in the Babylonian Enûma Elîsh, Marduk produces the fundamental 
divisions of the cosmos by cutting his female ancestor Tiamat, personification 
of the primordial Ocean, into pieces (Bottéro and Kramer 1989: 662–63). In 
Scandinavian cosmogony, the world was produced by cutting up the malformed 
body of the giant Ymir—imperfectly divided, like a premature fetus; in Vedic 
cosmogony it is Puru a, the originary Man, who is mutilated in order to pro-
duce not only the natural world, but also the social one. A final example: in the 
cosmogony of Mangaia the originary being (who lives at the bottom of the cos-
mic coconut) differentiates himself through self-mutilation. From the six pieces 
of flesh that he tears from himself are born, one by one, six sons, corresponding 
to an equal number of provinces of the cosmos (Gill 1876: 1011).14 In all these 
myths the idea of division is combined with that of sacrifice, that is with the 
idea that order has a price that must be paid with what is most precious: life.
If in Mangaia the motif of the primordial egg (or more precisely, the coco-
nut) is combined with those of mutilation and generation, in a myth collected 
in Porapora and Mo’orea (Society Islands) it is associated with a cosmogonic 
process modeled on the birth of a bird. The myth narrates that the god Ta’aroa 
was formed inside an egg of multiple shells laid one over the other and that he 
remained closed in it for countless ages until, tired of his solitude, he broke the 
14. The theme of self-mutilation is combined with that of fishing for islands in a myth 
from Tongareva. The god Vatea tries in vain to fish for them until, tearing a piece of 
flesh from himself and using it as bait, he succeeds (Williamson 1933, I: 38). 
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shells. One shell became the sky, the other the foundations of the earth, whose 
plants were born from the yellow and red feathers that Ta’aroa shook away from 
his body (Henry 1928: 336–68).
The cosmogonic process is sometimes modeled on verbal magic. An example 
universally noted is offered by the first chapter of the Genesis: “God said: ‘Let 
there be light.’ And there was light” (Genesis 1, 3).15 But here the magic word is 
also (and perhaps above all) a political word: the world obeys God as subjects 
obey their sovereign—and indeed the story of creation justifies His sovereignty 
(or rather that of His representatives, the priests of the second temple who drew 
up the myth) over the Israelites (cf. Burke 1970: 174–83, 186). The implicitly 
political character of the creation of order by means of the word is clear in the 
Babylonian poem Enûma Elîsh, where Marduk creates the order of the world 
not only by commanding the elements directly, but also and above all by com-
manding his subordinate gods to work for him. Cosmogenesis, therefore, takes 
the same form of political action (Bottéro and Kramer 1989: 488, 496, 655). 
Like a human sovereign, the divine sovereign acts on the world through the 
word—the word through which he elaborates a plan and through which he or-
ders his divine and human subjects to realize it (ibid.: 638). Or rather, according 
to this particular cosmogonic story, men are created to substitute for the lesser 
gods in the work of supporting the su-perior gods, and, through these, of the 
cosmos that depends on them.
But the idea of a creation explicitly or implicitly modeled on sovereignty—
where the sovereign’s job is essentially that of command—exists only where 
there exists the experience of the State. Much more widespread is an idea of 
creation modeled on artisanal, agricultural, and even predatory activities. An 
example can be found in Genesis itself, and in particular in its second chapter 
(Genesis 2, 5 ff.), which contains an account of creation very different from (and 
older than) the one of the first chapter. Here God, who is called Yahweh instead 
of Elohim as in the first chapter, creates the world not like a sovereign, with 
the word, but with his hands like an artisan (he molds Adam from the earth), a 
farmer (he plants the garden of Eden), and perhaps even a bonesetter (he cre-
ates Eve from Adam’s rib). Elsewhere, creation is modeled on fishing, as we have 
seen, but also on hunting and, above all, on war. Indeed, war, and more generally 
conflict, is one of the great cosmogonic motors. It is found again, for example, 
15. This idea is in turn derived from Babylonian cosmogony (Bottéro and Kramer 1969: 
661) and from the so-called theology of Menfi (Knight 1985: 142).
75COSMOGONIC MYTHS AND ORDER
in Mesopotamian cosmogonies, in the Hesiodic cosmogony, in Indo-European 
and Polynesian cosmogonies, and even in the so-called naturalistic cosmogonies 
of the Presocratics. 
Another fairly widespread cosmogonic procedure is procreation. In almost 
all cosmogonies there is a procreative aspect or stage. Cosmogony is then re-
duced to genealogy. The reason for this elective affinity between cosmogony and 
genealogy appears obvious. Procreation is the most elemental, intrinsic, and, at 
the same time, generalized form of creativity. If doing is the fundamental source 
of meaning, then that doing which is realized through sexuality has a quality 
that is immediately obvious. The entire cosmos is made, elementally, in the act 
of reproduction—which is not just replication, but creation, since the offspring 
is never identical to its parents. From here, the possibility of extending the ge-
nealogical-reproductive model to relations between species emerges. Genealogy 
thus acquires an evolutionary character: the simple generates the complex. But 
there is more. Genealogy resolves the opposition between the two principal 
forms of order. Since it is productive, the most elementary form of the rela-
tion between the parts of a whole (the sexualized couple) is realized in a series 
of replicas that are infinitely different from the couple itself. In sum, reducing 
the entire cosmos to genealogy is the most elementary and persuasive way to 
represent the unity of the world as the expression of a single order. Multiplicity 
is reduced to a unity that is resolved in the most fundamental form of intelligi-
bility: succession. Cosmology is wholly translated into cosmogony, order as the 
synchronic relation of parts into order as temporal succession. 
The total reduction of the cosmos to the genealogical principle is, however, a 
rare phenomenon, as cosmogonic thought tends to combine different principles. 
For the most part, genealogical cosmogonies have been neglected by scholars 
because they are seen as less interesting than those that contain the feats of gods 
and heroes.16 Perhaps the most complex and totalizing genealogical cosmogo-
nies are found in Polynesia, the most grandiose example being the Hawaiian 
song conventionally entitled Kumulipo or “beginning in the dark.”17 This song 
situates humanity, and more precisely the royal Hawaiian lineage, at the final 
16. Such is the case with the Sumerian texts which, unlike later texts in Akkadian 
(such as the Athrasis and the Enûma Elîsh) privilege procreation (and therefore 
genealogical description) over creation (Bottéro and Kramer 1989: 471–87). Many 
of these texts have not even been translated. 
17. Cf. the edition and partial translation in Beckwith (1951), and a brief analysis in 
Valeri (1985: 4–8). 
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stage of a long series generated by the successive coupling of the principal spe-
cies and other forms of being in an increasing order of complexity—so much so 
that one can speak of an evolutionist cosmogony.18
Evolutionist cosmogonies do not, however, necessarily have a sexualized 
form (cf. Frazer 1967). In reality, we are talking about conceptual genealogies 
which move from the abstract and general to the concrete and particular, com-
bining in a complex form ontological, epistemological, and orectic categories. 
Here, once again, Polynesia provides abundant and extraordinarily complex ex-
amples. One of the simplest examples, a text collected in Samoa, describes a 
process that begins with Nothing (Leai), from which emanates Fragrance (odor 
is something and nothing at the same time and as such appears frequently as 
an element of transition between nothing and being); from Fragrance is born 
Dust (more concrete than Fragrance, but equally undifferentiated), and from 
this is born the Perceivable (we now move on to an elementary cognitive cat-
egory); then the Obtainable (the presupposition of every practice or action); 
then Earth, then High Rocks (contrast of the horizontal and the vertical); then 
Small Stones (mediation of the preceding contrast); then Mountains. At this 
point, the first “sexual” union takes place—between Mountains and Changeable 
Meeting-Place (that is, the antithesis between stability and instability). The re-
sult is a “daughter,” Piece of Dust, who marries her vegetal counterpart: Down 
of the Sugar Cane’s Flower. From their marriage three sons and a daughter, who 
appear to be the first human beings, are born (Turner 1884: 3).
The motifs and processes that I have taken into consideration are enough 
to suggest that mythic cosmogonies extend the fundamental experiences of the 
order of daily life to the entire world: the experience of one’s own body and 
those of other living beings (as in the case of reproduction), the experience of 
human and animal behavior (struggles and agonisms, the chick that emerges 
from the eggshell, the marine birds that dive into the sea and bring back sand 
or algae from the bottom), the experience of political organization (command) 
and ritual (sacrifice, magic). These experiences all have a fundamental structure 
in common: they are processes and actions, and so they are characterized by 
the succession in time of cause and effect. Their extension to the entire cosmos 
means precisely that the order of the universe is apprehended narratively and 
not synoptically or tabularly, that is, as cosmogony and not as cosmology.
18. Cf. Williamson (1933, I). This is a kind of example of the great chain of being idea 
(Lovejoy 1936), which evidently does not exist only in Western thought. 
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The fact that cosmogonic myth utilizes daily experiences of causality does 
not, however, mean that it reproduces these exactly. Rather, its outcomes are 
often in conflict with those of experience exactly because, as we have seen, 
cosmogonic myth condenses, within the dimension of time, relations that are 
not themselves temporal. The contrast between before and after manifests and 
sustains conceptual, religious, moral, and even political structures. The sensible 
elements do not appear in myth as such, but rather inasmuch as they allow for 
the embodiment and symbolization of principles and relations. The order of 
myth—like that of art—exists therefore in a state of tension with experience: it 
never renounces it, but it never leaves it exactly as it is. This is demonstrated by 
a well-known text: the already cited cosmogonic story of the first chapter of the 
Genesis (1–2, 1–4).
STRUCTURE AND TEMPORALIZATION
In this myth, the god called Elohim19 does not create the cosmos ex nihilo,20 but 
by differentiating a pre-existent unformed mass—“the waters”—on which he 
breathes a “powerful wind” (Genesis 1, 2–3). We are presented here with a well-
known representation of the beginning of the cosmos: the primordial ocean 
surmounted by a sky that is not yet still (the “firmament”) but rather has the 
unstable form of the wind. The process of the division of this initial mass takes 
place over six days, divided into two periods of three days each. On the first day, 
light is separated from darkness, and thus day from night. On the second day, 
Elohim, exactly like Marduk, separates water from water—that is, he creates 
a solid celestial vault (the firmament) between the water below and the water 
above (from which rain comes). The third day is characterized by two successive 
divisions: the separation of earth and water under the sky; and the separation 
of the earth from its products: vegetation. On the fourth day, the sun and the 
moon are created with the other stars “to separate day from night and serve as 
signs for feast-days and for the days and the years” (Genesis 1, 14–15). On the 
fifth day, the creatures of the water and those that fly beneath the vault of the 
19. Elohim is actually a plural form and seems for this reason to be a remnant of 
polytheism (Burke 1970: 204; cf. Knight 1985: 141). 
20. The idea of creation ex nihilo appears much later, in the second century bc. 
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sky are created. On the sixth day the terrestrial animals are created and finally 
man and woman. 
The systematicity and symmetry of this narrative make the fact that it con-
tains an absurdity stand out even more: light (with the contrast between day 
and night) is created on the first day, while its sources, the sun and the other 
stars, are created on the third. Furthermore, the vegetation, whose development 
depends, as all farmers know, on the sun, is created before the sun. Paradoxically, 
the myth that ought to justify the order of the world seems to contradict both 
itself and the very experience of the world. Is this an absurd myth, or one that 
exposes the absurdity of confusing the succession of before and after of myth 
with that of experience?
Leo Strauss (1981) and Edmund Leach (1969) have noted independently 
of one another that the six days of creation are really two parallel periods of 
three days. The clearest sign of this parallelism is that day and night are sepa-
rated twice: on the first and the fourth days.21 In short, creation seems to have 
happened twice. Nevertheless, the parallelism of the two periods highlights a 
fundamental contrast that was brilliantly identified by Strauss. The separations 
created in the first three days are all static; those created in the last three are 
dynamic. In effect, in the first period, light is separated from darkness, the water 
above from the water below, the earth from the water, and vegetation from the 
earth. Once moved by God (that is, separated from one another), these things 
do not move again—rather, they must not move. During the second part of 
creation, on the contrary, the principle of separation is that of local motion 
(separation with respect to a place): stars move in the sky, animals and man 
move in their respective spaces.
The fundamental preoccupation of the myth is therefore that of organizing 
the fundamental phenomena of the cosmos on the basis of a hierarchical op-
position between stasis and dynamism. In fact, as Strauss demonstrates, given 
that God is essentially movement in this story, the mobile is superior to the 
immobile. Furthermore, the more a being is mobile, or the less it is static, the 
closer it gets to God. Man, who is characterized by the maximum mobility, and 
therefore liberty, is created in the image of God. The stars—which move, but 
21. Strauss maintains that the third and sixth days are also structurally identical. The 
reason given is that the third and sixth days are the only ones which present double 
creations. But in reality, there is a double creation on the fifth day too (birds in the 
air and fish in the sea.)
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not freely, since they are constrained by their orbits—are inferior to animals. In 
their devaluation, which contrasts with the Greek and Babylonian overvalua-
tion, Strauss sees an awareness of the risk that stars may compete with the single 
God. Static things are also hierarchized in relation to the privilege accorded 
to motion. Light and shadow are created first, since they are the most static 
realities, while vegetation, which is at the limit between static and dynamic, is 
created at the end of the static period of creation, and so just before the stars, 
which represent the inferior form of motion.
In short, a hierarchical structure is temporalized in myth: the static pre-
cedes the dynamic, and the relatively more static, or less dynamic, precedes 
the relatively less static, or more dynamic. Since it has a privileged position in 
consciousness, temporal succession possesses an obviousness that other kinds 
of succession do not: the latter are reduced to the former. But in this process 
of reduction of a hierarchical series to a temporal series, there necessarily 
emerge conflicts with experience, with the relations between cause and effect 
as they are perceived in the temporal flux of consciousness, where the sun pre-
cedes light because it is its cause. In the biblical myth, light instead precedes 
the sun, as that which is static precedes that which is dynamic in a hierarchy 
of progressively superior values.22 Analogously, vegetation, which does not 
move, or which moves less than the sun that nourishes it, must precede it in 
such a hierarchy, and, given that this hierarchy is temporalized, precede it in 
time. 
Myth therefore has a paradoxical character: since it is narrative, its predomi-
nant form is temporal succession; but structures of equivalence, implication or 
logical inclusion, and above all hierarchies of values, which are not temporal, are 
also expressed in this form. It would, however, be erroneous to deduce from this, 
in the way of Leach and fundamentally even of Lévi-Strauss, that the temporal 
dimension is extrinsic to myth, because it is reducible to a communicative fact: 
one thing has to be said after another; verbal communication is necessarily lin-
ear. It seems to me, on the contrary, that many mythic structures cannot be read 
indifferently in any and all directions. Cosmogonic myth, in particular, is firmly 
22. It should be noted that this is my explanation, not Strauss’. For Strauss, the creation 
of light is at the beginning of creation because light symbolizes separation. But in 
reality, god separates with the word, not with light. Light is not used to separate the 
water above from the water below, or the earth from the sea, or vegetation from the 
earth. My explanation seems to me to be more consonant with the contrast between 
static and dynamic specified by Strauss, which I have liberally refashioned here. 
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orientated, because it is a movement from the simple to the complex, from the 
general to the particular, and above all from that which is presupposed to that 
which presupposes it. Precisely for this reason, it has an elective affinity with 
temporal succession, which is the most orientated form of experience. Just as 
the qualities of gold make it suitable to become the general equivalent of value, 
without however being reducible to that value, so the qualities of the temporal 
series make it suitable to become the general equivalent for the logical relations 
of myth, without however being confused with these. In other words, the tem-
poral form of myth is not irreducible; what is irreducible is the persuasive power 
that it lends to the multiple forms that intersect in myth, as in every other kind 
of poetic production. 
COSMOLOGY AND SOCIETY 
What, finally, of the relationship between cosmogonic myth and that part of ex-
perience that includes social and political life? As is well known, the Durkheim-
ian school maintained that social structure provides the model for thinking of 
the cosmos. The order of nature would be modeled on that of society. This thesis 
was taken up by Vernant (1969) in a justly famous essay. Vernant identifies 
mythic cosmogonies with myths of sovereignty—that is, with the creation as it 
is described in the Enûma Elîsh, in Genesis, or in Hesiod’s Theogony. The world 
is not intrinsically, and therefore spontaneously, ordered, but is, on the contrary, 
intrinsically chaotic. It must be ordered by a force which is external to it, by a 
god who dictates laws to it, by a sovereign who commands it. For this reason, 
the diagnostic characteristic of mythic cosmogonies, says Vernant (ibid.: 112), is 
the distinction between origin and order, between, 
that which comes first from the temporal point of view and that which comes 
first from the point of view of power, between the principle that is chronologi-
cally at the origin of the world and the beginning that presides over its present 
order.
By contrast, in the naturalistic philosophy of the Ionian philosophers the same 
principle of order holds from the beginning to the end of the cosmos. Order, 
rather than chaos, is spontaneous. There is no ordering sovereign, and there is 
no difference between origin and order.
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Mankind, the divine, and the world form a unified, homogenous universe, all 
on the same level; they are the parts or aspects of a single and same physis that 
puts the same forces into play everywhere, that manifests the same life-force. 
(ibid.: 101)
Furthermore, it is not, as in mythic cosmogonies, the beginning “that illumi-
nates and transfigures the quotidian; it is the quotidian that renders the begin-
ning intelligible by providing models for understanding how the world had 
been formed and ordered” (ibid.: 101).
According to Vernant, this contrast between cosmogonies corresponds to a 
contrast between political forms. Cosmogonies “of sovereignty” are the coun-
terpart of a social order produced and personified by the king: the divine king 
in the cosmos corresponds to the human king in society. Naturalistic cosmogo-
nies correspond to the impersonal order immanent in all the citizens of the 
democratic city-state. In short, social and cosmic order depends in one case on 
the dominion of one part over the rest; in the other case, on the equilibrium 
between the parts. Historically, this contrast between hierarchy and equality is 
found in Greece between the Mycenaean monarchy (in turn re-echoing Eastern 
models) and the isonomia of the classical period. Free Science in a free State: 
Vernant serves up in a Durkheimian sauce the foundation myth of the liberal 
West in its two dimensions—political and cognitive. It is not the first time that 
a beautiful theory has been spoiled by a few ugly facts. The ugly facts in this 
case are numerous. Just for starters, there is no synchronism between demo-
cratic reforms and the birth of naturalistic philosophy in Greece.23 Also, the 
Ionian philosophers’ naturalistic cosmogonies are much less different from the 
myths of sovereignty than they appear to Vernant.24 In any case, it is arbitrary 
23. As is known, Cleisthenes’ democratic reform took place at the end of the sixth 
century, while the philosophy of Thales and Anaximander is situated in the first 
half of the same century. Furthermore, Cleisthenes’ reform was in Athens, while the 
Ionian philosophers lived in Miletus. In a subsequent essay, Vernant (1974, I: 215 
ff ) attempted to demonstrate that these temporal and local discrepancies have no 
importance, but his arguments are not, to me, totally convincing. 
24. The very idea that the real world must be explained as the result of a process of 
differentiation from an originary “unlimited” apeiron is a presupposition that 
Anaximander derives from mythic cosmogonies, and that does not have any basis in 
Vernant’s “quotidian.” Furthermore, the unlimited is conceived as being intrinsically 
gifted with movement because alive. It is therefore equivalent to the sovereign 
gods of mythology; the only true difference is that it is depersonalized. Another 
82 CLASSIC CONCEPTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY
to identify these myths of sovereignty with mythic cosmogonies tout court. The 
latter are extremely varied and cannot be reduced to a single formula, as we 
have seen. Many of the characteristics that Vernant attributes to naturalistic 
philosophy are also found in types of mythic cosmogony that he does not take 
into consideration. Finally, and above all, if it is true that in Mesopotamia or 
ancient Greece sovereign cosmogony corresponded to a political life where the 
sovereign dominated, this correlation is not necessarily found in other parts of 
the world.25
The two last points seem to me particularly important. I would like to il-
lustrate both with a single example: that of the genealogical and more generally 
evolutionary cosmogonies. Their chief characteristic, as we have seen, is the con-
tinuity of principle from the beginning to the end of the cosmogonic process. 
The distinction between origin and order which, according to Vernant, charac-
terizes myth is therefore not found here. Order is immanent in the world, not 
the product of a sovereign creator. The point of departure is not even anthropo-
morphic, but is an entity that, like the Pō (“night/darkness”) of the Hawaiian 
Kumulipo, is no less abstract than the “unlimited” Apeiron of Anaximander. As 
in the Ionian cosmologies, it is the present that illuminates the past, given that 
the interpretive principle of the cosmos is borrowed from the experience of 
sexual generation and the interconnection of individuals and forms. The differ-
ence between Ionian and Polynesian philosophers does not therefore lie in the 
idea of the immanence of order, but in the very manner of conceiving of order. 
The Ionians’ order is essentially spatial (and, according to Vernant, modeled on 
the space of the polis), that of the Polynesians is dynamic, realized in time. There 
mythic presupposition preserved by Anaximander is that this world will end and 
will return to the originary state of undifferentiation, which is the only state that is 
eternal. A new process of differentiation, followed in turn by another collapse into 
undifferentiation will then take place, and so on. Anaximander does not therefore 
totally abolish the difference between origin and order: the present is illuminated 
by the original and not just the original by the present. In this cosmos—as in those 
of other Presocratics—certain principles dominate. These are the principles of 
conflict, conquest, and compensation, which are found again in myths of creation, 
and the principle of generation by opposed elements which attract and combine the 
generation of parts of opposed elements, which are attracted to one another and 
combine with one another—a barely veiled transformation of the principle of sexual 
generation in comogonic genealogies (on all this, see Cornford 1971: 159, 201).
25. Not to mention that although the majority of Greeks lived in a city-state like the 
philosophers, they continued to believe in cosmogonies of sovereignty. 
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is no intrinsic reason for preferring one to the other, nor for believing that one 
is more mythical than the other. 
In any case, were Vernant’s theory true, the absence of a discontinuity of 
principle between origin and order in the Kumulipo and similar cosmogonies 
would have to be the ideological correlate of an isonomic social organization 
like that of the polis. In particular, these cosmogonies would have to be incom-
patible with kingship. On the contrary, the Kumulipo was produced in a Poly-
nesian society characterized by the most developed form of sacred kingship, of 
which the Kumulipo is to the contrary one of the instruments of legitimation. 
More generally, the principle of social hierarchy is important in all Polynesian 
societies, whatever cosmogonic model they have elaborated.
How can one explain how in one case (Mesopotamia, Ancient Greece) hu-
man sovereignty is translated into a cosmogony centered on divine sovereignty, 
while in the other (Hawaii) this translation does not exist? Or, to put it better, 
why in one case do we have an analogic relation between the sovereign as the 
one who gives order to society and the sovereign as the one who gives order to 
the cosmos, while in the other case the relationship—or rather, the principal re-
lationship—is metonymic (the human sovereign is at the terminal point of the 
cosmogonic process)? Naturally, it is possible to maintain that the question has 
been badly formulated, that, contrary to what Vernant’s Durkheimian thesis as-
sumes, there is not necessarily a direct relation between cosmogony and political 
organization. But it seems more likely that a relation does exist, although one 
that is infinitely more complex than what is supposed by the Durkheimian the-
sis. For example, it can be observed that genealogical ideology is extremely im-
portant in Polynesia because it justifies the king’s supreme hierarchy in society, 
or, as in Hawaii, in the aristocratic stratum. In such a case, the relation between 
king and society that is projected onto the Polynesian cosmos is not the relation 
of command, as in Mesopotamia, but the presupposition of command, that is 
genealogical “seniority.” There remains the fact that mythic cosmogony can-
not be identified with myths of sovereignty, nor myths of sovereignty with the 
Babylonian or Mycenaean type, which are the only ones considered by Vernant. 
But above all it is clear that the idea of the immanence of order in the cosmos, 
which Vernant reserves for the “scientific” cosmology (in pectore) of the Greeks, 
is not necessarily related to the practice or ideal of isonomia. On the contrary, it 
can be inspired by hierarchy. 
My conclusion is perhaps banal, but I hope at least to have argued it through: 
cosmogony’s relation to social experience is as complex as its relation to other 
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forms of experience. The order constructed by myth is never the simple echo of 
a pre-existent order. On the contrary, perhaps it can be said that myth is order’s 
principal form of existence in so-called “traditional” societies. And, in the final 
reckoning, all societies are traditional. 
chapter five
Cultural relativism
Translated from the French by Eléonore Rimbault
Cultural diversity is a fact recognized by everyone. However, some disagree-
ments remain as to its scope, its elucidation, and its consequences for anthropo-
logical knowledge. Two positions can be distinguished: rationalism and cultural 
relativism. 
According to rationalism, cultural diversity presupposes the universality of 
certain logical processes of inference and elements of perception, without which 
it would be impossible to identify the utterances of the members of a culture 
different from ours, and therefore to raise the question of their diversity. Some 
thinkers, like Robin Horton (1982), go as far as arguing that one can find in 
every culture the same interest in explaining, predicting, and controlling events. 
In this perspective, every culture is a theory of the world, the specificity of which 
results from the application of the same basic rationality to an experience that 
varies as a function of social and technological conditions which are themselves 
definable in a universal system of reference. Cultural plurality is thus reabsorbed 
in a certain universality. 
By contrast, relativism entirely denies universality, since it is founded on the 
principle that any expression, any belief, is only meaningful and valid within its 
context of use: “form of life” (Wittgenstein 2010), “scientific paradigm” (Kuhn 
2012), or “culture.” To understand an expression or an action, it must be located 
in this context, which implies that the latter can be known objectively. But how 
can we know it in our language, in our system of beliefs, if it is true that our 
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own convictions are only meaningful in relation to the entirety of our culture? 
How can one explain that one may exit one’s culture to describe another? And 
if, on the other hand, one claims that it is truly possible to do so, how is it pos-
sible to argue simultaneously that the meaning and the validity of our culture 
are internal to it? 
In short, by denying that any term borrowed from a culture may be applied 
externally, by holding that any extra-contextual use of a term is ethnocentric 
(Winch 2008), the contextual theory of meaning renders theoretically impos-
sible that which it advocates: the contextualization of the expressions uttered by 
members of another culture. Therefore, relativism should not only dismiss as il-
lusory the rationalist claims of using its fundamental concepts non- contextually: 
it should also conclude that the idea of a contextual comprehension of the mem-
bers of another culture’s actions and expressions is just as illusory, because it is 
not possible for the interpreter to rationally decide that he really has stepped out 
of the magic circle of his own cultural presuppositions. 
Relativism and rationalism ultimately depend on two contrary theories of 
knowledge that must be decided between. Rationalism maintains that experi-
ence or reason, or their conjunction, are able to determine theories. This allows 
the theory to decontextualize, at least in part, the criteria of signification and 
truth, because they depend on conditions and constraints external to the world 
of cultural communication. Relativism insists by contrast that although there 
may be logical dispositions and natural perceptual segmentations, these do not 
matter in the determination of the criteria of signification and truth, which are 
matters of cultural convention (Barnes and Bloor 1982). In short, what con-
stitutes signification and truth is the accord between what people say to each 
other, not between what they say and an autonomous perception and reason. 
This accord is crystallized in the language it uses to voice itself, and it modifies 
itself through the dialogues that this language makes possible. Thus there can-
not be a universal truth, because there is no universal language and consequently 
no universal system of belief. 
From these premises two relativist positions can be articulated. One of them, 
which traces itself to W. V. O. Quine (1960), argues that relativity only exists at 
the level of the interpretation of perceptual data, because different interpreta-
tions (“theories”) can be equally compatible with the same data. According to 
the other, relativity is found in the perception itself, because the latter is influ-
enced—in fact, constituted—by the categories of language and culture (Whorf 
2012). The users of different languages and cultures belong to different and 
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distinct perceptual worlds. Similarly, according to Kuhn (2012) and Feyerabend 
(1978), if a researcher were to change his theoretical paradigm, he would per-
ceive the world in a way entirely different from what he formerly perceived. In 
this perspective, lived worlds are as “incommensurable” as the epistemic para-
digms that constitute them. Several objections, both theoretical and empirical, 
can be raised against this extreme form of relativism. It has been noted, for 
instance, that Benjamin Lee Whorf refuted himself (somewhat like Zeno who 
denied the existence of motion while walking), since he was perfectly able to 
provide, in English, Hopi sentences meant to illustrate the incommensurability 
of English and Hopi “worlds” (Davidson 2001). 
On an empirical level, attempts were made to demonstrate that, contrary 
to Whorf ’s theses, color perception is not culturally variable, that it is in fact 
this very perception which determines linguistic categorization, rather than the 
other way around (Berlin and Kay 1999). This example additionally illustrates a 
more general idea: the fact that perception is imbued with interpretation (Hesse 
1980) does not allow us to conclude that it necessarily depends on cultural 
categories. According to several epistemologists and psychologists, perception 
is to a great extent constituted by the schemes of interpretation of a “primary 
theory,” which is presumably universal, and which culturally variable “secondary 




Translated from the Italian by Sarah Hill
THE END OF FEASTING
Our festivities are reduced to a shadow of what they once were. Cocktail parties 
and receptions are enclosed like contagious diseases within the rigid limits of a 
time and space measured with avarice. Oozing the ennui of carefully controlled 
excitement, followed by the anxious calculation of one’s successes and faux pas, 
our modern festivities transmit an impoverished image of what festivities once 
were. As Jules Michelet mourned: “We don’t have parties any more that expand 
and dilate our hearts. Such cold salons and horrible dances! It is the opposite of 
festivity. One is more dried up the day after, and even more haggard.” ([1870] 
1895: 583)
From the second half of the seventeenth century onward “the victory of work 
over free time in the organization of life became irreversible” (Bercé 1976: 152). 
But the process of rationalization begins earlier, in the field of religion. During 
the Council of Constance (1413), Jean Gerson had already proposed a reduc-
tion in the number of feasts, which according to him were too numerous to be 
adequately sanctified. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, more than one 
day out of three was a feast: it was inevitable that non-ritual activities (seasonal 
work, markets) should profane festive periods. To avoid this confusion between 
sacred and profane, holiday and work, the Church sought to reduce the number 
of feasts and to control their organisation (ibid.: 136–50). With the constitution 
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Universa (1627), Urban VIII reserved for Rome the right to establish feasts and 
limit their number. In the Protestant camp, the elimination of feasts dedicated 
to saints extended the time reserved for work. Montesquieu and Voltaire saw 
the consequences: the “marchandise catholique” was disadvantaged with respect 
to the “marchandise protestante” (Voltaire [1764] 1769). And it was not long 
before the interests of the saints were to be declared contrary to those of the 
people (Villette 1792).
But monarchical absolutism, the clergy, and utilitarian rationalism had al-
ready been fighting together against feasts for a century. From 1669 onwards 
Colbert’s directives had the effect of reducing by a third the number of feasts in 
a large number of dioceses (Bercé 1976: 153).
For the rationalist mentality, the feast was an activity and a form of as-
sociation which is not motivated by utility and therefore intrinsically subver-
sive. The feast seems to sum up everything against which the philosophes fought: 
laziness, wastage, superstition, vice, ignorance, fanaticism, enthusiasm. . . . For 
Voltaire, there was no doubt that innkeepers were the ones who had prodi-
giously multiplied the number of feasts, above all in accordance with the tastes 
of the religious customs of the peasants and artisans who knew only the cult of 
getting drunk on saints’ days. It was on those days of idleness and dissoluteness 
that all the crimes were committed. For Voltaire, therefore, feasts are what fill 
up the prisons and keep the clerks of the court and executioners in business. 
Voltaire believed moreover that feast-days perpetuate poverty: in Lyon feasts 
constrained silk-workers to idleness for eighty-two days a year. It is not festive 
sloth but work that “sanctifies.”
Forty or so years later, the archbishop of Dijon, in a pastoral letter, seems to 
echo Voltaire: “The habit of work is the guarantee of morality; we become im-
moral only when we are unemployed; we must not sanctify festive days with the 
cessation of work, but with religious works; those who lament the suppression 
of feasts and want to celebrate them by abstaining from work sanctify them less 
than those who work” (quoted in Bercé 1976: 155).
And in an imperial edict, Napoleon I announced the sad age of the religion 
of work: “One realises how ruinous, rather than useful, is the Sunday rest; one 
sees in how many arts, in how many trades this interruption has regrettable ef-
fects” (quoted in ibid.: 230). 
By this time, however, Rousseau had already denounced the contradictory 
character of a concept that seeks to reduce the social bond to pure utilitarian ra-
tionality. Taking feasts away from the people takes away their will to live and in 
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this way eliminates their very motivation for working (Rousseau 1759). Above 
all, individuals become isolated, making them “bad” (ibid.: 264), the occasions 
that promote sociability are eliminated and thus the foundations of society are 
destroyed. “Make the spectators themselves the show, make them become actors 
themselves; do it in such a way that each one sees and loves himself in others so 
that all may have stronger bonds of friendship” (ibid.: 269). Feasting was “the 
true cradle of all peoples”; thanks to primitive feast-days “we became milder 
with one another; struggling to make ourselves understood, we learned to ex-
plain ourselves” (Rousseau [1761] 1781, Italian trans.: 221). From here emerged 
language and the social contract.
Mindful of Rousseau, the revolution was to put an end to the tradition-
al feast-days and festivity only to substitute for them its own (Ozouf 1976; 
Mastropasqua 1976; Durkheim [1912] 1965). But the revolutionary festivals 
managed neither to supplant the old ones nor to eliminate the conflict between 
festivity and utility in modern ideology. The feast continues to be seen either as 
an organicist utopia in a society fragmented and threatened by individualism, 
or as a phantasm of transgression. From both sides of the barricades, until “May 
’68,” revolution and feasting have appeared synonymous.
THEORY OF THE FEAST
The feast as transgression
According to Freud, a “feast is excess that is permitted, or indeed offered, the 
solemn infraction of a prohibition. Men do not abandon themselves to excess 
because of some command they have received. Rather, excess is part of the na-
ture of every feast; the festive humour is provoked by the liberty of being able 
to do what is otherwise prohibited” (Freud [1912–13] 1952, Italian trans.: 144). 
Certainly, Freud affirms that the festive sentiment coexists with its opposite; 
but there remains the fact that for him the feast is essentially a legitimate trans-
gression of rules. This point of view is decidedly one-sided. In the first place, 
the freedom to violate the customary rules of behavior is not always associated 
with festive joy. To give but one example: both in Africa and Polynesia, the 
death of a king is followed by excesses, and by the legitimate violation of all the 
usual norms. However, these collective transgressions are not accompanied by 
joyfulness and are not in any way festive (cf., for the Hawaiian islands, Stewart 
[1828] 1830: 216; Ellis [1839] 1842 IV: 177). In the second place, feasts are not 
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necessarily transgressive. On the contrary, many festivities (corteges, processions, 
triumphal parades, etc.) consist in the representation of hierarchy and social val-
ues, and serve to reaffirm them solemnly (cf. Heers 1971: 13–43). Freud’s theory 
thus takes account of only one category of feasts, or only one aspect of the feast.
The same objection applies to René Girard’s theory. He, like Freud, William 
Robertson Smith (1972: 253–68), and Roger Caillois (1950), associates the 
feast with sacrifice. For Girard, the sacrifice of a scapegoat has a cathartic effect 
on the violence that accumulates in society and that risks destroying it: “The 
feast is based on an interpretation of the game of violence that presumes con-
tinuity between the sacrificial crisis and its resolution. By this time inseparable 
from its favourable resolution, the crisis itself becomes an object of jubilation” 
(Girard 1972: 172). But the nature of the violence that periodically re-forms 
within society only to dissolve itself once again into the act of sacrifice, remains 
totally mysterious.
Nor is the idea that the feast is a beneficial catharsis for society a new one. 
It is found in Confucius and in a letter of the Faculty of Theology in Paris 
(thirteenth century) that attempts to refute it: “But—they say—we behave this 
way for fun and not seriously, as is the ancient custom, in such a way that once 
a year the frivolity that is innate in us disperses outside and evaporates. Is it not 
perhaps true that wine-skins and barrels would often burst themselves were 
their orifices not opened every now and then? We are just such old wine-skins, 
such ruined barrels, through which the over-fermented wine of wisdom that we 
toil to compress for an entire year in the service of God would be dispersed in 
vain, were we not to abandon ourselves now and then to foolish jesting. There-
fore every now and then it is necessary to joke in order then go back to main-
taining wisdom more effectively” (in Migne, Latin patrology, CCVII, col. 1171; 
cf. Lucotte du Tilliot 1741: 30).
According to Georges Bataille ([1933] 1967), feasting is motivated by an 
immeasurable need for destruction and wastage that is satisfied in traditional 
society and suppressed in the bourgeois one. While the latter has made acquisi-
tion into an end in itself, in the traditional society wealth must be squandered 
if one wants to achieve honor and rank. The opposition between the two socie-
ties, one based on the principle of the feast, the other on its radical negation, 
is therefore irreducible. However, in declaring that feasting is revolutionary ex-
actly because it is destructive, Bataille does nothing more than to take up again, 
in his own way, the image that the feast has assumed in the utilitarian ideology 
that he is combating.
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The feast as spontaneous production of society
Resuscitating Rousseau and his revolutionary adherents, Michelet imagines a 
spontaneous feasting, in which the artificial barriers between humans and so-
ciety fall, and society becomes a harmonious unity (cf. Ozouf 1976: 26–27). In 
the history of the revolution, “successful feasting” is for Michelet the sign of the 
“successful revolution.” Since it establishes or restores harmony between men, 
the revolution cannot fail to culminate in a feast. Reciprocally, if there is no 
festivity, there is no revolution (Michelet [1870] 1895: 583–88).
But it is in Émile Durkheim and his pupils that Rousseau’s idea of the feast 
as a periodic restoration of the origins of society finds its most coherent elabora-
tion. In a famous essay, Marcel Mauss shows that two forms of association cor-
respond to the two seasons that govern the rhythm of Eskimo life. During the 
summer groups are dispersed, the intensity of social links is reduced to the mini-
mum, and rituals are few and private in nature. In winter, to the contrary, the 
population is concentrated together, relations and exchanges intensify, religious 
life is rich and collective in nature. “One can . . . represent all of winter life as a 
kind of long feast” (1904–05: 97). Thanks to the increased “social density” (ibid.: 
128), “a chronic state of effervescence and hyperactivity” (ibid.: 125) is created 
in which representations and actions that justify society are spontaneously pro-
duced. Feasting is this state of effervescence in which the group becomes visible 
to itself as such. Durkheim ([1912] 1965) explains the feasts of Australian tribes 
in the same way.
But in order that the material reality, the “body” of the group, can become 
the symbol of its ideal identity, the latter must already exist. The material in-
tensification of relations presupposes the social bond that it ought to explain 
and does not necessarily imply an increased solidarity. Mauss’ and Durkheim’s 
theory is based on a circular logic.
One of Mauss’ students, Caillois, tries to take account of the festive phe-
nomenon in terms of beliefs and representations rather than invoking “social 
density” or the psychological phenomenon of catharsis. In Caillois’ interpre-
tation, festive excesses recreate the originary phase of undifferentiation from 
which order was born. Exceptional powers are associated with the primordial 
age because everything then was possible. It was the age of metamorphosis: 
the golden age and at the same time the age of chaos, in which every form was 
unstable and crossed over into every other form. Periodically recreating a situ-
ation of undifferentiation, the feast reproduces the dawn of society and draws 
on its powers to repeat the process of forming order. But for Caillois (1950), as 
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for Durkheim, the festive commemoration is efficacious because it is a real, not 
solely symbolic, reproduction of the genesis of social order. Feasting must be 
defined as the “paroxysm of society” that purifies and at the same times renews.
But it is erroneous to maintain that the symbolic can be efficacious only if 
it is mingled with the reality that is assumed to correspond to it. Such an idea 
contradicts the very premises of Durkheim’s theory of society.
The theories that we have briefly expounded highlight aspects of feasting 
that are sometimes important, but none offers a definition of it that includes all 
of its forms. Feasting is not necessarily transgressive, as Freud, Girard or Bataille, 
for different reasons, would want to have it. Nor does it necessarily recreate a 
state of undifferentiation and of Gemeinschaft, as Michelet, Durkheim, Caillois, 
and also Harvey Cox (1969) suppose. On the contrary, many feasts represent 
marked differentiations among social categories. Feasting can have a distribu-
tive function, rather than being motivated (as Bataille supposes) by a tendency 
toward wastage and destruction. Finally, anyone who has studied actual feasts 
knows that these require organization, work, and sometimes complex direction. 
Far from being the chaos supposed by some theorists, feasts in many societies 
are more often the culmination of organized activity, and justify the perpetu-
ation of confraternities, guilds, neighborhood associations, and other forms of 
grouping that have a permanent endurance and a constant influence on the 
global society (cf., for example, Dundes and Falassi 1975 on the palio in Siena).
The theories that we have expounded reflect in each case the ambiguous 
status of feasting in modern ideology and society. Other than in sporadic cases, 
feasting is no longer part of our experience.
THE ESSENCE OF THE FEAST
What, then, are the differential features of feasting? There are two, it seems: first 
of all, feasting is any ritual activity related to the social organization of time; 
secondly, feasting is a pleasurable social activity. Obviously, the two character-
istics are interdependent. Being pleasurable, a feast is recorded in memory and 
anticipated in the imagination: it therefore tends to repeat itself in time.
The idea that feasting is linked to the social organization of time is cer-
tainly not new. It was advanced, for example, by Henri Hubert, for whom, as for 
Durkheim, the sacred is simply that which is an object of prohibition ([1905] 
1929: 222). The sacred is therefore necessarily indivisible and outside time: its 
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continuity presupposes the continuity of the prohibition. But on the other hand, 
the prohibition can not be continuous without preventing action: the sacred 
must therefore be able to be interrupted, to become divisible, without however 
being abolished. How then do we reconcile “divisible time and the undivided 
sacred that disintegrates in time” (ibid.: 196)? By means of a sacred time, rhyth-
mic but indivisible (ibid.), that is realized in feasts. In fact, feasts continue to 
make their effects felt even when they are over. They therefore combine the 
indivisibility and the duration characteristic of the sacred with the divisibility of 
the profane (ibid: 225–26). The result is a rhythmic, pendular time. 
But if this reasoning is valid, then rhythmic time presupposes divisible time. 
The feast determines a temporal form that coexists with another. Yet it is rather 
the case that, in the absence of measurement instruments, feasts create the very 
possibility of perception of a collective time, whether cyclical or irreversible, in-
troducing collective discontinuities into individual perceptions of duration. This 
is recognised by Edmund Leach (1961: 134), for whom the “discontinuity of 
repeated contrasts” constitutes the most elementary notion of time. The sacred/
profane contrast determines others of equal importance in the festive cycle. In 
fact, not only are feasts opposed to the intervals that separate them as the sacred 
is opposed to the profane, but the passage from the profane to the sacred, which 
opens the feast, and the passage from the sacred to the profane, which closes 
it, constitute another pair of contrasts. Each of these contrasts corresponds to 
different behaviors. The sacred is characterized by behavior that is the inverse 
of that of the profane to which it is opposed: the culmination of the feast is 
therefore associated with “role reversal”; men dress up like women, people walk 
backwards, etc. The same goes for the rites of entrance and exit into and out of 
the feast: one is characterized by “formal behavior,” the other by a “masquerade.” 
The temporal pendulum is realized therefore through behaviors that follow one 
another according to a prescribed order.
This outline is seductive, but difficult to accept, since its relationship to ac-
tual feasts does not seem evident. It is true that “formality,” “inversion,” and 
“masquerade” are often present together in feasts, but not necessarily in the or-
der postulated by Leach; nor are these behaviors motivated only or even mainly 
by the pendular structure of time. Furthermore, Leach, like Hubert, maintains 
wrongly that feasts are linked only to a cyclical notion of time. On the contrary, 
a number of feasts constitute the reference points of an irreversible and linear 
time, whether in individual life (baptism, confirmation, marriage, initiation, fu-
neral, etc.) or in collective life (victories, celebrations of peace, visits of famous 
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personages; marriage, coronation, death of a prince, etc.). The tendency to ac-
centuate the importance of feasts of this type to the detriment of cyclical feasts 
obviously corresponds to a change in the perception of time, so it should not be 
surprising that this type of feast is particularly emphasized in the modern age—
for example in Medicean Florence—which offered an example of this to the 
European courts (cf. Minor and Mitchell 1968; Jacquot 1957). But more than a 
radical change, we are talking about a change in the relative importance of two 
notions of time that we always find associated in every festive system. In fact, 
cyclical feasts never repeat themselves in a completely identical way: each one is 
individualized in collective memory. One might think in particular of Carnivals, 
of Mysteries, of civic festivals. Often each occurrence of these feasts is associated 
with an “invention,” a central theme, which individualizes it, or with memorable 
events (for example, the visit of an important personage, the victory of a certain 
individual or party in a battle). The Antwerp ommegang and the Lord Mayor of 
London’s parade constitute particularly eloquent examples of the association of 
the two temporal forms (cf. Bercé 1976: 93–111; Williams 1957).
Let us consider for example the ommegang. This is a procession whose circu-
lar itinerary begins and ends at the Antwerp cathedral. All the city’s important 
organizations participate: religious confraternities, guilds, municipal builders. 
Spectacular floats with religious and profane subjects parade by. Alongside the 
fixed elements, which are repeated identically year after year (Williams 1957: 
352), there are variable elements, intended to furnish interpretations of con-
temporary events. A theme, which subsumes even the fixed elements, gives the 
festival its unity every year. Contingent events are thus incorporated into the 
perennial framework of the festival, but the latter in turn acquires a new sense 
of its relation to history, the political context, and so forth.
As Williams and Jaquot have shown (1957: 362–63), the ideology of the 
ommegang (and of the 1561 one in particular) is expressed in the famous verses 
found in the work Les proverbes anciens flamengs et françois correspondants de sen-
tence les uns au autres (1568):
Peace engenders prosperity,
from prosperity comes wealth,
from wealth pride and pleasure,





from humility peace returns;
thus return the deeds of man.
[Pais engendre prospérité
de prospérité vient richesse
de richesse orgueil, volupté,
d’orgueil contention sans cesse,
contention la guerre adresse,
la guerre engendre povreté,
et povreté humilité,
d’humilité revient la paix,
ainsi retournent humains faicts.]
But there is no doubt that alongside and in a dialectical relation with this cycli-
cal notion of time, there exists another, of a time both linear and without order, 
that is expressed in an inscription on the first float of the procession: “That 
everyone should note here the course of the world. / with what inconstancy it 
turns at every moment: / it is the strangest of God’s works, / without beginning, 
without end, and without foundation, / called a sea of movement by the wise” 
(quoted ibid.: 363).
Cyclical time and irreversible time, structure and history thus find their 
equilibrium in the feast, which reduces chaos, the contradictory and senseless 
world, to order. But in the seventeenth century, when royal power robbed the 
city and the countryside of festivals and concentrated them at court, this equi-
librium (which the civic festival still preserves) was altered in favor of linear 
time, punctuated by unrepeatable events.
In France, above all, the process of expropriation of collective feasting on 
the part of monarchical absolutism coincided with the expropriation of all the 
correlatives of these festivals: the cities’ financial and administrative autono-
my (Bercé 1976: 113–18), freedom of association (the societies that organized 
festivals—for example the Infanterie dijonnaise, the Cornards of Rouen and of 
Evreux—were dissolved or phased out [cf. Welsford 1966: 205–12]), freedom of 
political critique. Royal power took over festivity, integrated it into the etiquette 
of court, and used it as an instrument of political propaganda.
In a society in which magnificence—always present in feasting—is still a 
necessary attribute of political power, this attribute must become a “virtue of 
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princes alone” when princes want to concentrate all power in themselves. This is 
underscored by Tesauro, a court writer and creator of ideas and librettos for the 
festivities of the Dukes of Savoy: “Among the most noble objects of Magnifi-
cence, virtue of princes alone, are numbered Popular Festivities, because Sump-
tuousness generates Majesty, Joviality the Love of the People” (quoted in Viale 
Ferrero 1965: 63). From being spectators of themselves in festivities, the people 
become spectators of their princes. The code of the cyclical feast disappears to 
leave room for new and always different inventions. The feast transforms into 
theatre, in which the lead actor is the prince. At the wedding festivities given 
by Mazzarino for the marriage of Louis XIV, for example, the king and queen 
danced in the opera Ercole amante (1660) and in the Fêtes de Bacchus (1651) 
(ibid.: 52). The young Louis had danced in Lully’s Amour malade (1657). In the 
feast the king gave at Versaille in 1664, he played the part of Ruggiero (Voltaire 
1751). Charles Emmanuel II was an even more versatile actor who, in the fa-
mous festivities of the court of Turin, disguised himself from time to time as 
a woman, a clown, Hercules, the King of the Alps, a Turk, Achilles, etc. (Viale 
Ferrero, 1965). At the end of the seventeenth century, court festivities, already 
eminently theatrical, ended by losing ground in relation to true theatre, particu-
larly the theatre of opera (cf. ibid.: 63–65).
The entire process is clear. At first collective feasting is expropriated by the 
king and the court becomes a theatre in which actors and spectators are conflat-
ed. In the end, the court itself becomes spectator. The ceremonial is increasingly 
distinguished from the feast, the actors from the spectators, the real from the 
imaginary. Feasting is driven into the closed and increasingly shameful spaces 
of the theatre. Not much time was to pass, however, before the theatre was 
also to be entrusted with the function of being a “mirror of reality.” From the 
seventeenth century onwards, then, there is a progressive reduction of the space 
and time left to the imaginary. Energy is increasingly concentrated on work and 
serious activities. The term for this process is “Realism,” in which the spectacle, 
the last, pallid reflection of the feast, is charged with sanctifying day-to-day 
squalor on stage.
The transformation that we have outlined briefly coincides with a transfor-
mation of social time, which, from being predominantly cyclical and reversible, 
becomes predominantly irreversible and mathematicized. Wristwatches from 
Geneva have taken over our festivities. Between the mathematical time of the 
watch-maker god and the solitary, subjective perception of time, the mediation 
of the social time of feasting has become minimal. 
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There is no doubt that the feast, whatever form it may take, is associated 
with the fruition of a certain pleasure. But to claim that this pleasure derives 
from the transgression of normal rules of behavior is to isolate arbitrarily an 
aspect of the feast that can never be totally dominant. 
A totally transgressive feast, in which the only rule was the suspension of 
every rule, would not in fact be associated with pleasure, but with anxiety. “None 
does offend, none, I say, none” (Shakespeare, King Lear, Act IV, scene vi): the 
absolute lack of differentiation between good and bad, king and fool, is tragic, 
not festive, because it entails the suspension of every social bond. The latter 
entails the absence of all predictability in the behavior of one’s neighbor and 
thus a great deal of tension. At its extreme limits, the “transgressive” conception 
of the feast coincides with the absurd idea of a purely individual and private 
kind of feasting. To the contrary, feasting is characterized by the increased pre-
dictability of one’s neighbor’s behavior, and by a more intense social solidarity, 
which manifests itself in regulated activities that cannot be explained by a sim-
ple emotional state. 
There is always a difference between the rules of feasting and the rules of 
daily life, but not necessarily a relationship of inversion. Feasting can oppose 
itself to “normal” society or, on the contrary, represent it in a synthetic and ideal 
form in which it becomes easily perceptible as a totality. In both cases, feasting 
is an experience of transparency, an increase in meaning whose effects extend 
into “normal” society. If in fact meaning consists in the perception of relations, a 
decrease in the obstacles that prevent us from perceiving these relations consti-
tutes an increase of meaning.
Feasting is exactly such an increase in the perception of relations since it 
unites in experience that which is normally separated: spirit and material, supe-
rior and inferior parts of the body (cf. Bakhtin 1968), before and behind, right 
and left, high and low, king and fool, the fragmented parts of self and society.
It is not by chance that the central character of the feast should be a rep-
resentation of totality, of the unity of categories that are normally separated. 
Carnival is at the same time king and fool, “madman” and wise man. Carnival is 
a scapegoat which represents the death and rebirth of the community (Welsford 
1966: 69 ff.; Toschi [1955] 1976: ch. VII-IX; Frazer 1911–15]), uniting life and 
death and revealing their profound relationship. Carnival masks represent the 
dead reunited with the living (Toschi [1955] 1976: 166–72]).
Originally an infernal character (ibid.: 196–208), Harlequin is, more than 
any other masked character, a symbol of festive totalization, which is symbolized 
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by his costume itself, sewn with different-coloured pieces and scraps of mate-
rial. Harlequin is the trickster who reintegrates the vestiges of order, who unites 
that which is separated. If he introduces disorder, it is to create a different or-
der. A symbol of totality, Harlequin is often represented as a hermaphrodite 
(Willeford 1969: 181). The meaning of the fool or the madman, often at the 
centre of feasting, is the same (ibid.: 59). 
Holbein, in his illustrations for Erasmus’ In praise of folly (1509), represents 
the fool in the act of contemplating his own image in a mirror or in the doll 
attached to his scepter (Saxl 1943). These designs seem to stage the essence of 
feasting itself, which not only renders visible that which is invisible, but recon-
ciles the self to the other. The latter is revealed to consciousness by the discrep-
ancy between the internal and external images of the self. It is in recognizing 
one’s self in others and others in one’s self that one enters into the festive spirit; 
and it is for this reason that feasting consists of an increase in solidarity and 
renews the social bond.
The transgressive aspect of the feast should therefore be seen as a reflection 
of its fundamental characteristic, which is the creation of a transparent totality 
of relations. If in the feast separations fall away and chaos seems sometimes to 
infiltrate its way into the cosmos, it is not because the feast is the negation of 
order, but because it represents order as totality. It is therefore necessary that 
what is set apart as dangerous and rejected as disorder in daily life should be 
part of feasting. 
If the essence of feasting consists in the immediate and unimpeded experi-
ence of relations that we are not permitted or not easily able to perceive in day-
to-day reality, one must suppose that pleasure, with which it is always associated, 
is produced by this experience.
In many cases, this is analogous to the pleasure that a witty remark sets 
off. According to Freud (1905), the latter consists in the unification of repre-
sentations that are normally kept separate. The pleasure that derives from it is 
produced by the “economy” of psychic energy necessary to keep these represen-
tations separated. The energy is freed, if it is already present, or is saved, if it is 
about to be used.
But it is not necessary to suppose that the unification (or association) of 
representations that are normally separated is transgressive, and that its only 
function consists in the liberation of unconscious contents. The cognitive di-
mension of feasting is more important than its transgressive element, even when 
this element exists.
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More profoundly, festive pleasure can be compared to aesthetic pleasure, as 
Franciscus Hemsterhuis describes it. According to him, the soul judges most 
beautiful that from which it can form an idea in the shortest possible time. 
This actually derives from the dialectic between a “reduced model” (Lévi-Strauss 
[1962] 1966)—in which separate things are perceived as a whole—and daily 
experience, which determines separations and oppositions.
Feasting constitutes a “reduced model” of society, but never simply its “icon,” 
even if inverted as is a mirror image. Like a work of art, festivity has a com-
plex relationship with reality. It is not simply the reproduction or inversion of 
meaning, but—in totalizing experiences that are normally separated—it gives 
meaning to that which in daily life escapes it. Between the festive world and the 
day-to-day world there is a relationship of complementarity. 
More than as an autonomous institution, feasting can be defined as a ritual 
activity in which traits (like aesthetic pleasure and the scansion of time) that are 
present in other ritual activities become predominant and thus distinctive. For 
this reason, it is in a global theory of ritual that the differential traits of feasting 




Translated from the Italian by Sarah Hill
WORD ASSOCIATION AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
The term “fetish” comes from the Portuguese feitiço, which was in turn derived 
from the Latin factitius. In the accepted usages of its original adjectival forms, 
feitiço means, like the Latin term, “artificial,” and, beyond that, “false, feigned, 
unnatural” (cf. Vieira 1873). Turned into a noun, the term has taken on the 
sense of “witchcraft, sorcery, necromancy, philtre, enchantment, magic” (ibid.). 
In Castilian, the corresponding word—hechizo—underwent a parallel evolution 
(Corominas 1954–57, II: 862). 
It was in its substantive sense (for example, with the meaning “enchant-
ed object”) that feitiço was adopted from the seventeenth century onwards in 
English and French, and was introduced into Charles de Brosses’ intellectual 
lexicon (1760). Yet the connection with facticius seems never to have been lost 
and to have survived at the preconscious level. De Brosses himself often uses 
fétiche as an adjective (for example in the very title of his book: Du culte des dieux 
fétiches) in contexts in which it inevitably evokes the notion of “fictitious.” 
The history of the notion of the fetish perhaps illustrates a law of discourse: 
when a word assumes a meaning that is increasingly vague and extended, the 
concept with which it was intentionally associated disintegrates under the im-
pact of the uncontrolled and subconscious associations that language imposes. 
104 CLASSIC CONCEPTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY
In this case, however, language seems to reflect a real property of fetishistic 
phenomena and to demand that we reflect on that property.
I will explain successively four theories (those of De Brosses, Comte, Marx, 
and Freud) that function as paradigms for the majority of the discussions on 
fetishism. I will then show that, notwithstanding their differences, these theo-
ries agree on a fundamental point. Finally, having explained the reasons for 
misunderstandings of the fetishistic phenomenon on the part of modern eth-
nology, I will attempt to show that objects that can be called fetishes exist and 
to indicate their meaning.
FOUR THEORIES OF FETISHISM
De Brosses
De Brosses’ Du culte des dieux fétiches elaborates an “anthropological” theory of 
religion, in opposition to the “theological” theory of the “mythologists” (like 
Banier). The latter, supposing an original revelation, considered idolatry, sa-
beism (the cult of the stars), and so on, as perversions in which objects that 
functioned as symbols of the divinity lose their symbolic nature and accom-
modate a “direct” cult (cf. De Brosses 1760: 189–90 and 278 ff.). Even while 
admitting, hypocritically, to an original revelation, in which God had bridged 
“the immense gap between divine nature and human nature” (ibid.: 207), De 
Brosses asserts that with the Fall, man finds himself having to begin again 
from nothing, that is, from his own nature. It is therefore in human nature and 
its evolution that we must search for the roots of humanity’s religious ideas. 
“It is necessary to study man not in possibilities but in man himself: it is not 
a question of imagining that which he could have or should have done, but 
of looking at what he has done” (ibid.: 285). Now, both the actual history of 
what man has done and the awareness of man’s nature (ibid.: 202) lead him 
to conclude that the “mythological” theory inverts the effective order of intel-
lectual evolution.
In effect, the progress of humanity and its ideas corresponds to the process 
of abstraction: “The human spirit elevates itself by degrees from the inferior to 
the superior: an idea of that which is perfect is formed by means of abstrac-
tions drawn from that which is imperfect: slowly the more noble part of a hu-
man being separates from the rougher part: increasing and reinforcing the idea 
that it forms of that which is perfect, the human spirit applies that idea to the 
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Divinity” (ibid.: 207). The most elevated idea of divinity can be found, therefore, 
not at the beginning but at the end of human history.
What, then, was the religion of primitive man? Anthropology (a term which, 
however, De Brosses does not use) indicates that the fundamental “affections” of 
humanity are fear, wonder, recognition, and reasoning. Among primitive peo-
ples, the first two affections (or “feelings”), and in particular fear, with its cor-
relate, hope, are dominant. We are speaking of affections related to that which 
is the object of human needs, or which is linked to the desire to prevail over 
other men. 
Primitive man worries only about the “different and contrary eventualities 
of human life.” His lack of power makes him anxious, and sets his imagination 
to work—an imagination that “employs itself in forming an idea of certain 
powers superior to his own, which do what he cannot do, from the moment 
that they know and uphold the causes of which he does not have the power to 
determine the effects” (ibid.: 215). So, on one side fear drives man to transcend 
the visible, supposing the existence of invisible powers; on the other, his senses 
drive him to fix his attention on visible objects. He therefore finds himself 
caught between two contradictory tendencies (two operations that are “opposed 
and simultaneous,” as De Brosses calls them) which are reflected in his concep-
tion of objects that elicit his fear and hope. He associates invisible power with 
the visible object without distinguishing the material object from the intel-
ligent power which he, in the rough structure of his reasoning, supposes to be 
contained within it. In situations in which “chance, or unforeseeable accidents” 
dominate, this way of thinking is accentuated: the more the object reveals the 
powerlessness of a man, the more he conceives of it as endowed with the power 
that he wants to obtain or by which he fears being oppressed. De Brosses notes 
that in uncontrollable situations (in games of chance, in war, at sea) man tends 
to become more superstitious. Not only this, but uncertainty also determines 
the extreme multiplication of the number of invisible powers: “Since in this 
way of thinking it is natural to attribute to them only a power that is limited 
to certain effects, albeit superhuman ones, it also becomes natural to multiply 
the number of them so that it corresponds to the extreme variability of events” 
(ibid.: 219). 
Strange, abnormal, unforeseeable situations therefore tend to be the ones 
that are “divinized” rather than situations that are normal and therefore control-
lable (cf. ibid.: 20, 46–48, etc.). This anthropological deduction of the original 
religion is confirmed by facts furnished by history and by travellers’ tales. De 
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Brosses takes as a paradigm of these facts the West African cult of objects which 
travellers called “fetishes.”
Fetishes are “of animals or inanimate terrestrial beings” (ibid.: 61) and, more 
generally, any object endowed with divine qualities: oracles, amulets, talismans 
preservatives, and so on (ibid.: 10–11). De Brosses distinguishes between fet-
ishism and idolatry: while the first deifies natural objects, the second yields a 
cult of “works of art that represent other objects, which are those to which the 
worshipper really devotes himself ” (ibid.: 64). 
Fetishism thus does not distinguish between signifier and signified, between 
the human world and the natural world, and, in the final analysis, between experi-
ence (defined sensualistically) and desire. Above all, fetishism is characterized by 
the absence of the signifying function: as soon as a natural object becomes a sign 
of something else, it is no longer a fetish (cf. ibid.: 147). Paradoxically, the absence 
of artificial or natural signs produces an artificialization of nature, which is per-
ceived fictitiously as a humanized world. In other words, the artificial passes from 
the sphere of the sign, where it is absent or disregarded, to the sphere of nature.
Comte
According to Auguste Comte, the “fictitious” nature of fetishism is found in the 
entire “theological” phase of evolution, of which fetishism constitutes the first 
stage (1844, Italian trans.: 3). Comte thus clarifies one of the implications of De 
Brosses’ theory: although fetishism may be only a particular form of religion, it 
is the form that best reveals its essence (cf. 1830–42, Italian trans. I: 461–62).
Fetishism corresponds to man’s spontaneous cognitive activity and thus to 
that which is inscribed in his nature, independently of the reflection that is 
historically developed (cf. Lévy-Bruhl 1900: 48). Its spontaneity determines its 
three fundamental characteristics: it is a form of empirical and not generalizing 
knowledge; it tends to look for causes and not laws; it presupposes the only 
knowledge that does not derive from any other, that is, the knowledge of one-
self, of one’s own activity. As a consequence, fetishes have three characteristics: 
they are concrete objects and not classes; they are determined by an internal 
causality; and this causality is akin to the human causality and for this reason is 
conceived as essentially affective, given the preponderance of affective life over 
intellectual life in spontaneous activity (cf. Comte 1851–54; 1830–42).
The preponderance of affective life renders fetishistic representations ficti-
tious, but it makes them the inevitable point of departure for every cognitive 
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activity (1851–54, III: 126, 89) whenever intellectual reflection cannot intervene 
or is incapable of furnishing a rational explanation of phenomena. Fetishism 
therefore offers a provisional synthesis, in expectation of a “positive synthesis” 
in which the relationship between intellect and affectivity—and, correlatively, 
the relationship between man and nature—are reversed (cf. Canguilhem 1968). 
This in fact allows the correspondence between man and nature to be realized, 
attributing to natural phenomena, and particularly to inorganic ones, charac-
teristics that are immediately known to man. Consequently, it humanizes na-
ture. Science, by contrast, explains the human phenomena starting from natural 
phenomena and, in the final analysis, inorganic ones. This reversal permits the 
actual realization of the practical synthesis between man and nature that fetish-
ism (that is, human desire) fictitiously anticipated. It is in fact the intellect, not 
the affective faculty, that allows for the mastery of nature.
The positive synthesis can never reconstitute, however, that “particular feel-
ing of complete satisfaction” that is the characteristic of the fictitious synthesis, 
in which “the external world is presented naturally to the spectator in perfect 
harmony that can never again be found to the same degree, and that must pro-
duce in him a particular feeling of complete satisfaction, which today we are not 
able to describe well. . . . It is easy to understand how this exact, intimate cor-
respondence between the world and man must link us profoundly to fetishism” 
(Comte 1830–42, Italian trans. I: 463–64).
Fetishism therefore is not only an evolutionary phase; it is also a function 
that constitutes part of human nature, and that is present in everyone’s experi-
ence. The same functions are found in every evolutionary phase, but in dif-
ferent proportions. What allows a phase to be characterized as “fetishistic” or 
“polytheistic” and so forth is the dominance of one function over the other. More 
precisely, one can say that when an “order of fundamental notions” is extended 
to moral and social ideas, which constitute the most specific and complicated 
field of intellectual life, there is a new “mental regime” (ibid.: 454).
This, very succinctly, is the Comtian paradigm. It should be noted that even 
here, fetishism is, in the final analysis, characterized by “fiction.” Comte consid-
ers it a “fictitious synthesis” that does not correspond to the real laws of nature. 
But—unlike De Brosses—he transcends the level of representation in order to 
isolate that which motivates it, and which for him remains constant in human 
evolution. In effect, realized in different representations, the desire for a harmo-
nious relationship with nature is part of the very essence of man and therefore 
is not fictitious.
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Marx
As has been noted, Karl Marx maintains that the quantitative equivalence be-
tween commodities that have heterogeneous use values would not be possible if 
a qualitative equivalence did not exist between them, if they were not all forms 
of appearance of a single substance, labor, which renders them comparable and 
therefore exchangeable. Exchange does not thereby create value, but manifests 
it ([1867] 1990). Nevertheless, and paradoxically, the form in which value mani-
fests itself is also the condition of concealment of its true nature. 
While in fact, according to Marx, the use value of a commodity is immedi-
ately perceptible in the commodity itself, its exchange value is immaterial and is 
perceptible only in a relationship: when one commodity stands for the equiva-
lent of another (ibid.: 148–49). But if the value of a commodity is independent 
of its use value, of its corporeity (if it is something immaterial) how can it be 
perceived without the aid of something material that acts as a signifier for it? It 
is from this need for the intervention of the material as a sign of the immaterial 
that the “metaphysical subtleties” of a commodity are derived: the possibility of 
perceiving its value, but also of distorting it fetishistically (ibid.: 143).
In effect, in the value relation, the material object—that is, the use value of 
a commodity that acts as an equivalent (commodity B)—becomes the sign, the 
“figure,” of the value of the commodity that is equated with it (commodity A): 
“By means of the value relation . . . the natural form of commodity B becomes 
the value-form of commodity A, in other words the physical body of commod-
ity B becomes a mirror for the value of commodity A” (ibid.: 144). A is the 
Wertkörper of B. 
Supposing, for example, that commodity A is a certain quantity of fabric 
and that commodity B is a suit: “The value of the commodity linen is therefore 
expressed by the physical body of the commodity coat, the value of one by the 
use-value of the other. As a use-value, the linen is something palpably different 
from the coat; as a value, it is identical with the coat, and therefore looks like the 
coat” (ibid.: 143). “The use value becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, 
value” (ibid.: 148).
This also explains why exchange, which is the condition for perceiving value, 
should also be the cause for concealing its true nature: the form in which it 
manifests itself is confused with its essence (labor). Once the equivalent form 
of value has the corporeity of a signifier, value—which is a social relation—can 
be naturalized and one can believe that the materiality of the commodity that 
functions as an equivalent “possesses by nature a form of value.” Even the coat, 
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for example, “seems to be endowed with its equivalent form, its property of 
direct exchangeability, by nature, just as much as its property of being heavy or 
its ability to keep us warm. Hence the mysteriousness of the equivalent form, 
which only impinges on the crude bourgeois vision of the political economist 
when it confronts him in its fully developed shape, that of money” (ibid.: 149). 
If indeed the mysterious character of the form of value already exists in its 
simple form, it is in its generalized form that it imposes itself on consciousness. 
In their generalized form, all concrete labors are reduced to abstract labor, to 
commodity, and find a monetary expression (that is, they are all expressed by a 
commodity that functions as a general equivalent).
It is therefore in an economy based on the commodification of all human 
labor (every product of labor is exchangeable with every other), in turn based 
on the idea of equality (the labor of all humans has the same value [ibid.: 151]), 
that the common essence of the value of commodities becomes more easily 
perceptible, but at the same time more easily fetishizable. In fact, the universal 
equivalent (money) expresses the value of all other commodities, and therefore 
of all human labors; but this property, which is social, can be mistaken for a 
natural one, given the material character of the money-form. This leads to the 
fetishistic belief that the source of value lies in money and not work. This belief 
corresponds to the mode of perceiving value that is made possible by a society 
in which the exchange of work (“crystallized” into objects) between humans ap-
pears as an exchange between commodities: 
Objects of utility become commodities only because they are the products of the 
labour of private individuals who work independently of each other. The sum 
total of the labour of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labour of 
society. Since the producers do not come into social contact until they exchange 
the products of their labour, the specific social characteristics of their private 
labours appear only within this exchange. (ibid.: 165)
But, 
Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour into relations with each 
other as values because they see these objects merely as the material integuments 
of homogenous human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different 
products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of 
labour as human labour. They do this without being aware of it. (ibid.: 166–67) 
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If we follow Marx’s argument rigorously, we must conclude that, just as a simple 
form and a generalized form of the value relation exist, so do a simple form 
and a generalized form of fetishism. Marx defines the nucleus of fetishism as 
something that is inherent to the very expression of value, to the necessary dia-
lectic between the material and the immaterial. The illusion of fetishism would 
consist in mistaking the material inasmuch as it is a signifier of an immaterial 
value (the social relation) with the materiality of value (ibid.: 112–13). This idea 
of Marx’s has its antecedent in Kant (fetishism as the confusion of the natural 
and the supernatural) and in Hegel (fetishism as a consequence of the necessity 
for thought to have “something objectual” with which to think), and seems to 
anticipate a semiotic analysis of the commodities (Marx speaks of a “language 
of commodities”) (ibid.: 143).
With the generalization of the production of commodities, however, there 
is not a simple generalization of the confusion between signified and signifier 
(which can be called “fetishism of the signifier”). Between simple fetishism and 
generalized fetishism, in fact, an alienation of the worker from the products of 
his work and the means of production takes place.
The generalized fetishism of commodities is therefore something very dif-
ferent from its simple form: unlike the latter, not only is it part of the global 
ideological construction (political economy), but it corresponds to an histori-
cally determined form of production. 
Nevertheless, in his argument Marx de facto reduces simple fetishism to its 
generalized form. It is indeed in the latter that the confusion of the signifier 
and the signified reveals itself for what it really is: a confusion of subject and 
predicate, a misrecognition of labor for its product.
In this way, however, Marx opens himself up to two criticisms. On the one 
hand, the argument that reduces the fetishistic ideology of bourgeois society 
to a generalization of simple fetishism—in turn a mechanical reflection of the 
generalization of the production of commodities—is not very convincing. On 
the other hand, a phenomenon of more general significance than a specific form 
of production (the “reification” of the signified similar to Mauthner’s “fetish-
ism of words” [1901–02, I: 150–59]), is reduced by contrast to a generically 
pre-capitalist form of production. Marx thus disregards the properly cognitive 
character—not immediately reducible to a social determination—of the “sim-
ple” fetishism of the commodity.
These (and other) ambiguities in Marx make us sense his lack of a the-
ory that distinguishes and adequately articulates cognitive, ideological, and 
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economic levels. They force us to conclude that the Marxist notion of fetishism 
covers, in a rather confused way, different phenomena, on which Marx provides 
intuitions that are often brilliant and profound, but that cannot be considered 
a coherent “theory” of fetishism. In the same way as Comte, Marx dissolves the 
notion of the fetish, giving it such a vast range and such an imprecise meaning 
as to allow it no invariant connotation save that of “fictitious objectivization.”
Finally, it should be noted that by reducing the fetishism of the commodity 
to the fetishism of value, to alienation, Marx ignores those aspects of the fetish-
ism of commodities which his analysis in terms of the signifier seems to leave 
open: that is, a fetishism that one might call a fetishism of “use value,” in which 
signifying relations based on objects present themselves as a propensity, inher-
ent in their nature, to satisfy “needs” (cf. Baudrillard 1972).
Freud
Of the four paradigms of fetishism under consideration, that represented by 
Sigmund Freud refers to a phenomenon of an outwardly limited scope. The 
rigor with which it is explained, however, brings to light mechanisms of gen-
eral importance that transcend the sphere of sexuality. Freud treated fetishistic 
perversion directly in two brief articles, one written in 1927, the other in 1938.
In the first article, he maintains that the formation of a fetish is linked to 
the castration anxiety that is manifested when the little boy, on first seeing the 
female sexual organ, discovers that “a woman has no penis” ([1927] 1959: 199). 
The “enormous majority” overcome this anxiety (which also needs to be associ-
ated with a real or phantasmatic threat of castration by the father in order to 
manifest itself ([1938] 1959: 373–74]), and accept the difference between the 
sexes. Those who do not overcome it remain in a neurotic condition in which 
belief in the phallic woman—who constitutes a guarantee against the terror of 
castration, but also blocks or disturbs the development of a normal sexuality—
perpetuates itself. 
In fetishistic perversion, the perception that belies the infantile belief in the 
woman’s phallus is not negated; but the belief is displaced onto an object (the 
fetish) that renders it invulnerable (ibid.: 374). Fetishism does not therefore 
involve an hallucination (as Comte, for example, believed); it does not alter the 
representation, but repudiates its reality. 
In fact, it is not correct to say that the little boy, after having observed a 
woman, has maintained his belief in the woman’s phallus with no modification. 
112 CLASSIC CONCEPTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY
He has maintained it, but he has also abandoned it (aufgegeben); in the conflict 
between the weight of an undesired perception and the force of his counter-
desire he has arrived at a compromise, something that is possible only under the 
dominion of unconscious thought, of primary processes. Certainly, in the psyche 
the woman nevertheless has the penis, but this penis is no longer the one it was 
before. Something else has taken its place, has been designated its substitute, 
so to speak, and has now become heir to the interest that was directed to-
wards it previously. Furthermore this interest increases extraordinarily, because, 
in the creation of this substitute the terror of castration has erected a memorial 
of itself. The estrangement (Entfremdung) from the real genital organs of the 
woman, which is always found in the fetishist, remains as an indelible stigma of 
the removal that was produced. 
It can now be seen that the fetish is “a token of triumph over the threat of 
castration and a safeguard against it; it also saves the fetishist from being a ho-
mosexual by endowing women with the attribute which makes them acceptable 
as sexual objects” ([1927] 1959: 200). 
The fetish is therefore a substitute for the phallus, but it is not always its 
iconic reproduction. Often the object of the impression that precedes the trau-
matizing experience becomes a fetish. This explains why shoes, feet, underwear, 
and so on, which the gaze of the little boy encounters from below, before the 
traumatic discovery of the female sexual organ, function as fetishes. In all cases, 
the fetish—sometimes in its very making—reflects at one and the same time 
denial and affirmation of the woman’s castration. This corresponds to the coex-
istence of two opposite attitudes (tenderness and hostility) as regards the fetish 
(cf. Smirnoff 1970: 44), in turn a manifestation of a splitting of the “ego” (Ich-
spaltung) that Freud discusses in his incomplete article of 1938. 
The nucleus of a splitting of the “ego” occurs when “a conflict between the 
demand of the instinct and the command of reality” is produced in the little boy 
([1938] 1959: 372). The boy chooses neither the one nor the other, or rather 
chooses both. “On the one hand, with the help of certain mechanisms he rejects 
reality and refuses to accept any prohibition; on the other hand, in the same 
breath he recognizes the dangers of reality, takes over the fear of that danger as 
a symptom and tries subsequently to divest himself of the fear” ([1938] 1959: 
373).
The formation of the synthetic function of the “ego” is therefore disturbed. 
Freud illustrates these mechanisms with a clinical case. A three or four-year old 
little boy becomes aware of the female genital organs by being seduced by an 
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older girl. After the end of their relations, he prolongs his sexual stimulation 
through masturbation. His governess catches him in the act and threatens him 
with castration by his father. The threat reactivates the unease provoked by the 
moment of discovering that the phallus is absent in the little girl. “The little boy 
now thinks he understands why the girl’s genitals showed no sign of a penis and 
no longer ventures to doubt that his own genitals may meet with the same fate. 
Thenceforth he cannot help believing in the reality of the danger of castration” 
([1938] 1959: 374).
The usual consequence (the one that is considered socially “normal”) of cas-
tration anxiety is that the boy gives in to the threat and thus renounces either 
totally or partially the satisfaction of impulse; he no longer touches his genital 
organs. In the clinical case considered by Freud, however, the patient extricated 
himself from these difficulties differently. “He created a substitute for the penis 
which he missed in women, that is to say, a fetish. In so doing, it is true that he 
had given lie to reality, but he had saved his own penis. So long as he was not 
obliged to acknowledge that women have lost their penis, there was no need 
for him to believe the threat that had been made against him: he need have no 
fears for his own penis, so he could proceed with his masturbation undisturbed” 
([1938] 1959: 374).
But this “sly” way of dealing with reality carries with it a contradictory ten-
dency: on one side the boy continues his masturbation as if he were not putting 
his own penis in danger; on the other he displays a symptom that demonstrates 
that despite everything he does believe in this danger. Thus, simultaneous with 
the creation of the fetish, a strong castration anxiety appears, that the boy can 
only compensate for with a total mobilization of his masculinity.
The fundamental characteristic of fetishism is therefore that it permits the 
recognition and the disregarding of reality at one and the same time. For this 
reason it is differentiated from psychosis, which is a pure and simple repudiation 
of reality (Khan 1970: 99–103). The price that the fetishist pays, however, is a 
splitting of his ego. In fact, on the one hand the fetish serves to save his ego by 
creating a defence against the recognition of infantile traumas and the threats of 
disintegration of his personality that derive from this recognition. On the other 
hand, this threatens even the loss of the ego because it submits it totally to the 
object (the fetish). In effect, “thanks to a tour de force of psychic functioning, 
the fetishist creates in his infancy a unitary imago which dates from experiences 
and characters that belong to two different personalities: the ‘self ’ and the ob-
ject.” (ibid.: 102; cf. Smirnoff 1970: 47).
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COMPARISON OF THE PARADIGMS
The differences between De Brosses, Comte, Marx, and Freud are too evident 
for it to be necessary to underline them, but they share something less evident: 
all of them—in particular Freud and Marx—conceive of the fetish as an object 
made up of a contradictory relationship with reality, as a fictitious representa-
tion (of the neurotic or of society) that however also makes possible (or bear-
able) a true representation.
The contradictory character of the fetish is particularly underlined by Freud, 
but it can also be found in Marx’s theory. For the latter, the fetishism of the com-
modity allows the reality of value to be simultaneously recognized and misappre-
hended. It recognizes in fact the existence of a single value-substance that ren-
ders commodities comparable, but it misapprehends the fact that this substance 
is human labor. It can therefore be at the same time socially efficacious and mys-
tifying. The reality of value is not denied; that which is denied by means of the 
creation of a fetish (money etc.)—which protects it from any negation to which 
experience could lay it open—is the social relation that subtends that reality.
Even for Comte fetishism contains at one and the same time a false judg-
ment (the world is guided by human motivations) and a true judgment (nature 
is characterized by activity). The “fetishistic synthesis,” although false in itself, 
anticipates a true relation between man and nature, and above all, constitutes an 
initial conceptual frame that makes the gathering and classification of positive 
observations possible. Furthermore, fetishistic ideas allow for the functioning 
of a first embryo of society, because they constitute common notions that allow 
men to understand and associate with one another.
For De Brosses (as for Kant) fetishism is based on a confusion between nat-
ural and supernatural. Unlike the other authors discussed, he does not however 
recognize in fetishism the perception of any reality save that of uncontrollable 
situations.
All four of the authors considered have in common the relatively simple 
idea that fetishism brings with it the confusion of something human with 
something nonhuman, or even something animate with something inanimate. 
Freud’s position, however, is more complex: there is fetishism when amorous 
over-valuation is concentrated on certain attributes of the person who is loved 
which are detached from that person to become the only objects of sexual desire 
(cf. Smirnoff 1970: 42–52). In this way a rupture in the love-object is produced 
which is correlated with the rupture of the subject.
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For Freud, as for Marx, the genesis of fetishism resides definitively in the 
“fictitious” separation of the part from the whole. For Marx, the value of a com-
modity is nothing but an attribute of the human labor that produced it and that 
encompasses it. The attribute, separated from its human substance, becomes a 
fetish. For Freud, the fetishist fictitiously separates the attribute of the person 
loved from the totality of that person.
But there is also a fundamental difference between Marx and Freud: the 
totality to which Freud refers is always the person, while for Marx the totality is 
the species (Gattungswesen): the abstract labor that constitutes the essence—the 
species of man. If it can be said that the capitalist is socially “perverse” because 
he over-values in the other only the attribute that can be detached and appro-
priated, that is, his labor-power, can it not also be said that there is something 
perverse in the Marxist idea that abstract labor (perceptible only through that 
which is detachable from the worker, the commodity) is the essence of man? 
And, more generally, is there not always something fundamentally perverse 
when, in human relations, a “human essence” is separated from the concrete 
totality of the person? The normative model of “health,” for an individual as for 
society, is constituted by the integrity of the other, the condition of the integrity 
of the self.
THE SYSTEM AND THE FETISH
In his Gifford Lectures (1889; 1892), Max Müller noted that the word fetish-
ism—“whatever that may mean” (1876: ix)—had taken on such disparate and 
even contradictory meanings as to render its elimination from the science of 
religions necessary. A true “superstition” of fetishism had developed among trav-
ellers, missionaries, and anthropologists, who, ignorant of the languages and 
systems of ideas of the populations they were describing, or moved by apolo-
getic motivations, “were fetishizing” any religious phenomenon that they did 
not approve or understand. For this reason Müller proposed to reject the notion 
of “fetishistic religion.” With a certain delay, anthropologists have accepted his 
point of view and have put a professional taboo on the term “fetishism.” Such 
radical conversions are suspect however: both the censure of fetishism and its 
immoderate use betray perhaps a denial of the same kind. 
J. B. Pontalis (1970: 13) has in fact astutely noted that the attitude of eth-
nologists as regards fetishism is analogous to the mechanism of the Verleugnung 
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that lies at the basis of fetishism. That is, it takes the form of a judgement of this 
type: “it is not true, and yet. . . .” They thus begin by saying that fetishism is a 
pseudo-concept to leave to missionaries and colonial administrators (“it is not 
true”), but end by admitting, like Alfred Adler (1970) that nevertheless there 
do perhaps exist in a culture objects that function like fetishes (in the Freudian 
sense).
Let us leave to Pontalis the task of psychoanalyzing the ethnologists: what 
explains, on the purely conceptual level, their ambivalent, if not contradictory, 
attitude towards fetishism, which consists in negating its existence a priori, but, 
meanwhile, having to recognize it as a strongly rooted ethnographic residue?
In order to understand fetishism, it is necessary to take account of the dia-
lectic between two points of view on religious phenomena that have been in a 
state of encounter and interpenetration since the eighteenth century. The first 
constitutes a tradition that—if we leave aside its antecedents—begins with Fon-
tenelle and culminates in Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss. According to 
this tradition, religion accounts for regularity. The second point of view—in-
troduced by David Hume and Adam Smith—maintains instead that religion 
does not explain that which, being regular, seems to carry on by itself without 
needing to be justified, but rather explains irregular, singular, phenomena result-
ing from chance.
This viewpoint was taken up in De Brosses’ and Comte’s theories (cf. Can-
guilhem 1968: 89–94; Lévy-Bruhl 1900: 49), though they exhausted it by ex-
tending it too far. Above all, the Comtian theory of fetishistic religion postu-
lates a phase of the history of consciousness in which all phenomena appear 
unique, in which regularity does not exist.
The reaction to Comte was relatively minor, and with the growing popularity 
of theories on religion that considered the latter as an explanation of the natural 
and social order, “irregular,” “exceptional” phenomena, and along with them “fet-
ishes,” were relegated to a subordinate position. Thus Müller—who contributed 
more than anyone else to destroying the idea of a “fetishistic religion”—thinks 
that the notion of the fetish might be preserved to designate “objects of fortui-
tous origin that possess miraculous powers” (1889: 160). E. B. Tylor considers 
fetishism a subordinate stratum of animistic religion “or rather the doctrine of 
spirits incorporated in material objects, or attached to them, or acting through 
them” and he looks for their origin in a turn of mind similar to that which 
“makes Englishmen collect rare stamps or sticks from bizarre landscapes.” 
(1871, Italian trans.: 144–45).
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According to Herbert Spencer ([1873] 1877), it is the unusual and irregular 
nature of certain objects that makes them into fetishes: the notion that a ghost, 
which inhabits the object, corresponds to this strangeness is a derived, not a 
primary one.
The Durkheimian school deprives the notion of fetishism of the limited 
space that the English school had left it. To Müller, Tylor, and Spencer who as-
sociate fetishism with the chance object that is striking for its strangeness and 
its exceptional character, Mauss opposes another point of view: “The object that 
functions as a fetish is never, whatever may be said about it, just any object, cho-
sen arbitrarily, but is always defined by the code of magic and religion” ([1908] 
1969: 217).
But if the fetish-object is no longer paradoxical in any way, if it is a function 
of the code of magic and religion, then there is no reason to distinguish it from 
other signifying objects. “Fetishism” no longer designates either the totality of 
religion or a particular residual dimension of it. It is only “an immense misun-
derstanding” (ibid.: 245).
Mauss and his successors, influenced by Saussure, substitute the notion of 
the arbitrariness of the sign for the arbitrariness of the fetish-object ([1929] 
1969: 470): the signifying relation is never motivated by events that transcend 
the code.
The problem of fetishism has therefore been excluded from ethnology on 
the one hand because fetishism was defined as a thought that gives meaning to 
that which is irregular, and on the other hand because a theory was imposed for 
which there is no meaning outside of a “code” and because therefore no objects 
exist whose meaning is “unique.” Fetishism is thus dissolved by the semiological 
model.
In more recent years, however, and significantly in Great Britain where the 
tradition initiated by Hume continues underground, some anthropologists (for 
example Turner 1969; Douglas 1966, 1975) have attempted to confront the 
problem of paradoxical and marginal phenomena that seem to transcend the 
code. Since these phenomena elude a model (like that of the French sociologi-
cal school) based on inclusion among classes, the British theorists explain them 
in terms of intersections among classes and maintain that they are associated 
with “diffuse powers” that would be reutilized by the system (for example, in 
the form of sanctions against violations of order). But such an approach, how-
ever interesting, does not explain the irreducible paradox that certain objects 
and events represent. It limits itself, in fact, to considering irregularities at the 
118 CLASSIC CONCEPTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY
level of the species. But a fetish object, even when its membership in a species 
is recognized, is always sacralized as individual, inasmuch as it is linked to an 
unrepeatable event. The stamps that are cancelled the day after their release are 
identical to those that are cancelled the day after that, but only the first are the 
objects of a fetishistic behavior. The copy of a painting by Titian can be perfect 
or even better than the original, but the value of the latter is not aesthetic, but 
rather consists in being unique, in the fact that it is the real residue, not the mere 
symbol, of the unrepeatable situation in which Titian produced it. 
The fetishes of “primitive” society are characterized by the same integral 
individuality and irreducibility that ethnologists cannot fail to recognize. So, 
among the Nuer and the Dinka, fetishes are objects acquired individually and 
serve individual ends. They are amoral in their actions, because manipulable at 
will: they allow for revenge, for the acquisition of power and wealth independ-
ent of morality (Evans-Pritchard 1956: 101–4; Lienhardt 1961: 64–68).
Even in the Ashanti religion fetishes (suman) have an individual character 
and serve individual ends (Rattray 1927: 9–24). Their power derives from the 
fact that they are made up of the remains of impure things (cadavers, men-
strual blood, etc.). They therefore concern everything that does not enter into 
the moral order of the world, everything that cannot be fit into the system, and 
that constitutes its residues. Far from being reintegrated into this order, these 
fetishes represent an irreducible conceptual and moral paradox that it would be 
mystified to want to ignore and reduce. They are considered paradoxes, or limits, 
blind spots in the order, by indigenous ideology.
It is therefore important to underline two properties that the objects called 
“fetishes” by ethnographers seem to possess (although not all of them enter into 
our definition [cf. Forde 1964: 254–83]; and, reciprocally, objects that are not 
called “fetishes” in ethnographic literature ought to be considered as such ac-
cording to our definition). One concerns the material aspect of these objects and 
indicates their conceptual status; the other concerns their moral significance. As 
regards the latter, it must be noted that fetishes—residual and unique objects—
are associated with that which in the system has a residual status on the moral 
level: the desire for power, the thirst for revenge, the success of one who violates 
the social order and should therefore have to encounter failure, and so on.
In their material aspect, fetishes seem by definition to elude every characteri-
zation and in fact to link themselves to the objet trouvé. But something relatively 
uniform is evident in the way they are preserved and treated: they are very often 
packaged up, wrapped up in material, hidden (cf. Pontalis 1970). Among the 
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Dinka, for example, fetishes are made up of bundles that contain pieces of wood, 
roots, and other residues (Leinhardt 1961: 65, 68, 222). An essential feature of 
every fetish is however that the gaze is in some way at least impeded, that they 
are surrounded by taboo, by complex rituals of manipulations, by openings and 
closings, and so forth. The modern incarnation of the fetishist, the collectionist, 
will indeed show his treasures, but only to a few: it is essential that they not be 
accessible to all, that they only be kept in a secure place, that they be taken out 
only with thousands of precautions, and so on.
The value of the fetish consists in this contradictory coexistence of its ac-
cessibility and its inaccessibility. Inasmuch as it is a material object, the fetish 
is accessible; it can be found by chance, acquired, it is not a prerogative, it is 
immediately at its possessor’s disposal and for this reason gives him the impres-
sion of total dominion that is expressed by the uniqueness of the possession. But 
the fetish is also inaccessible (as the taboos, the material that envelopes it, the 
ritual precautions without which its power dissolves, all symbolize). This inac-
cessibility is paradoxically revealed by the need that the fetishist sometimes feels 
to show his fetish to someone else, to make him test his power, to discover in 
the other a sense of an exclusion, of an inaccessibility, that he finds in himself, 
but whose reality he wants to negate, projecting it onto another. The fetish is 
therefore the paradoxical object that manifests a lack, an irreducible limit—
ideological and practical—of a collective or individual “system,” rendering it as 
an absolute denseness of meaning, as a unique and unrepeatable power. Thus in 
capitalist society money is presented as absolute meaning, absolute power, but 
its fetishization, the mystic belief in its power, hides the limit that bourgeois 
ideology encounters in explaining and accepting the mystery of its value.
The accessibility, the sense of power that the fetish offers to the perverse, 
hide his incapacity to accept the reality of an essence and the trauma that frag-
ments the ego.
More generally, and more simply, in many if not all societies, the objects 
“without meaning”—associated with that which is unique, fortuitous, unpre-
dictable, bizarre—are sacralized as such. Their uniqueness, which challeng-
es the laws of the system and reveals its limits, seems to offer the one who 
makes himself owner of it a guarantee of absolute power, a reserve of meaning 
that transcends the unacceptable limits of the universe of codified signs and 
classifications.
No one has defined the feeling of power felt by the fetishist better than an 
African of the seventeenth century: “We make and break our gods daily, and 
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consequentially are the masters and inventers of what we sacrifice to” (Bosman 
[1704] 1967: 368).
In conclusion, we can define fetishes as the disguises assumed by the resi-
dues of a system: they constitute at one and the same time the recognition of 
their existence and the refusal to recognize their nature.
chapter eight
Kingship
Translated from the Italian by Lynn Westwater 
and revised by Alice Elliot
“Roi, basileus, tyrannos, rex, dux, imperator, melch, baal, pharao, éli, shodai, ado-
ni, shak, sophi, padisha, bogdan, chazan, kan, krall, king, kong, koenig, etc., etc., 
all expressions that seem to mean the same thing and that express completely 
different ideas” (Voltaire [1771] 1879: 375).
At first glance, it is tempting to think Voltaire is right: kingship assumes 
such different forms it seems impossible to reduce them all to a common de-
nominator. Yet upon considering each form in its entirety, one is immediately 
struck by the recurrence of certain themes and structural relationships. Even 
the history of the principal forms of kingship, in Europe and Asia alike, reveals 
constants, as if only a limited number of possibilities were available.
Hence, the notion of kingship raises the problem that is central to every 
comparative attempt: how to identify not an abstract essence that sacrifices dif-
ferences and history, but on the contrary certain structural principles that testify 
to both.
Let us begin with a minimal definition of “kingship.” Kingship is a mode of 
political organization where one person—the king—is the center of, or the focal 
point for, the entire community. As such, the king represents the fundamental 
values of the society over which he reigns, and is therefore considered sacred 
or even divine. Even when the king is not sacred in sensu stricto, he stands in a 
privileged relationship to those who are: gods or their interpreters, their priests.
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The mystic powers of kingship generally come in tandem with military pow-
er. In many theories of kingship, one power derives from the other: for some, 
sacred aspects are primary and military power is derived, whereas for others “it 
was a lucky warrior who was the first king” (Voltaire, Mérope I, III), or, to go 
along with Max Weber ([1922] 1968: 1141), “Everywhere the king is primarily 
a warlord. Kingship originates in charismatic heroism.”
The theory that posits the first king as a “magician” is associated with the 
the name of Frazer, according to whom kingship is the result of “superstition.” 
This superstition has positive effects, however, allowing the most capable men 
(magicians and thus inevitably intelligent impostors) to obtain power and au-
thority over other men, to change ancestral customs, and thus to advance hu-
manity (Frazer 1905: 82–88). Soon, however, the intellectual consequences of 
the political revolution introduced by the king-magicians affect their status: it 
becomes difficult to believe that they have the power to directly control nature. 
The king-magicians thus turn into king-priests: they now claim to reach their 
goals through transcendental powers, the “gods,” with whom they are capa-
ble of communicating and whom they at times even claim to incarnate (ibid.: 
127–28). In a subsequent phase, the religious aspect of kingship is separated 
from the “civil” one: temporal power is given to one person, spiritual power to 
another, and, meanwhile, the magicians become scientists (ibid.: 151).
A contemporary scholar, Luc de Heusch (1958, 1962a), still refers to Frazer 
when he distinguishes between “magic kingship” and “religious kingship.” 
A.  M.  Hocart’s theory (1927, [1936] 1970), which has come back into 
fashion, is a modified form of Frazer’s. Hocart abandons the categories of 
“magic” and “religion” and the idea that kings are useful impostors, but he still 
puts forward the hypothesis that kingship has ritual origins. For Hocart, the 
king is in all societies the “principal” actor in a mimetic rite whose function is to 
promote life: imitating, for example, natural phenomena, plant and animal spe-
cies—or, rather, the spirits or gods who give them life—the “principal” believes 
he can identify with them and influence them for the community’s benefit. 
Only when men have learned to obtain life by secular means does kingship 
correspondingly become secularized, leaving as its legacy to the bureaucratic 
State its centralized structure, which originally resulted from the division of 
ritual labor. 
Among the many criticisms that can be made of the “ritualistic” theory, one 
should be emphasized: the major weakness of Hocart’s hypothesis is that “ritual” 
and “political” are radically opposed, and that the “political” is posited as an 
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evolutionary phase that comes after the “ritual.” However, even if we want to 
admit that kingship originally has purely ritual ends, these ends inevitably in-
volve dimensions that are not ritualistic. Hocart ignores the material and social 
conditions of possibility of the rite. The complex ritual organization that he as-
sociates with kingship is already a political organization, because it requires that 
a certain number of people be hierarchically associated, that they become the 
focal point for the community, that resources for the rite be produced, and so on. 
The opposition between “ritual” and “political” is therefore artificial. If the idea 
that the ritual the king performs generates life can continue to be confirmed 
in collective experience, this is also because its performance actually produces 
life and prosperity as they are concretely possible in a certain social form: it 
stimulates cooperation, the formation of surpluses and their circulation, and so 
on. The rite is thus simultaneously the representation of the ends of kingship 
(which are identified with those of society as a whole) and of the means that 
actually lead to these ends. It provides, in short, a coordination and a totalization 
of all social activities.
It is not, therefore, a question of establishing a causal and evolutionary re-
lationship between “ritual” and “political”: these categories are of our creation. 
What matters, rather, is to understand that there are no social structures with-
out symbolic structures, and vice versa.
Similarly one-sided is the theory that posits the king as a “lucky soldier.” 
The theory disregards the fact that violence and military success are themselves 
objects of cultural interpretation: they are not seen as simply physical force. The 
isolation of physical force, the opposition between purely military and purely 
religious power, is a modern phenomenon. The king’s military power gains le-
gitimacy by acquiring meanings that transcend the power itself. Moreover, the 
conquering king is transformed when he establishes a permanent relationship 
with the population and the territory he controls: he moves from the periphery 
to the center of society. He thus associates himself with the values of this center, 
even if he maintains, as we will see, a relationship with the chaotic and violent 
world of the periphery.
The duality of the figure of the king is universally reflected in mythology and 
in the ritual of kingship: the king is a foreigner, a violent conqueror, but at the 
same time “the king belongs to the people,” as the Yoruba say (see Lloyd 1954), 
he is the guardian of the established order.
As we will see, this duality has symbolic causes, but it is also rooted in a real-
ity that symbolism must order and control.
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THE KING AS CONQUERER AND PREDATOR: AFRICAN 
EXAMPLES
The formation of monarchic states is explained by some as an endogenous pro-
cess and by others as the result of a conquest that permits a militarily strong 
group to impose itself on another and exploit it (Balandier 1967). In reality, 
the two processes can be, and in a certain sense always are, combined (Mair 
1977: 21–22). It must be emphasized that even when kingship grows out of an 
endogenous process, disparities in power are created at the regional level: inevi-
tably, the stronger group expands and becomes conqueror. The “conquering” and 
“foreign” aspects of kingship thus have quite real origins. Two African examples 
effectively illustrate this point.
The formation of Rwanda, a kingdom of the inter-lake region of eastern 
Africa, has been reconstructed in detail by Belgian scholars (Vansina 1962; 
Heusch 1966). I briefly summarize here the schema proposed by Jan Vansina.
The original population of the region between the great lakes was made up 
of Hutu farmers who were either politically acephalous (every lineage was au-
tonomous), or organized in small groups guided by hereditary leaders, endowed 
with ritual privileges and in particular with the ability to control atmospheric 
phenomena (Vansina 1962: 77–78). Vansina thus supposes a situation quite 
similar to that of the “king-magicians” described by Frazer. His reconstruction 
is indirectly confirmed by the presence in the region of political organizations 
of the same type, for instance that of the Alurs, which Aiden Southall (1953) 
suggests developed through an endogenous process. 
This region was then infiltrated by groups of pastoral people of Nilotic af-
filiation, later known as Tutsi, who occupied its pastures. These populations 
also had an acephalous organization, but group migration took place under the 
guidance of leaders who were able, with gifts or livestock loans, to attract a 
sufficient number of men for their incursions. Once settled in an area occupied 
by the Hutus, a band would offer them protection from other groups and their 
raids. Thanks to their military superiority and mobility, which allowed them 
to control relatively vast areas (pastoral peoples, because of the very nature of 
their activity and because of the need to open new pastures, are strongly ex-
pansionistic and have an effective military organization), the invaders secured 
control over the Hutus; they also obtained work and agricultural products from 
them, which were only partially compensated by counter-prestations of sheep-
farming products.
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Vansina claims that the leaders of the groups who were most successful in 
gaining control over of the Hutu people became the first kings, who then began 
to replace the leaders of confederated lineages with their own relatives, reinforc-
ing in this way their control over the group they led. This also led to scissions 
amongst rivals. The formation of the kingdom of Rwanda was the final result 
of a series of similar scissions that began with the kingdom of Mubari, which, 
according to traditional accounts, was the first to be formed.
The two brothers who founded the kingdom of Rwanda conquered small 
neighboring kingdoms, two of which had adopted the ritual practices of Hutu 
leaders and had even taken on their title: abiru. These abiru lineages came to be 
associated with the Rwandan king’s court; as a result, according to Vansina, the 
Tutsi kingship became sacred (more likely, in my opinion, this was a passage 
from a purely Tutsi sacredness to a sacredness that took on the values and sym-
bols of the dominated people; cf. below). This sacredness favored the unification 
of the invading group around its leader.
But one must also note that the king’s sacralization proceeded hand in hand 
with the reinforcement of his control over military power. From the sixteenth 
century, the king prohibits subordinate leaders from recruiting warriors without 
his permission; toward the end of the eighteenth century, he begins reserving 
the right to select the leaders of the various military units, despite not having 
an army of his own. In addition, he creates regional capitals, each occupied by 
a queen (i.e., one of his wives) and her court, which controls strategic areas and 
rounds up resources to sustain the main capital. Little by little, a “civil” admin-
istration takes shape alongside the military one, and, by the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the king Rwabugiri can afford to disregard hereditary rights 
to offices and appoint his own protégés instead. The extension of the king’s 
power leads to the expansion of his territorial dominion, and, at the same time, 
is rendered possible by it (allowing the gathering of new resources).
Rwandan history shows how the kingdoms of East Africa were formed by 
groups of shepherds who exploited groups of farmers; in West Africa we find 
instead, at the origins of kingship, warrior groups that control international 
commerce and use weaker populations as hunting grounds for slaves.
In his interesting book on the relationship between State and technology 
in Africa, Jack Goody notes that in West Africa, the combined effect of poor 
soil, abundant availability of land and absence of the plow prevents the for-
mation of a sedentary agriculture that is able to produce significant surpluses. 
Transportation and exchange difficulties, in combination with the above factors, 
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prevent the formation of a class of lords that can live off the control of agricul-
tural resources. The economic support for a politically centralized organization 
thus cannot be income from the land (as, for example, in medieval Europe), 
but instead consists of the two complementary activities of war and commerce 
(Goody 1971: 42). Military expeditions indeed allow the collection of spoils, 
in particular of slaves, some of whom are sold to European traders in exchange 
for guns (which enable the capture of other slaves), while others, especially in 
Dahomey (Lombard 1967: 74), are put to work to produce the food that is 
necessary to sustain the king and his court. Military superiority also insures the 
control of markets (which are taxed) and of commercial routes (on which tolls 
are levied), the monopolization of trade in certain products, and the creation of 
stable sources of supply from vassal states, which provide slaves, cola, nuts, ivory, 
and gold as forms of tribute.
The military superiority of the mostly immigrant groups that formed the 
monarchies of West Africa was made possible by the combination of two exog-
enous factors: the introduction of iron weapons and of the horse (Goody 1971: 
43–49). Indeed, the kingdoms of the Savannah were built “on horseback.” 
There is therefore a certain parallelism with East Africa: in both areas, the 
founders of the monarchies are groups of conquerors characterized by mobility 
(shepherds in one area, horsemen in the other) and military superiority. In the 
West as in the East, the spread of iron technology set in motion processes that 
have led to the formation of complex political organizations (ibid.: 46–47). 
Both of these areas also illustrate another important fact: in the absence of 
ecological, technical, and organizational conditions stimulating the produc-
tion of an agricultural surplus and its regular collection, plunder is the primary 
and fundamental form of wealth collection that enables the formation of an 
aristocracy and the kingship it expresses. War is therefore the principal “means 
of production” of these political organizations: often commerce complements 
it, prodding it on and providing the instruments (the arms, for example) of its 
perpetuation. Thus in West Africa, the kingdoms of the forest areas—whose 
formation lagged behind that of the other kingdoms founded by the horsemen 
of the Savannah (Smith 1969: 4–5)—became increasingly dependent on the 
foreign trade that occurred, especially in the fifteenth century and beyond, in 
the Gulf of Guinea. The control the king exercised over trade, and therefore 
also over firearms, and the absence in the forest area—difficult for horses to 
penetrate or survive in—of an equestrian aristocracy counterbalancing royal 
power, explain how the kings of Benin and of Dahomey, and also to a certain 
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extent those of the Ashanti (cf. Wilks 1967), were able to acquire a supremacy 
that was out of the reach of their colleagues who headed the “cavalry states” 
of the Savannah (Goody 1971: 51–55). With regard to Benin, R. E. Bradbury 
speaks of a “patrimonial regime” (1973: 133–46); the king of Dahomey is in 
any case able to develop a full-fledged bureaucratic organization and to in-
crease slave production (Lombard 1967: 77). It should also be noted that the 
increasing importance of the slave trade, upon which the prosperity of these 
kingdoms is based until the nineteenth century, by intensifying raids, fosters 
the formation of kingdoms in the peripheral hinterlands, both because the 
kings of the coastal areas create vassal states of horsemen who are given the 
task of capturing slaves, and because the acephalous tribes that do not flee 
into the inaccessible inland areas enter into confederacies with one another 
and choose leaders or kings who defend them from the incursion of the raid-
ers. In this way kingship spreads over vast areas through a process ultimately 
dominated by external factors. It is therefore quite appropriate that kingship 
appears to local consciousness as an institution that has an external reference 
point.
Both the Rwandan and the West African case confirm therefore that a polit-
ically centralized organization does not form because of an immanent tendency 
to extend and to reinforce the functions of “government.” It is thus difficult to 
believe, following Goody, that “the nucleus of the state systems can be discerned 
even among lineages, age-sets, cult-associations, and other basic groupings of 
acephalous society” (1971: 18). Under normal conditions, acephalous societies 
tend in fact to recreate themselves as such, since the means of household pro-
duction in force prevent the formation of a significant surplus and, most im-
portantly, prevent its concentration in the hands of the few (cf. Sahlins 1972). 
In this system, a leader can increase production and accumulate a surplus only 
temporarily, if he is able to persuade friends and relatives to work for him in 
preparation, for example, for a feast. In this way, the leader becomes indebted, 
and the debts must be paid. In the end, what is accumulated needs to be redis-
tributed, and often paid back with an interest, so that the “great man” is really 
only great when he has become poor (cf. Sahlins 1963).
It also should not be forgotten that in a society whose principal production 
is food, there is a quantitative and temporal limit to accumulation. The accu-
mulation of food is not in and of itself an incentive. As Max Gluckman (1960) 
has noted with regard to the Zulu, a leader is not able to eat much more than a 
common man.
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The egalitarian ideology of acephalous societies ensures in any case the elim-
ination of disparities in power and wealth. Amongst the Kapauku of Irian Jaya 
(Western New Guinea), the relatives of a leader who is too rich, and thus too 
egotistical, kill him yelling “You should not be the only rich man, we should all 
be the same, therefore you only stay equal with us” (Pospisil 1958: 80).
So, if acephalous societies evolve toward unequal forms, it is because in-
equality is imposed by a dominant group. However this group is formed, it 
remains associated, even in its subsequent transformations, with the externality 
of constraint, with the alterity of authority. This externality and alterity is often-
times spatialized: and in a world of scattered communities, authority is in fact 
extraneous, if not foreign.
FROM OUTSIDE TO INSIDE
The king is thus a warrior, a conqueror, inextricably linked to the use of force. 
But this force is not simply physical; his military superiority and his success 
seem exceptional and thus not human. It is a short step to the view that these 
are divine. Thus, for example, the success in war of Goth kings was attributed 
to their divine nature (see Jordanes’ De origine actibusque Getarum, XIII). And 
when Chaka, after having moved from victory to victory, founded the Zulu 
kingship, he was considered a god (Mofolo 1931: 133, 139), and his excep-
tional military success was attributed to the aid of magic powers. But in the end, 
these powers consist in the accomplishment of actions that are in opposition 
to normal human behaviors and motivations: his boundless thirst for power 
brings him to kill in cold blood (or allow to die) his brothers, the chief who 
had protected him and even the woman who was most dear to him, and, more 
notably still, was pregnant with his child. Like other kings who surrounded 
themselves with animals or with monstrous men (dwarfs, albinos, the “insane” 
[cf. Anderson 1972: 12; Heusch 1966: 156]), Chaka surrounds himself with two 
monstrous characters, one of whom is half beast (Mofolo 1931).
Metahuman, the king is in fact always associated with untamed nature, in-
accessible to man, and in particular with fierce animals like the leopard, the 
lion, the elephant, the python, and so forth. The kings of Dahomey claimed to 
have descended from a leopard that one of their ancestresses met in the forest 
(Argyle 1966: 4); in the European Middle Ages it was believed that a special 
relationship existed between kings and lions, so much so that “enfant de roy ne 
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doit lyons mengier” (cf. Bloch 1973: 148)—indeed, lion does not eat lion. As 
for Yoruba kings, they descended from the god of thunder, Shango (Morton-
Williams 1967: 58). One could multiply ad infinitum examples of the associa-
tion between kings and all that which in nature constitutes uncontrollable, and 
therefore divine, powers. Even in Saint Paul (Rom. 13: 1–7) we can find the 
echo of the idea that the power of kings is divine because it is power: if power 
comes from God, any king, good or bad, is a manifestation of God and should 
therefore not be opposed.
But if the king, precisely because he has strength, transcends humanity and 
is conflated with nature, then it is possible to control nature by controlling the 
king. The extraneous, invading character of the king thus takes on a meaning 
quite different from the one considered so far. With the king, nature pene-
trates into culture and can thus be domesticated, controlled. The scourge is now 
beneficent, and he who bears death becomes a bearer of life. But to make this 
possible, it is necessary to transform the king: the invader must become part of 
the people he rules, transcendent power must become immanent.
This transformation of the king is usually represented in the rite of corona-
tion (Hocart 1927: 75–77). Through this rite, violent and non-human power is 
transformed into legitimate and productive power: the king is united with the 
people, both directly and through the gods who represent the moral principles 
of the community. Naturally, the king does not have to literally be a true invader: 
the rite of coronation takes on the task of representing the king’s passage from 
human to divine, from immanent to transcendent, and his triumphal return 
(symbolic “invasion”) into the human, to the inside of the community.
The passage to the wild, monstrous world is often represented spatially by a 
movement from the village to the forest or the bush. Also frequent is a ritual in-
cest which the king is obliged to perpetrate, which represents his transcendence 
of the line of conduct of the community and thus too of kinship ties, which are 
based on the prohibition of incest (Heusch 1958, 1962b: 147). From this nega-
tive point of view, incest is divine like all that is monstrous insofar as it is not 
human. But incest can also be considered a positive manifestation of the king’s 
divine character: by marrying his own mother, his own daughter, or his own 
sister, the king makes his self-reliance clear. Indeed he does not need to receive 
women from other men, he depends on no one, just like a god.
Other “monstrous” acts necessary to accede to the throne can include ritual 
parricide (there are examples of this in East Africa and from the Magadha 
kingship in India (cf. Basham [1967] 1971: 931), matricide (for the kingdom of 
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Oyo, see Morton-Williams 1967: 65), the murder of other blood relations, or, 
simply, human sacrifice (for Dahomey, see Argyle 1966: 117).
The combination of incest with parricide is by no means limited to the 
Oedipal myth: quite the contrary, it is found for example in East Africa (Heusch 
1962b: 149) or in Hawaii (cf. Valeri 1972).
These and other practices allow the king to transcend the human world, to 
acquire a “wild” sacredness which is characterized as an uncontrollable force 
and identified with nature. Strengthened by this sacredness, the king can, like 
an irresistible conqueror, break into the world of culture. But by entering into 
contact with this culture, the king is transformed. It is significant that many 
African kings, Jukun kings for example, after having symbolically or actually 
engaged in ritual incest, renounce it definitively once they have re-entered 
the human world (cf. Meek 1931: 138–39). Their relationship with the queen 
mother will remain very close, but it will be desexualized (for Dahomey, see 
Lombard 1967: 83). 
The identification of the king with nature undergoes a parallel transforma-
tion: after the leopard-king, the lion-king, or the cannibal-king, which corre-
spond to the king’s “conquering” and wild aspect, comes a king who is identified 
with beneficent nature or even with edible plants. For example, the Jukun king, 
who is called lion when he enters the capital (“The slouching gait, the lion ap-
proaches with slouching gait: take to your heels!” sing the drum players [Meek 
1931: 152]), is then called “Azaiwo (our Guinea-Corn), Afyewo (our Ground-
nuts) or Asoiwo (our Beans)” (ibid.: 129), or “our crops,” “our rain,” “our health,” 
“our wealth” (ibid.: 137).
An analogous transformation takes place in the relationship between the 
king and the law. The conquering king is a transgressive king: in order to gain 
power he has disobeyed the law, he has killed, he has committed incest, and 
so on; but once in power, he is the keeper of the law, he punishes murder, in-
cest, and so forth. Thus Romulus—after having founded Rome committing, 
among other crimes, one or more parricidia (he kills his brother and, according 
to one version, his adoptive father)—passes a law that prohibits parricidium (see 
Plutarch, Lives, Romulus, 22, 4). Moreover, the king, mobile and active before he 
is brought to power, becomes immobile (the Yoruba king, for example, could not 
leave his palace [cf. Morton-Williams 1967: 61]) and even makes himself invis-
ible, hiding behind a curtain when he speaks with other men (as in West Africa 
[Meek 1931: 123]; and East Africa [Heusch 1966: 73]), or closing himself up in 
a hut during the day (as in Hawaii, see Kamakau [1866–71] 1961: 10).
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The idea that the coronation transforms the conqueror and the usurper into 
a king with a priestly, if not divine, nature, can also be found in the Christian 
West. It is expounded, for instance, by Jean Golein in his famous fourteenth-
century Traité du sacre:
and when the king disrobes, this is testimony that he is relinquishing his former 
worldly state to take up that of the royal religion; and if he holds it in such rever-
ence as he should, I believe that he is as fully cleansed of his sins as one just pro-
fessed in a religious vocation; concerning which St. Bernard says towards the end 
of his book De precepto et dispensacione: that just as sins are pardoned at baptism, 
so they are on reception into the religious life. (cited in Bloch [1924] 1973: 278)
Theodor Balsamon narrates that the emperor Johannes Zimisces, guilty of hav-
ing obtained the throne by assassinating his predecessor Niceforo Foca, was 
nonetheless admitted into church by the patriarch because “the royal unction 
had obliterated the assassination of which Zimisces was guilty even before he 
received this unction” (see Migne, Patrologia Graeca, cxxxvii, col. 1156).
It is well known that, according to Marc Bloch ([1924] 1973: 81), the rite 
for treating the scrofula of French and English kings originates in the attempt 
of two usurping dynasties (the Capetians and Plantagenets) to legitimate them-
selves. But this attempt was successful not only because it was in tune with 
the ideology of sacred kingship, as Bloch maintains, but also because it cor-
responded to an equally important schema: the individual and violent power of 
the usurper king had to transform into a power beneficent for the collectivity; 
the warrior-king had to sublimate into the priest-king and even the god-king. 
The same schema was applied moreover by Pipin of the Franks, a usurper who 
had to sublimate into a priest-king, receiving unction from the ecclesiastical 
authority (Kern [1914] 1939: 35–36).
DIALECTIC OF THE WARRIOR AND THE PRIEST IN EURASIA
It is clear that the passage of the king from the extreme of warrior to the op-
posite extreme of priest, from evil force to beneficent force, cannot be total or 
irreversible without taking away a necessary dimen-sion of kingship. Three solu-
tions are possible: either the king, who has become priest and even god, is paired 
with a person who carries on the warlike and more strictly “political” functions 
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of kingship; or, vice versa, the king remains fundamentally a warrior, but has to 
be rounded out by a priest who insures his relationship with the divine in its 
beneficent aspect; or, finally, the king as an individual, or rather kingship as a 
function, oscillates over time between the two states.
Each one of these three solutions has been adopted in different societies, 
or, over time, by one and the same society. For example, it is well-known that 
the first solution was adopted in Japan up through 1868. However it should 
be emphasized that the dual sovereignty realized by the mīkado (or tennō, ten-
shi: “priest”-king) and by the shōgun (“soldier”-king) was itself the product 
of a complex evolution, whose point of departure was the failure of a unified 
kingship based on the Chinese model, with centralizing and bureaucratic ten-
dencies. The collapse of this centralized system was facilitated by the pro-
gressive weakening of the emperor’s military importance. This weakening was 
above all determined by two concomitant factors: the absence of an external 
military threat and the adoption of Buddhism, which teaches non-violence 
and the sacred nature of every form of life. The imperial army was practically 
abolished, while at the same time the Chinese bureaucratic ideal was never 
realized. This resulted in increasing chaos, the emergence of private armed 
bands, some of which were maintained by the Buddhist convents themselves, 
and so on. Already in the mid-ninth century, the role of the emperor was split 
into two by regents, the Fujiwara, who held administrative and military power 
but still resided at court. From the twelfth century onward, however, with the 
shogunato Kamakura, the separation between the emperor (whose functions 
are only religious) and the shōgun (whose powers are based on control of the 
warrior class) became also spatial. From that point on there were two capitals 
(Bendix 1978: 63–73); in one resided a divine and non-violent sovereign, and 
in the other a human and violent potentate. The conflict between the opposed 
exigencies of the two components of kingship was thus resolved by severing 
them.
The Indo-European area offers the most interesting and complex examples 
of oscillation over time from one solution to another, oscillations that are a 
function of history but that presuppose, more profoundly, the persistence of the 
idea that royal power (and in reality every form of political power) is inevitably 
ambiguous for the very reason that, as totalization of society, it must incorporate 
contradictory elements.
The oldest representations seem to reflect a precise awareness of this am-
biguity. Two examples are particularly illuminating, one being the rituals that 
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in ancient India permit periodic renewal of royal power, the other the cycle of 
legends that narrate the events of Roman kingship.
We will first consider the evolution of the Indian ideology: this ideology 
illustrates the passage from a situation where the king oscillates over time from 
one pole to the other, to one—more stable but no less ambivalent—where to 
each extreme corresponds a single official.
J. C. Heesterman (1978: 9) summarizes the dilemma of Indian kingship 
with this formula: “The king has to belong to the community, but at the same 
time he must stand outside so as to guarantee his authority.” In the oldest pe-
riod of Indian kingship, the king belongs both to the “agricultural community,” 
grāma, and to the “jungle,” ara ya; it is in the latter that the king finds the divine 
source of his authority. The conflict between these two “belongings” is irremedi-
able; the ritual of royal consecration enables not its solution but its control, by 
expressing it symbolically: for this reason, it cannot be performed once and for 
all, but has to be repeated periodically (cf. Heesterman 1957). Community and 
jungle are thus reduced through ritual to two phases in a temporal cycle.
In a successive phase, the cyclical nature that the ritual originally possessed 
was intentionally destroyed in favor of a linear order, so as to “break out of the 
endless cycle by establishing a new conception of the transcendent, and thereby 
of authority” (Heesterman 1978: 15). This transformation is correlated with the 
expansion of sedentary agriculture and with the elimination, or rather devalua-
tion, of the warlike and violent aspect of kingship. Agonistic aspects of royal in-
vestiture (for example, chariot races) are eliminated or ritualized: the authority 
figure thus flees every challenge and aleatory aspect of the game and becomes 
“incontestably transcendent.” But as such, this authority is “irretrievably cut off 
from the social world” (ibid.: 16). Absolute authority no longer belongs to the 
king, but to the sacred texts, to the Veda.
How is it then possible to relate authority and kingship? By establishing a re-
lationship between the brāhman (“priest”), who embodies transcendent author-
ity, and the rājā (“king”) who possesses immanent power. Heesterman suggests 
that in the beginning, rājā and brāhman did not belong to mutually exclusive 
groups. When the king went into the forest he became a brāhman, a fact which 
is probably reflected in the rite of royal unction where the king is proclaimed 
“brāhman” (ibid.). The reformers radically separated king and brāhman, and the 
authority of the king from ultimate authority. The king, by now permanently 
inside the community, needs the authority of the brāhman who is left outside. 
These two moments, which originally alternated in the figure of the king, have 
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been definitively separated into two functions, into two classes. But in this way 
an irresoluble conflict is created between the need to keep the two principles 
separate, and the need to make them cooperate (ibid.: 18).
Heesterman’s characterizations of both the older phase of Indian kingship 
and the “reformed” phase are in some ways debatable.
As far as the older phase is concerned, it seems that the opposition between 
the sacred external and the profane internal, between the external source of the 
authority and its internal application, is poorly formulated. The analysis of the 
ritual shows that the king’s passage to the outside symbolizes a military expedi-
tion. But it is in the inside that the king is anointed and enthroned. In other 
words, the opposition between internal and external does not correspond, for 
the king, to the opposition between profane and sacred, but rather to two forms 
of sacredness precisely analogous to those described above: the conquering, “un-
tamed” aspect of the king’s sacredness, and the “domesticated” aspect—produc-
tive for the community—of the king’s sacredness. The king’s oscillation between 
the two spheres thus has a different meaning from the one attributed to it by 
Heesterman, who too rigidly identifies “outside,” “authority,” and “sacred,” and 
who must therefore allow for the paradoxical figure of the warrior who is at the 
same time a brāhman (ibid.: 16). 
Equally debatable is the characterization of the “reform.” Here, too the rigid 
equation between an outside, in which all authority is concentrated, and an 
inside, in which there exists only force, leads Heesterman to distort in part both 
the figure of the king and the figure of the brāhman. His hypothesis forces him 
to identify the brāhman with the renouncer, who is effectively outside of society. 
But how do we then explain the fact that the brāhman stands within society, that 
he is part of the caste system?
As for the king, it is true that he gains his authority from his relationship 
with the brāhman, but it is also true that he adds something of his own, which 
should not be ignored. In fact, the king finds his own legitimacy in his capacity 
to transform the abstract, transcendent order (dharma, divine law) into a con-
crete, immanent order; he must, for instance, protect the caste system, which 
allows persons to realize their own dharma. In this way, the merits acquired by 
the subjects affect the king’s status; in fact, such merits will be considered his 
merits as well, since it is his government that made them possible (cf. Lingat 
1973: 211).
Certainly, the divide between transcendence and immanence cannot be 
overcome, and thus kingship can never resolve the ambivalence, indeed the 
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contradiction, of its positioning between two opposing worlds. The scission of 
sovereignty in brāhman and rājā is the sign of this; but their cooperation makes 
it possible to attenuate that scission and to justify the recurrent idea that the 
king embodies the dharma (Spellman 1964: 99). Furthermore, the transcend-
ence of the brāhman, which impedes his direct exercise of power, allows him to 
maintain the continuity of divine law, and therefore enables him to transform 
the various “conquerors” by subjecting them to the supreme values of the com-
munity. From this perspective, the mechanical association of the brāhman with 
the “outside” and the king with the “inside” appears unacceptable. The brāhman 
is outside of society only insofar as he must preserve intact the values which 
regulate it: therefore, with regard to the still “untamed,” “conquering” king, he 
is “inside,” whereas with regard to the already transformed king, he is “outside.” 
As one can see, the relative position of the three terms— brāhman, king, com-
munity—changes in the different phases of ritual transformation, just as the 
meaning of the opposition inside/outside changes.
In my view, the brāhman is not simply added as an antithetical principle to 
the king; the king is, or should be, transformed by his relationship with him. The 
sign of this transformation is not only the fact that the king is considered an 
incarnation of dharma, but also that he institutes a complementary relationship 
with society, through which the merits of his subjects become his own merits, 
since it is he who made them possible. Between the warlike and the dharmic as-
pects of sovereignty there is therefore no radical opposition or separation. Rather 
there is a tension, which is expressed and controlled by its symbolic representa-
tion in ritual, and by the ideology that necessarily connects priest and king.
As one can gather, then, the mechanism by which the forceful king is trans-
formed into a king who is beneficient for the community exists even in India, in 
forms which are typically its own.
* * *
The originary oscillation of kingship between two poles and their transforma-
tion into two permanent statuses can be found also in Rome, another society of 
Indo-European origin.
The legends about Latin and Roman kingship are long and complex, and it 
is clear that they have to be analyzed taking into consideration all of the “codes” 
that they presuppose. Nevertheless, it is possible to list a certain number of char-
acteristics that define, together or separately, the various kings:
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1) The king is a foreigner. At the very least, Saturn, Aeneas, Romulus, Numa, 
Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius fit into this category. Even Brutus, 
whom one can associate with the kings because he is considered a second 
Romulus (so much so that his statue was erected amongst those of the kings 
[see Plutarch, Lives, Brutus, I]), is the son of a foreigner, Marcus Junius, 
whom Tarquinius Superbus suspected of aspiring to royal dignity and whom 
he therefore had killed;
2) The king is “untamed.” He is often turbulent (Romulus is an example of this) 
and gains power by killing his predecessor or a rival (Amulius kills the son 
of Numitor, heir to the throne of Alba Longa; Romulus, in one version, kills 
Titus Tatius; Ancus Marcius kills Tullus Hostilius [see Dionysius, Antiquitates 
Romanae, III, 35, 2–4]; the sons of Ancus kill Tarquinius Priscus; Tarquinius 
Superbus kills Servius Tullius and Marcus Junius); the king is a rebel (like 
Romulus and the regicides listed above; one can also think of Saturn, con-
quering king and god linked to the Saturnalia, which are a symbolic rebellion 
against the established authority—according to Macrobius [Saturnalia, I, 8] 
the celebration was introduced by Tullus Hostilius, warrior king par excellence); 
he is associated with the forest and with the animal world (for example, Picus, 
Faunus, and Romulus, who is nourished by birds of prey and by wild animals 
[see Plutarch, Lives, Romulus, 7, 6]), as well as with rearing livestock, a mobile 
activity which from the point of view of sedentary farmers is also turbulent 
and destructive (as in the case of Romulus); and with war, and particularly 
with the furor that characterizes it (e.g., Tullus Hostilius and his champion, 
Horace [cf. Dumezil 1942]). Finally Brutus, the uterine grandson of Tarquin-
ius Superbus who nevertheless transcends kingship and creates the Republic, 
puts the final touch on this catalogue of traits universally associated with the 
disordered aspect of kingship. As his own name indicates, he pretends to be an 
imbecile, and is used as an actual fool at the court of the Tarquini (Livy, I, 56);
3) The king is originally a slave. Servius Tullius is an example of this, but so is 
the rex nemorensis of Aricia, who was a fugitive slave (Frazer 1911–15, I: 11). 
The role of slaves in the Saturnalia is well-known; one can deduce that the 
slaves are connected with Saturn and, indirectly, with Tullus Hostilius, who 
instituted this festival;
4) The king is associated with a prostitute. So it is with Romulus, raised 
by one Acca Larentia (Plutarch, Lives, Romulus, 4, 3) who, like the Acca 
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Larentia associated with the rule of Ancus (Dumezil 1968: 280–81), is a 
prostitute;
5) The sexual behavior of the king is transgressive. Some kings rape or abduct 
women (Faunus, Romulus, Tarquinius), or are incestuous: Faunus marries 
his sister (or his daughter) Fauna, and the usurper Amulius rapes his niece 
Rhea Silvia (Dionysius, Antiquitates Romanae, I, 76; Plutarch, Lives, Romu-
lus 4, 2). So too, in conformity with the widespread theme of royal incest, 
we note that at least two kings are born out of incest: Latinus and Romulus 
himself, if one accepts the version according to which his father is Amulius, 
and not Mars. But it is well-known that divine birth and incestuous birth are 
considered one and the same in many cultures.
The theme of royal incest also appears at a metaphoric level at the end of the 
monarchy. It is in fact well-known that two sons of Tarquinius (Titus and 
Arruns) were sent to Delphi to learn the oracle’s interpretation of a predic-
tion. After having heard the interpretation, they also asked which of the two 
would become king. The answer was: the first of you who, upon returning to 
Rome, kisses your mother. The two interpreted the oracle’s statement literally. 
But Brutus, who was accompanying the two to entertain them with his foolery, 
interpreted it differently and, by means of a trick, positioned himself as predes-
tined successor of his uncle Tarquinius: he intentionally tripped over in order to 
fall with his mouth on the earth, “mother of all living beings” (Livy, I, 57).
The incestuous implication of kissing one’s mother is clarified by a simi-
lar episode related to Caesar, another future ruler. Caesar dreams of raping his 
mother: according to the soothsayer who interprets this dream, the mother is 
none other than the earth (Suetonius, De vita Caesarum, VII, 2; cf. Artemidorus 
of Daldis, Oneirocritica, I, 79).
So, the kiss given to one’s mother, incest, and the conquest of land all belong 
to the same symbolic paradigm. These legends condense two aspects of king-
ship: a) the king is incestuous, that is, outside of society and its rules, and; b) the 
king becomes united with the land that he conquers, and fertilizes it;
6) The king kills a relative. Romulus kills Amulius (this, if we follow the ver-
sion of the hero’s birth given by Dionysius and Plutarch, is also parricide) and 
kills his adoptive father Faustulus and his brother Remus; Tarquinius Superbus 
has his father-in-law Servius Tullius killed; Brutus kills his cousin and is at the 
same time killed by him; before this he had his two children put to death; and 
so on and so forth.
138 CLASSIC CONCEPTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY
Such violent and “monstrous” traits allow kings to seize power, and define 
kings above all in the initial phase of their careers. The untamed aspects of the 
king’s transcendence must be overcome at least in part, however: if the king is 
not “domesticated,” he cannot reign for long over the community. The opposi-
tion between two formally homologous episodes demonstrates this, one associ-
ated with the founding of the monarchy, the other with its abolition.
The first episode is the rape of the Sabines. It involves a violent act which al-
lows Romulus and his followers to establish a relationship with the land, whose 
true proprietors are the Sabine families (cf. Preaux 1962: 117). The second is 
the rape of Lucretia by a son of Tarquinius Superbus. Lucretia lives in Collatia, 
the Sabine city. Her husband, Tarquinius Collatinus, is the son of the son of 
a brother of Tarquinius Priscus, who had received from this king the task of 
governing Collatia (Livy, I, 38, 1). Lucretia thus is a Sabine woman and lives in 
Sabine territory [ibid.: 57]. Tarquinius’s action thus repeats formally the “rape 
of the Sabines,” which stands at the origins of the monarchy; but the formal 
identity highlights the substantive opposition. Romulus abducts virgins (with 
the exception, however, of Ersilia, a matron who becomes his wife or the wife 
of his champion, Hostus Hostilius, grandfather of the king Tullus Hostilius 
[Dionysius, Antiquitates Romanae, II, 36; Plutarch, Lives, Romulus, 18, 29; Livy, 
I, 11, 22; Ovid, Metamorphoses, XIV, vv. 830 ff.]), who are then married properly 
in accordance with the most prestigious rite—confarreatio (cf. Dumezil 1979: 
75; Dionysius, Antiquitates Romanae, I, 52, 25). By marrying the Sabines and 
having children with them, the violent invaders become “domesticated” and are 
able to establish definitively a positive relationship with the “people” (the au-
tochthonous Sabines). The action of Tarquinius, to the contrary, is only brutal 
and untamed. He rapes a married woman and the relationship ends there, it 
cannot be transformed. Rather than life (children), the rape of Lucretia pro-
duces only death (the unfortunate woman kills herself ).
The repetition of the founding event of the monarchy, inverted in its out-
come, thus justifies the end of the monarchy, making evident a fundamental 
idea: if the untamed king is not domesticated, and cannot be, if his founding 
violence is not transformed positively, he cannot create a positive relationship 
with the people. Tarquinius, in contrast with Romulus, is a king who remains 
wholly “untamed” and violent: because of this he is rejected by the people.
This transformation is represented in various legendary episodes. But more 
than by the lives of individual kings, it is illustrated by the regular alternation, 
within kingship, between kings who realize above all their violent side and kings 
whose peaceful side is most evident.
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Violent, warrior kings Peaceful kings of prosperity
1. Romulus
 2. Numa Pompilius
3. Tullus Hostilius
 4. Ancus Marcius
5. Tarquinius Priscus
 6. Servius Tullius
7. Tarquinius Superbus
Every king clearly has disordered and ordered traits: what allows us to group 
them in two opposing series is the relative proportion of the two kinds of char-
acters. Only Numa seems completely lacking in “untamed” traits, but this is 
probably because tradition has exaggerated his peaceful and religious aspect to 
make him represent paradigmatically the series to which he belongs. The traces 
of a similar, but opposite, operation can be found in the characterization of 
Romulus, who is also the paradigm of his series.
Numa’s relationship with the nymph Egeria betrays in any case an original 
connection with the rex nemorensis, the prototype of the untamed and violent 
king, at least if we consider it to be significant that Egeria is present both in a 
grove close to Porta Capena ( Juvenal, Satirae, I, III, vv. 10 ff.; Livy, I, 21, 33) and 
in Aricia (Frazer 1911–15).
As for the traits that support the opposition of the two series of kings, the war-
like and violent aspect of Romulus and Tullus Hostilius is so well-known that we 
do not need to examine it further. No less apparent is the association of the two 
Tarquini with military activity and with a politics of conquest; this is in fact the 
only positive aspect that Livy recognizes in them. Similarly well-known is the “leg-
islative” character of Numa and Servius Tullius. Ancus Marcius is remembered for 
an important contribution: the creation of meticulous rules for declaring war, the 
following of which ensures the fighting of a “just and holy” war (Livy, I, 32, 12). In 
opposition to this “just” war is the furor that characterizes the war of Tullus Hos-
tilius and the brutality with which he treats Metius Fufetius (cf. Dumézil 1942).
In contrast, the other series of kings is associated with prosperity. Numa 
develops agriculture and keeps the Romans out of war, while Ancus’ name is as-
sociated with demographic expansion and wealth (cf. Dumézil 1968: 280–81); 
as for Servius Tullius, his reform classifies citizens according to their income. 
These kings are in short linked to the “popular” element—generally taken to 
include the lower and most numerous stratum of the citizen classes. Both Numa 
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and Ancus are Sabines and thus “popular” par excellence; Servius was born of a 
slave woman and is represented as favorable to the people (he is also popular 
through distributing lands (Livy, I 46, 21).
The organizing principle briefly traced here highlights the ambivalence 
of kingship by polarizing the two necessary but contradictory components of 
kingship, and reflects in a mythical structure a transition that occurs in reality, 
and whose crucial moment is constituted by the rite of inauguration that every 
king must undergo.
Simplifying to the utmost, we can claim that the king passes through three 
phases: 
1) First he asserts himself militarily or politically with force. Even popular 
support is, in this phase, a simple component of force. As the legends indi-
cate, the king’s power at this stage is regarded as disordered and as acquired 
through actions that violate normally accepted rules of behavior; 
2) The man who has imposed himself is put forward (creatus) by the interrex. 
Thus begins the process of legitimization, which can include or not an elec-
tion (this point is controversial [cf. Palmer 1970: 211; Coli 1951: 92]), but 
which, in all cases, must include the rite of the inauguratio which allows 
establishment of whether there is present in the king a quality, auges (a noun 
that designates an abstraction: “increase,” “fullness” [cf. De Francisci 1959: 
433; Dumézil 1974: 586]). In the oldest phase of the rite, this quality was 
probably transmitted to the king, through the medium of the augur (the 
priest who officiated at this rite), by Jupiter himself. This fact is suggested by 
Livy’s description (I, 18, 6–10)—based on the inauguratio of the successor 
of the rex, the rex sacrificulus of the Republican era in which the augur, while 
praying to Jupiter (whom he seems to “hook” with a lituus, a stick curved 
at one end), places his right hand on the king’s head. Pierangelo Catalano 
(1960: 28) maintains that the augurium has no more than “permissible ju-
ridical value, revealing the fas: therefore the divine power that it contains is 
not the sole cause of success, but the support, the help, of human and natural 
power.” Whatever the chosen interpretation, one fact remains certain: divine 
intervention completes and “perfects” human action, either by transmitting 
a substance to it or, at the least, by approving it and recognizing its adequacy. 
Indeed this recognition has the effect of completely changing the way in 
which people evaluate the power of the elected person; in other words, di-
vine recognition legitimates that power; 
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3) Thus rendered augustus by Jupiter’s approval (Coli 1951: 90–91), the king 
comes to be recognized by the people, who confer upon him the imperium, 
that is, the legal use of power. According to some, who follow Cicero on this 
(De re publica, I, 25), a true lex (lex curiata de imperio) is voted in (cf. Palmer 
1970: 212); in the opinion of others, who point out that a vote appears 
absurd after Jupiter’s will has been unequivocally manifested, it is a simple 
matter of acclamation (cf. Coli 1951: 66, 93). 
Whichever hypothesis one adopts, the meaning of the rite is clear: one becomes 
king by force (it matters little whether military or political); but this force, which 
is in and of itself disordered and violent, must be transcended through contact 
with (or the approval of ) a god who represents for the community the ideal of 
kingship. Through Jupiter, who transforms him, the king can be united with 
the collectivity, which in turn confers upon him the imperium, thus legalizing 
his power. Although the king remains a man, he thereafter represents Jupiter, 
whose symbols he indeed bears: a) the red toga, sometimes embroidered with 
gold (toga picta), which represents the radiance of the god whose statue on the 
Capitoline temple was painted red; b) the scepter (hasta) (cf. Benveniste 1969: 
30; Alföldi 1959); c) the ivory throne; and d) the chariot (currus) (Coli 1951: 
57–59).
Just as Jupiter, “keeper of the law” (Dumezil 1977: 155), “rules over the 
whole world” (Cicero, De re publica, VI, 13), the rex rules over Rome.
* * *
We again find a schema similar in many ways to the Indian one: kingship im-
plies the use of force, of military power, and is a thing of warriors; nonetheless 
this force is transcended by establishing a connection with divine law, which in 
turn creates a productive relationship between king and community. In India, 
the king incarnates dharma in political society; Rome, more sensitive to the 
distinction between human and divine, makes the king simply a representative 
of Jupiter.
With the passage to the republic, the two roles of the king are separated: 
there is then a rex sacrorum (or sacrificulus), who is first in the hierarchy but, like 
the brāhman, without imperium; and in an initial time period a praetor maximus, 
then two consuls who do have the imperium (Momigliano 1963; cf. Mazzarino 
1944).
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Presenting the relationship between the two aspects of kingship as a conflict 
between two types of kingship that never succeed in merging, the legends of the 
royal epoch legitimate the passage to the republican situation which excludes 
oscillations of sovereignty from one pole to the other by radically separating 
the priest from the holder of the imperium. From this point of view, the Roman 
evolution is parallel to the Indian one, where sovereignty is divided into brāhma 
(which “conceives”) and k atrá (which “does”), the latter being the province of 
the warrior (k atriya) (Lingat 1973: 216–17, 221). Rome went beyond this dis-
tinction, however, grounding political offices in purely human law founded in 
the sovereignty of the populus Romanus and not in that of the gods. In India, on 
the other hand, the king has remained in an ambiguous situation, suspended be-
tween divine and human, because his task was to translate an entirely divine law 
(Spellman 1974: 103) into the sphere of competence of the imperium. This dem-
onstrates that a true secularization of political authority is not possible without 
a corresponding secularization of the law. The presence of pragmatic precepts, 
like those of the Arthaśāstra, does not suffice to secularize the king: these are 
in fact expedients, not laws able to create a political arena endowed with its 
own legitimacy. It is this that certain observers, as for instance Louis Dumont 
(1966b), forget. This explains why the Indian king continues to be considered 
divine—albeit of an inferior divinity to that of the brāhman (cf. Spellman 1964: 
26–42)—but also why the doctrine according to which the king has to obey the 
dharma (ibid.: 105) coexists in contradiction with the Arthaśāstric one, accord-
ing to which the artha is more important than the dharma. The latter doctrine is 
in effect the paradoxical result of the former. In truth, the king’s dharma consists 
in protecting the hierarchy of the castes, so as to allow each person to accom-
plish his or her own duty (svadharma) according to the dictates of divine law 
(Lingat 1973: 208). From this point of view, the dharma of the king encompass-
es all others, since it makes them possible (see The shanti parva1 [Śāntiparvan], 
63, 25). But in order to ensure the realization of the dharma, the king has to 
defend the body politic, and thus follow the laws of the artha, that is, of instru-
mental reason, the raison d’état, which can be in conflict with the dharma’s laws. 
Kautilya, to whom the Arthaśāstra is traditionally attributed, is therefore able 
to affirm that force is more important than the dharma, given that force makes 
possible its effective realization: “When Kautalya [Kautilya] remarks that might 
and self-aggrandizement are more important than religion and morality, he 
means that moral principle must be subordinated to the interests of the state 
1. The twelfth book of the Indian epic Mahabharata. —Ed. 
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inasmuch as the moral order depends upon the continued existence of the state” 
(Drekmeier 1962: 201).
Between dharma and artha there thus exists a contradictory relationship, 
not—as Dumont holds (1966: 366)—a simple hierarchical relation between 
two perfectly distinct activities. As we have seen, the hierarchy shifts, but does 
not eliminate, the contradiction.
There has been an attempt in India, linked to Buddhism, to humanize king-
ship in its entirety. Its paradoxical result is, however, a sacralization and even 
divinization of kingship.
In the Buddhist “Genesis,” the Aggañña-Suttanta, the king derives his legiti-
macy from a social contract that aims to remedy the Hobbesian bellum omnium 
contra omnes or, to use the Indian metaphor, the “logic of the fish” (matsya nyāya 
[cf. Lingat 1973: 207]). The king has the right to collect taxes only in exchange 
for actual protection (Spellman 1964: 22). But this contractualist theory is in-
scribed within a cosmogonic myth that provides the theory with a meaning 
quite different from the Hobbesian one. As Stanley Tambiah has noted (1976: 
22), this myth constitutes the intentional inversion of the brahmanic myth of 
Manu. In the brahmanic myth, the order of the universe is generated by divine 
energy, while in the Buddhist myth the process of differentiation is the result 
of a degeneration due to purely human acts. It follows that from the brahmanic 
point of view, the social order, which is part of the order of the universe, has 
divine origin, whereas from the Buddhist point of view it is of human origin. 
Additionally, while in Brahmanism the priest is generated before the king and 
is thus superior to him, in Buddhism, to the contrary, the formation of kingship 
precedes that of society and its hierarchy: the king, put in place by the social 
contract so as to end chaos, is responsible for social organization. The brahman 
is thus subordinate to him.
In essence, the humanization of kingship finds its pride of place in the work 
of resisting the chaos of degeneration and of reproducing the originary state. 
The king is therefore identified with the utmost expression of the corrective 
process which allows the realization of freedom, the state of happiness (nirvā a) 
experienced by Buddha (ibid.: 39–40).
This doctrine was drawn from the Theravada variety of Buddhism, which 
asserted itself in Ceylon and in Southeast Asia, where the king is not only the 
emperor of the world (cakravartin), but is also a Buddha incarnate or a being 
destined to become Buddha (Bodhisattva). As a famous inscription of Sukhodaya 
says, the king “has the desire to become a Buddha and the desire to lead all crea-
tures beyond the ocean of sorrows of transmigration” (Coedès 1948: 369).
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Fundamentally, Buddhist theory reunites the sovereignty that Hinduism has 
divided, and ensures it a privileged relationship with dharma, eliminating the 
mediation of the brāhman. It also stands in opposition to caste, and subordi-
nates all subjects in equal measure to the king. The reunification of sovereignty 
has as its goal the transcendence of the dharma–artha opposition: Buddhism 
nonetheless inevitably returns to this opposition in the concrete exercise of 
kingship (Tambiah 1976: 522). The solution adopted to resolve this contrast 
is an “oscillation” between two incompatible principles: the warlike and vio-
lent king, conqueror of the world, will have to transform himself, periodically 
or definitively, into a monk (bhikku, “beggar”), that is, into a member of the 
Buddhist “order” (Sa gha); or rather, like Aśoka, he will have to transform him-
self from conqueror into peace-maker, thus justifying, especially in Southeast 
Asia, an imperialist and expansionist ideology of kingship (ibid.: 46–57).
Usually, though, kingship is legitimated by an interchange (goods for merits) 
with the Sa gha. The latter recognizes the king as a “just ruler”; for his part, the 
king protects the Sa gha and as such has the right to “purify him” of the unde-
sirable elements around him, among them the king’s adversaries (ibid.: 517–24).
It is interesting to compare the evolution that took place in South and 
Southeast Asia with the evolution that occurred in the medieval West. Schema-
tizing to the utmost, one could claim that, after the fall of the Roman Empire, 
Western kingship passed through the following phases:
1) The monarchies of the conquering Germans were based on the idea of the 
sacredness of a lineage from which the king must be chosen (Kern [1914] 
1938: 13; Benveniste 1969, II: 85);
2) After the conversion to Christianity, kings are officially desacralized. In ef-
fect, the Christian conception (like that of other monotheistic religions and 
particularly of Islam) makes all men equal before a god who concentrates all 
powers within himself. Nonetheless, kings keep their ancient sacredness in 
the popular consciousness (cf. Bloch [1924] 1973);
3) From the beginning of the eighth century, the unction of the kings by the 
Church sacralizes kingship in Christian terms. But the rite of unction gen-
erates an ambiguity: who is superior, the priest who gives the unction, or the 
king who receives it? Between the eighth and tenth centuries, the priest is 
subordinate to the king, whose unction has a sacramental valence that places 
him in direct relation to God: he is a christus;
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4) With Gregory VII the Church attempts to establish its own superiority over 
royal authority. Removing the sacramental valence from the kings’ unction, 
the ecclesiastical institution tries to monopolize the relationship with divine 
law and attempts to secularize kingship (Kern [1914] 1939: 55–56), or in 
any case to subordinate it to its own authority. This theocratic tendency is 
implicit in the Christian ideology of the State, according to which the State’s 
task is to translate divine or natural laws into positive law, contributing to 
the improvement of humanity and thereby procuring its salvation. As Kern 
writes, “the mediaeval Christian State is not merely a juristic institution, but 
expresses the ideal of active social betterment and civilization” (ibid.: 71).
This ideology inevitably leads to the priests, as keepers and interpreters of divine 
law, becoming actively involved in its positive translation, rather than being 
satisfied with a mere spiritual or ritual supremacy (as in India). At the same 
time however it gives kingship a religious dignity and function, and thus moti-
vated it to resist the Church’s initiatives. The latter, if it actually hopes to control 
the State, has to be able to condition it in its material powers, and thus has to 
take on some of its prerogatives and organizing characteristics (centralization, 
bureaucratization, dominion over a territory). On the other hand, the State, in 
order to preserve its own autonomy and dignity with respect to the Church, has 
to preserve and increase the sacred characteristics that the ecclesiastical power is 
trying to monopolize (cf. Bloch [1924] 1973; Kantorowicz 1957).
So, the rivalry between the two organisms brings them not to differentiate 
themselves from one another, but rather to assume one the characteristics of 
the other: the Church becomes “state-like”, the State becomes “church-like.” 
Ernst Kantorowicz (1957: 193) effectively summarized the resulting symbolic 
interchange: 
The pope adorned his tiara with a golden crown, donned the imperial purple 
and was preceded by the imperial banners when riding in solemn procession 
through the streets of Rome. The emperor wore under his crown a miter, donned 
pontifical shoes and other clerical raiments and received, like a bishop, the ring 
at his coronation. These borrowings affected, in the earlier Middle Ages, chiefly 
the ruling individuals, both spiritual and secular, until finally the sacerdotium had 
an imperial appearance and the regnum a clerical touch.
* * *
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In conclusion, Hinduism, Buddhism and medieval Christianity illustrate dif-
ferent modalities of the priest-king relationship and, more profoundly, the rela-
tionship between two aspects of sovereignty:
1) Hinduism subordinates the king to the priest by differentiating their spheres 
of activity. But as we have seen, this differentiation and its correlate hierar-
chy stand in opposition to phenomena that contradict them;
2) Both Buddhism and Christianity assign to the king a religious function. 
Clergy and kingship are therefore partially undifferentiated: the possibility 
of conflict is even stronger than in the Hindu formula. However, conflict 
occurs only sporadically in Buddhist society, above all because the Sa gha is 
composed of individuals who abandon the world (with which they maintain 
only a relationship of exchange) and who, moreover, constitute a free asso-
ciation of free men (they remain so because they do not take a vow of obedi-
ence), lacking the cohesion of a bureaucratic or, at any rate, state organism;
3) Quite different, on the other hand, is the case of the medieval Church, a bu-
reaucratic organization where the principle of obedience prevails, and which 
attempts to control the State directly, making it a worldly instrument for 
otherworldly ends. As we have seen, the struggle against the Church pushes 
the State to assume sacred and religious characteristics. The resulting lack of 
differentiation between State and Church is resolved therefore at the level 
of force. The Western development is thus quite a special case. Among other 
things, it leads to the formation of a “kingly religion” to which the “State 
religion” is still heir.
THE SYMBOLIC STRUCTURES OF KINGSHIP
In his March 21st speech to Parliament, James I declared: “Kings are justly 
called gods for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon 
earth. For if you will consider the attributes to God, you shall see how they agree 
in the person of a king” ([1609] 1965: 307). These bold words reveal the extent 
to which the king was implicitly deified by theorists of divine-right monarchies. 
The visible god, chosen by the invisible god, seems to fuse with the latter.
Whether through images of a transcendent god or of immanent gods, why 
do kings tend to be deified?
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The explanations proposed are for the most part psychological: thus, recent-
ly, Paul Veyne (1976b: 587) once again took off the shelf the phenomenological 
theory of religion, maintaining that “the shiver that one feels when standing 
before a divine statue or a sacred mountain, one also feels when introduced to 
the presence of the king”.2But is it experience that produces representation, or 
representation that generates experience? It is not fair to invoke the existence 
of a specific experience of the “numinous” which would make one perceive gods 
and emperors with similar feelings (ibid.: 585–86): the divinity attributed to 
kings is not reducible to an emotional reflex of a “heteronomic dependence,” 
but is conceptualized in a precise way, and augmented and renewed with ap-
propriate rituals (cf. Meek 1931: 138, 42, 148–49; Heesterman 1957; Inden 
1978); the king himself must behave like a divinity and hide when he needs to 
behave like a man (cf. Meek 1931: 10, 121; Heusch 1972: 23). We can at least 
say that the emotions that surround the figure of the king are perpetuated and 
reproduced through a corpus of practices and representations: they have thus 
nothing spontaneous about them. Indeed, the king’s same authority can have 
radically different representations in different societies; this demonstrates that 
the theory of “sentimental deification,” of the political emotion of heteronomic 
dependence, propounded by Veyne (1976b: 567), is inadequate.
It is therefore representations, and not emotions, that we should study. Fur-
thermore, we must also refrain from confounding the ideas we ourselves associ-
ate with certain words with the ideas other cultures associate with them. The 
word “god” has totally different meanings in different cultures: for us, the word 
evokes a being who is omnipotent, immortal, invisible, and so forth. It therefore 
seems inconceivable that a king, whose mortality and lack of omnipotence, for 
instance, anybody can recognize, might be considered a god. But in innumerable 
theologies, gods are considered neither immortal nor omnipotent, and the op-
position between the human and the divine is not as distinct as it appears to us.
Scholars often emphasize the marked differences existing between ideolo-
gies of kingship where the king is truly considered like a god (Pharaonic Egypt, 
for instance), and ideologies where he is considered only the privileged inter-
locutor of a god, his helper or representative in exceptional cases (as in Mesopo-
tamia and China) (Frankfort 1948). Less often do these scholars note that these 
claims should be qualified by taking into consideration the entire pantheon and 
the entire ideology of the divine. The Indian king is often considered a god and 
2. Editor’s translation. This passage is not in the English translation of Veyne (1990), 
which is abridged. —Ed.
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treated as such; but in Hindu theology, where gods are innumerable, have hu-
man passions and where their very existence depends on rites performed by men, 
“divinity is cheap” (Basham [1967] 1971: 88). Moreover, brahmans are “more 
divine” than kings. The Pharaoh himself is certainly a god, but a god amongst 
other gods, who participates with them in a cosmic drama, from which he some-
times emerges the victim of his opponent, Seth (Frankfort 1948: 123–39).
These observations help explain why it is so difficult to compare ideologies 
of kingship in terms of degrees of “divinity” or “sacredness” attributed to the 
king function.
What is more important is to specify the structural characteristics that, in 
the right context, lead to a sacralization of kingship. 
Whatever forms the sacredness of the king takes, this sacredness is perpetu-
ally motivated by its capacity to represent society to itself as a totality and, better 
still, to realize it as such. Moreover, since social reproduction depends on the 
reproduction of nature, the king is frequently thought to guarantee the latter 
(cf. ibid.: 3).
Insofar as he actually achieves social totalization as part of the totalization 
of the cosmos, the king is attributed with exceptional powers; moreover, he 
possesses the characteristics of the totality that he creates and represents, ex-
tending himself, like that totality, in time and in space. Totality and divinity are 
in the end equivalent notions (cf. Durkheim [1912] 1960: 630, n. 2): the king 
is therefore deified insofar as he is fully identified with totality (Kantorowicz 
1957: 271–72). But even in the absence of this complete identification, it is still 
true that the king is closer to totality (represented here by a transcendent god) 
than his subordinates—subordinate to him precisely because of his privileged 
relationship with totality.
The king is the abstract idea of totality which aspires to be concretely real-
ized. Such concrete realization is rendered in part possible thanks to a process 
of doubling of the king in: 1) “doubles” of his ordered dimension in a) space and 
b) time, and; 2) “doubles” of his disordered dimension:
1a) It is not difficult to understand why the king, as a totality, must split 
himself in space. By definition he has the gift of ubiquity: he is present every-
where—for instance in every court in which his law is administered (ibid.: 5). 
This ubiquity is often represented by sanctuaries or statues of the king spread 
across the land. A person is deified though her or his multiplication in the form 
of statues: this was understood perfectly in Republican Rome, where erecting 
statues to living people was prohibited, save those for victors in war, which in 
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any case represented Jupiter (cf. Versnel 1970: 84–93). When, after the victory 
of Thapsus, a statue was decreed for Caesar, he was automatically declared a 
demigod ( µίθεος) (Weinstock 1971: 41, 53). The same idea can be found in 
Babylon: whereas the king’s person was not considered divine, the statues that 
represent his person were! (Frankfort 1948: 303).
Elsewhere, the king’s person is doubled through his living alter egos. For ex-
ample, a double of the king existed in both sectors of the capital of the kingdom 
of Yoruba of Oyo: as doubles of the king, they were killed at his death. With 
the aid of these and other “doubles” (Morton-Williams 1967: 61–63), the king 
concretely represents the unification of differences, both at a political-territorial 
level and at other levels. 
Another and more important realization of the same principle is constituted 
by the way the structure of the court, or the capital, is generalized in all of the 
subordinate parts of the kingdom (cf. Lombard 1967: 83; Wilks 1967: 210). The 
reproduction of this structure throughout the territory allows the extension of 
the king’s power to be measured, and allows the sphere of influence of one king 
to be distinguished from the sphere of influence of another; it also facilitates 
administrative coordination.
At the very least, the penetration of the king’s person into society is realized 
by his subjects’ imitation of his behavior. The king and his court tend thus to 
become the model of behavior (etiquette, and so forth); especially in modern 
Europe (cf. Elias 1969), the king has extended his control over society in this 
way. Giacomo Casanova keenly observed: “In those days the French imagined 
that they loved their king; in good faith and by habit, they repeated all his affec-
tations” ([1791–98] 1959, II: 16). But if all people behave like the king, then the 
collectivity is the king: this unlimited generalization of kingship leads paradoxi-
cally to its dissolution into a new sovereign: the people. For this reason, kingship 
must periodically recreate the distinction between the whole (king) and the part 
(court) that symbolizes the whole; from this comes the phenomenon of fash-
ion, which intensifies precisely in the capitals of modern European monarchies, 
where the diffusion of information is most rapid.
1b) Kingly totalization happens not only in space, but also in time. Kingship 
endures, though kings die. The successor is therefore the “double” of his prede-
cessor. This reproduction in time takes different forms and, moreover, does not 
pertain only to succession. Thus, for example, the king of Oyo had a spiritual 
double (Orun) who remained with God in heaven: every year it was necessary 
to divine whether the king was on good terms with this double; if he was not, he 
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was forced to commit suicide (Morton-Williams 1967: 54). There is therefore 
a continuous kingship at a transcendent level, which must be realized in time 
though immanent kingship.
So too among the Minangkabau (Sumatra), the immanent king corresponds 
to his transcendent double, who is in the Seventh Heaven (Abdullah 1972: 
192–93). The dichotomy between the permanent divine aspect and the transient 
human aspect is immanent in the very person of the Jukun king. The king’s im-
mortal and inviolable part is called juwe and is concentrated in his heart and 
right arm. Therefore his successor, in whom the divine king must reincarnate 
himself (cf. also Lombard 1967: 84), eats the heart of his predecessor (Meek 
1931: 131) (this custom exists also among the Yoruba [cf. Morton-Williams 
1967: 53]), and the successor keeps the deceased king’s right arm as a relic 
(Young 1966: 148–49). Reliquaries or regalia, insofar as they last longer than 
people, often incorporate the permanent aspect of kingship. Regalia moreover 
can appear as epiphanies of the transcendence that legitimates kingship. Thus, 
according to the Malay annals (Sejarah Melayu 1952: 42–43), the regalia of the 
first sultan were brought from overseas by the fakir who converted the sultan to 
Islam and who gave him his title. The true sultan is at base the totality of regalia, 
the possession of which legitimates those who are successively in charge of it.
The need to create doubles of the king who survive his death is particularly 
motivated by the difficulties caused by the interregnum. In many societies, in 
effect, the period of the interregnum coincides with an actual suspension of 
kingship, which translates into a temporary disaggregation of society. From this 
comes the tendency to abolish the interregnum and to introduce the princi-
ple of dynastic continuity, independent of the rite of coronation. Thus in India, 
the most ancient royal ritual presumes a period of interregnum in which the 
kingship dies with the king; but the rites of coronation (abhi eka) of the high 
Middle Ages (700–1200 ce) reflects the elimination, or at least the reduction 
to the minimum necessary, of interregnum. The continuity of kingship is never 
interrupted (Inden 1978: 42–43).
The kingdoms of Dahomey and Hawaii offer two striking examples of the 
interregnum’s consequences for societies where kingship centers on the king’s 
physical person: anarchy and violence reign supreme until the new king ac-
cedes to the throne (Lombard 1967: 79; Kamakau [1866-71] 1961: 22, 266; 
Steward 1828: 216). Similar phenomena still occurred in Europe in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, justified by the old medieval idea that the new king is 
not the king until he has been crowned (Kantorowicz 1957: 317–18, 324). The 
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interregnum can be avoided by doubling the king. One common method con-
sists in associating the ruling king with his successor: this method can be seen, 
for example, in medieval India (Inden 1978: 38), in Tahiti (Henry 1928: 188), 
in medieval Europe (Kern [1914] 1939: 24 n. 13), in Egypt (Frankfort 1948: 
101), and so on.
But the most notable method was adopted by English and French monar-
chies at the beginning of the fifteenth century (Giesey 1960: 26–27, 81) and 
reached its greatest development in the Renaissance. This method consisted 
in the fabrication of an effigy of the defunct king, which was treated as if it 
were alive (people pretended to feed it and so forth). In this way, the king was 
fictitiously kept alive until his successor took his place.
The ideological underpinnings of this ritual practice have been admirably 
reconstructed by Kantorowicz (1957). It is a practice that illustrates the idea— 
especially developed in English law—according to which the king has two bod-
ies: the natural body, which is mortal, and the “body politic”, which is immortal. 
The latter is a corporation of one, or rather a corporation sole, that is a corporatio 
made up of one individual who is considered eternal. Like the Phoenix, the 
king is the individual who represents the species and who each time is reborn 
in identical form, the perfect representation of kingship as totality in time and 
space.
The funerary effigy represents the king’s eternal body, which continues to 
live until it is incarnated in his successor. The contrast between the king’s eternal 
body and the cadaver—whose human misery is obsessively underscored, even 
in statuary—illustrates “the triumph of Death and the triumph over Death” 
(ibid.: 425).
The assertion of the idea that the king has an “immortal body,” and thus that 
he is, at least in this attribute, divine (ibid.: 272), is concurrent with the monar-
chy’s assertion of divine right. Divine right is correspondingly linked to the need 
to maintain the continuity of the crown over time, and thus to eliminate the in-
terregnum. The successor takes the place of his predecessor “by divine choice”—
it is God who makes the successor be born. The divine approval, and thus the 
divine substance of kingship, is in the very blood of the king, and is not given 
to him at the moment of the unction (ibid.: 331 ff.). The use of kingly effigies 
is situated in the position of a compromise between this new theory of succes-
sion—which implies that succession happens automatically upon the death of 
the reigning king—and the old medieval theory according to which succession 
happened at the moment of coronation: in this compromise, succession takes 
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place at the moment of the funeral and of the burial of the deceased king. Dur-
ing the period of the interregnum that precedes this rite, images manifest the 
continual presence of the king in his immortal body (cf. Giesey 1960: 1);
2) We have already illustrated the essentially ambivalent nature of the king: 
violent and peaceful, disordered and ordering, and so forth. This ambivalence 
is manifested in the concrete history of kingship, with its conquerors, with its 
periods of war and of peace. But if kingship can encompass this concrete his-
tory, it is because it already contains its paradigm at a symbolic level. In effect, 
kingship is attributed with the property of creating order by encompassing dis-
order into itself, transforming and neutralizing it. Without this process, which 
makes kingship oscillate, more or less often, between order and disorder, king-
ship would dissolve. Paradoxically, then, kingship neutralizes the disorder that 
it itself helps to create.
The king thus holds in himself the negative principle he fights: and it is with 
this principle that he fights it. But victory is possible only when the internal 
negative aspect is completely expelled in the course of its struggle against the 
external negative aspect: putting to death his enemy and every other bearer of 
disorder, the king puts to death that which is disordered and violent within 
himself, and can therefore transform into the principle of order incarnate. The 
danger that threatens kingship is therefore the blocking of this mechanism—
the danger not only that the enemy might win, but also that the expulsion of the 
king’s negative aspect may not be successful. In the case of such failure, the king 
becomes an element of disorder, an enemy to sacrifice and to drive out.
All kingships thus have developed cathartic mechanisms in which the ca-
tharsis of society coincides with the catharsis of the king’s negative aspect. The 
king is represented in these cases by his “monstrous double” (as René Girard 
defines him), who can be represented by a prisoner of war, by a criminal, or 
by actual monsters, animal and natural (cf., for example, Anderson 1972: 12). 
The catharsis of the negative aspect can be tragic or comic, tragic if these 
“monsters” are put to death in a sacrificial rite, comic when they are “killed” 
by the laughter that they cause (the court’s monsters are also the court’s fools, 
found in most kingships). The two transformations of the negative aspect can 
be realized in more or less direct forms; they can, for example, be manifested 
in theatrical forms: instead of a true evil king being put to death, a fictitious 
representation of such a king, provided by an actor, is killed; instead of laugh-
ing at a true imbecile, people laugh at an actor who pretends to be such on the 
stage, and so on.
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Between king and fool, king and sacrificial victim, there is always a very 
close relationship. Together, they represent the two complementary aspects of 
kingly totalization: they are the agents of incessant transformations of nega-
tive into positive, transformations that are represented in a controlled symbolic 
space (Willeford 1969: 151–73).
But the symbol refers to a reality whose control is always precarious: the 
king’s disordered double, terrifying or ridiculous, reminds him of the risk that 
he always runs—the risk of turning into a fool. The threat of this transformation 
looms as an already tragic premonition of the king’s final transformation into a 
victim, of the inevitable triumph of death.
Once upon a time kings represented to all this drama of all. Today, the dra-
ma is immortalized in theaters, erected by kings. Hamlet, deprived of Yorick, 
continues to madly combine within himself the king and the fool, Lear to dis-
cover that “when we are born we cry that we are come to this great stage of 
fools” (King Lear, IV, 6).




THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF MOURNING
The term “mourning” designates the totality of social practices and psychologi-
cal processes elicited by a person’s death. These practices and processes last a 
certain amount of time. According to traditional interpretation, this is attribut-
able to a gradual attenuation of grief and of the initial impression produced by 
the loss of a beloved object.
However, a number of sociologists (following Hertz [1907] 1928) and psy-
chologists (following Freud [1915] 1959) have demonstrated that separation 
from a beloved person does not happen in a single stroke and requires time, 
because it is the result—and in no sense a guaranteed one—of a specific “labor” 
on the part of the subject and the collectivity which demands the expenditure 
of a certain amount of energy (cf. Lagache 1938).
Freud has explained the psychological mechanism of this labor: the beloved 
object is connected to the libido through countless images. In order to accept 
the loss of the object, the subject has to relive each of the ties that united him or 
her to the deceased. When this process concludes, death comes to be accepted: 
the libido has been separated from the deceased “piece by piece,” and can be 
now reinvested in other objects. The sign of the end of psychological mourn-
ing is therefore the transition from indifference to external reality to a renewed 
interest in it. Freud’s theory was later enriched and complicated, especially with 
respect to survivors’ ambivalent feelings toward the dead (cf. Abraham [1924] 
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1927; Klein 1950; Bowlby 1960, 1961). Nevertheless, it remains the basis for an 
explanation of the individual psychology of mourning.
When we turn our attention to the collective dimensions of mourning, 
however, a rather different picture from the one constructed by Freud emerges: 
manifestations of grief depend on the respective social positions of the deceased 
and the bereaved, on the degree of their relationship, and so on. Not only is 
mourning regulated, but even emotions themselves seem to have been learned 
and have social, not libidinal, motives.
The manifestations of mourning in ancient Chinese society are particularly 
telling in this respect. Marcel Granet ([1922] 1953: 233) has defined them as 
“a ritual syntax”: “a true language whose rules and correctness are established by 
the grammarians, i.e., the ritualists, a language moreover in which philosophical 
analysis is able to rediscover a logic that accords with the intelligible order of 
the universe” (ibid.: 223–24).
The mourner’s clothing, for example, signals the “class” of his or her mourn-
ing and the nature of his or her obligations. From the number of threads in the 
warp of the fabric one can learn whether the mourner is only allowed to answer 
yes or no through gestures, or if he or she can answer orally but not speak first, 
or can speak but must avoid taking part in a discussion, or, lastly, can take part 
in it, but not to the point of taking pleasure in it (ibid.: 227).
It is forbidden to a Chinese person to express grief without the aid of a 
symbolic apparatus that is codified, prescribed, and consecrated. Mourning ges-
tures constitute a “system of signs” (ibid.: 242) that is superimposed on natural 
feelings. Spontaneous expression of such feelings is considered “barbarous”; the 
civilized person follows the dictates of a rite that prescribes, moderates, and 
regulates emotions.
Conventional and mandatory displays of mourning have as their goal a 
“therapeutics of social invention” (ibid: 238); they generate a catharsis of grief 
and are opposed to the passive behavior that is characteristic of a state of mourn-
ful torpor.
Confronted with this, as with countless other examples of the codification of 
feelings and their expression, one is tempted to harden an opposition between 
the “sincerity” of feelings spontaneously expressed, and the “hypocrisy” of exte-
rior manifestations of mourning. Thus formulated, the opposition is a false one. 
Sincerity is compatible with both convention and obligation (cf. Mauss [1921] 
1969: 275); in order to be expressed, a feeling must be communicated, and must 
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therefore be transformed into a message, an impossible task without a system 
of conventions. The more developed the code, the more numerous the shades of 
feelings it allows one to express.
The opposition between individual spontaneity and collective convention 
does not exist by default: it is indeed meaningless in most societies.
In fact, the social aspect of mourning is not simple support for the individual 
work of grief (as, for example, Ernesto de Martino claims [1958] 1975). Death 
is the occasion for a reunion of a vast number of people: relatives, neighbors, 
friends, and clients gather around the deceased. No group can form and endure 
on a given occasion without the observance of certain rules and conventions: in 
a gathering of people that is often quite vast, particular forms of behavior, lan-
guage, ornamentation, dress, and nourishment must signify different categories 
of mourners, in such a way as to dictate appropriate behaviors. The conventions 
of mourning also play this communicative function and cannot be simplistically 
reduced to a cathartic function, to dramatizations, or to spontaneous projections 
of the “labor of mourning” as described by Freud. One need only think of the 
often notable duration of funerary rites (thirty-three days and thirty-two nights 
among the Ngaju Dayak of Kalimantan [cf. Scharer 1966: 15–25]), the enor-
mous amount of labor and riches they require, the wide-spread custom of per-
forming two funerals for the dead—some-times several years apart from each 
other (Hertz [1907] 1928)—or the fact that death raises problems concerning 
succession to titles and to political and religious offices, and makes necessary 
the transmission and the division of the deceased’s property, to realize that the 
psychological process of mourning is encompassed by other processes that can-
not be merely reduced to it.
A study of mourning, therefore, requires that, together with the psycho-
logical one, at least the sociological dimension be taken into account. Neither 
should one neglect a specifically cognitive dimension, for death also poses con-
ceptual problems.
It is erroneous to aspire to give mourning a fictitious unity, reducing all of its 
dimensions to a single one. Each dimension has its own rules, which may be in 
contrast with the rules of others.
This article, however, will address only the homologies between the various 
dimensions or “levels” of mourning. Indeed, the main task of a theory of mourn-
ing is to explain how these dimensions can coexist and reinforce one another, 
articulating ideas, emotions, and social roles.
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THE COORDINATION OF DIMENSIONS
In all three dimensions considered here (psychological, sociological, and cogni-
tive) there appears the same basic procedure. In its first stage, the experience 
of loss is accompanied by denial. Death is, in the end, accepted, however this 
requires a symbolic substitution: something takes the place of that which was 
lost and reconstitutes it at another level.
In its psychological dimension, this process corresponds to the “labor of 
mourning,” grounded in the paradox that acceptance of loss is possible through 
a process that requires its initial denial. In order to convince him or herself of 
the loss of the object, the subject must relive all the object’s aspects that con-
nected it to his or her own libido. Thus, the beloved object becomes present as 
never before: one could even say that, for the subject, the object has never been 
so alive. However, the mental reproduction of every aspect of the deceased can-
not but reveal its concrete absence to the libidinal call: whence come, presum-
ably, the frustration (that is, grief ) and then separation, which finally gets the 
upper hand, albeit with limits. In fact, a certain continuity of the object is prob-
ably a condition for the subject’s very continuity: the object lost must persist in 
some way, by means of an image, a relic, etc., or must be recuperated into a new 
object that can function as a metaphor for the old one.
An analogous mechanism is found in the sociological dimension of 
mourning: the loss is, at first, negated. For example, it is quite common to 
prohibit the use of the deceased’s property for long periods of time (six to 
twelve months in the Micronesian island of Yap [Labby 1976: 67–68]) as 
the dead may still be using it. Yet, the state of abandonment of the dead’s 
orchards and fields only makes more evident the ultimate necessity of inherit-
ance—of the creation, that is, of a substitute for the deceased in the system 
of social relations. The ultimate acceptance, on the part of society, of the loss 
of one of its members coincides therefore with the creation of a substitute, 
which allows the resumption of the relationships interrupted by death. Even 
in this case the substitution carries a certain degree of symbolism, at once 
metaphoric and metonymic. The living become in fact the image of the dead 
whom they substitute for and, reciprocally, the dead become the model for 
the living (metaphoric relations). Heirs can enjoy their rights thanks to their 
possession of the dead’s relics (which function as regalia), or because—as in 
Fiji and Yap—their homes are built on the same stone platforms where their 
ancestors reside (metonymic relations).
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Finally, the same paradoxical process of affirmation and negation is in force 
in the more properly conceptual dimension of mourning. The non-sense of 
death, at first denied, is consequently accepted, but as non-sense only with re-
spect to the referential system of existence in which the survivors continue to 
live. The transcendence, void of sense, into which the deceased was thrown by 
death, becomes a superior sense, precisely because it transcends and therefore 
encompasses the “sense” perceived in existence. An example of this overturning 
is provided by the funerary rite of the Sa’dan Toraja of Sulawesi (Indonesia), its 
different phases corresponding to movements of the deceased along the horizon 
(i.e., the threshold between visible and invisible).
The first phase of the funerary rite is connected with the south-west (aluk 
rampe matampu, “rituals of the direction where the sun sets”), which is associated 
with death and all that which is negative: the color black, darkness, impurity, 
and so on. In the final phase the position of the dead undergoes a complete 
reversal, and moves from south-west to north-east. This latter direction is asso-
ciated with light, the color white, life, and, above all, with ritual practices linked 
to the cultivation of rice, the main source of subsistence for the Toraja.
A crucial stage in the transformation is the rite of mangrara pare—“covering 
rice with blood”—which involves the sacrifice in the rice field of numerous pigs 
that belonged to the deceased: the shedding of their blood signifies a definitive 
change in property (Koubi 1975: 119). The dead person is transformed into an 
entity called deata, who guarantees the productivity of the rice for his or her 
successors (Veen 1965; 1966).
The rite is particularly interesting as the three dimensions of mourning are 
here perfectly integrated: the end of mourning coincides with the transferal of 
the dead’s property, with the definitive acceptance of his death, and with his as-
sumption of a transcendent existence.
In sum, the three dimensions considered here have in common a final com-
promise that combines the acceptance of death with its negation: the loss is rec-
ognized, but its reality is transformed. The lost object is resuscitated at another 
level of existence and meaning, which encompasses and transcends others.
Together with the fundamental correspondence between the processes that 
take place at the three levels of mourning, it is possible to find other, more 
specific correspondences at the level of “funerary technique,” so to speak. A 
striking parallelism exists between a specifically psychological aspect of the 
work of mourning (the reliving of everything that motivated an attachment to 
the deceased) and an important component of funerary rites: the laments. The 
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latter consist, in fact, of lists, of enumerations of the qualities of the dead and of 
what death has taken away. An even more significant fact is that this enumera-
tion is based on the presupposition that death did not occur. In other words, just 
as Freud claims, the representation of the dead during the work of mourning 
entails as a condition the provisional negation of death.
It is necessary, at this point, to introduce two examples to illustrate these 
correspondences.
The first example is offered by a funeral lament for a Hawaiian chief, col-
lected by the missionary William Ellis in his Polynesian researches ([1839] 1842: 
178–179):
Alas, alas dead is my chief,
Dead is my lord and my friend;
My friend in the season of famine,
My friend in the time of drought,
My friend in my poverty,
My friend in the rain and the wind,
My friend in the heat and the sun,
My friend in the cold from the mountain,
My friend in the storm,
My friend in the calm,
My friend in the eight seas;1
Alas, alas, gone is my friend,
And no more will return.
Here, the act of listing extinguishes, one by one, the ties with the deceased: the 
final stage is necessarily a point of no return. The efficacy of the lament lies in its 
suggesting and constantly repeating the process of separation, until this actually 
takes place. One finds here an example of the dialectic between the psychologi-
cal and the sociological. At first glance, the fact that the lamentations consist of 
enumerations suggests that the psychological level functions as the cause of the 
sociological one. In reality, the motivation is transcended and modified by what 
it motivates: the linguistic structure of the lament, by articulating the work of 
1. A figurative term for the channels between the different islands of the group. 
[Footnote from Ellis, interpolated in brackets into the lament by Valeri in his 
quotation of the text. —Ed.]
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mourning, also makes it possible. The efficacy of the formula derives therefore 
from its ability to organize and socialize that which pre-exists it and motivates 
it. The relation between the two levels is obviously dialectical, not causal.
A second example allows us to deepen the theme of efficacy in the social 
articulation of the work of mourning. Among the LoDagaa of Ghana there is, 
in lament as in other aspects of funerary rites, a split or even an opposition in 
behaviors vis-à-vis the dead. Whereas members of the deceased’s lineage sing 
his praises by enumerating his virtues, members of other lineages sing songs in 
which they insult him and list his defects. In both cases, the singers pretend that 
the deceased is not dead (Goody 1962: 100-1).
The scission between the singers and between the content of their songs 
is a form—more complex than the Hawaiian one—of the social organization 
of the work of mourning: not only are lamenters multiplied and represent to 
each other the loss of the object (enabling in this way its apprehension and 
consequent catharsis), but they also have their counterweight in another group 
of singers who express the mourners’ aggressive feelings toward the dead (the 
relationship with the dead is ambivalent [cf. Freud [1912–13] 1952: 51]), which 
they themselves cannot show.
In this way, the individual work of mourning is extended and transcended 
in a kind of theater where the subject’s ambivalent feelings are represented and 
objectified. There is thus a true and proper social division of mourning labor, a 
division that makes all the more efficacious. Indeed, the efficacy of the rite con-
sists in its ability to coordinate the various systems and levels where the subjects’ 
experience develops. The more levels coordinated, the easier it becomes for the 
subjects to recover their unity. Enhancing the coordination of levels and persons 
in the funerary rite is indeed the answer to a crisis that makes the subject more 
vulnerable to the contradictions between the different dimensions in which his 
or her existence unfolds.
MIMETIC AND SACRIFICIAL RITES
The critical moment in the process of mourning takes place when the attempt to 
restore the object is overturned, producing an emotional withdrawal that is the 
prelude to a new investment in an object (Bowlby 1961). It is as if, after having 
denied the actuality of death, after having pretended that the deceased “was 
sleeping” (as the Toraja say, often for several months following the death), the 
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survivors suddenly inflict on the dead person the only death that is acceptable in 
their eyes: death in their affections, in their thoughts. Thus we are faced with a 
new paradox: natural death is negated, but only in order to inflict a psychologi-
cal and cultural death (cf. de Martino 1975: 213).
A culturally inflicted death is often represented in a sacrifice where the 
victim is identified with the dead person. We can indeed say that the entire 
funerary rite oscillates between two poles. During moments where denial pre-
vails, mimetic rites of lamentation are predominant; when the reality of death 
strikes, sacrificial rites become prevalent. In the first case there is an attempt 
to reconstitute the deceased in the visible world, an attempt that, through 
its failure, opens the way for the recognition of the inevitability of death; in 
the second case, acknowledgement of the killing of the deceased in the vis-
ible world has the inverse meaning: it makes possible the belief in his or her 
invisible life.
A few examples illustrate the two poles of funerary rites. The first phase of 
mourning and, in general, the entire first exequies of death (where double ex-
equies are performed), are characterized by the paradox that Neckel has called 
lebende Leiche, “living corpse” (cf. ibid.: 211). A man’s death is not seen imme-
diately. Our experience of the deceased does not change enough from our ex-
perience of him or her as a living person, and the familiar features of his or her 
appearance automatically trigger the usual reactions. In this instance we realize 
how a body is a system of signs or even, following Charles S. Peirce’s defini-
tion, that “man is an external sign.” Still physically intact, this sign begins to lie: 
it continues to proclaim life when the decay of death has already imposed its 
worms. We need, therefore, to be persuaded of this death, which is still invisible, 
or just barely perceptible through the absence of habitual signs. In the end, this 
persuasion will be made possible by the physical modifications of the corpse. 
The decomposing matter and the skeleton are the great persuaders of death. 
For this reason, they are also the aspects of death most carefully suppressed or 
neutralized by means of taboos and ritual practices. But other means contrib-
ute to quicken the awareness of death. Principal among these is language. The 
deceased has the bearing of a living person, but he does not answer; his sleep 
is very deep. The lament, when directed to the dead, betrays the impossibil-
ity of communicating with them. It is impossible to communicate with the 
deceased: the limitation of the word that receives no answer is the reality of 
death. We do not see death, we only see the deceptive signs of life. The word is 
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an interrogation reduced to a soliloquy; death, the void emptiness that comes to 
surround discourse.
A homologous mechanism is found in mimetic rites, particularly elabo-
rate among the LoDagaa. In certain sequences of the funeral, the community 
mimes the activities the deceased has engaged in: hunting, war, agriculture, 
and so on. These are celebrations of the qualities of the deceased (as are, after 
all, the enumerations contained in the laments), but at the same time they are 
also symbolic devices that highlight the absence of the dead person within the 
group in which he used to perform the activities mimed. Death appears literally 
as a void that is produced in the midst of the group; the invisible that makes 
itself visible by contrast. The deceased disappears in this way from the horizon 
of the living: indeed, LoDagaa state that the purpose of mimetic rites is to 
“prevent themselves from dreaming about the deceased” (Goody 1962: 107–8, 
129–30).
These and other figurative rites are performed by a “funerary group” that 
consists of distant agnates and/or affines of the bereaved. These are positioned 
between “proximity” and “distance,” between “us” and “the others.” As such, they 
are able to represent the transition of the dead from the inside to the outside of 
his or her group, from identity to alterity.
A similar function pertains to the buffooneries and jokes performed during 
the funeral by relatives with whom the dead had a joking relationship (ibid.: 69).
In the joke, in the witticism, and in the buffoonery the oscillations of mean-
ing between opposites, or simply between manifest and latent content, corre-
spond to the oscillations of the dead between visible and invisible, between life 
and death, between integrity and destruction, between identity with the living 
and alterity.
When the “oscillatory” phase of the lament, the mimetic rite, the masquer-
ade, and the joke is over, when the violent contrasts between acceptance and 
negation of loss, between laughter and tears come to an end, the deceased has 
become definitively an other, and may therefore be conceived of either as animal 
or stranger (among the LoDagaa the corpse is dressed as a stranger [cf. ibid.: 
69–70]; in Melanesia, the dead are believed to transform into animals such as 
the shark or the frigate bird, hostile animals from whom it is necessary to main-
tain a distance [cf. Codrington 1891: 179–80]).
The identification of the dead with a domestic animal such as the buffalo, 
which is simultaneously “other” (as it is an animal) and “proximate” (as it is 
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domesticated), explains why sacrifice may be an efficacious symbol of separa-
tion. Immolation puts an end to the ambiguity of the beast, iconic of the ambi-
guity of the deceased: it will become either consumable meat, or a corpse to be 
thrown away, far from society. In both cases, it will definitely be “other.”
The comment of a LoDagaa informant at the moment of the mortuary 
sacrifice of a cow is revealing regarding this point: “Now they [the bereaved] 
really know he [the deceased] is dead. He’s no longer a human being, but has 
changed to meat” (Goody 1962: 175; cf. 200–1). Of the first buffalo whose 
sacrifice enables conceiving the deceased no longer as “sick” but truly dead, the 
Toraja say it is “fatally wounded at the same time as the man [the deceased].” 
This equation of the deceased with the buffalo makes comprehensible the 
prohibition imposed on the dead man’s family against eating the meat of the 
sacrificial animal, which is instead consumed by all others present at the rite 
(Koubi 1975: 109). The same prohibition exists among the LoDagaa, who ex-
plain that the afflicted should not eat “their own dirt” (Goody 1962: 179). The 
deceased is in fact identified with that which must be separated from the living 
but is however theirs: dirt. 
In the same way, Merina (of Madagascar) call the meat of the victim of the 
sacrificial rite hena ratsy, “bad meat,” and prohibit the deceased’s family from 
eating it (Molet 1956: 95).
These prohibitions signify both the kinship between the dead and the be-
reaved (who cannot “eat themselves”) and their separation, achieved through 
sacrifice.
Among the Ngaju Dayak, the victim of the separatory sacrifice is a man, a 
stranger. This man is in fact a slave, generally a prisoner of war or a man whose 
head is “hunted” and is thereafter brought into the village, where it is symboli-
cally “sacrificed” (Hertz [1907] 1928: 61, n. 2).
Sometimes the slave is sent out of the village on a pretext. There, a warrior 
who has followed him cuts off his head and carries it back, victorious, to the 
village. When the Dutch colonial government prohibited human sacrifice, the 
Dayak began to sacrifice buffaloes, which they believe to be men’s affines, be-
cause both descend from the same ancestor. The identification of the deceased 
with a “foreign” victim, whose putting to death will “take him away,” is very clear. 
For example, before being sacrificed, the man is dressed in the ordinary clothes 
of the dead (Grabowsky 1892: 109), the victim’s head can be laid over the bones 
of the deceased (ibid.: 194), and so on.
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But the funerary sacrifice of the Ngaju Dayak also involves identification 
of the victim with the bereaved. This double identification is the condition for 
complete separation between living and dead, a separation that is represented 
by the cutting of the victim’s head. The head’s blood is the sign of the achieved 
separation, and it is spread on the living to liberate them from mourning. In-
deed, Tiwah, the rite’s name, means precisely this: “liberation” or “purification” 
(Hardeland 1859: 608).
The only reason why both the bereaved and the deceased can identify 
with the victim is because they are already identified with one another in 
the first place. Indeed, the bereaved are not only identified with the dead by 
being made impure through their contact with the corpse (which needs to 
be washed, anointed, dressed, and so on; sometimes, as among the Dayak 
of the Kapuas River [cf. Hertz (1907) 1928: 9], the relatives must also eat, 
during the whole period of mourning, its decomposing matter, mixed with 
rice). Additionally, the very fact that they do not want to detach themselves 
from the deceased and accept his or her death assimilates them to this death. 
Both psychologically and socially, they identify with the dead and run the risk 
of following him to his grave. Their situation is ultimately an intermediary, 
ambiguous, and still undecided one, like that of the slowly putrefying corpse, 
like that of the sacrificial victim who, a stranger brought into the village, a 
domesticated animal, is at the boundary between outside and inside, between 
strangers and relatives.
However, putting the deceased to death does not result in a total loss: 
through the sacrifice he or she assumes a new form of existence. While the 
corpse is destroyed by the process of decomposition, its image survives in mem-
ory. One could argue that the corpse is quickly concealed from view so that its 
image may not be contaminated by the experience of the loss of form. Con-
versely, concealment of the corpse contrasts with later unearthing of the bones, 
which becomes the occasion for the second exequies and which makes possible 
the transformation and definitive establishment of the image of the dead. In-
deed, as Trobrianders say, “the relic (kayvaluba) brings the departed back to our 
mind and makes our inside tender” (Malinowski 1962: 133).
Bones are thus of crucial importance in funerary representations: on the 
one hand, they are the symbol of the definitive character of death—their con-
trast with the complete remembered image of the deceased has a persuasive 
force lacking in any other experience. Yet, on the other hand, because bones are 
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the permanent and stable remains of the dead, they also make him perpetu-
ally accessible. Thus, bones and other relics lend their empirical stability to the 
fleeting memory of the integral image of the dead. This image is reconstituted 
with the colors of life around the white bones, and the deceased continues to 
live.
In the famadihana funerary rites of Merina of Madagascar, this dialectic 
assumes an incomparable strength and vividness. The bones of the deceased 
are exhumed, covered with precious and colorful silk (lamba mena, literally “red 
fabric”), and laid down in a large family grave (Bloch 1971: 145). These are the 
second exequies of the dead, celebrated no earlier than two years after death. 
What distinguishes the famadihana from other classic examples of second ex-
equies, however, is the habit of using this event as an occasion to unearth and 
cover with new clothes the bones of those dead who, also buried in the tomb, 
have not yet been forgotten.
These rites are characterized by well-defined transformations of the emo-
tions of the bereaved, especially in those who see the bones of their dear ones 
for the first time. The contrast between the remembered image and the skeleton 
triggers a violent emotion, to the point that relatives have to be forced to ap-
proach the tomb, to view and touch the remains of the dead. In this moment, 
the emotions of mourning are repeated with great intensity: the reality of death 
is recognized as never before. This phase is followed, however, by one where the 
skeletons are wrapped in a great quantity of lamba mena, whose bright colors 
undoubtedly represent life and whose name (red) probably alludes to blood. “A 
body” is thus reconstituted on the existing skeleton. The body, produced by the 
affection of the living, hides bones from sight and serves as a scaffolding for the 
intact image of the deceased.
The efficacy of the idea of the dead’s reconstitution is demonstrated by the 
drastic emotional change of the bereaved once the remains are wrapped in fab-
rics. The women who had held the remains of the deceased in their laps in a 
state of depression now take them in their arms and begin to dance almost like 
Bacchae; relatives who had a “joking relationship” with the deceased pretend to 
prevent them from going back to their graves (Bloch 1971: 159).
In the form of relics or images—purely mental or material—such as statues, 
shadows, or ancestors, the dead continue to live in the memory of the living; 
and as long as this memory endures, the dead will continue to be an integral 
part of society, to receive offerings and sacrifices, to inflict punishments and to 
grant rewards. Positioned at the boundary between visible and invisible, they 
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mediate between society and the forces that transcend it. However, the dead can 
continue to exist socially only because, as happens for example in the Trobriands 
(cf. Weiner 1976: 84), survivors perpetuate around their remains the exchanges 
and relations that made them exist socially when they were alive. Consciousness 
realizes in this way that the condition for social existence is no different for liv-
ing and dead, that one lives and continues to live at the intersection of relations 
and exchanges that are more lasting than the individuals and the objects that 
actualize them.
It is also as permanent lessons of this social law that the dead emerge as the 




Translated by Nicholas DeMaria Harney
“THIS IS PLAY”
You simply have to open the entry “Play” in any good European-language 
dictionary to realize the extraordinary semantic range of this word.1 This ex-
pansiveness paradoxically contrasts with the restricted space that is officially 
granted to play in social life.
Scientists are understandably distrustful of this proliferation of meanings: 
“The fact that there is a common term for various activities does not mean that 
these can be explained with the same mechanism or that they are all determined 
by the same set of conditions; it merely demonstrates that people did not deem 
it necessary to distinguish these in common use. For a long time the word ‘play’ 
was a second order linguistic term to describe an apparently voluntary action, 
that however does not seem to have any biological or social use” (Millar 1968: 
11).
But a premature desire for the rigor of definitions can be worse than the use 
of a common concept: so, the view of psychologist Harold Schlosberg (1947)—
who considered the concept of “play” as irredeemably vague and useless scien-
tifically—had the effect of discouraging scientific interest in playful activities 
for some time.
1. Thanks to Mario Motti for his assistance with some terms in translation. —Trans. 
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According to Schlosberg the label “play” indicates heterogeneous phenom-
ena that should be studied separately. Some of those activities so-called play 
would be nothing other than the expression of childish aptitude: the poor ability 
to discriminate between phenomena and to generalize. One says that a dog that 
chases a ball “plays”: in fact, according Schlosberg, it does nothing but respond 
in a “generalized” (nonspecific) way to a small object that moves. So-called play, 
in other cases, is nothing more than a learned behavior that is switched on with 
the occurrence of any of the circumstances that are present in the original learn-
ing situation, or when the threshold that primarily stimulates the production of 
a behavior is lowered.
In the last twenty years, however, there has been a strong increase in ex-
perimental studies of play and a point of view has been adopted according to 
which play is not a behavior in itself but an aspect of a set of human and animal 
behaviors: “Thus, play is a borderline phenomena to a number of human activi-
ties and, in its own playful way, it tries to elude definition.” (Erikson 1963: 212).
The criteria to distinguish playful behaviors from the not-playful ones are 
not evidently absolute and in particular they will vary depending on the species 
considered. In subhuman primates and humans, the criterion is provided by a 
signal (for example, laughter or fake bites; cf. van Hooff 1972) that the animal 
performs to communicate the playful character of its behavior. The signal “this 
is a game” has a metacommunicative value: in this way it defines the relationship 
between two animals and makes it possible to distinguish it from other forms of 
relationships with which it could be confused.
It is known that in certain species playful behaviors resemble those of com-
bat. It is the metacommunicative signal “this is a game” that avoids confusing 
them. When baboons, for example, do not see this signal, they react to a “play-
like attack” as if it were a genuine attack (Miller 1973). The same phenomenon 
is well known in human play: the laugh or the smile indicates that a behavior 
that might normally be aggressive is free of aggressive intention; it is a game, a 
fiction.
The signal “this is play” is of fundamental importance, not only because it 
allows the existence of the set of behaviors—mimicking, fictitious, ghost-like, 
etc.—whose importance grows the higher we climb on the evolution scale, and 
which make it possible for relative “freedom” with respect to the reality that is 
the basis of the adaptation of the human species, but also because it represents 
the first manifestation of a metacommunicative function that is essential for the 
development of communication and, ultimately, of language.
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The discrimination between “play” and “nonplay,” between “fantasy” and 
“nonfantasy” implies at least the genesis of “ego,” i.e., a distinction between 
primary processes (unconscious) and secondary-processes (consciousness). Ac-
cording to Gregory Bateson (1972: 185), play is in fact a phenomenon inter-
mediate between phenomena purely primary as dreaming (when we dream we 
are not aware of the fact that we dream, there is no signal that distinguishes the 
dreamlike activity from that which is not dreaming) and phenomena purely sec-
ondary (in which, instead of emotions-signs or signs explained, there are signs 
not explained, whose properties are not confused with those that they indicate: 
the word “cat” does not mean scratching).
Play and fiction generally imply that two behaviors are at the same time 
identified and distinguished. The mimesis of an actual behavior (for example, a 
combat [fight]) seems, in fact, to be confused with what it designates, but at the 
same time it is distinguished from the latter, due to the signal “this is a game” 
that puts it, so to speak, “in frame,” that is, it indicates that the rules that apply 
to the playful behavior are different from those applicable to that which is not 
playful.
But, unlike a purely logical “frame”—which distinguishes between entities 
of the same logical type—the psychological “frame” that makes play possible al-
lows one to discriminate between entities that belong to different types of logic: 
i.e., between messages consisting of emotions-signs and messages constituted 
from simulations of emotions-signs (play, threat, histrionics, etc.). This explains 
why play and artistic fiction in general have always been associated with logical 
paradoxes, but it also makes one aware of their creative character: without the 
paradoxes of abstraction, communication would never transcend the stage of 
emotions–signs: “Life would then be an endless interchange of stylized mes-
sages, a game with rigid rules and unrelieved by change or of humor” (Bateson 
1972: 193).
PLAY AND IMMATURITY
The metacommunicative capacity to express and to recognize the signal that 
“this is a play” offers, therefore, a criterion to distinguish, in primates, playful 
behavior from those behaviors that are not playful.
This ability correlates to an increased importance (in evolutionary terms) of 
play, which in turn is a function of a longer period of immaturity. In fact, there 
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is a direct relationship (already recognized by Karl Groos) between the position 
of an animal species on the evolutionary scale, the length of its period of im-
maturity, and the importance that play assumes for that species.
In humans, the prolonged immaturity is, according to Irven De Vore (see 
Eimerl and De Vore 1965; see also Leroi-Gourhan 1964), the evolutionary re-
sult of two contradictory selective pressures, which formed early Proto-homi-
nids. The first pressure pushed toward bipedal locomotion and therefore, toward 
the liberation of the hand for tasks not locomotive. The second pressure tended 
to increase the volume of the brain so as to be able to receive the more complex 
program required by the new features of the hands. However, the erect position 
and the bipedal locomotion produced structural changes of the skeleton and 
in particular of the pelvis: the birth canal is narrowed to give the pelvis greater 
resistance.
From here there is a contradiction: a being with a larger brain would have to 
pass through a smaller opening during childbirth. The contradiction is resolved 
by an increase in the initial immaturity and by the extrauterine development 
of the brain (which at the time of birth has a volume of about 335cm but then 
increases until it reaches 1300cm). The immaturity implies that at least part 
of adult behaviors are not immediately available to the child but must be as-
similated through a learning process, or mastered, at each stage of the biological 
development, by means of practices not linked to external stimuli.
Not being autonomous, the baby is in a state of dependence on adults. The 
latter, on the one hand, become the object of observation and “imitation” by the 
child; on the other hand, adults offer security and freedom from environmental 
pressure, which are necessary conditions for the child to experiment with be-
haviors that he analyzed so far, until he will be able to fully master them.
According to J. S. Bruner (1976), human play (and partially, that of the more 
advanced monkeys) presupposes learning from observation (or “imitation”), 
which depends on two prerequisites that can be studied experimentally: 1) The 
ability to perceive the difference between their own or others’ embodiment of a 
certain behavior. This implies the recognition of themselves, which is the condi-
tion to assume the other, or certain aspects of the other’s behavior, as models. 
Bruner argues that this mechanism is identical to that of the deixis in linguis-
tics: for example, the use of the personal pronoun “I” presupposes learning the 
difference between when I say “I” and when you say “I”; 2) The ability to build 
sequences of actions that correspond to external models, coordinating elements 
learned and mastered one by one.
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Children’s ability to manipulate develops from actions that must be im-
proved and mastered individually and then combined in sequences. Adult be-
havior is therefore not simply imitated but is analyzed through the combination 
of constituent parts in various combinations during play. In the end, a child will 
eventually reproduce the adult combination that served as a model. Play is not 
simply mimicry.
At this point, one understands the importance of the signal “this is a game”: 
it allows the child to carry out an exploration and combination of activities 
without running the risk of being punished because of an incorrect reproduc-
tion of the behavior that “imitates” or because it has violated the rules.
At the same time, the mechanism for the reproduction of adult behavior 
through play and the analytical and artificial freedom that is granted to imma-
ture members of the species is of fundamental importance from an evolution-
ary point of view: “The activity of playing offers an excellent opportunity to 
try combinations of behavior that would never be tested under the pressure of 
functional activity” (Bruner 1976: 3).
It is, therefore, through playing during this period of immaturity that new 
combinations arise or are experienced, which later on can be revealed as useful 
to the entire species. For example, the experiments of Junichiro Itani (1958) 
prove that when one eliminates a single pressure (for example, hunger) in a 
group of Japanese macaques in a state of freedom, the increase of playful activity 
that follows leads to the introduction of innovations. Even if they are not always 
the instigators, the young are always the experimenters, and their experiments 
have a crucial role in the adoption of innovations by the entire group.
This “thrust to the variation” associated with play also helps to explain the 
variations in the behavior of chimpanzees as it relates to the variation of the 
environment in which they live.
Playful activities have a crucial role in the evolution of the use of the tools: 
“Play, given its concomitant freedom from reinforcement and its setting in a 
relatively pressureless environment, can produce the flexibility that makes tool 
using possible” (Bruner 1976: 42).
Play is also important for the development of language. In this regard, 
Bruner sets out the hypothesis that the fundamental structures that character-
ize play (one consists of a function and its arguments; the other, on the contrary, 
consists of an argument and all its functions) are identical to the predicative 
structure, which is one of the universals of language. In other words, a toy coex-
ists with a number of acts, and an act with a certain number of toys. Similarly, 
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in language one has a series of expressions like, John has a hat, John is a man, 
John jumps the fence, etc., and another set of the expressions like, he brushes the 
hat, he carries the hat, he throws away the hat, etc. (Bruner 1976: 43, 49). Com-
mutations of the same type are present in the language games of three-year-old 
children, as described by R. H. Weir (1962).
PLAY, “EGO,” AND CULTURAL CREATION
Both Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud and his followers have pointed out, al-
though in different ways, the “egocentric” character of human childhood play.
It is well known that Piaget assumes the existence of two fundamental poles 
of behavior: assimilation and accommodation. For the child, the adjustment 
of his movements and his perception of objects constitutes the pole of accom-
modation; the opposite pole consists in assimilating reality into sensory-motor 
schemes and  into his own activity. This assimilation has two complementary 
aspects. The first one is active repetition and consolidation: it is functional and 
reproductive assimilation. The child grows “functioning.” The second aspect is 
that of “mental digestion,” i.e., the perception or conception of the object as it is 
incorporated into real or feasible action. Of course, the two aspects of assimila-
tion are closely related: the child assimilates objects to actions that then become 
schema. These schemas are the functional equivalents of the concepts and the 
logical relationships that appear in the subsequent stages of development.
Assimilation and accommodation are found in all the stages of the develop-
ment of intelligence and scientific thinking. However, while rational, or scien-
tific, assimilation is not centered on the self, the initial assimilation of the child 
is centered in the individual, or egocentric. Play corresponds precisely to the 
egocentric stage of the development of intelligence: it is “the outer pole of the 
assimilation of the reality to ego while at the same time have something of 
the creative imagination which will be the motor of all future thought and even 
reason” (Piaget [1945] 1962: 159).
Piaget distinguishes between practice play and symbolic play. Practice play 
reveals the first dissociation between assimilation and accommodation, and 
when the child has learned to perform a certain act, he repeats his actions not 
to continue to learn them or to investigate them, “but only for the joy to master 
them, to treat himself to the spectacle of his own power, and [the joy to] subdue 
the universe to it” (Piaget [1945] 1962: 159).
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Symbolic play (the “pretend to”) is the next step  in the process of disso-
ciation between assimilation and accommodation. This stage of play requires 
the ability to form images, or internalize imitations, intermediate between the 
indices (not yet separated from the perceived object) and the purely “arbitrary” 
signs, between sensory-motor schema and logical concepts. In addition, while 
the images are individual signifiers, the signs are always social.
In symbolic play, “meaning is simply assimilated to the self, that is to say 
evoked for momentary interest or immediate satisfaction, and the signifier con-
sists then, rather than a precise mental imitation, in an imitation by means of 
material frames in which the objects are themselves treated as alternatives. . . . In 
other words, while in cognitive representation there is a permanent equilibrium 
between assimilation and accommodation, in ludic symbolism there is a pre-
dominance of assimilation in the relationship between the child and the signi-
fied, and even in the construction of the signifier” (Piaget [1945] 1962: 165). In 
short, “symbolic play is nothing other than egocentric thought in its pure state” 
(166), and provides an “individual language indispensable for the expression of 
his subjective feelings, for which collective language alone is inadequate” (167), 
etc. Its function is to protect the self against forced accommodation to “ordinary 
reality” (168).
In a later stage of the child’s development emerges a third type of play, in 
which the satisfaction of the ego is legitimated by “the rules of the game, through 
which competition is controlled by a collective discipline, with a code of honor 
and fair-play. This third and last type of play is not inconsistent with the idea of 
assimilation of reality to the ego, while at the same time it reconciles this ludic 
assimilation with the demands of social reciprocity” (Piaget [1945] 1962: 168).
For Freud play is—as the dream—the expression or the “dramatization” of 
desires but also and especially the manifestation of a compulsion to repeat, in 
words and deeds, painful experiences. This repetition gives the self the impres-
sion to overcome them since it can mention them all at will.
Developing these ideas, Erik Erikson suggests, “the theory that the child’s 
play is the infantile form of the human ability to deal with experience by creat-
ing model-situations and to master reality by experiment and planning” (1963: 
222). Play is a function of the ego, an attempt to synchronize to the self the 
bodily and social processes. Play is, therefore, a form of self-therapy: thus the 
scope of child psychiatry is to make possible child’s play, even creating a play-
ful relationship between patient and psychiatrist. In a similar manner, animal 
psychiatry uses playful activity (Lecomte 1967: 45).
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Bateson (1972) and D. W. Winnicott (1971), for their part, consider that, 
even with regard to adult patients, there is a homology between deep thera-
peutic process and playful process. In a sense, patient and psychiatrist “play to-
gether”; they dedicated themselves to a combinatory activity (of words, images, 
etc.) that has the purpose of breaking obsessive formations and to rebuild the 
unity of the self.
But psychoanalysts, focusing their entire attention “on psychic reality, which 
is personal and inner and its relation to external or shared reality,” (Winnicott 
1971: xv) may not take adequate account of playful phenomenon and the related 
phenomena of art, religion, etc.
These phenomena in fact take place in an intermediate area between internal 
reality and external reality. How is this intermediate zone formed and what is 
its role?
According to Winnicott, the initial phase of the child’s psychological de-
velopment is that of the “subjective object.” In this very early phase in its de-
velopment, every child, in a certain environment provided by the mother, “is 
capable of conceiving the idea of something that would meet the growing need 
that arises out of instinctual tension. The infant cannot be said to know at first 
what is to be created. At this point in time the mother presents herself. In the 
ordinary way she gives her breast and her potential feeding urge, the mother’s 
adaptation to the infant’s needs, when good enough, gives the infant the illusion 
that there is an external reality that corresponds to the infant’s own capacity to 
create” (Winnicott 1971: 8).
At the beginning of the development process, there is therefore a perfect 
agreement between inner reality and external reality: the nonself is indistinct 
from self. The child becomes the mother’s breast.
But this “subjective object” illusory experience “paves the way for the objec-
tive subject—that is, the idea of a self and the feeling of real that springs from 
the sense of having an identity” (Winnicott 1971: 107). In fact, no feeling of the 
self can be formed without resting on the “sense of being” that is provided by the 
initial experience of unity between subject and object (107–8).
Paradoxically, the sense of being is thus based on an illusion but this illusion 
is a necessary condition: the mother may, immediately after having frustrated 
her baby, disappoint him without trauma and give him the experience of the 
object as not-self, avoiding any block in the development of the synthesis of self.
Inner reality and external reality are distinguished and they connect this 
initial play back and forth between the mother and child. This play is the first 
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nucleus of an area of intermediate (or transitional) experience between the two 
realities, an area that is not subject to the criterion of truth, and that is accepted 
as such.
The first transitional object may be the angle of a blanket, a wad of wool, a 
word, a melody, a gesture, etc. (See the famous cover immortalized by Schulz 
in his Peanuts.) In any case, it has to do with object with which the child has 
his first symbolic experience. The object is and is not the mother, her breast: it 
is the symbolic substitute of her, magically accessible as her breast but at the 
same time different from the breast, not only physically but also and above all, 
because it is experienced as not-self. The transitional object is the point of pas-
sage, the “switch,” between identity (to be) and relationship (to do), between 
unity and diversity, between self and nonself, between symbol and the thing 
symbolized (Winnicott 1971: 10). It therefore allows for the creation of the 
symbolic area that—subtracted from reality—conjugates internal and external 
reality.
The transitional area constitutes the greater part of the child’s experience, 
“and throughout his life is retained in the intense experiencing that belongs 
to the arts, to religion, to imaginative living and to creative scientific work” 
(Winnicott 1971: 19).
Removed from the certainty of truth, the illusory representations of play, 
art, and religion can also constitute a meeting point in the transitional areas 
of different individuals and thus make it possible for the existence of forms of 
association and relationship based on common experiences, not threatened and 
challenged by the reality but necessary for its acceptance. Winnicott’s theory 
therefore takes into account in psychological terms the paradox that makes play-
ful make-believe a condition of human adaptation to reality.
The root of this paradox lies in the fact that the self exists thanks to play, 
for which it finds itself reflected in the nonself, in the other. The correlation of 
self and of the other, of the internal object and of the external object, of creative 
fantasy and of reality, brought to light by Winnicott, leads us to reject the point 
of view that only focuses on the dichotomy between personal psychic reality and 
external reality, and the adaptation of the first to the second. For this point of 
view, particularly well-represented by Piaget, play could not be anything other 
than “egocentric thought in its pure state,” pure “individual truth,” etc. But, if 
play was actually like this, it’s not clear how play is a function fundamental to 
adaptation to reality, and in particular, in the formation and perpetuation of the 
ego as synthesis of the experience.
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Among other things, Piaget’s theory seems to be in contradiction with the 
well-known fact that children between the ages of three and five are perfectly 
aware of the fictitious nature of their games (see Bruner 1976: 18). The “ani-
mism” that Piaget associates with play seems more like a deformation by adults 
of the child behavior than an innate or universal characteristic (see Mead 1932).
In reality, as has been noted by L. S. Vygočkij, Piaget’s theory is based on the 
assumption of a “natural” individual that preexists society and that is progres-
sively “socialized,” “adapted” to the “ordinary reality.” Against this Swiss psy-
chologist’s utopian precapitalist individual, Vygočkij says that, on the contrary, 
“the true direction of the development of thought is not from the individual to 
the socialized one, but from the social to the individual,” which is itself a social 
construction (1933: 38). Thus, for example, “ego-centric” language is not—as 
assumed by Piaget—a presocial stage in which the child would be impervious 
to experience but a transitional stage that makes possible the passage from vo-
cal language (communicative—and therefore social—from the beginning) to 
interiorized language, to the individual “conscience” (32–37).
FROM CHILDISH PLAY TO ADULT PLAY
The theories of Bruner, Bateson, and Winnicott, starting from different prem-
ises and phenomena, all converge in considering play a phenomenon that char-
acterizes a specifically human way to exist and that constitutes the permanent 
core, an almost “scaled-down model” of culture.
It should be emphasized in particular the close bond between evolutionary 
play, the use of tools, and language development (Bruner 1976).
The discoveries  of modern science  thus confirm the intuition of Johan 
Huizinga (1938) according to which play is the creative force of culture. In the 
human species, in fact, not only does creative play extend for a  longer period 
than in any other species but continues during almost all or for the most part of 
existence. In a sense, artists, scientists, and inventors are adults who are socially 
allowed to continue to play: that is, to continue to analyze and experiment with 
the possible combinations of ideas, objects, units of behavior, etc. This com-
binatorial practice produces cultural innovations that are socially selected and 
adopted.
However the creative play of the artist and the scientist has two possible 
social destinies (at the end, not incompatible with each other): either it changes 
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into nonplay, in socially accepted and “useful” forms, or remains play and also 
benefits society, but then it is play as representation, since it allows spectators 
what Roger Caillois calls “play through a third person” (1958: 43).
In the “normal” adult, in fact, play only has a limited space and it is often 
enjoyed only indirectly. Its function is to mobilize and to reproduce the capital 
of “being” once created in child’s play. Therefore, between child’s play and adult 
play there is continuity, even if on the surface they differ. The essential character 
of adult play is the preponderance of  rules. But the rule is the equivalent of 
the infant’s sign for “this is a game”: it separates play from reality; it forms the 
frame that surrounds the world of fictitious play and therefore maintains its 
relationship with reality. What are the rules, if not the “pure” essence of social 
reality? Therefore, if play is separated from this reality it is because it represents 
the utopia of reality.
As order reproduces separation between reality and play for infants and at 
the same time articulates this separation, so, too, do rules leave room to ma-
neuver—choices, strategies, and the coalitions that rules makes possible are the 
equivalent combinatorial and experimental activity of child’s play.
Play therefore offers to the adult the mirror in which he must necessarily 
look to find his illusory self, on which is founded the real self. It is the projection 
of an order of movements, actions, and laws that can be “comprehended”—in 
the double sense of incorporating and understanding—and therefore mastered.
The apparent absurdity in which the player, in order to “distract himself ” 
from real obstacles, voluntarily creates artificial hurdles, is a therapeutic experi-
ence that gives back to the self the feeling of existence, without which no con-
tact with reality is possible.
Play reproduces the feeling of existence thanks to an object-relation that is 
profoundly satisfying, because the self experiments in play with an external ob-
ject, which corresponds miraculously, thanks to the playful order, to the internal 
object.
In play, not even chance is left to chance. Superstitions that surround playful 
activities, that rationalize what escapes the likely, are the index of the fact that 
play is the experience of absolute mastery, if not absolute order.
Even games of chance or games in which we abandon ourselves to a physi-
cally and psychically uncontrolled state (games that Caillois calls ilinx) consti-
tute an extreme exorcism of chaos: the “voluntary” resignation of control from 
the ego is evidence of the power of the ego on the events. The voluntary loss of 
reality is the supreme confirmation of the accessibility of the reality.
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What in certain occasions is experienced as play or an occasion to laugh 
is identical to what in other occasions is experienced as terror. It has been ob-
served that a mother is capable of making her child laugh by involving him in 
a game that, coming from a stranger, would be of unbearable stimulation. This 
explains why play can suddenly transforms itself into its opposite: “The instincts 
are the main threat to play as to the ego” (Winnicott 1971: 69).
For the mediated person, play—the spectacle (theater, film, sports, etc.)—
creates a further  protective shield against the instincts and emotions that, 
directly experienced, run the risk of being destructive. Spectacle is therefore 
an enlargement of the limits within which one can play, in addition to being the 
main social extension of the effects of play.
Fiction, as a prerequisite for any play, becomes twofold in a spectacle: specta-
tors are identified with the players (in many languages the activities of the actors 
and musicians are designated by the word identical to the one that designates 
the activities of the players) and the players in the audience. The players mimic a 
society, which is mirrored in their play. Without this double reflection, it would 
not be possible to close, put in a frame the space of the dramatic play, to create 
the illusion (in-lusio, “entry into the game”) that makes it exist.
In this regard, the “transformative” role of applause should be noted: it is 
a sign of the narcissistic identity between actor and spectator, but also of its 
illusory character, and therefore of their difference. Applause acts as a “psycho-
logical frame” (see Bateson 1972) and as a modern equivalent of catharsis: when 
the identification between spectator and player has become unbearably strong, 
applause is the signal that reestablishes the difference and “releases” the tension 
of the relationship, restoring its playful and fictitious character.
Thus, in all its forms, play is a back-and-forth between the object and the 
subject, between the self and the other, between the scene and the audience, 
which circumscribes the restricted world of fiction only because there you find 
the image of reality, without which it is folly.
chapter eleven
Rite
Translated from the Italian by Stefano Mengozzi 
and revised by Alice Elliot
DIALOGUE BETWEEN AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AND 
A HORTICULTURALIST
We see a man working in his garden; with a pointed stick he digs the dirt 
around a tuber. The meaning of his action seems clear: the man wants to dig out 
the tuber, no doubt in order to eat it. We convince ourselves that such an action 
fits the purpose, that it is “rational,” and that it corresponds to what we would 
do it we found ourselves in the same situation. But in a flash, the man kneels, 
murmurs a few words on a leaf of the plant, and then spits on it.
Our reaction is now totally different. The action seems bizarre and incom-
prehensible, it no longer corresponds to our expectations, nor with what we 
would do in the same circumstances. Speaking to a plant as if it could hear? 
Spitting on it? We are tempted to label such actions “irrational.” If the man 
belonged to our own culture, we would not hesitate: we would think the sun has 
gone to his head. But sophisticated anthropologists that we are, we have a ready 
answer to the doubts we have fleetingly entertained: the man has just performed 
a ritual act.
* * *
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The opposition to which we refer is a canonic one in “current anthropology.” 
Thus, for example, Edmund Leach distinguishes between “rational-technical” 
and “magical (or ritual)” behaviors, describing the first one as a behavior “which 
is directed towards specific ends and which, judged by our standards of verification, 
produces observable results in a strictly mechanical way,” and the second one as 
a “behavior which is potent in itself in terms of the cultural conventions of the 
actors but not potent . . . in itself ” (Leach 1966: 403, emphasis in original).
Yet, in purely “objectivist” terms, this opposition between “ritual action” and 
“rational-instrumental action” is by no means such a secure criterion of distinc-
tion as it might first appear. Indeed, a seemingly “ritual” action may also pro-
duce “observable results” according to “our standards of verification.” Must we 
conclude that if a shaman effectively cures a sick person his action is no longer 
ritual, while it is if he fails? To this criticism one could object that if the shaman 
is successful, then his action must include some component that is capable of 
acting “in a strictly mechanical way.” However, even admitting that this effica-
cious component (for example, medications) is identifiable and that the entire 
efficacy of the shamanic treatment depends on it, an irreducible fact still re-
mains: such a component does not exist concretely as an autonomous entity, but 
only as part of the entire process of the shamanic cure. Moreover, it is the entire 
process that makes the treatment socially acceptable and therefore enables it to 
function. The efficacy of the ritual cannot, therefore, be reduced to a chemical 
mechanism because the therapy presupposes social and ideological relations, as 
much in a modern hospital as in a sorcerer’s hut.
To ferret out in the shamanic cure a “non-ritual” component only means 
revealing that the category of “ritual” is a creation of the observer, the reifica-
tion of a term in the “rational/irrational” opposition. Such a reification is based 
on a value judgment that fails to consider the concrete social context in which 
the action takes place. Therefore, even a definition of “ritual” as a mere aspect of 
more complex actions—a definition later proposed by Leach (1968)—does not 
fundamentally resolve all the problems raised by an “objectivist” definition of 
ritual. Particularly questionable is the assimilation of certain processes that can 
be analyzed in the rite according to our criteria of causal effectiveness (for ex-
ample, a chemical process, and so on) to an alleged “rational/operative” dimen-
sion. In fact, the correlation between end and means here is not intentional, but 
purely casual. In reality, a more correct way to account for the relation between 
“causally efficacious” phenomena and the totality of the ritual action is perhaps 
the following: symbolism casts over the world such a vast network of relations 
183RITE
that some real causal connections remain trapped in its net. These contribute, 
no doubt, to perpetuating the existence of the ritual, but they can be defined 
neither as “real infrastructure” masked by an “ideological superstructure” (the 
“ritual superstition”), nor as the technical-rational “dimension.” Rather, such 
phenomena confirm a more general law: each discovery of real connections 
takes place thanks to schemes and procedures that are complex, redundant, and 
even incoherent. The scientific attitude (one that develops only under certain 
social and cultural conditions) consists of weeding out—once the awareness 
of the discovery has matured—all those representations that are useless to the 
discovery’s canonic conceptualization, which allows its most effective learning, 
transmission, and utilization. As Ernst Gombrich writes: “Most technical in-
ventions carry with them a number of superstitions, unnecessary detours which 
are gradually eliminated through short cuts and a refinement of means” (1959: 
331). Unlike scientific thought, “savage thought” is not grounded in a criterion 
of effectiveness. Therefore, it does not eliminate the “complications” and “super-
stitions” that are considered such only when the complexity of mental processes, 
and of processes of discovery, is retrospectively negated.
Some of the difficulties raised by an “external” definition of rite can be avoid-
ed by resorting to indigenous definitions. Not all cultures, however, draw an ide-
ological distinction between “ritual” and “non-ritual” actions. In general, where 
such a distinction seems to be in place, the category that the anthropologist is 
tempted to translate with the term “ritual” is more comprehensive than what he 
or she means by the term and, in fact, includes all strictly codified behavior. In 
Hawaii, for example, the term kapu refers not only to prohibitions, but to every 
positive regulation as well, be it ritual or non-ritual. 
At any rate, the agnostic recourse to indigenous categorization is not suf-
ficient: it does not explain why such-and-such a categorization, and not an-
other one, is in place, nor why certain actions are performed in one way but not 
another. 
What has been said briefly above should be sufficient to suggest that elabo-
rating a theory of ritual cannot depart from a typology of forms of actions 
defined a priori and ethnocentrically. In fact, such a strategy predetermines the 
results, since definitions already contain implicit theories. It is therefore neces-
sary to consider first the theories of ritual behavior from which definitions like 
Leach’s derive, and then to proceed to a reformulation of the entire problem. 
Before beginning this unavoidable discussion, however, I would like to invite 
my readers to reflect on their reactions to this introduction and on the apologue 
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that opened it. If they are still perplexed and wondering “What is he getting 
at?” it will mean that their attention has already been awakened. Furthermore, 
since this discussion will lead to the conclusion that rites (as well as myths) 
must, in order to function, begin by increasing the level of attention beforehand, 
it is hoped that readers will recognize, in the experience of reading the present 
article, an analogue to the article’s subject, and will smile in retrospect at having 
been subjected to a rite of passage: namely, the narration of a short myth about 
what constitutes a “rite.”
THEORETICAL REASON OR PRACTICAL REASON?
The first anthropologists who attempted in the nineteenth century to provide a 
scientific explanation of ritual action adopted two contrasting approaches that 
have been perpetuated up until this day. 
According to some, ritual acts are the translation, at the level of action, of be-
liefs that depend on intellectual processes and preoccupations. Whereas magical 
and religious beliefs aim to explain natural phenomena, rites aim to control 
them. In other words, whereas belief is an erroneous science, rite is an illu-
sory technical action. Such an approach, which has been labeled “intellectualist” 
(Evans-Pritchard 1933), is associated with the names of Tylor and Frazer, but 
it is also found, modified, in theorists such as Lévi-Strauss (1962) and Horton 
(1967, 1973)—even if, unlike their predecessors, they attribute a certain theo-
retical validity to belief and ritual by demonstrating important analogies be-
tween “scientific” and “savage” thought. 
A second approach, associated with the name of William Robertson Smith 
(1889) and definable as “functionalist,” ultimately takes for granted the cog-
nitively illusory character of beliefs while maintaining that they are born and 
perpetuated in order to fulfill not a theoretical or technical need, but rather a 
“practical” one (either moral or social). Thus, for example, animal totemism (that 
is, the idea that some degree of kinship-type relationship exists between a cer-
tain animal species and a social group) is not the result, according to Robertson 
Smith, of an erroneous zoology, but rather of social practices. Members of a clan 
gather periodically to reaffirm their solidarity. On these occasions they have a 
feast and sacrifice certain animals in order to eat them. In the long run, the col-
lective consumption of these animals becomes associated with the group’s status 
of maximum solidarity. The commensals believe that, by eating the flesh of the 
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animal, they absorb a substance identical to that of their group. From here, it is 
a short step to believing that the substance of the group is constituted by that of 
the animal that nourishes it. But whoever speaks of “common substance” speaks 
of “kinship” inasmuch as the animal comes to be conceived as a “relative” or an 
“ancestor” of the group that it “regenerates” socially when it is eaten during a 
feast.
The belief in some degree of kinship between certain species and certain 
groups is due, therefore, to social and not theoretical reasons, and the rites as-
sociated with this belief (for example, the totemic meal) do not constitute a way 
to control nature, but rather serve to reproduce within the group the belief that 
allows it to constitute an organic entity. 
Religious representations are, therefore, motivated by their social functions, 
namely, by what contributes to make them exist in the world of “practice.” Such 
a result is the “true” referent of a representation. Its validity is practical, not 
theoretical. 
It is possible that Robertson Smith’s conception was influenced by the 
Kantian idea according to which the validity of moral judgments does not de-
pend on their “truth” or “falsity,” like that of theoretical judgments. Practical 
reason and intellect have different criteria of validity.
At any rate, the Kantian influence is clear in Émile Durkheim, who—in 
his polemic against the intellectualist school—insists on the fact that the per-
sistence of religion could not be explained if its representations were totally 
illusory. Both for Durkheim and for Robertson Smith, the reality to which the 
religious belief refers and that ritual aims to reconstitute in each individual’s 
conscience is the moral and social world: “Religious interests are only the sym-
bolic form of social and moral interests” (Durkheim [1912] 1947: 316). The 
religious representation is not to be taken literally: it is explained by what it 
makes people do, rather than what it says. Thus if the apparent function of 
rituals is to reinforce the “bonds attaching the believer to his god,” their real 
function is to reinforce the “bonds attaching the individual to the society of 
which he is a member, since the god is only a figurative expression of the soci-
ety” (ibid.: 226).
Durkheim maintains that religious representations are caused by a state of 
collective effervescence (corresponding to ritual action); that they represent this 
state in a more or less reified form (totems, ancestors, and gods are in fact “per-
sonified rites” [ibid.: 279; cf. 295]); and that, by representing this state of effer-
vescence to their consciousness, they prompt its reproduction.
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Because ritual effervescence coincides with a state of maximum cohesion in 
society, religious representations—by reproducing the ritual actions that gener-
ated them—reproduce, in fact, society itself: this would be their true function. 
It is clear that Durkheim tends to identify arbitrarily three types of relations 
between religious representations and society: causal, functional, and symbolic. 
His theory is based, however, on a petitio principii: indeed it presupposes the 
society whose existence it ought to explain (Lukes 1972: 480–81; cf. Valeri 2001 
[see Appendix II, this volume]). The theory contains, moreover, another prob-
lem: on the one hand, in order to explain the discrepancy between the literal 
referent of representations (which concerns natural and transcendent objects, 
and so on) and their supposed referent (the group that produces them), Dur-
kheim has to admit that the consciousness of this second referent was already 
in place at the beginning, and that it was subsequently lost. On the other hand, 
his theory obliges him to maintain that this symbolic referent continues to exist 
because it is the precondition for the social function of representation. 
Part of the difficulty derives from Durkheim’s extremely vague and confus-
ing use of the term “symbol.” He does not distinguish, for example, between the 
semantic and pragmatic aspects of symbols. It is possible to claim that a reli-
gious representation is an index of a certain group, to the extent that that group 
makes use of it; but this does not mean that a representation in a more or less 
reified form represents the group, as Durkheim would have us believe.
* * *
We have briefly discussed Durkheim’s account of religion in terms of “practical 
reason.” It should now be added that he also attempts to transcend the Kantian 
dualism between the gnosiological and the practical through recourse to two 
hypotheses. On the one hand, he claims that the categories of the intellect, as 
well as the religious representations from which they derive, are produced by 
society and are even representations of it. On the other hand, in order to explain 
how these categories allow one to know nature, he claims that the structure of 
society is homologous to that of nature as, ultimately, society is part of nature 
and indeed produced by it. If the perception that society has of itself (some 
kind of collective self-reflection) precedes the perception of nature, it is because 
the structures that society and nature hold in common would be more easily 
discernable in society (Durkheim 1912, conclusion; cf. Durkheim and Mauss 
1903).
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In the “strong” form it has taken in Durkheim’s writings, the attempt to 
elaborate a sociology of knowledge appears to have failed. However, in its 
“weak” form—one which is based on a “charitable” interpretation of Durkheim’s 
thought (as Gellner 1962 has defined it)—the idea that the necessary charac-
ter of intellectual categories is due to the intervention of society, rather than 
to some mysterious force hidden within the intellect, ultimately proved to be 
a fruitful one, as both Gellner (ibid.) and Horton (1973) have shown and as 
Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) theory indirectly demonstrates.
In spite of all its flaws and contradictions, or perhaps because of them, 
Durkheim’s work still remains the point of encounter and conflict between 
functionalist and intellectualist interpretations of beliefs and rituals. But the 
failure of this attempted reconciliation explains why, in the long run, only the 
strictly functionalist aspect of his theory had a lasting influence. 
At this point, it is necessary to discuss the later functionalist developments 
of Durkheim’s theory, both because they have contributed to highlighting im-
portant aspects of ritual behavior, and because they have created some not in-
considerable conceptual problems which we should now clear away.
THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH
Radcliffe-Brown: Ritual and social order
The elaboration of the functionalist aspect of Durkheim’s theory is indebted 
most of all to A.  R.  Radcliffe-Brown. His explanation of Andaman ritual 
(Radcliffe-Brown 1922) is ultimately grounded in the observation that rational 
activity, either instrumental or moral, only constitutes one part of social behav-
ior (ibid.: 88). Man also has emotional behavior (he loves, hates, suffers, rejoices, 
fears, and so on) which is socially regulated and utilized. The relations among 
the various social roles are therefore associated with specific emotional attitudes, 
or, at the very least, with the external signs of such behaviors—so that, for ex-
ample, a son is expected to carry a feeling of respect toward his father, or at least 
display such feeling.
Every aspect of the social system and every natural phenomenon that some-
how influences the existence and structure of society becomes an object of so-
cially regulated feelings. Rituals are the means that permit collective expression 
of these feelings: in so doing, they reproduce them in individuals and, facilitat-
ing their apprehension through imitation, permit their transmission from one 
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generation to the next (ibid.: 233–34). In brief, the function of rituals is “to 
maintain and to transmit from one generation to another the emotional dis-
positions on which the society (as it is constituted) depends for its existence” 
(ibid.: 234).
This theory obviously presupposes that emotions and their meaning pre-
exist their regulation (cf. ibid.: 246; an analogous thesis is found in Wittgenstein 
1953; cf. Skorupski 1976: 78). The ritual regulates them in the sense that it leads 
to the association of certain natural feelings with certain “artificial” (i.e., social) 
situations. The imitation of prescribed feelings can effectively produce them 
(Radcliffe-Brown 1922: 241, 239); but man has this truly human characteristic: 
he can dissimulate, he can intentionally reproduce the external signs of certain 
internal feelings even in absence of these internal states. As moralists and re-
ligious reformers have never grown tired of repeating, ritual is concerned with 
the “exterior,” not the “interior”; it is a matter of form, not substance. It could 
be argued, however, that these forms in fact constitute the substance of social 
life, that the enthusiasm, the sincerity of feelings are uncertain, not reproducible 
at will, and cannot therefore constitute the permanent basis of social relations. 
Such relations can be developed precisely because signs exist independently 
from internal states, and because the performance of the signs is a stronger con-
cern than the real presence of the states that are allegedly signified.
There are two classes of ritual behaviors: those regulating interpersonal rela-
tions and those regulating relations between society and nature (in particular, 
certain animal and plant species). If a behavior whose validity is associated with 
social relations is extended to relations with certain natural species, this is be-
cause such species partake of the moral universe. Indeed, society attributes a 
certain value to them. It is this value to society—and hence, indirectly, society 
itself—that constitutes the true object of ritual behavior, both when this behav-
ior concerns a natural object and when it concerns a person.
This theory is a reformulation of Durkheim’s claim that society, by adoring 
that which it holds sacred, adores itself. However, whereas for Durkheim the 
natural objects that “symbolize” society are arbitrarily (or randomly) chosen and 
have value only qua signs, for Radcliffe-Brown this choice is not arbitrary, and 
their value is not simply emblematic. 
Ultimately, this value is determined by a combination of utilitarian motives 
(the importance of certain animal species for the diet of a given society, the dif-
ficulty of capturing them, and so on) and intellectual ones (associations among 
species due to associations among their properties—although the ultimate 
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referent of these associations tends to be a certain “utility”). As the famous fifth 
chapter of The Andaman Islanders testifies, Radcliffe-Brown takes into account 
both motives without, however, managing to reconcile them in a satisfactory 
way. Sometimes Radcliffe-Brown’s analyses anticipate with great finesse those 
of the structuralist method; at other time they are either grossly utilitarian or 
tautological (cf. Leach 1971: 41; Lévi-Strauss 1985).
At any rate, the theory of the value of ritual behavior as expression of the 
social value of certain objects and interpersonal relations is defective, as it forces 
the theorist to reify society. Indeed in order to explain the fact that two qualita-
tively heterogeneous objects (for example, a certain animal and a certain social 
role) still give rise to a ritual behavior, Radcliffe-Brown assumes that they are 
quantitatively identical, that is, that they have the same quantitative value for 
society. But in order for society to become the yardstick for measuring the rela-
tive value of each and any object, it must be substantialized (i.e., become the 
substance of value).
Furthermore, it is necessary to assume that this substantialized society is 
always present in the consciousness of those individuals who enunciate value 
judgments, or else that such judgments (whose function is to guarantee the 
survival of society) impose themselves through a process of natural selection. 
In reality, a good number of the concrete analyses of Andaman rituals of-
fered by Radcliffe-Brown (cf., for example, 1922: 261) show that both the uti-
lization of certain phenomena during rites or the formation of ritual behaviors 
around them depend more on the qualitative than on the quantitative or utili-
tarian aspects of these objects. For example, certain natural species attract at-
tention because their position within an ensemble of natural relations seems to 
correspond to the position of a certain role in social relations. Thus the former 
may become the metaphor for the latter.
Reading The Andaman Islanders, one has the impression of a conflict be-
tween Radcliffe-Brown’s sensitivity to the more properly cognitive and se-
mantic aspect of ritual and the theoretical framework that he adopts, which 
is dogmatically functionalist and evolutionist. Ultimately, analysis in terms of 
meaning always turns into analysis in terms of function: an acknowledgement 
of the action of intellectual processes is obliterated by the implicit recourse to 
the evolutionist model of natural selection. Even worse, at times a ghost seems 
to wander through the pages of the book—that of a personalized society which 
calculates utility in a way worthy of a stockbroker in order to generate and ma-
nipulate behaviors necessary to its survival. 
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The reduction of interpretation in terms of meaning to an interpretation in 
terms of function is mirrored by the tendency to treat “function” and “meaning” 
as if they were interchangeable terms. Such a procedure can appear legitimate 
only for the analysis of certain rituals. For example, in the Andaman wedding 
ritual the spouses’ embrace signals their transformation into husband and wife: 
“The ceremony brings vividly to the minds of the young couple and also to those 
of the spectators the consciousness that the two are entering upon a new social 
relation of which the essential feature is the affection in which they must hold 
one another” (ibid.: 236).
In other words, by displaying in public for the first time the reciprocal 
emotional behavior that is prescribed between husband and wife, the couple 
is socially recognized as such. From then on all the community members will 
follow—in their behaviour toward the two persons—the prescribed rules for 
dealing with a married couple; it is indeed this collective recognition that effec-
tively makes them spouses. In this case, then, the ritual obtains its social effect 
by representing it: function and signification coincide.
But in many other rituals, the postulated social referent is absent from in-
digenous consciousness. Radcliffe-Brown would therefore have to admit that in 
these cases meaning does not reflect function, but is a rationalization, a second-
ary formation whose value is not cognitive, but “practical.” It reproduces behav-
iors necessary to society, without, however, representing its true object.
This notwithstanding, Radcliffe-Brown still maintains that the ritual “signi-
fies” the social relation that it has the function of perpetuating. As we will see, he 
bequeaths to his successors this confusion between signification and function, 
between the indigenous point of view and the point of view of the observer.
The Manchester school: Ritual and conflict
Radcliffe-Brown’s theory of ritual disregards the tensions and conflicts that ex-
ist in social life and that are a product of its functioning. In fact, according to 
this theory, rituals mechanically reproduce the social structure by organizing 
individuals’ emotions according to the “needs” of society (ibid.: 234).
While accepting the postulates of functionalist theory, Max Gluckman 
complicates it by ascribing to ritual the function of reproducing social equilib-
rium in situations of potential conflict. Indeed he claims that ritual expresses 
not only those feelings that correspond to the established social order, but also 
those that are in conflict with it. By “symbolically” unleashing these feelings, 
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however, ritual allows their elimination or neutralization and thus, ultimately, 
the unchanged reproduction of social order. This theory would also explain why 
certain social situations generate ritual behaviors while others lack them. 
Ritual behavior would develop both in those societies where social order is 
accepted by all but conflicts with individual aspirations (Gluckman 1963) and 
in those societies where the same people perform different social roles. Indeed, 
in order to distinguish one role from another, it is necessary to resort to special 
behaviors (that is, rituals) that signal which role is performed by which individ-
ual in a given situation. These behaviors generally represent the role in question 
in an exaggerated form (Gluckman 1962).
In the first case, then, ritual behavior would constitute the formation of a 
compromise. The formalized (and therefore controlled) expression of a mor-
ally forbidden but socially recognized behavior would allow its neutralization 
(Gluckman 1963: 127). Thus, for example, in a famous, though much debated 
(cf. Beidelman 1966; Smith 1979) essay, Gluckman (1963) attempts to dem-
onstrate the existence of “rites of rebellion.” In some monarchies of southern 
Africa the king is, once a year, ritually insulted and rejected. In this way, the 
hostility that has accumulated against him is released. The ritual revolt would 
prevent real revolt and be the index of a consensus over the acceptability of the 
monarchical institution, but of a dissensus over the individuals who fulfil the 
duties of the king. 
On the other hand, in those societies in which dissensus pertains to the 
institution of monarchy and in which it is admissible to change the social struc-
ture, one finds not only “rites of rebellion,” but actual rebellions (ibid.: 129).
More interesting and complex are the developments that a disciple of 
Gluckman, Victor Turner, has given to these rather rough ideas. It should be 
noted above all that Turner was the first scholar to provide truly satisfactory 
descriptions of ritual actions. In fact, he did not limit himself to taking accurate 
records of the most important rituals of the Ndembu (a people of Zambia) 
but also studied them in their social context and, most importantly, questioned 
his informants systematically about the meaning they attributed to each of the 
ritual actions and symbols. The information that he collected, together with his 
own interpretations, led him to distinguish three components of meaning in 
these symbols: the “exegetic” or “interpretive” meaning, the “operational” mean-
ing, and the “positional” meaning (Turner 1968: 17).
The first of these meanings is the one drawn from his informants’ words; 
the second one is implicit and is revealed by the use made of the symbol; and 
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the third, finally, depends on symbols that are adjacent to it in a given spatio-
temporal context. The following example will clarify the relations among these 
three components of meaning. 
The dominant symbol of the initiation rites for young women (nkang’a) is 
a young tree of the species called mudyi. The female initiate must lie down at 
a mudyi tree’s feet during the first day of the rite. This act symbolizes that she 
“dies” as a girl and is born as an adult. The exegetic meaning of the tree is the 
following: it represents the maternal milk and, therefore, the matrilineage that 
“nurtured” the girl. This symbol thus has two poles of reference: it refers, on the 
one hand, to organic and physiological phenomena (milk, breastfeeding, and so 
on), and, on the other hand, to social norms and values (matrilineage, customs, 
and so on). According to Turner, this polarity is found in the main symbols used 
during Ndembu rituals. The organic pole evokes illegitimate “feelings and im-
pulses” (ibid.: 18), such as infantile, regressive associations with maternal milk, 
whereas the social pole evokes their opposite, that is, moral imperatives. Turner 
assumes that the emotions aroused by the organic referents of these symbols 
are “borrowed,” so to speak, from their ethical referents, although he does not 
explain how such a transfer takes place and how it is possible. Turner seems 
to associate it with the mechanism of “sublimation”: “The emotions, which, as 
psycho-analysts have shown, may often be connected with illicit and socially 
reprobated impulses, . . . are purified by their association with morality and law. 
It is as though the ‘energy’ of virtue flowed from organic and primitive sources, 
though the original goals of the drives were altered. It is as though the infan-
tile pleasures of breast-feeding were associated with the correct performance 
of one’s duties as an Ndembu tribesman or member of a matrilineage” (ibid.: 
18–19). This thesis is summarized in a single sentence: “The obligatory is made 
desirable, and the desirable allowed a legitimate outlet” (ibid.: 19).
The various ways in which the mudyi is used in different contexts consti-
tute its “operational” meaning. For example, in another phase of the nkang’a 
ritual the mudyi tree is used operationally as a symbol of femininity in op-
position to masculinity (ibid.), or as a symbol of the daughter’s separation 
from her mother, and so on. Through an analysis of these operational symbols 
Turner deduces that the mudyi tree symbolizes not only certain principles of 
Ndembu social organization but also the conflicts that are aroused by enacting 
such principles. 
As for the positional meaning, it seems to consist of a particularly con-
cealed component of the symbol, which is revealed by a symptom: its regular 
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association with another symbol. So, for example, “the regular association 
of the forked chishing’a pole, representing huntmanship and virility, with a 
ring of twisted grass which encircles it below the fork, may well represent 
a Ndembu belief, repressed in the unconscious, in basic human bisexuality” 
(ibid.: 81–82).
These examples show that if the “exegetic” meaning of the symbol is obvi-
ously a conscious one, both the operational and, especially, the positional ones 
can be unconscious. 
More precisely, Turner distinguishes among three levels of signification: 
1) the manifest meaning, which is fully conscious and illustrated by indigenous 
exegesis; 2) the latent meaning, of which “the subject is only marginally aware 
but could become fully aware” (81), and; 3) the “hidden” meaning, which is 
completely unconscious and which Turner connects to infantile or even prenatal 
experiences (81).
This treatment of ritual symbolism explains how it is possible for individuals 
to assimilate social rules. Indeed, it is not by chance that most rituals consid-
ered by Turner serve the function of curing afflictions that are the symptom of 
a conflict between individual and society, between instinct and law, and so on 
(cf. Smith 1979: 109–10).
Yet, by acting on individuals in a collective context, rites also act on society 
as a whole, bringing it back to a state of equilibrium (Turner 1968: 267–68). 
From this perspective, ritual is for Turner (cf. 1957: 122–25) what it had been 
for Gluckman, namely a device aimed at re-establishing order in a situation 
where normal “juridical” devices are insufficient. Using a typically functionalist 
argument, Turner therefore assumes that ritual is generated by its function, that 
is by a “need” of society. Ritual furnishes Ndembu society with a service equiva-
lent to what a more complex political system could provide: therefore, it “may be 
regarded as a magnificent instrument for expressing, maintaining, and periodi-
cally cleansing a secular order of society without strong political centralization 
and all too full of social conflict” (1968: 21).
In this sense, the presence of rituals within a society is interpreted by Turner 
as the index of a structural contradiction that the social organization cannot re-
solve with “rules” and procedures that are properly political—that is, ultimately, 
“rational.” He claims, for example, that Ndembu rituals are all dominated by a 
“basic contradiction,” which is the conflict between the principle of virilocal 
residence and the principle of matrilineal filiation (ibid.: 279–83, 201; 1967: 
4–6; 1969: 81–84).
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It is not possible to discuss here whether such a contradiction really exists 
and whether it has the effects attributed to it by Turner. However, it should be 
noted that: 1) the approach adopted by both Gluckman and Turner leads them 
to search for contradictions where they do not necessarily exist. This tendency 
results from the thesis that ritual is necessarily the expression of a contradiction; 
2) The thesis that ritual is the Ersatz of a real resolution of these contradictions 
requires additional explanation: if there is a real “contradiction” (it would be 
better to say conflict [cf. Colletti 1975]) between matrilineage and patrilocality, 
how can the two institutions continue to coexist? What forces prevent harmo-
nization between rules of filiation and rules of residence? 3) Numerous ritual 
events described by Turner do not seem to confirm the thesis that ritual realizes 
a kind of organic unity allowing the transcendence of social conflicts (cf. Turner 
1968: 197). In fact, a rite, like any other social occasion, may also generate or 
precipitate conflict (for an example cf. ibid.: 231); 4) The “purgative” model of 
ritual necessarily implies the idea that this event is accompanied by definite 
feelings and their transformation (ibid.: 235).
However, aside from the fact that it is difficult to evaluate the emotions 
actually felt by participants in a rite, it is well known that ritual often consists of 
a series of purely “formal” acts separated from emotions even as they represent 
them. Indeed, as has been already highlighted, the presence of internal states’ 
external signs does not guarantee the real presence of these internal states. 
More plausible is Turner’s idea that the efficacy of ritual depends on its 
“dramatization” or “representation” of an empirical conflict. In fact, the rep-
resentation is efficacious in and of itself inasmuch as it allows conflict to be 
brought to light (and thus collectively recognized) and clarifies its nature, while 
also relying on rational methods in order to establish responsibilities, sanctions, 
reparations, and so on. The importance of the “cognitive” aspect of ritual is at-
tested by the Ndembu idea that ritual “unmasks,” “reveals,” “makes public what 
is private and hidden,” and so on (ibid.: 190–91; 1975: 110–11).
* * *
In The ritual process Turner develops further the idea that a functional relation-
ship exists between ritual and social structure, and tries to interpret it as a re-
lationship between two different states of society and even as the organization 
of society according to two opposing but complementary principles (Turner 
[1969] 1977: 126–27).
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Society normally possesses a structure, which is to say—according to 
Turner—a system of roles that are often organized hierarchically. At times, 
however, society takes the form of a relatively undifferentiated and egalitar-
ian community. These moments of undifferentiation reproduce “an essential and 
generic human bond, without which there could be no society (Turner [1969] 
1977: 97). In other words, societas presupposes communitas: the former differ-
entiates and articulates the social bond that the latter creates. Because exces-
sive differentiation runs the risk of eroding the very base of the social bond, it 
is necessary to reproduce periodically the communitas through ritual acts. The 
dependency of societas on communitas is demonstrated, for example, by the fact 
that the assumption of any role, and political roles in particular, requires rituals 
characterized by the passage through an undifferentiated stage associated with 
the values of the communitas. It is from the communitas that the role attains its 
ultimate sacredness and legitimacy (ibid.: 96–111).
The notion of communitas derives directly from Robertson Smith’s and 
Durkheim’s idea that ritual renews the social bond by establishing a “com-
munion” whose effects also reverberate in the “secular” world (i.e., Turner’s 
“structure”). In this sense, it represents nothing new. Another aspect of Turner’s 
theory brings him, however, closer to Arnold Van Gennep (1909) rather than 
to Robertson Smith or Durkheim. This is the idea that the state of undifferen-
tiation and communitas is connected to liminal situations, that is, to the passage 
from one state to another. This liminal phase has a transformative function, not 
merely a reproductive one (cf. Turner 1969: 128).
Turner’s theory, thus formulated, is often perplexing. When he opposes soci-
etas to communitas as “structure” to “antistructure,” as “cognition” to “affectivity” 
(ibid.: 128–29), as a device for satisfying “organizational and material” needs 
(ibid.: 129, 132) to a kind of élan vital (the reference to Bergson [1932] is obvi-
ous here), or as “constriction” to “freedom” (1969: 133), he distorts the kernel of 
truth that his theory contains. 
The phenomena classified under the label communitas appear to Turner 
as characterized by “lack of structure” because he does not transcend the ju-
ridical notion of structure elaborated by Radcliffe-Brown, Meyer Fortes, and 
Gluckman. In reality, ritual sets in motion structures that can be defined at a 
more abstract level than normative and empirical structures, the only ones that 
Turner takes into account; and it is only in contrast with the latter that the for-
mer appear to be “non-structural” (cf. T. Turner 1975: 654, 657).
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CONSCIOUS OR UNCONSCIOUS MEANING?
We have seen that one of the presuppositions of the functionalist approach is 
that the efficacy of ritual depends on its “symbolic” nature—so much so that a 
recent interpreter (Skorupski 1976) has called this approach “symbolist.”
However, we have also seen that the notion of “symbolism” is used in a rather 
vague way. In particular, we have come face to face with a problem to which 
we must now turn. Durkheim and his functionalist successors claim that ritual 
symbolizes social structure; but this symbolic relation does not correspond to 
the letter of a rite, nor, therefore, to the meaning attributed to it by those who 
perform it. Durkheim bypasses the problem or “resolves” it in evolutionary 
terms: the relationship, originally symbolic, has been reified. Nevertheless, he 
continues to define the relationship between religious representation and soci-
ety as “symbolic.” As we have seen, this implies an unwarranted identification 
between the products through which society “reifies” and “estranges” itself on 
the one hand and the “symbols” on the other. 
Such confusion is also found in Durkheim’s successors. Radcliffe-Brown 
is aware of the difficulties raised by relating indigenous interpretation to that 
of the observer, but he ends up claiming that the latter simply clarifies what is 
only implicitly present in the former. In other words: if the observer’s interpre-
tation were explained to a native, the latter could not but admit that it reveals 
the implications of what he does and says. As we have seen, however, not all of 
Radcliffe-Brown’s interpretations can be conceived as simple “explications” of 
the presuppositions and implications of meaning that the Andamans attribute 
to rituals.
By introducing the notion of “unconscious meaning” next to those of “man-
ifest meaning” and “latent meaning,” Turner seems to be able to resolve the 
problem of the relationship between indigenous interpretation and the inter-
pretation of the observer.
In reality, though, the notion of “unconscious meaning” raises considerable 
problems. Turner and his followers place among the unconscious meanings of 
ritual both sociological and psychological elements of a Freudian type. How-
ever, whereas Freudian theory justifies the unconscious character of psychologi-
cal elements through a theory of psychic apparatus that explains why they are 
removed from consciousness, an equivalent theory does not exist for the alleged 
unconscious elements of a sociological nature. The Durkheimian-functionalist 
theory, therefore, does not provide a criterion for distinguishing between those 
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elements that effectively bear unconscious “meanings” and those that are arbi-
trarily postulated as such by the interpreter.
The absence of such a criterion, and of a theory that would allow it to be 
established, is particularly evident in some “semiological” analyses of ritual, of 
which a recent book by Alfred Gell (1975) constitutes an extreme and eloquent 
example. It is convenient here to consider this study briefly and compare it with 
an interpretative position opposed to it, in the hope that the proverbial clash of 
opinions will let us glimpse at the truth. 
Gell has observed a ritual of great complexity, called the Ida, among the 
Umeda of New Guinea. However, he was not able to obtain from his informants 
an exegesis of the ritual, which indeed does not seem to exist. Nevertheless, he 
claims to have been able to reconstruct the unconscious meaning of the ritual. 
This unconscious meaning would be constituted by a variety of elements per-
taining to Umeda society. 
In order to justify this reconstruction of the unconscious “semantics” of the 
ritual, Gell utilizes two arguments. The first is the methodological argument. If 
the analysis is able to reach a level at which the material to be explained appears 
perfectly coherent, to the point that there “is a quasi-predictive relation between 
the parts of the system” (1975: 212–13), then one can be certain that the model 
is true. The “empirical” proof of this argument would be constituted by the fact 
that an element of new observation can be reconciled with the system. That is, 
it appears as the logical consequence of the principles of the system. The second 
is the “ontological” argument. In order to justify the fact that the meaning thus 
reconstructed is not “verbalized” by the informants, Gell proposes the follow-
ing hypothesis: what is “communicated” through non-verbal symbols cannot be 
communicated through verbal symbols (an hypothesis also accepted by Forge 
[1965] for a society close to the Umeda one). Thus, the impossibility of express-
ing the rite in words would be part of the very nature of the rite’s meaning—an 
idea that conveniently justifies the discrepancy between the “meanings” singled 
out by Gell and the accounts of informants, who appear to know nothing of 
these meanings. 
The first argument is a familiar one. Dumézil, for example, has claimed that 
“in the speculative disciplines coherence is but one basic quality of reasoning 
which does not guarantee the truth at all. The empirical sciences, however, are 
different, for in that case the problem is one of classifying empirical data in 
their variety and diversity and according to their own nature” (1948: 18). As 
this excerpt demonstrates, the argument is based on the presupposition that 
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phenomena that occupy the empirical sciences (among them anthropology) 
are logically coherent. It would follow that the logical coherence of the model 
elaborated to explain these phenomena would itself be a guarantee of its truth. 
Even accepting that the phenomena to be explained are coherent, however, 
nothing guarantees that the coherence of the explanans coincides with the co-
herence of the explanandum. On the other hand, if one does not admit the 
intrinsic coherence of the explanandum, then the coherence of the explanans 
not only fails to guarantee validity but generates a paradox: the more the model 
presents its object as a coherent system, the less it is true (cf. Bourdieu [1980] 
1990: 250).
All this simply demonstrates that the criterion of coherence is not a guar-
antee of validity. Any fact may be broken down into elements such as to render 
it compatible with a given model; but the existence of those elements and the 
validity of the model are not in this way demonstrated. Analogously, I could 
reduce a ritual to the “meanings” that are compatible with a coherent model; but 
I will not thereby have demonstrated that such meanings exist—all the more so 
if I am not able to single out the interpreter for whom they exist. Without this, 
the alleged meanings are made to exist in and of themselves, in some Platonic 
universe, as if just waiting for an anthropologist to discover them (cf. Lewis 
1980: 145).
Let us now turn to Gell’s “ontological” argument. Even if we admit that 
non-verbalized messages exist, this does not suffice to prove that a non-verbal 
behavior actually bears a message; it might even be devoid of meaning. In any 
case, Gell’s argument leads to paradoxical results for the kind of analysis it is 
supposed to justify. An example will clarify why.
Let us consider music. If it is true that music communicates messages that 
cannot be expressed in words, then either it is not legitimate to translate music 
into verbal messages or one can describe verbally only the evocations aroused by 
the musical phrases, evocations that are vague and changeable depending on the 
listener. A music critic who takes his or her own personal experience of music 
to constitute the musical content itself, or, worse, who presumes to describe its 
semantic-referential content (“this phrase describes the sheep, this other one the 
fauns”), is considered, rightly so, to be engaging in an arbitrary operation. Yet, it 
is precisely to the latter operation that Gell subjects the Ida ritual!
The intrinsically contradictory character of Gell’s position becomes even 
more evident when he gives his principle a much “stronger” form, claiming that 
the symbols of the ritual are “symbols of a ‘transcendent’ reality which cannot 
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be grasped except through the symbol itself” (1975: 214, emphasis in the text). Gell 
explains neither what this “transcendence” is, nor how the above mentioned 
claim—derived from Jaspers and Schutz—might be compatible with his semio-
logical analysis. Nevertheless, he believes he can infer from this the observer’s 
right to describe and explain these symbols from the outside. But if it is true 
that ritual is constituted by experiences of the “transcendent,” then a conclusion 
opposed to Gell’s would seem necessary: the observer can only attempt (if it is 
even possible!) to immerse himself in that kind of experience and evoke it for 
his readers. The claim to reconstruct “objectively” from outside the meaning of 
symbols that have been defined a priori as untranslatable and that can be under-
stood only through personal experience (i.e., only subjectively) is an absurdity 
pure and simple, and in any case is based on the assumption that the observer 
has direct access to the same transcendence that the Umeda can experience only 
through symbols (i.e., “unconsciously”).
In direct, if tacit, opposition to Gell’s, Gilbert Lewis’ analysis (1980) of the 
ritual of the Gnau of Sepik (New Guinea)—a population that is culturally akin 
to the Umeda—privileges the indigenous interpretation of the rite. 
Lewis criticizes the semiological point of view, according to which the ritual 
can be understood as a communicative code comparable to Saussurian langue. 
In fact, in order to recognize true acts of communication in the ritual, it is nec-
essary to locate the following elements in it: 1) a communicative intention and 
a sender animated by this intention; 2) a vehicle for communicating; and 3) a 
receiver who actually receives the message being communicated (ibid.: 18–19).
It is easy to observe that the presence of these three factors is not always 
found in ritual acts: one could even argue that it is rare that actors in a rite have 
a communicative intention and that spectators are able to recognize real mes-
sages in it. At any rate, different rituals and even different sections of the same 
ritual are considerably at variance on this point. Therefore, one cannot reduce 
the problem of the interpretation of ritual to the search for the supposed “code 
for the transmission of the information.”
According to Lewis, the signs used by ritual are not communicative as much 
as they are expressive: in other words, they are mostly symptomatic or indicative 
(for example, blushing which betrays the one who blushes) and, therefore, they 
do not presuppose a code in order to be interpreted; instead, they may be the 
object of different interpretations, that are subjectively variable. Above all, these 
signs are complex stimuli which produce complex effects—not just intellectual 
but also emotional, sensible, and so on. They act in fact on the totality of persons. 
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The prevalence in rituals of expressive symbolism over communicative sym-
bolism allows us to explain—more efficiently than with a semiological model—
ritual’s efficacy (i.e., the fact that it has certain effects on participants) (cf. ibid.: 
116, 118).
In the concrete analysis of Gnau rites proposed by Lewis, such a theoretical 
approach generates a certain tension between two opposed tendencies. On the 
one hand, the refusal to superimpose arbitrarily meanings that are meaningful 
only to the interpreter over those actually perceived by the natives themselves 
leads Lewis to adhere as much as possible to the letter of the indigenous ex-
egesis. But, on the other hand, he cannot but realize that the indigenous exege-
sis itself requires an interpretation (cf. Sperber 1975: 17–50). Furthermore, the 
distinction between communication and expression and, correlatively, between 
meaning and evocation creates in and of itself a large field (that of “evocations” 
or “reactions” produced by either expressive or involuntary signs) of which, by 
definition, one cannot argue that the indigenous interpretation furnishes an 
adequate image. This vast field indeed transcends the capacities for verbalization 
and analysis of the Gnau people. 
Consequently, Lewis is forced in his interpretation to invoke a set of traits 
that would exist implicitly in ritual (1980: 142) and thus to resort to the prin-
ciple adopted by Forge and by Gell: ritual allows the expression of what cannot 
be expressed in words (ibid.: 24).
If Lewis recognizes the importance of implied meaning he neverthe-
less refuses to take into consideration the possibility that some “unconscious 
meaning” may be present in a rite. But recognizing the fact that the relation 
between representation and its non-conscious conditions (psychic, social, eco-
nomic, cultural, and so on in nature) cannot be defined as a symbolic one in 
the absence of an effectively documented interpretant (cf. Peirce 1897) does 
not warrant ignoring the role these conditions can have. Rather, such condi-
tions orient representations in certain directions, block access to others, create 
resistances or censures against recognition of certain facts or interest in others, 
and so on.
Taking this into account is necessary in order to explain why representations 
may have a certain structure and a certain content, and ultimately why they may 
be compatible with a certain social or psychic situation as well as why they may 
be functional in relation to the given situation. 
* * *
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Let us discuss a concrete example, namely the ritual to which Lewis devotes a 
good part of his analysis. On various ritual occasions, Gnau men open a wound 
in their penis and let it bleed; in particular, when, in the course of a boy’s puberty 
rites, his penis is wounded for the first time, the maternal uncle or, in his ab-
sence, an equivalent relative, opens a wound in his penis and lets the blood that 
gushes bleed on the body of his nephew (1980: 78). The Gnau people maintain 
that this ritual permits the young man to free himself from his own “bad blood” 
and to acquire his uncle’s “good blood” in exchange (ibid.: 178). The ritual of 
the penis’ artificial hemorrhage is a male secret: no woman must know it exists. 
It should be noted that the father can never provide blood from his own 
penis to his son. The only exception is the ritual in which he smears the face of 
his first born with his own blood at the moment of birth. Also, younger brothers 
cannot give blood to older brothers, whereas older ones can give blood to the 
younger brothers. These differences would seem to be explained by the Gnau 
theory of conception, according to which every man and every woman pos-
sess a certain reserve of blood that is used to generate offspring. When a son is 
born, he has already received his share of paternal blood; the remaining amount 
of blood, none of which that son is entitled to receive, must be used to gener-
ate more sons. A father, therefore, may not sprinkle his son during rites (ibid.: 
176). This theory justifies the fact that relationships within a consanguineous 
group are determined by birth and cannot be modified by voluntary donations 
of blood from the father to one of the sons. 
According to Lewis, this theory also explains why, within the group of 
brothers, the ritual donation of blood from the penis may occur only in order 
of seniority and not in the opposite order. Yet the resort to this rule is not com-
pletely satisfactory: for example, the Gnau older brothers do play a “paternal” 
role in their relations with younger ones and from this point of view transfer-
ring blood from the former to the latter would have to be forbidden. At any 
rate, such a transference represents an alteration of the order of distribution of 
agnatic blood among consanguines, and as such should be forbidden by virtue 
of the same principle, according to which the father cannot modify the distribu-
tion of his blood among his sons. Moreover, it is not clear why an older brother 
would have to donate blood to a younger brother, blood that belongs to his 
own sons. The fact that the rules of blood donation may harmonize with the 
order of seniority is not enough to eliminate, thereby, the contradictions that 
exist among some of these rules. Furthermore, it remains to be explained why 
the father donates blood from his penis to his oldest son at the moment of his 
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birth: indeed, according to the indigenous theory of conception, the older son 
has already received his share of paternal blood. 
It appears, then, that the indigenous ideology does not explain coherently 
and completely all the rules. Most particularly, it does not explain why the ideal 
donor of blood is the maternal uncle. This notwithstanding, Lewis accepts this 
ideology as if constituting a sufficient explanation.
The main problem, however, is posed by the very existence of the ritual. Why 
do Gnau men frequently open a wound in their penis and let it bleed, some-
times on one of their relatives?
First, it should be noticed that this ritual is common in the Sepik area and 
that different populations explain it in different ways. The natives of the Wogeo 
Island, for example, claim that men need these periodic haemorrhages in order 
to free themselves from the pollution generated by sexual contact with women. 
Similar ideas exist among the Abelam (Forge 1965). According to these popula-
tions, the artificial hemorrhage from the penis is the equivalent of the natural 
hemorrhage of women (cf. Hogbin 1970: 88, n. 102). It was thus not wrong of 
Hogbin, the ethnographer who described Wogeo culture, to title his book The 
island of menstruating men.
Based on these observations, some scholars have interpreted this ritual as 
the expression of the unconscious desire to menstruate on the part of men, that 
is to say, to take on the feminine power of procreation. Supposedly, men are en-
vious of this power, and the ritual reveals a latent hostility against women, who 
indeed are not allowed to take part in it. In essence, this ritual would be sort of 
male revenge. 
But according to Lewis, Gnau do not make the association between the loss 
of male blood and female menses—on the contrary, they energetically deny it 
when it is proposed to them (1980: 110–11). Their interpretation of the ritual 
is completely different: mature men give their blood to younger relatives so that 
they may grow and become strong (ibid.: 178). This interpretation would be 
based on the “implicit” idea (i.e., one that is not “explicitly” formulated by the 
Gnau) according to which blood is associated with life (ibid.: 180); by giving 
blood, one gives life. For Lewis, the indigenous interpretation would be ad-
equate, and it would be arbitrary to search beyond it. 
Lewis’ conclusion, however, is not convincing, because the native interpreta-
tion is not completely coherent and does not explain all the facts. In the first 
place, there seems to be a contradiction between two justifications for these 
hemorrhages: according to one, hemorrhages allow for the elimination of “bad 
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blood”; according to the other, they serve to transfer “good blood.” Why is the 
blood “bad” for the one who gives it and “good” for the one who receives it? 
The first justification for the hemorrhage implies, at any rate, that blood is not 
always associated with life, as Lewis claims; on the contrary, it is the loss of blood 
that seems to promote life. But there is also a more serious problem: the indig-
enous theory (or Gnau people’s claims that Lewis considers as such) does not 
explain the most typical aspect of the ritual: if it is only the blood that matters, 
why does it have to be extracted from the penis? This question is not a frivolous 
one, all the more so in that the operation is painful, and at least for the initiates 
a cause for anguish. It should also be noticed that, whereas, in extraordinary 
circumstances, a woman may be present in all the other rites that are normally 
reserved to men, the operation on the penis is the only one that women are not 
allowed to attend in any instance (cf. ibid.: 182). This could constitute a point 
in favor of the thesis that there exists an unconscious association (unconscious 
because repressed from the consciousness) between male hemorrhage and female 
menstruation. Indeed, the prohibition regarding women would be interpreted 
as the conditio sine qua non so that the story that men tell themselves (“we are 
also able to menstruate, to give our blood to the children”) is not destroyed by 
the presence of those who in this context represent the reality of the difference 
between the sexes. Lewis could rightly object that such an interpretation is too 
conjectural; it is somewhat bolstered, however, by the origin myth of female 
menstruation: Gnau in fact believe that men, not women, originally menstru-
ated, but that they transferred this nuisance to their female companions with a 
trick (ibid.: 124). It could be added that through another trick (the rite itself ) 
men periodically re-appropriate their lost prerogative and in the rite, the origi-
nal trick to which women fell victim is repeated in another form: excluded from 
the rite, they will never be in a position to apprehend that the transfer was not 
complete and that men continue to menstruate, though now only when they 
want to. 
If one admits even the partial validity of this interpretation then the Gnau 
people’s denial of the connection between the artificial hemorrhage of the penis 
and the natural hemorrhage of the vagina does not have the incontrovertible 
value of proof that Lewis attributes to it. Such a denial could instead be in-
terpreted as a defence against an association repressed into the unconscious 
of which the myth (even more than the ritual) would constitute the symptom.
One could cite other signs in support of the theory that unconscious psy-
chic formations have an influence on conscious acts and representations whose 
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existence they help to explain. However, it is not necessary to belabor this point 
nor to decide here which interpretations of the ritual wherein men provoke a 
hemorrhage of their penis is most adequate. The point is only to show concretely 
that Lewis’ “phenomenological” and, at times, “literal” approach is not satisfac-
tory because it does not take into account the internal contradictions of ideol-
ogy, nor the tension between ideology and rules nor, finally, the very existence 
of the ritual. 
In conclusion, the two approaches discussed here both appear to be inad-
equate. Whereas one ignores the unquestionable existence of unconscious as-
pects of the ritual, the other disregards completely the conscious interpretation 
(or lack thereof ) and interprets the ritual entirely as an unconscious process of 
communication.
Without ruling out the existence of unconscious aspects in communica-
tion—or, better, “intuitive” or “subliminal,” as Jakobson (1970) calls them to 
highlight that they can be potentially accessible through psychological reflec-
tion and thus are not completely unconscious—it should be emphasized that 
the possibility of inferring information from an unconscious behavior does not 
turn this behavior ipso facto into a “message.” In fact, the information is deduced 
through inference by the observer, not communicated by the person being ob-
served (cf. Lyons 1968: 413–15).
The distinction between “communication” and “inference” allows us to for-
mulate an approach that does not arbitrarily reduce ritual to the single matter of 
communication but recognizes its cognitive dimension. The following pages are 
dedicated to illustrating such an approach. 
COMMUNICATION OR INVENTION?
The preceding considerations have shown that when ritual is regarded either as 
a purely communicative mechanism or is made out as the mere enactment of 
beliefs we quickly find ourselves at a dead end.
Without wanting to deny either the existence of communicative aspects in 
ritual or the fact that it reflects certain beliefs, we would like to formulate an 
alternative hypothesis: considered from a cognitive point of view, ritual does not 
mainly look like a code for the transmission of pre-existing messages, but rather, 
like a mechanism that allows people to obtain new information. In other words, 
ritual is, in aggregate, potentially a creator of knowledge.
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In order to understand this hypothesis, it is necessary to discuss a few exist-
ing relationships between the communicative and ritual process. We have al-
ready noted that true communicative acts involve both the intention to commu-
nicate and the possibility to choose among alternatives that are known both to 
the sender and recipient of the message (cf. Gombrich [1962] 1985: 61; Cherry 
1961). Not only is the actual presence of these conditions not demonstrable in 
each and every rite or aspect thereof, but it is not even always possible to single 
out a sender, or, in other cases, the sender is only imaginary (gods, ancestors, and 
so on, who can also function as imaginary recipients).
Like the communicative process, the ritual process is based on expectations 
and projections: the addressee of a sentence “feels” more than he or she actually 
“hears,” because his or her anticipations and expectations constitute the schema 
with which he or she analyzes aural impressions—choosing some of them as 
pertinent, interpreting others as mere noise, or integrating them with compo-
nents that are not actually uttered, but whose occurrence is predicted by analysis 
of the context. 
In the ritual process, however, the element of anticipation and projection 
becomes predominant with respect to what is effectively received. This is due 
to the absence of a true process of communication, in which the presence of 
alternatives known to both the sender and the receiver allows them to keep 
their projections and anticipations under control. In particular, the sender can 
adjust his messages in accordance with the recipient’s reactions in such a way as 
to correct those interpretations that do not correspond to the communicative 
intention. 
This element of control is certainly weaker in those one-sided communica-
tive situations where feedback is not possible: films, paintings, and ritual repre-
sentations cannot be changed in function of the spectator’s reactions. One could 
even claim that those who produce these types of messages deliberately utilize 
communicative one-sidedness in order to stimulate to the utmost the spectator’s 
projections.
This effect is even more likely when it is not possible to single out in a ritual 
a sender, a receiver, or a true communicative intention, or when such an inten-
tion appears to be only marginal. 
In effect, the rite appears then as a collection of signs, although without of-
fering the code that allows for a full interpretation of those signs. On the one 
hand, it looks as if it is endowed with meaning; on the other hand, it seems 
devoid of any apparent sense. This contrast powerfully attracts attention and is 
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tantalizing: it may stimulate a search for meaning in what is ordinarily mean-
ingless but is “put in quotation marks” as if it possessed it. This can then prompt 
people to “play” with the rite’s signs, to establish homologies and oppositions, 
to reunite things that are normally kept separate, and to separate things that are 
normally conjoined.
The permanent inadequacy existing between stimulus and answer, as mecha-
nism of provocation, would then constitute not so much an indication that the 
rite involves “unconscious statements” (Gell 1975: 213), but rather a structural 
aspect of the rite, one that allows it to function as a means to transcend given 
meanings and rules. This is particularly true when the rite puts in quotation 
marks elements and aspects of daily life that are fundamental but at the same 
time problematic. By reducing the distances among them, reordering them, 
breaking the barriers that keep them separate from ordinary perception, and 
stimulating the perception of new relationships among them, the rite allows 
people to reflect on the fundamental constituents of experience and to derive 
from them, if not a clear meaning, at least the sense of interconnectedness that 
results from manipulating them in the same context. 
This reflexive work stimulated by the rite can be realized more or less con-
sciously; it can lead to an actual objectification; it can produce reinterpretations, 
criticisms, reforms, and so on; or it can simply contribute to the learning of 
structures and social codes, and, therefore, to their reproduction and reinforce-
ment. But it can also remain an unrealized potentiality. Indeed, the degree of 
actualization varies considerably according to the rites, the circumstances, the 
presence or absence of other means and situations for the learning and objec-
tivization of structures, and so on. It is precisely for this reason that it would be 
misleading to identify the rite as a proper metalanguage, a “code of a superior 
order,” collectively constituted. If this were the case, then the whole community 
would have to be aware of this particular status. On the contrary, the rite is 
simply a situation that favors reflection because it works by destructuring and 
restructuring everyday life, and it continues to be efficacious by virtue of the 
fact that it is not a specific code that can be learned once and for all. The rite 
is therefore a constant stimulator and potential bearer of new information, an 
instrument for reinvesting with meaning the world constituted by and crystal-
lized in social experience. 
Because it stimulates the subject’s projective tendencies and plays with ex-
pectations, paradoxes, and obscure areas of experience, the rite tends to make 
evident both the contradictory or unclear aspects of external experience (i.e., of 
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society and nature), and the problematic or obscure zones of subjects’ internal 
experience.
At times, these two blurred and subversive levels of experience are put di-
rectly in relation to each other: certain rites trigger a real psychological acting out 
in which, as a response to a collective expectation, elements of the experiences 
of certain individuals come to be projected upon incomprehensible elements of 
social experience in order to give them meaning. This happens, for example, in 
rites involving spirit mediums, shamans, and (to a lesser degree) oracles. In these 
rites, all that is problematic seems to be mobilized in an attempt to provoke a 
certain “spark” or a certain unexpected mediation which may allow the rite to 
restructure, correlatively, collective and individual experience, and give meaning 
to both. Society utilizes no differently the “creativity” of an artist.
In other kinds of rites, these projective, combinatory, and even “ludic” aspects 
are more strictly regulated. This is particularly true for feasts, in which a certain 
controlled destructuring of the everyday has the purpose of reconstructing it in 
the collective consciousness, reinforcing its meaning through a play of “back and 
forth” between the internal order of the subjects and the external order of reality. 
Finally, there exist rites where the playful aspect is reduced to a minimum 
and which reproduce normative structures by representing them in a highly 
ordered and formalized way, in contrast with the relative disorder of their reali-
zation in the everyday world. Even in these cases, however, a ludic element still 
contributes to giving meaning to the rite in a way that recalls the relationship 
between a “score” and a “performance.” It is an interpretive, essentially “musical,” 
and often virtuosic game where what counts is the ability to follow the rules 
in spite of their difficulty and indeed because of their rigidity. The meaning of 
the rite lies then not in its semantic significance, but in doing it by the rules, 
adjusting one’s behavior to the requirements of the “text” while at the same time 
leaving some room for embellishment, interpretation, and invention. 
This subtle dialectic between freedom and rule, between individuality and 
collectivity, becomes then a powerful imaginary scheme for the experience of 
the relationship between reality and desire, between the social and the individ-
ual. The victory of the individual over the norm, within the victory of the norm 
over the individual, is a pleasing experience of an essentially aesthetic nature.
In these cases, the rite offers an experience quite similar to the one offered by 
an aesthetically satisfying interpretation of a very well-known musical piece—
one that has come to be accepted matter-of-factly, as a tradition, without too 
many questions about its meaning. What then attracts a person either toward 
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the “temple of music” or the temple where the rite unfolds (and are they re-
ally different?) is ultimately the opportunity to live an experience that could be 
called “temporal,” i.e., a kind of confrontation and—herein lies happiness—a 
possible reconciliation between traces left in the memory by past performances 
and impressions of the present performance, which settle upon older ones much 
as a saline solution orders itself upon its corresponding crystal. Discovery and 
memory are thus reconciled in the flux of time, which, mastered at last, seems 
headed on a clear course toward an unknown but secure direction.
A scene from a film comes to mind: an old Dogon man contemplates, as he 
beats the rhythm of the music with his hand, the rite he attended sixty years 
earlier. A voice asks him: “Are you happy?” “Yes, I am happy.”
AN EXAMPLE
We have seen that the ludic, projective, and meaning-creating aspect of ritual is 
not present in the same measure and in the same fashion in all rites. Consider-
ing the entire ritual system of a society, one observes that rites of different types 
have complementary functions within that system. Moments of formality, of 
physical or verbal constraint, and so on, alternate with relatively unstructured 
moments of playful exploration, whose purpose is to stimulate the objectifica-
tion and apprehension of mental and physical schemes of habitus which inform 
everyday life but which do not appear clearly to consciousness. Both meth-
ods are often employed to reproduce the fundamental schemes of social life, 
and thus transmit them from one generation to the next and to reinforce them 
within each individual. 
Here, briefly, is an example of the complementarity between these two op-
posite kinds of rites. The rituals in question were performed in Hawaii each 
year until the end of the eighteenth century and, in a modified form, until 1819. 
The year-long ritual cycle consists of two principal phases: the first marks the 
transition to the new year and lasts four months; the second takes place dur-
ing the central part of the year and lasts eight months (Malo 1951; ‘Ī‘ī 1967; 
Kamakau 1976). During the latter period the men gather in the temples four 
times a month (for a total of eight days a month) to offer sacrifices and prayers. 
These rites are extremely complex and require an extraordinary formality, bod-
ily control, and level of attention. Each period spent in the temple ends with 
a rite (hono) during which the participants must seat themselves in the order 
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of their rank and remain motionless for several hours while listening to the 
priests’ prayers. Anyone who moves is immediately sacrificed to the gods. This 
rite represents in the clearest way the hierarchical structure of society, which is 
reproduced in the period spent in the temple. 
The ritual period of eight months begins in the main temple with the inau-
guration of a sovereign on whom all the other temples depend. The rites per-
formed on this occasion last ten days and involve human sacrifices. It is impos-
sible to summarize them: suffice it to say that, given the extremely complicated 
prescriptions, performing them properly is a real achievement, a triumph for the 
sovereign and for all of society. These rites constitute the fullest example of the 
ritual type where the ludic element (when it can actually manifest itself at all) is 
limited to the performance. Social laws and schemes are superimposed on it in 
a particularly clear-cut, rigid way.
On the other hand, the situation is much more fluid and the ludic element 
reigns supreme in the rites of passage from one year to the next. The term “ludic” 
is to be taken literally in this case, for among the gods who receive cults on this 
occasion is the “god of games” (Akua pā‘ani) who presides over games, feasts, 
and dances accompanying the passage in each district of another god, Lono 
makua (Lono the genitor). It is possible to demonstrate that the “god of games” 
is in fact the transformation of Lono makua. The latter has a threatening aspect: 
he returns annually to enforce his rights over the land cultivated by men, but he 
is neutralized by offerings and thereby sent back into the ocean. The neutraliza-
tion of Lono makua means the temporary neutralization of the law imposed 
from outside and of the schemes that constitute the basis of society and thought. 
These schemes, however, are imposed anew on consciousness through the 
spontaneous process of the game, set free by the rite. In fact, the ludic process 
has the same result as the non-ludic one in force during ordinary rites: both 
help, ultimately, to reinstate the normative structures of society. 
During the festival of the new year, dance, mime, and theater, mostly of a 
comic character, take place. Concretely, these often involve fictitious behaviors 
that imitate normal behaviors, thus allowing people to reflect on the latter, to 
objectify them and to place them at a distance. In addition to mime, theater, and 
dance, fake combats also take place (war is forbidden at this time of year, while 
it is common during the rest of the year; indeed it provides most of the victims 
for the human sacrifices).
The rigid social hierarchy is loosened, if not neutralized, during the festival 
of the new year; even the fundamental opposition between the sexes loses most 
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of its strength. They join freely, “experimenting” with unusual and even forbid-
den interpersonal combinations. Something similar happens at the conceptual 
level: jokes, comedies, and other representational activities reshuffle normal 
concepts and relationships.
The laughter that accompanies all these behaviors functions as a psycho-
logical frame (cf. Bateson 1954). It announces that the calling into question of 
normal hierarchies and established schemes is not real, but a mere game. But 
it is this game that generates the possibility of understanding the reason and 
necessity of the usual social order, and thus of freely accepting it. Also, this game 
generates ideas and new combinations that could be translated into the norma-
tive order. This creative aspect of the feast underlines its temporal context. In 
fact, the feast takes place in the period following the first rising of the Pleiades 
after sunset, which was also the moment when the cosmos began to take shape 
and to differentiate itself from the original state of chaos (Beckwith 1951: 58). 
It thus seems that the ritual game repeats in consciousness the process of forma-
tion of the cosmic order. 
However, laughter also demonstrates that this ideology of the feast, accord-
ing to which the social order can be freely reproduced and learned through the 
game, is, in part, a fictitious one. Indeed, the fact that the violation of normal 
relationships is laughed at manifests precisely the distancing of this violation 
and, therefore, the constant presence, at the heart of the feast, of a norm that the 
feast does not produce, but rather presupposes in order for it to function.
The fact that the norm is presupposed and, therefore, the existence—from 
the perspective of the feast—of a residue of “non-sense” and violence, is revealed 
by the way in which the king puts an end to the new year’s rites. He arrives 
from the sea, conquers the gods of the feast during a fictitious battle in which 
he emerges victorious, dismantles them, and deposits them in his main temple, 
where he offers sacrifices. This rite signals the beginning of the return to the 
cult’s ordinary religious period, in which norms are imposed by authority and 
in which the free interplay between internal and external order is reduced to a 
minimum. 
However, the ordinary period of rituals benefits from the capital of sense and 
consensus built up during the feast. Thus, the anti-ludic aspect of the temple rite 
presupposes the ludic aspect of the rite of the new year, much as the latter, in 
turn, assumes the former. This demonstrates that it is possible to establish the 
meaning of a given rite only by considering it within the entire social system of 
which it forms a part. In this way, one realizes that playful and creative elements 
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exhibited during the Hawaiian ritual year are balanced with other elements that 
are rigid, formalized, and imposed by authority. Such a complementarity does 
not coincide, however, with the one described by Victor Turner between com-
munitas and societas. This instead is the complementarity between two cognitive 
experiences. During different moments of the ritual cycle, inverse importance is 
assumed by the combinatory faculty exploring all possibilities and the authority 
deciding among the various alternatives. Even the feast of the new year, which 
seems related to Turner’s communitas, ultimately contradicts his scheme and the 
hierarchy that Turner establishes between the two terms of the opposition. In-
deed, as we have seen, the feast presupposes the very norm that it is instead 
supposed to found (i.e., societas, to use Turner’s terminology), and the authority 
of thought over society is revealed as encompassed by the authority of society 
over thought. 
EFFICACY UPON SOCIETY AND EFFICACY UPON NATURE
The preceding considerations on ludic and aesthetic aspects of ritual account for 
ritual’s potential cognitive efficacy. This, however, remains implicit, and it is not 
normally conceptualized by indigenous ideology. It may be inferred from the 
aesthetic judgments expressed by participants in a ritual (“it is beautiful,” “it is 
pleasant,” “we are happy,” and so on), as well as from the effects that the percep-
tion of form and schemes objectified within the ritual has on their performance 
in social life. 
Another type of efficacy is more directly present in indigenous conscious-
ness. It is commonly held that the rite has a certain effect and aims to produce a 
certain result: it can make an individual move from the status of “adolescent” to 
the status of “adult”; transform two “engaged” individuals into a “married” cou-
ple; move a man from the status of “private citizen” to “chair,” “head,” or “priest,” 
and so on. In other cases, it is held that the rite may also have results that, from 
our point of view, are not exclusively social: for example, the rite of passage from 
the status of “adolescent” to “adult” may be conceptualized as an act that either 
makes the subject grow (in a biological sense) or causes him or her to become 
prosperous. Other rites aim to modify or influence “natural” processes: to pro-
voke rain, to stop an epidemic, to make the crops grow, and so on. 
In order to account for this particular aspect of ritual behavior, it is good to 
start with those rites whose efficacy is not supposed to transcend social relations 
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(thus, with those ties that may properly be called “ceremonies,” see Valeri 1977 
[Chapter XI, this volume]). These rites still exist in modern societies, a good ex-
ample being provided by civil marriage. When the judge pronounces a formula 
of the kind “I now pronounce you man and wife,” the engaged couple effectively 
become husband and wife. In this case, then, we have a linguistic act that is not 
simply communicative or declarative; by virtue of the declaration, it transforms 
the social relationship between two individuals. The word thus produces an ef-
fect on reality, owing, naturally, to a collective convention: the formula “I now 
pronounce you man and wife” is uttered by the right person in the right situa-
tion, it has the effect of transforming x and y into husband and wife. 
The linguistic act that produces this kind of effect is called “performative,” 
and the element within it that is capable of producing real effects (and not sim-
ply communicative ones) is called the “illocutionary force” (cf. Austin [1955] 
1962, Searle 1969). (Of course, performative acts are not necessarily linguistic: 
for example, laying a crown on a man’s head turns him into a king.) It is true, 
therefore, that in some cases saying is doing, and that certain rites have real, not 
just imaginary, effects. These apparently magical effects of rites are, however, not 
in the slightest way magical. It is not a force intrinsic to language or visual im-
ages that explains their power, but rather the power of society over itself—the 
power to make a decision and to recognize its effect (cf. Bourdieu [1980] 1990: 
188). The person who, by simply pronouncing a formula, transforms what is 
enunciated into a reality exercises a power that has been accorded to him by 
society and that ceases the moment society takes it back from him. 
Even though this illocutionary use of language or any other symbolic ex-
pression is not magical, it is possible to discover in it the roots of magic in a 
proper sense. Indeed, the idea of the real efficacy of certain declarations, orders, 
and so on, when pronounced by certain people, can be extended from a sphere in 
which a decision is sufficient to produce the desired effect to another in which 
the decision is either not sufficient or totally powerless. To say “You are healed” 
cannot have a real effect because the bodily processes that determine the state 
of illness or health do not depend on an arbitrary act of collective will; they are 
not a fact of convention, but a fact of necessity. This seems obvious to us because 
we are used to radical oppositions between “social rule” and “natural law,” “free-
dom” and “necessity,” “society” and “nature,” “human” and “nonhuman.” How-
ever, all these distinctions (which are always anyway fragile) are the result of a 
slow process of discovery, not the result of immediate facts of experience. On 
the contrary, the primary tendency is to “anthropomorphize” nature or—no less 
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important—to “naturalize” society. When angry, we kick on object and break 
another; if a tile falls on our head, we insult it, and so on. Such behavior does not 
mean that we believe material objects can feel and hear, or suffer, but indicates 
that our immediate, uncontrolled reactions cause us to treat material objects as 
we would treat someone who has hurt us and who may thus become the target 
of our vengeance.
On the other hand, the fact that certain cultures extend the validity of per-
formative acts beyond the real limits of their validity does not however imply 
that they totally confuse nature and culture. It only means that the borderline 
that they establish between these two domains is not as clear as the one that we 
have established. 
At any rate, it can be claimed that wherever religion exists, there exists at 
least one area in which a certain indistinctness between nature and society is 
kept in force. Indeed, the element common to all religions is the idea that natu-
ral processes depend to some extent on moral order. Disguised under the idea of 
man’s dependence on forces that transcend him—and that are generally located 
in nature (whether in the skies or in the forest matters little)—religion in reality 
expresses the idea that nature is dependent on a human order. This is an idea of 
nature that has it behaving according to rules or morality, a nature that punishes 
evil with lightning and rewards the righteous with abundance. From experience 
of the efficacy of the word to which society delegates its authority over itself, 
society derives the idea that this authority extends to a nature populated by 
human images, by social and moral projections such as ancestors, gods, evil and 
beneficent wills, and so on.
Ultimately, this confirms that Durkheim’s theory of religion contains a ker-
nel of truth: in order for a rite to be considered efficacious, it is necessary to 
experience the real force that society exerts over its individuals, as well as—it 
should be added—experience the effect that this force has over the natural 
world through its effect on human will. Indeed, that part of nature that de-
pends, through labor, on human will is effectively modified by the collective 
acceptance of an order, a formula, and so on. In such a case, the formula func-
tions as a performative—efficacious not only on social relations, but also on 
the part of nature that, being under man’s control, is, by virtue of this, part of 
society.
In the end, nature in its entirety, inasmuch as it is known, categorized, and 
felt, is in some sense part of society. The mistake of religious (or magical) ideol-
ogy lies in taking humanity’s gnosiological appropriation of nature as a practical 
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appropriation. Both the reification of concepts and the humanization of nature 
result from this confusion.
CONVENTION AND EXPERIENCE
The previous discussion should demonstrate that, if performatives are a mat-
ter of convention, interpretable in terms of practical reason, the sphere of their 
application is, in contrast, not purely conventional, but depends on a certain 
knowledge and experience of the world. Whereas in the Western world we have 
learned to confine these acts to an area in which convention is indeed effica-
cious, in other cultures this sphere is not so clearly distinct from nature. 
In actual experience, the extension of performatives to nature encounters a 
resistance that has to be taken into account: the gap between the ritual’s claim 
and the events that actually happen can be filled in by interpretation, which 
points to factors that enable one to justify the rite’s failure without abandoning 
belief in its efficacy (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937). However, the power of interpre-
tation to neutralize the disproving of experience is not unlimited, as is explicitly 
or implicitly posited from Frazer forward (cf. Wittgenstein [1931–48] 1979: 
17e–18e).
These observations prevent us from recuperating, by means of the theory of 
performatives, the Durkheimian-functionalist theory according to which ritual 
acts—inasmuch as they are produced by a social “convention”—refer exclusively 
to this convention, to the act, and, therefore, to the actors who produce them 
(cf., for example, Tambiah 1973b: 221), and can thus be interpreted in terms of 
practical reason only. Such a thesis does not take seriously the fact that ritual 
acts make predictions that can be confirmed or denied by experience (cf. Lloyd 
1966: 178–79; Skorupski 1976: 61, 158, 181), or else it implicitly adopts a the-
ory according to which experience would be wholly conditioned by a certain 
conceptual form and thus always unable to contradict it. This latter conception 
was popularized by Lévy-Bruhl ([1910] 1985) and persists even today in more 
refined forms (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937), as, for example, in Tambiah’s theory 
of the persuasive use of analogy in magical actions (1973b).
Let us consider an example proposed by Tambiah in order to illustrate his 
theory. In political rhetoric one can encounter the following analogy: an em-
ployer is to his employees as a father is to his sons. The point of this anal-
ogy is the transference of a certain quality (love, respect, and so on) from one 
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relationship to another. The analogy should evoke in the workers the idea that 
they are like children, and it should lead them to assume an attitude of childish 
dependency in relation to their employer (ibid.: 211–12).
However, one could argue against Tambiah that the analogical transference 
would never be accepted by the workers if their experiences contained facts that 
contradicted it. The formula is efficacious not so much for the persuasive effect 
of the analogy per se but because it is proposed against a background that—like 
a screen that makes visual illusion possible (cf. Gombrich 1959: 228, 276)—pro-
tects it from those experiential signs (for example, the employer’s real behavior) 
that would contradict its suggestions. In such cases, the “screening” action is due 
to the employer’s control of the means of information and of the instruments 
for interpreting the experience made accessible to the workers. Nevertheless, the 
experiences that deny the analogy are never completely suppressed, and may be 
reactivated in other situations. 
The necessity to screen experience so that formulae, magical or political, 
may be effective, shows that experience is not totally conditioned by conceptual 
form. On the contrary, it preserves a certain degree of resistance, and thus of 
autonomy. This is why practical motivations for the rite, when its efficacy is 
extended to nature, may not disregard knowledge of nature itself, that is, the 
properly gnosiological dimension.
GAME, ART, AND RITE
Our discussion thus far suffices to demonstrate not only the multivalent char-
acter and extreme complexity of ritual acts, but also and above all the fact that 
the category “ritual” in the way it is commonly used does not have a theoretical 
justification. In fact it includes behaviors that fall into other categories: for ex-
ample, ludic and aesthetic behaviors. 
It is not by chance that these phenomena are so often found in “rituals.” 
Indeed, it could be argued that what is specifically ritual, or at least one of its fun-
damental aspects, is nothing but a particular variant in a family of phenomena 
that also includes games and art.
All three of these phenomena are marked by the presence of a “psychologi-
cal frame” (cf. Bateson 1954: 184–93), or by metacommunicative signals that 
oppose actions “in a frame” or “in quotes” to ordinary actions (Valeri 2001 [see 
Appendix II, this volume]).
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The psychological frame communicates that it includes a representation of 
action or a “fiction,” an action that does not belong to the same ontological level 
of that which it represents and is opposed to.
Among the most common means used to “frame” ritual are “formality” of be-
havior, a fixed and repetitive character to gestures, colors, scents, special decora-
tions, noise (or, in contrast, complete silence), the utilization of special languages 
or special levels of a language (Van Gennep 1908), music and special instruments, 
and so on. Naturally, all these means can have (and generally do have) other func-
tions within ritual, but their presence suffices to identify certain events as rituals. 
As we have seen, the frame signals that what it encompasses is “fictitious,” 
“representative,” and so on. Yet, the frame has the effect of isolating impres-
sions produced by representations from impressions generated by the real world, 
which remain outside. In this way, the frame can also function as a screen against 
those experiential signs that contradict the “reality effect” of the images that it 
encompasses, when those images are particularly evocative. Thus, paradoxically, 
the frame assumes two contradictory functions: one signals that what it contains 
is fictitious; the other causes its fictitious character to be forgotten. The relative 
importance of the two aspects of the frame’s functioning allows one to differen-
tiate between game, art, and rite. 
In a game, the evocative power of what is framed is never so great as to oblit-
erate the message “This is a game.” If, however, the player identifies too intensely 
with the game, the latter stops being just a game and may become a craze and 
sometimes a rite, as the superstitious acts of the most avid players demonstrate. 
In art, the illusory effect of representations is more intense than in games. In 
fact, artistic images trigger the projection of mental images, fulfill expectations 
and desires, and, as such, are “integrated” by the spectators, who unconsciously add 
to them what is missing in order for them to appear real (cf. Gombrich 1959: 277).
Abandonment to the illusion is, however, kept under control. The frame’s 
two opposed modes of functioning alternate regularly and quickly: one moment 
it concentrates the viewer’s attention on what it contains (the representation), at 
the same time blocking the eye’s movement toward what lies outside it (reality), 
yet a moment later it pushes attention outside what it circumscribes (for ex-
ample, beyond the picture). In the first moment, the viewer yields to the image 
and its power; in the second, the image recovers its illusory character through 
confrontation with the reality outside the frame. 
Aesthetic pleasure is produced by the sense of control that derives from this 
quick and regular oscillation: indeed, abandonment to the power of the image 
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is always followed by the experience of being able to oppose it, of directing our 
eyes back to reality and breaking the spell. Thus, we are dealing with a pleasure 
that derives from control over the illusion experienced by voluntarily yielding 
to it, knowing full well that awareness of the illusion can be recaptured at will. 
It is truly the power to resist the power of images that is absent from ritual 
proper. In rituals, images, words, and gestures are perceived as identical to real-
ity and consequently associated with the humiliating experience of dependency, 
which indeed is the religious feeling par excellence (cf. Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 
175–77).
Obviously, the situation in which a complete illusion is achieved—in which 
the ability to “put in quotes” is completely obliterated—is only an extreme case. 
An analysis of magical rites, for example, would be able to show that an aware-
ness of the fictitious and, at any rate, “less real” character of ritual practices may 
be inhibited, but is never absent altogether, and indeed it influences belief, giv-
ing it its deepest form: “It is not true, but I believe it; I don’t believe in it, but it is 
true” (cf. Mannoni [1964] 1969). At any rate, one may speak of ritual experience 
when the balance between the two functions of the frame—between making 
people aware of the fiction and providing a screen against reality—is altered in 
favor of the latter. 
The theory presented here allows one to account for the fact that an aes-
thetic experience can be transformed into a ritual one and vice versa. Oscil-
lations from one type of relationship between representation and reality to 
another are found in the course of a single symbolic action as well as in a 
diachronic dimension. Indeed, what transfers a given action from the sphere 
of ritual to that of art or games, and vice versa, is not its intrinsic qualities as 
much as the variable effects that these properties possess in different contexts 
and upon different spectators. What yesterday was a rite is today a simple 
“festival” set up for the aesthetic pleasure it gives; we know of some children’s 
games that were once rituals; when transported from the church to a mu-
seum, a sacred image becomes mere “art,” although it used to be part of a 
ritual experience. In sum: the mode of experiencing an image depends on its 
power within a given culture. Belonging as we do to a civilization in which 
generalization in use of images has been accompanied by an extraordinary 
enhancement of the ability to control them and to keep them at a distance, in 
other words by an unprecedented growth in the specifically aesthetic sphere, 
it is difficult for us to imagine the disconcerting power that images have long 
exercised over humans. 

appendix
Marcel Mauss and the New Anthropology
Translated from the Italian by Alice Elliot
Everything that has been is eternal: the sea will cast it up again. 
— Friedrich Nietzsche 
“Above all it is essential to draw up the largest possible catalogue of categories; 
it is essential to start with all those which it is possible to know man has used. 
It will be clear that there have been and still are dead or pale or obscure moons 
in the firmament of reason” (Mauss 1979: 32). With this phrase, Marcel Mauss 
captures the entire meaning and program of anthropology. The phrase has sus-
tained, for more than half a century, his extraordinary and prophetic oeuvre, 
which becomes increasingly timely as its deepest intention materializes in new 
discoveries, in the evolution of the science he contributed to establish. So, para-
doxically, despite aging, Mauss becomes increasingly “new,” and one is obliged 
to take a stance, as we are barely at the beginning of the road he has mapped out.
One cannot merely refer to Mauss: with him, one must debate. 
The originality of the themes he addresses and the brilliance with which he 
sketches a solution sets in motion his readers, pushing them forward, beyond 
the page, so that they cannot but sense him as being both dated and contempo-
rary at the same time, as it is he who pushes beyond himself.
To the page corresponds the man, to his humanism a moral figure, a mental 
toolkit able to reckon with the whole of humanity. “Mauss knows everything,” 
his students used to say. But his wasn’t a self-satisfied knowledge, forgetful of 
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how things are always vaster than what they seem. He knew only too well that 
one cannot build a universe within oneself, but only between oneself and others. 
And that we need to advance as much as possible into the latter kind of uni-
verse. Indeed, few have created such an array of tools as Mauss did for relating 
to mankind. His knowledge of sociology, ethnology, psychology, psychopathol-
ogy (he was a student of Ribot, and among the first to acknowledge the con-
tribution of psychoanalysis to the explanation of ethnological facts), linguistics, 
history, and philosophy, his prodigious memory, his extraordinary intellectual 
curiosity and his ability to arouse that of others, made of him an exceptional 
scholar and teacher. His students, all of them excellent, bear witness to this: 
Marcel Griaule, B. Maupoil, Michel Leiris, Denise Paulme, Roger Bastide, 
Jacques Soustelle, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Henri Lehmann, Alfred Metraux, and 
Georges Devereux. 
The merits of Mauss, however, were more than this. He had a profound 
knowledge of all aspects of the Classical, Germanic, and Celtic worlds, and was 
above all a remarkable Indologist. For many years, in fact, he was Professor of 
the History of Indian Religions and, as Louis Dumont (1964: 90) recalls, he 
never ceased, even in his later lectures, to attach great importance to the Indian 
world and the Orient in general.
His interests, however, increasingly moved towards ethnology, and he be-
came Director of the Institute of Ethnology at the University of Paris in 1925, 
together with Lévy-Bruhl and Paul Rivet.
Mauss was thus a man for humanity as a whole, a man, that is, who would 
not settle for living and thinking within the limits of Western culture. It is for 
this reason, as Lévi-Strauss has highlighted, that his opus has such an “an-
ticipatory” character, with his theories forerunning those of Ruth Benedict and 
Margaret Mead and, more generally, the American “culture and personality” 
school. He also anticipates Cannon in the study of the relationship between 
the physiological and the social. His rigorous method and his patient empiri-
cal research influenced English anthropology: not so long ago Evans-Pritchard 
(1954: 7) wrote: 
We are far from the rigorous discipline which men like Mauss had in mind, a 
discipline which supposes the specialist study of a lifetime and which, while set-
ting limits to aims and problems, necessitates scholarship which embraces not 
only a vast range of information about primitive peoples but also the study of the 
history of religions, of sacred texts, and of exegesis and theology. 
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In a sense then, because of the extreme breadth of his conceptions, Mauss is still 
“ahead” of modern anthropology.
Such knowledge, such (thoroughly scientific) care for the tools of compre-
hension and interpretation, denote a profoundly new mental approach, a hu-
manism which is not self-indulgent, and that refuses to speak of man without 
knowing him in his most diverse, and contradictory, manifestations—those that 
reveal him. A humanism that does not settle for a certain cultural tradition, 
whose history is chewed over again and again to the point of making it unus-
able, but which, rather, is well aware that venturing out in space is possibly more 
important than venturing out in time, as time always and only means our time, 
the time we feel as completed and solid, behind us.
In this sense, it is by reverting once again to the teachings of Mauss that 
Lévi-Strauss is able to write the manifesto for the new anthropology: a sci-
ence that strives to make the Kantian project of the study of the laws of human 
thought, of that which makes man man—symbolic activity—scientific. But,
the ethnologist, unlike the philosopher, does not feel obliged to take the condi-
tions in which his own thought operates, or the science peculiar to his society and 
his period, as a fundamental subject of reflection in order to extend these local 
findings into a form of understanding, the universality of which can never be more 
than hypothetical and potential. Although concerned with the same problems, 
he adopts an opposite approach in two respects. Instead of assuming a universal 
form of human understanding, he prefers to study empirically collective forms of 
understanding, whose properties have been solidified, as it were, and are revealed 
to him in countless concrete representational systems (Lévi-Strauss 1986: 10–11).
The ethnologist thus chooses the most divergent symbolic systems “in the hope 
that the methodological rules he will have to evolve in order to translate these 
systems in terms of his own system and vice versa, will reveal a pattern of basic 
and universal laws” (ibid.: 11). This approach, whereby all men are equal in the 
common problem of the essence of man, to which everyone makes a contribu-
tion; this humanism, of which ethnology—insofar as it is our code for gather-
ing together these scattered contributions in a single reference system—is its 
main organ, exposes all the distance between the new and the old anthropology. 
When confronted with the savage world, Frazer spoke of a “tragic chronicle of 
human error and folly, of fruitless endeavours, wasted time, and blighted hopes” 
(1936: vi), while in his Notebooks, Lévy-Bruhl confessed how myths “no longer 
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have any effect on us . . . strange narratives, not to say absurd and incompre-
hensible  .  .  .  it costs us an effort to take an interest in them.”1 Behind these 
judgments there stood a concept of man identifiable with the concept produced 
by the West, or rather, with the man of the industrial revolution. The West’s ar-
rogance, the mask of its imperialism, is in fact a recent phenomenon.
Until Rousseau, and later still, the savage world, the world of the “others,” 
was still a term of reference for thinking of man; indeed, in the savage world, 
humanity’s common essence revealed itself in its most simple guise, thus allow-
ing empirical analysis. It is perhaps not by chance that Rousseau’s “new science” 
is closely associated with ethnology: “when one wants to study men, one must 
look around oneself; but to study man, one must extend the range of one’s vision. 
One must first observe the differences in order to discover the properties” (1966: 
30–31). Humboldt (1920: 21) too was convinced that an objective knowledge of 
man required an analysis of the entirety of man’s subjectivities: “the subjectivity 
of humanity as a whole becomes however in itself something objective.”
Barely sixty years later, Baker, one of the very first ethnographers—whose 
accounts were central to the development of Lubbock’s theories—declared, 
however, that “human nature viewed in its crude state as pictured amongst 
African savages is quite on a level with that of the brute, and not to be com-
pared with the noble character of the dog” (Baker 1866: 227). Hegel said, “the 
transition from monologue to dialogue is the birth of man.” With the rejection 
of “dialogue” so typical of classic anthropology, the exorcism of the specter of 
the savage, man was dead. He was dead, at least, as a man who poses himself as 
a problem. One sets oneself as a problem only by considering all men, and thus 
all the living manifestations of man. 
All men interest us, as they are all actualizations of what we can be. With 
the Industrial Revolution, however, the “other” men are not men anymore; they 
are just objects, nature. Their scientific objectification corresponds to their eco-
nomic objectification: a purely naturalistic anthropology emerges. 
But the negation of the savage’s humanity corresponded to the negation, 
within western civilization itself, of many of man’s “provinces,” and man was 
conceived as pure Homo Oeconomicus, as pure producer.2 
1. In Lévi-Strauss (1966: 121). —Trans. 
2. It is interesting to note that Mauss explicitly affirms in The gift: “it is only our 
Western societies that quite recently turned man into an economic animal” (1969: 
74).
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As Roger Bastide (1964) has noted, the concept of praxis emerging from 
Marxism is still actually ethnocentric, as it limits itself to the praxis of the west-
ern man. Marxism, being concerned solely with the problem of alienation, dis-
engages itself from many of man’s components, “from dream, from sensibility 
and affection” (ibid.: 445); faced with these phenomena, Marx narrows down 
the concept of praxis of his youth and adopts a “reductionist” approach.
European culture ends up by reacting irrationally to this mutilation of man; 
the savage world, which has conserved intact a lost reality, is once again reduced 
to the status of “thing,” distanced, mythicized. Savage thought is, for Freud and 
Jung, a revelation of the unconscious, for Piaget—following in Freud’s foot-
steps—it is narcissistic regression, for Lévy-Bruhl it is “mystic participation” 
and “paralogism,” and for Frobenius, Jensen, and Volhard it is “paideuma,” the 
original intuition of the world, religious emotion. 
It is in this context that Mauss works, with a clear humanistic conscience. His 
approach is closer to that of the Renaissance than to Descartes. For Descartes, it is 
sufficient to know oneself in order to know the whole of man. Rationalism shuts 
itself off from all of humanity’s experience, while the Renaissance, right from the 
start, related itself to configurations of civilization that were “other” in order to 
know and complete itself. The Classical world, the Hebraic world and the freshly 
discovered New Worlds weren’t just myths: they were manifestations of a com-
mon humanity, and had to be investigated in order to solve one’s own problems. 
The Renaissance lives in a tension toward the other, the different to oneself; 
man who seeks completeness feels incomplete in the absence of all other exist-
ing men. Thus Montaigne (1743: 20), convinced as he is that “every man carries 
the entire form of human condition,” anticipates the approach of Mauss and 
modern anthropology. Montaigne searches for a direct contact with those men 
that we call barbarians solely because “everyone gives the title of barbarity to 
everything that is not in use in his own country” (228), queries at length a man 
“that lived ten or twelve years in the New World, discovered in these latter days” 
(224), “a plain ignorant fellow, and therefore more likely to tell the truth” (227), 
and collects, as a true ethnologist, savages’ songs, of which he declares: “now I 
have conversed enough with poetry to judge thus much: that not only there 
is nothing barbarous in this invention, but, moreover, that it is perfectly Ana-
creontic. To which [it may be added that] their language is soft, of a pleasing 
accent, and something bordering upon the Greek terminations” (228). He also 
defends cannibals, accusing Europeans of being far more barbaric than them, 
who only eat the bodies of the dead. He engages in a long dialogue with a savage 
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arrived in France, interrogating him on common human feelings: honor, cour-
age, pride, and recognizes him as a man.
Mauss, who has contributed, perhaps more than any other, to the launching 
of the new anthropology and, above all, given it its meaning (wherein scienti-
ficity becomes the attainment of a better humanity and man’s reclamation of 
everything that is human), is closer to the humanism of the Renaissance, the 
deepest meaning of which we ourselves have lost. 
Despite the limitations of its time, his oeuvre still at least preserves, intact 
and fresh, this reference to man in his totality. This approach is perfectly re-
flected on the methodological plane: the concept of total social fact, his most 
interesting contribution, is the angle from which the whole of his work needs 
to be read and discussed.
The total social fact has a tridimensional character: 1) sociological, 2) his-
torical, 3) physio-psychological. It is able, in certain instances, to set in motion 
society and its institutions as a totality. These “total” facts exist at the social level, 
but can only be perceived in concrete data, in individuals: 
The tangible fact is Rome or Athens, or the average Frenchman or the Melane-
sian of some island, and not prayer or law as such. Whereas formerly sociologists 
were obliged to analyse and abstract rather too much, they should now force 
themselves to reconstitute the whole. This is the way to reach incontestable facts. 
They will also find a way of satisfying psychologists who have a pronounced 
viewpoint, and particularly psycho-pathologists, since there is no doubt that the 
object of their study is concrete. They all observe, or at least ought to, minds as 
wholes and not minds divided into faculties. (Mauss 1969: 78)
The tridimensional character of the total social fact on the one hand, and the 
problem of the relationship between society and the individual on the other 
(with its corollary problem of the relationship between collective and individual 
psychology), form the conceptual core of Mauss’ project, which is developed in 
different dimensions through his essays. 
It is thus necessary, and more helpful, to trace the development of the theo-
retical endeavor of Mauss in relation to the concrete analyses to which it is 
linked. Only this way—remaining loyal to his method—can we attempt to ex-
plain what a “total fact” is, and what its explicative value may be. 
Compared with his more mature work, the essay “Esquisse d’une théorie 
générale de la magie”—first in the Sociologie et anthropologie collection, now 
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translated in Italian with the title Teoria generale della magia e altri saggi,3 writ-
ten in collaboration with Henri Hubert and published in 1902–3 in Année soci-
ologique—is, in a way, part of prehistory. It is however one of Mauss’ most beau-
tiful and organic essays, and has something of a revolutionary character, with an 
approach radically contrasting to that of British anthropology, and in particular 
Frazer. The point of departure for Mauss lies in French sociology’s critique of 
British sociology, which was to be summarized by Lévy-Bruhl (1985: 23) as 
follows:
collective representations are social phenomena, like the institutions for which 
they account; and if there is any one point which contemporary sociology has 
thoroughly established, it is that social phenomena have their own laws, and laws 
which the analysis of the individual qua individual could never reveal. Conse-
quently, any attempt to “explain” collective representations solely by the function-
ing of mental operations observed in the individual (the association of ideas, the 
naïve application of the theory of causality, and so on), is foredoomed to failure.
As we know, this critique dates back to Durkheim’s article Représentations indi-
viduelles et représentations collectives (1898).
Mauss, who was Durkheim’s nephew and also his collaborator in Le suicide 
(1897) and “De quelques formes primitives de classification” (1901–2),4 always 
remained faithful to this approach, although integrating it with the advances 
that had been made in psychology and sociology.
This is why the essay on magic has a clearly sociological tone right from the 
outset: “magic should be used to refer to those things which society as a whole 
considers magical, and not those qualified as such by a single segment of society 
only” (Mauss 1972: 18). Magic cannot thus be explained, as Frazer did, as a 
deformation of individual psychological laws, and nor can it be affirmed that 
“its two great principles [homeopathy and contagion] turn out to be merely two 
different misapplications of the association of ideas” (Frazer 1980: 12). 
3. Translated in English as A general theory of magic (1972). —Trans. 
4. We have included full references for these texts here as they were not included in 
the original publication. Durkheim, Émile. 1897. Le suicide: Étude de sociologie. Paris: 
Félix Alcan. Durkheim, Émile and Marcel Mauss. 1901–02. “De quelques formes 
primitives de classification.” Année Sociologique 6: 1–72. —Ed. 
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What is fundamental, in the determination of magical representations, is 
their sociological character. What requires investigation are thus magic’s agents, 
acts, and representations. 
Mauss also criticizes some of Frazer’s other postulations. Sympathetic prin-
ciples are characteristic not only of magic, but also of religion. And, more gen-
erally, magic and religion cannot be clearly distinguished on the basis that the 
rites of magic are constraining and those of religion persuasive. Rather, religion 
and magic should be postulated as two opposite poles with a whole range of 
often difficult to distinguish phenomena appearing between them. Magic is the 
pole of sorcery, religion the pole of sacrifice. 
From a sociological perspective (and thus, for Mauss, from a “total” perspec-
tive), magic is anti-religion: “a magical rite is any rite which does not play a part 
in organised cults—it is private, secret, mysterious and approaches the limit of 
a prohibited rite” (Mauss 1972: 24).5 Magic is thus defined on the basis of the 
conditions in which its rites are produced and the role they play in social life. 
Mauss thus analyzes with extreme care the sociological elements he has 
identified in magic and the psychological consequences derived from them that 
can explain it. 
Firstly, the most important thing to notice is the particular relationship be-
tween magician (or shaman) and social group. This topic, which mobilizes and 
raises the question of the complex relations between the physiological, psycho-
logical, and sociological dimensions, will never cease to interest Mauss who, in 
1909, again in collaboration with Hubert, was to write an essay on “L’origine des 
pouvoirs magiques dans les sociétés australiennes,” and in 1926 a comment—
published in Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique—on the physical ef-
fects that the community’s ideas about death have on the single individual. The 
issue, however, remains open to this day and, despite de Martino’s studies and 
the essays by Cannon and Lévi-Strauss (later collected in Anthropologie struc-
turale), the problem has yet to be solved. We still know far too little about the 
complex relations between the physiological and the psychological, the indi-
vidual and the group, to be able to provide a satisfactory explanation of those 
phenomena that are exploited by magic and yet exist, under different guises, also 
in our own society.
5. This argument will be resumed by Durkheim in Les formes élémentaires de la vie 
religieuse (1912).
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In this sense, Mauss was one of the first to highlight the abnormal nature 
of the magician and the shaman, in an attempt to match them more closely to 
our psychopath.
Exceptionally excitable or abnormal individuals constitute a social class that 
has magical properties “as a consequence of society’s attitude towards them and 
their kind” (Mauss 1972: 28). From this angle, the issue implies a number of 
problems, and raises the question of the relationships between ethnology and 
psychology. 
Firstly, if we consider society as a system of information, that is a system of 
symbols, what relationship does the psychopath’s symbolism have with that of 
the group? Taking the issue even further, are psychopathological phenomena 
exclusively individual? Can the language used to speak of non-collective phe-
nomena be used by the anthropologist for the explanation of collective facts? 
As Lévi-Strauss noted in his introduction to Mauss, Ruth Benedict was the 
first to discover how the phenomena dealt with by ethnologists and psycholo-
gists are expressible in psychopathological terms. But precisely because she did 
not have a clear knowledge of the problems we have just outlined here, she was 
not able to explain this paradox. In truth, the issue could only be solved if we 
knew something more about the nature of the symbolic function. This too is a 
field that still lies ahead for anthropology. We can nevertheless agree with Lévi-
Strauss when he states that psychological phenomena must be subordinate to 
sociological ones: it was thus imprudent of Benedict to use psychiatric termi-
nology to characterize social phenomena; if anything, the relationship should be 
the opposite way, between psychiatry and sociology. “It is natural for society to 
express itself symbolically in its customs and its institutions; normal modes of 
individual behaviour are, on the contrary, never symbolic in themselves: they are 
elements out of which a symbolic system, which can only be collective, builds 
itself. It is only abnormal modes of behaviour which, because desocialised and 
in some way left to their own devices, realise the illusion of an autonomous 
symbolism on the level of the individual” (Lévi-Strauss 1987: 12). On the other 
hand, the domain of the pathological is never confused with that of the indi-
vidual, as disorders are classified in categories, and each society has its favorite 
categories of disorders: the actual psychopathological phenomena themselves 
are determined by society.
Here, a double set of problems arises, which Mauss, with the limited pro-
gress of his time in the psychological and social sciences (he still hadn’t met 
Freud when he wrote A general theory of magic), could only glimpse from afar.
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The first problem pertains to the relationship that exists between our psychopath 
and the sorcerer. Do they or do they not belong to the same order of phenomena? 
To address this first problem, we will use the approach Lévi-Strauss adopts 
in his introduction to the essays of Mauss. 
Firstly, as regards phenomena of shamanism, psychiatrists have ruled out 
that these can be considered identical to our psychopathological states, as this 
would be too simplistic. Furthermore, when not in a possessed state, sorcerers 
are normal.
The contradiction can be solved in two different ways:
1)  Either “trance” behaviors have no connection with our psycho-pathological 
behaviours
2)  Or, they are of the same kind, but in this case “it is their connection with 
psychopathological states that we need to consider as contingent and as re-
sulting from a condition peculiar to the society in which we live” (Lévi-
Strauss 1987: 15)
The latter solution leads to a further alternative:
a.)  Either the alleged mental illnesses must be considered as the effect of so-
ciological factors on the behavior of individuals “whose history and personal 
constitution have partially dissociated them from the group” (Lévi-Strauss 
1987: 16)
b.)  Or, a truly pathological state is indeed present in these patients, but one of 
physiological origin, which simply creates fertile ground for certain symbolic 
behaviors “for which a sociological interpretation would still be the only ap-
propriate thing” (ibid.).
Let us now turn to the second problem: what relationships exist between society 
and the phenomena it classifies as pathological?
The problem is of interest for two reasons: on the one hand, in fact, it is only 
by approaching it in this way that we can hope to achieve an understanding 
of ecstatic, shamanistic, and magic phenomena. On the other, it addresses the 
actual meaning of the presence of psychopaths in our society, and also the pos-
sibility of curing them. 
It is clear then that these considerations re-connect to points (a) and (b): 
they do not claim to answer them (only an aprioristic mentality could hope for 
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this in the absence of empirical research), but only to delineate a possible direc-
tion for research.
We note first of all two things: 1) from the studies of Mauss (particularly 
the 1909 ones) it emerges that the shaman or the magician, despite being 
“normal” when not in a possessed state, is subject to a whole series of taboos 
and prescriptions which maintain him in a state of psychological tension, and 
separate him from the group, intentionally relegating him to a situation of 
abnormality. 
Again: people considered “abnormal” (because unexplainable or socially un-
classifiable), such as women during menstruation, children (a world in them-
selves), psychopaths, foreigners, etc., are particularly fertile ground for magical 
phenomena, under the psychological pressure of the group. 2) Each society cat-
egorizes mental disorders in variable classes. Each society, that is, seems to pro-
voke—one could almost say create the possibility for—only certain disorders.
It thus seems that society, while on the one hand taking cognizance of 
abnormality, on the other generates it, almost as if it needed it and therefore 
“chooses” only certain kinds of abnormality. Mauss had already affirmed that “it 
is public opinion which makes the magician and creates the power he wields” 
(Mauss 1972: 40).
What, then, is the meaning of pathology and its cure? Is pathology definable 
unequivocally, or only in relation to a specific society? 
We already know, from Malinowski’s studies in the Trobriands, that the lat-
ter alternative is more plausible. Malinowski (1949) has shown that one of the 
pathological models present in our society (the Oedipus complex) is absent in 
Trobriand society, whereas another is present (the matrilineal complex).
If, on the basis of these experimental grounds, we can make a generalization, 
it could perhaps be argued, hypothetically, that in every society there are:
1) models of normality
2) models of pathology 
strictly complementary and dependent on the constant asymmetry between so-
cial structure (which tends to be synchronic) and individual demands (which 
tend to be diachronic).
An attempt to explain this reciprocal functionality, where society specializes in 
two groups, one immensely more vast, the other smaller (although maybe, as Lévi-
Strauss has suggested, in a relationship with one another that remains, for each 
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society, stable), can be based on documentary material provided by Lévi-Strauss in 
Chapter IX of Anthropologie structurale, and by Nadel (1946). A hypothesis on the 
relationship between the two groups can be derived from these essays.
Society responds to the individual’s demands with certain behavioral models 
that correspond to certain specific possibilities for fitting into the social organi-
zation. But, because of the asymmetry mentioned above, a number of demands 
remain unsatisfiable in terms of “normal” models unless there is a profound 
restructuring of the social organization itself. 
Society, however, needs to frame this residue socially. This presents it si-
multaneously with a problem of organization and a psychological problem that 
triggers a classification mechanism. Society classifies its centrifugal tendencies, 
in the sense that it makes possible only certain so-called “pathological” behaviors in 
order to demonstrate their eccentric and peripheral position in relation to its social 
organization and depict them negatively. This classification, on the other hand, is 
strictly complementary to the psychological problem that the pathological ele-
ments themselves pose to the group, and to the “abnormal” tendencies that are 
repressed in “normal” individuals. Probably, a satisfactory explanation for this 
contradictory yet functional relationship can be attained only by ordering all the 
social system’s elements within a single informational model. Only then perhaps 
can we understand exactly the instinctive mechanism which, on the one hand, 
has to deal with the problem of socially framing centrifugal forces that it cannot 
satisfy, and, on the other, producing these forces according to certain models, 
in order to placate a potential dissatisfaction (and thus a potential centrifugal 
force) in its normal elements. A society, in fact, is a system that has to reckon 
with individuals, who are never entirely reducible to the terms of the model it 
maps out. If what we are saying is true—that society is unable to include within 
normal behavioral models certain “demands,” and thus certain characteristics, 
of the individual, and can only offer pathological models of stabilization and 
“normalcy”—then the complementary relationship between normal and patho-
logical could be expressed as follows. On the one hand, society gives a “periph-
eral” status to anything not falling within its “central” code, while on the other 
it makes use of its peripheral elements to vent, through specific “rituals,” the 
potentially pathological and centrifugal traits of normal individuals, deriving 
from the incomplete overlap between social models of behavior and individual 
“demands.” The shaman thus is used to discharge all the group’s anguish and 
aggression, to objectify and project elsewhere the aggression, the psychic mate-
rial removed from the group, by means of the scene he acts out. In this sense, 
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as Lévi-Strauss has brought to light, the shaman has a function that can be 
compared to that of our psychoanalyst.
What the group also asks of the shaman (or of the psychopath in general) 
is a unilateral exacerbation of his psychic energies, of his abilities, in a direction 
that remains extraneous to the group. This explains why the shaman or the ma-
gician has tangible “abilities”—and possibilities—for emotional and intellectual 
experiences that the group uses to rebalance itself. 
In this sense, the magician’s tricks and prestidigitation are functional behav-
iors, as they satisfy the group’s needs.
An experimental confirmation of this hypothesis can be found in Nadel’s 
study, where he ascertains that societies with shamans—unlike those without 
shamans—have not recorded an increase in mental illness because of the influ-
ence of their contact with our civilization, which is generally a traumatizing 
event for any group of “primitives.”
One could even ask if society needs a class of “abnormals.” Because it is 
through “abnormality” that experiences extraneous to the “normal” person are 
possible, experiences that he needs for reassurance, for overcoming what de 
Martino so effectively termed a “crisis of presence,” by actually exceeding his 
“normal” condition, which, in movements of anguish, is felt to be profoundly 
unsatisfactory. This would explain the compensatory and calming role played by 
abnormality, and the “exceptional” behavior of certain individuals with regard to 
the “normality” of the group. A number of equivalents to this relationship can 
be found in our society: the dictator, the actor, the singer—don’t they all produce 
phenomena extremely close to those observed in magic or shamanic rituals? 
Notorious criminals like Jack the Ripper are needed by our calm bourgeoisie for 
venting its sadistic and aggressive instincts.
The mentally ill themselves have an important function. Although in a 
marginal position, with regard to the system, they are integrated in it. As Lévi-
Strauss (1987: 18) observes: “the group seeks and even requires of those indi-
viduals that they figuratively represent certain forms of compromise which are 
not realizable on the collective plain; that they simulate imaginary transitions, 
embody incompatible syntheses.”6 The magician, says Mauss (1972: 96), “is a 
6. One just needs to think of the ways in which some societies—particularly in 
moments of crisis—have idealized illness as a privileged and eccentric state of being 
with respect to a system increasingly felt as profoundly unsatisfactory for individual 
needs. Cf., for example, some of Thomas Mann’s reflections in The magic mountain. 
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kind of official, vested by society with authority, and it is incumbent upon the 
society to believe in him.”
Mauss’ value, regarding the question we have tried to clarify, is that he was 
the first to shed light on the terms of the problem. His essay is a turning point 
because it addresses the relationship between psychological and social phenom-
ena and the relationship between collective and individual behavior. The clari-
fication of the problem, however, has no corresponding satisfactory solution, 
which, after all, Mauss still didn’t have the tools to provide. The qualitative jump 
to be made was from the portrayals of magical phenomena in some societies 
to the level where an explanation can be found for these portrayals that unifies 
them. Mauss wasn’t able to make this step. But, here too, he made an important 
breakthrough by removing magic from the domain of the arbitrary.
Magic is the manifestation of the classifying and ordering faculty of human 
thought. Going back to the themes of the well-known essay De quelques formes 
primitives de classification ([1902] 1963), Mauss argues that sympathetic rela-
tions group things and their properties by similarity and opposition: “in this 
way, the system of sympathetic and antipathetic magic can be reduced to one of 
classifying collective representations. Things affect each other only because they 
belong to the same class or are opposed in the same genus” (Mauss 1972: 78). 
“Magic becomes possible only because we are dealing with classified species. 
Species and classifications are themselves collective phenomena. And it is this 
which reveals both their arbitrary character and the reason why they are limited 
to such a small number of selected objects” (78–79).
But what mental operation lies at the heart of magic?
Mauss realizes that it is not possible to explain it from an intellectualist 
perspective, as British anthropology had done. “From the point of view of an 
individual’s intellectualist psychology” (181), magic would simply be an absurd-
ity: “let us see whether a non-intellectualist psychology of man as a community 
may not admit and explain the existence of this idea” (ibid.). Mauss thus wants 
to avoid the danger of interpreting categories that are alien to us with our own. 
But does the method he chooses allow him to achieve the goal he had set him-
self ? The procedure with which Mauss obtains the “single principle” of magic 
is a good example of his “method of residues,” which Lévi-Strauss sets against 
Durkheim’s method of concomitant variation.7 Mauss explains his method as 
follows: “the various explanations which can be brought forward as motives for 
7. See “La sociologie française,” in La sociologie au XXe siècle, Vol. 1 (1947: 542).
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beliefs in magical acts leave a residue, which we must now try to describe. . . . It 
will be here that we shall find the real basis of these beliefs” (Mauss 1972: 106). 
In truth, this method of residues is simply masking a process of induction: as 
such, it does not question our interpretive categories, as was postulated, and 
ends up explaining the problem on the basis of them. The single principle of 
magical facts cannot be obtained with the normal inductive process we use for 
our own cultural facts.
And this is because the categories of the European observer of European 
social facts belong to the same order as the objects being studied, while the same 
cannot be said of the anthropologist, who constantly has to exercise “anthropo-
logical doubt”: 
This “anthropological doubt” does not only consist of knowing that one knows 
nothing, but of resolutely exposing that which one thought one knew, and indeed 
one’s very ignorance, to the insults and contradictions which are directed at one’s 
most cherished ideas and habits by those who can contradict them to the high-
est degree. Contrary to appearances, I think it is by its more strictly philosophic 
method that ethnology is distinguished from sociology. (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 
120–21)
The purely sociological induction procedure, in fact, applies categories that are 
commensurable to the social facts, because sociologists are subjects that belong 
to the social and cultural world they measure. In the induction procedure for 
cultural facts that are radically different to those the observer (the subject of the 
research) belongs to, a kind of mental revolution is necessary in order to create 
some elements of communication between my own subject and the subjects 
that have produced the fact I am studying. What are necessary are intermediary 
categories that allow the transition from our cultural and classificatory system 
to theirs. It is this typically philosophical operation of subjecting the actual 
categories of our research—the very ways in which we ourselves think—to criti-
cism and analysis, that is vital to the anthropologist. 
The final result cannot—we think—be the reaching of the very “essence” of 
the phenomenon studied, but the setting of the conditions for communicating 
with it.
In anthropology, it is a relationship between different subjects that is es-
tablished, rather than a relationship between subject and object. In this sense, 
the result is characteristically philosophical; it is communication, dialogue, 
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knowledge of a neutral ground where an encounter is possible, and thus the 
only possible form of comprehension. 
Mauss, therefore, has not developed all the implied consequences of the 
revolutionary concept of the total social fact. As Lévi-Strauss (1987: 30–31) 
notes in his Introduction, “an appropriate understanding of a social fact requires 
that it be grasped totally, that is, from outside, like a thing; but like a thing which 
comprises within itself the subjective understanding (conscious or unconscious) 
that we would have of it, if, being inexorably human, we were living the fact as 
indigenous people instead of observing it as ethnographers.” Internal learning 
needs thus to be transposed in terms of external learning. Accomplishing this 
task is possible because the social sciences reject any clear-cut distinction be-
tween the subjective and the objective: 
[T]he subject itself—once the object-subject distinction is posited—can then 
be split and duplicated in the same way, and so on without end, without ever 
being reduced to nothing. Sociological observation, seemingly sentenced by the 
insurmountable antinomy that we isolated in the last paragraph, extricates itself 
by dint of the subject’s capacity for indefinite self-objectification, that is to say 
(without ever quite abolishing itself as subject) for projecting outside itself ever-
diminishing fractions of itself. (ibid.: 31–32)
The importance of anthropology in its new humanism derives from the fact 
that “it offers this unlimited process of objectification of the subject, which is 
so difficult for the individual to effect; and offers it in a concrete, experimental 
form” (Lévi-Strauss 1987: 32). Different societies become the subject’s differ-
ent objects: in no case, though, can the subject forget that these objects proceed 
from him and that analysis integrates them into subjectivity.
The qualitative jump Mauss was not able to accomplish was to reach the 
level of the unconscious, where the subjective and objective meet. The laws of 
unconscious activity reside in fact beyond subjective learning, but determine the 
modalities of this learning. 
Mauss actually attributes a lot of importance to the subconscious. But does 
he draw all the consequences from the statement quoted above, that magic phe-
nomena should be studied like linguistic phenomena?
Mauss is not alone in his awareness of the necessity to reform ethnology by 
bringing it closer to the methods used in linguistics (the first of the human sci-
ences to make itself more scientific). Troubetzkoy, for example, according to his 
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autobiographical notes, was already convinced just a few years later that “ethnol-
ogy, history of religion, culture history, etc. could pass from the ‘alchemic’ stages 
of development to a higher stage only if, with regards to method, they would 
follow the example of linguistics” (Trubetzkoy 1971: 311). But adopting such a 
method implies studying cultural facts at the level where they become similar to 
linguistic facts, and thus at the level of the subconscious rules of speech. 
Just as one speaks unconsciously following grammatical and syntactic rules, 
so one thinks and performs certain acts following categories that one is unaware 
of. Ethnological research requires us to move beyond the conscious interpreta-
tion an individual or group gives to the phenomena we are studying.
It is precisely this that Mauss did not do. The notion of magic that he applies 
(like that of the gift, later) is taken from a Melanesian interpretation of magic’s 
potential. Mauss (1972: 108) says 
the idea is that found in Melanesia under the name of mana. Nowhere else is it 
so clearly evident. . . . Mana is not simply a force, a being, it is also an action, a 
quality, a state. In other terms the word is a noun, an adjective and a verb. . . . On 
the whole, the word covers a host of ideas which we would designate by phrases 
such as a sorcerer’s power, the magical quality of an object, a magical object, to be 
magical, to possess magical powers, to be under a spell, to act magically.
This, thanks to the method of residues, is where the analysis arrives at.
In actual fact, in identifying the notion of mana, Mauss was only able to 
discover the semantic value it has for the savage. Thus he always remains in 
the realm of the savage’s own description of magic—an ambiguous description, 
because the essence of magic escapes him, as it does us. The issue is not to know 
what the savage designates with the word mana, but the nature of those ambigu-
ous phenomena that he designates with the ambiguous word mana. 
An analysis of the concept of mana, therefore, can only be an analysis of the 
degree of the savage’s understanding of these phenomena, and not an analysis 
of what is being designated with such a term. Lévi-Strauss (1987: 53) suggests 
that mana might be “a function of a certain way that the mind situates itself in 
the presence of things,” which must therefore make an appearance “whenever 
that mental situation is given.” Mana is one of those indeterminate terms like 
truc, coso, whose function is to fill in the gap between signifier and signified.
Words such as orenda and mana are used to designate phenomena that are 
not strictly magic, but that become magical to our eyes precisely by virtue of the 
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extremely generic sign attributed to them. It is precisely this semantic vagueness, 
this indistinctness, that makes us call these designations magical designations. 
With this word, the savage designates facts whose precise meaning escapes him, 
but which he feels immersed in and which he uses (e.g., parapsychological and 
psychosomatic phenomena, which science, however, isolates).
Magic’s substantial ambiguity, seen from the perspective of the indigenous 
interpretation and subsumed under “objective interpretation” of the phenom-
enon is, on the other hand, repeatedly acknowledged by Mauss. Regarding this, 
however, two questions can be asked:
1)  Whether the term “magic” subsumes phenomena that are only provisionally 
declarable as similar to one another, and, if so, whether the analysis of magic 
actually refers to that level that Mauss doesn’t reach but which is the only 
one common to all these phenomena;
2)  Whether this level resides precisely in that confusion of images that he recog-
nizes as being typical of magic, but that he does not examine in depth.
What we need to consider, however, is whether this “confusion” has its own laws, 
and what its actual meaning may be. If we do no more than talk of “confusion,” 
we remain as outsiders and merely state our ignorance, with the properties we 
attribute to the object being the opposite to the thought we are judging it by. 
Magic, on the other hand, like art and myth, is a specific symbolic process, 
and its scientific investigation is still at a very early stage. There is probably a 
relationship between the three forms, residing precisely in the trait we have 
termed “confusion of images”: in these symbolic processes, there is no empirical cor-
roboration and language is used in an “overabundance of meaning” that it has with 
regard to the object, and nothing is done to put it in a rigorous relationship with the 
object that has been preliminarily established by a method of investigation. 
The condition for the construction of an order, in myth as in art as in magic, 
resides in the use of laws that allow for the possibility of constructing an entirely 
linguistic order. This condition is to be found first and foremost in the very 
imprecision of language, in the possibility of making it work without a direct 
confrontation with experience. Is it not the case that what is present in magic 
under the guise of technique is present in all dimensions of this symbolic level? 
Language is posed as a creator in relation to the world, not as something that 
requires verification. Language is always true, as long as it acquires a form. In 
magic and myth this form is more strictly traditional, as it is very much in art. 
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The fact that in art language is more flexible, does not make art less “traditional,” 
in the sense that the words, the semantic “pieces” through which it operates, are 
never artificial, conventionally postulated by the artist: the Saussurean “arbi-
trariness of the sign” does not exist in art. These semantic “pieces” can be used 
poetically only because they already contain “resonances” of deep meaning in 
the language they inhabit: “love” and “heart,” as Umberto Saba said, is in fact 
the most difficult of rhymes,8 to which all poets dedicate themselves. Do these 
words take on poetic value because they are in a context that awakens their im-
manent poetic quality? Why are poetry, myth, magic, at different levels and each 
in its own field, dominated in such impressive ways by the same themes? But 
even if we wanted to limit ourselves to the observation that words have reso-
nances of meaning and a semantic value (which the artist finds already formed, 
and upon which he works), circumscribed to a certain historical domain, does 
the reasoning not remain nevertheless valid?
In any case, Mauss’s theory of mana is an interesting chapter in the his-
tory of epistemology: it exhibits the importance of words in knowledge. When 
cultural phenomena, so to speak, are of the same order of the language used to 
discuss them, the weight of the words is much less perceptible. But in the case 
of anthropology, the issue becomes macroscopic. The hermeneutic use of certain 
categories such as mana, orenda, potlatch, or totem, has played nasty tricks on 
anthropologists.
Words like these indicate a relation between objects and subjects. For ex-
ample, the word totem, in a given society, corresponds to the human-animal or 
human-plant relation. But while the objects in the relation remain the same in 
different societies, the word, and hence the relation, changes. The word, then, 
is the real distinctive and discriminating criterion, as it is inserted in a system 
of relations that gives it its meaning, a system it indirectly reflects. The human-
animal relation can have very different meanings, and cannot be reduced to the 
interpretation of any one society. For the ethnologist looking from the outside, 
the criterion will be that of reconnecting all the relations he knows objectively to 
a certain subjective interpretation of that relationship, an interpretation which, in 
truth, should be in the class of the objects only, as it is only the interpretation 
of one studied group. Only subjective interpretations can be compared to each 
8. The words love (amore) and heart (cuore) rhyme in Italian. The banal yet complex 
nature of the rhyme particularly struck the Italian poet Umberto Saba, as we read 
for example in his poem “Amai” (1946). —Trans.
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other: otherwise, phenomena belonging to different classes would be compared 
as if they belonged to the same class. The ethnologist’s task can thus only be that 
of comparing all the subjective perspectives, all the languages with which certain 
facts are discussed: to know them, it will not be possible to reduce them to one of those 
being observed as an object, from the outside.
The essential task will be to compare these to our subjectivity, to our language, 
digging deeply until the points of contact between us and them are found. 
The misunderstanding we encountered in the notion of mana crops up again 
in “Essai sur le don” (Année Sociologique 1923–24). And despite this, the essay 
has remained beautiful, exciting. It is in this essay that, for the first time, the 
concept of total social fact is expressed with extreme clarity, and its hermeneutic 
value is proven. Another thing that makes the essay interesting is its novel ap-
proach, the discoveries it discloses (particularly about the primitive economy) 
have been made possible by direct ethnographic research. Mauss, in fact, draws 
mainly on Malinowski’s ground-breaking studies in the Trobriand, thus dem-
onstrating the importance of research “in the field.” 
The phenomenon that Mauss analyzes is this: in many societies: “contracts 
are fulfilled and exchanges are made by means of gifts. In theory such gifts 
are voluntary but in fact they are given and repaid under obligation” (Mauss 
1969: 1). Within this class of phenomena, one single aspect is isolated: “presta-
tions which are in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, but are in 
fact obligatory and interested” (ibid.). The problem to be solved will thus be: 
“in primitive or archaic types of society what is the principle whereby the gift 
received has to be repaid?” (ibid.).
To solve this problem, Mauss accepts the use of a restricted comparative 
method, applied within limited areas, in order not to create confusion. Basically, 
he applies the method of Durkheim, who had criticized the false “exhaustive-
ness” of the British comparative method, working instead on “crucial facts” in 
order to arrive, through successive extensions, at a characterization of the social 
fact under investigation. 
The structure of the The gift is thus determined by its method: firstly, the 
problem is posed; secondly, it is solved by taking as objects of investigation facts 
that are particularly significant in two delimited, but far apart, geographical 
areas (some areas of the Pacific and Australia; North America); thirdly, through 
successive extensions, the survival of gift-based exchange systems in ancient 
Roman Law, classic Indian law, Germanic law, Celtic law, and Chinese law are 
studied. Finally, Mauss draws some “conclusions of a moral nature”: if sociology 
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is society becoming conscious of itself, it can do no other than end with conclu-
sions such as these, as it says something about the orientation of human actions. 
The essay’s structure gives a glimpse into the extraordinary richness of its 
content. With exceptional erudition and agility, Mauss presents numerous facts 
in an entirely new light, and unmasks the myth of primitives’ inability to con-
ceptualize economic value (as sustained by Karl Bücher). 
He also reaches a fundamental conclusion: barter is not—as Bücher be-
lieved—the primitive form of exchange and, on the other hand, sale on credit 
is not found in evolved societies only; indeed, it derives—necessarily—from 
the gift. “Barter arose from the system of gifts given and received on credit, 
simplified by drawing together the moments of time which had previously been 
distinct. Likewise purchase and sale—both direct sale and credit sale—and the 
loan, derive from the same source” (Mauss 1969: 35)
What is the explanation Mauss feels he can provide for the legal bond of the 
gift as a primitive form of exchange? Once again, he postulates an indigenous 
interpretation as an “objective” interpretation. 
The interpretation is provided by the Maori: the hau. The hau is the spirit of 
the thing given as a gift, which has such a constraining power that it forces its 
restitution through another object.
“In Maori custom this bond created by things is in fact a bond between 
persons, since the thing itself is in fact a person or pertains to a person. Hence it 
follows that to give something is to give a part of oneself ” (10).
Exchange has the role of maintaining unity between groups and implement-
ing an actual division of labor. The best example of this is the Trobriand Kula 
studied “in the field” by Malinowski. This seems to be the culminating point of 
a whole system of prestations and counter-prestations: “the kula is the gathering 
point of many other institutions” (25).
Gift and exchange are the same thing in this system. In the context of social 
solidarity, in fact, an entirely free gift does not exist: exchange always requires 
reciprocity.
This specific kind of relationship guarantees foreign, interinsular trade, but 
also sheds light on the very essence of archaic society: what we have is one of 
those total social facts that activate the societal structure at all its levels. “The ob-
ligation is expressed in myth and imagery, symbolically and collectively; it takes 
the form of interest in the objects exchanged; the objects are never complete-
ly separated from the men who exchange them; the communion and alliance 
they establish are well-nigh indissoluble. The lasting influence of the objects 
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exchanged is a direct expression of the manner in which sub-groups within 
segmentary societies of an archaic type are constantly embroiled within and feel 
themselves in debt to each other” (Mauss 1969: 31). “The circulation of goods 
follows that of men, women and children, of festival ritual, ceremonies and 
dances, jokes and injuries. Basically they are the same. If things are given and 
returned it is precisely because one gives and returns ‘respects’ and ‘courtesies’. 
But, in addition, in giving them, a man gives himself, and he does so because he 
owes himself—himself and his possessions—to others” (44–45).
The conclusion Mauss draws from the archaic system of exchange goes as 
follows: “the spirit of gift-exchange is characteristic of societies which have 
passed the phase of ‘total prestation’ (between clan and clan, family and family) 
but have not yet reached the stage of pure individual contract, the money mar-
ket, sale proper, fixed price, and weighed and coined money” (45).
But the study of the gift leads to some considerations concerning the eco-
nomic structure of our own society. Against the supposedly “natural economy” 
(which, in reality, as Mauss has demonstrated, is merely a myth unproven by 
history), against the rigidity and cruelty of our law, against the marked distinc-
tion between real and personal rights, Mauss argues that we need to return to a 
“group morality”: “we should return to the old and elemental” (67), to a system 
of total prestations. “A wise precept has run right through human evolution, and 
we would be as well to adopt it as a principle of action. We should come out of 
ourselves and regard the duty of giving as a liberty, for in it there is no risk” (69). 
These “moral reflections” are not as utopian as they may seem.
Today, even revolutionary theories—as Fortini9 recently pointed out—seem 
to tend exclusively towards a “rationalization” of bourgeois society. The archaic 
concept of exchange as gift, though, is so much part of our axiological structure 
that, it seems to us, even the concept of alienation is permeated by it. The re-
jection of alienation signifies indeed an attempt to return to a model that sees 
exchange as a gift, and not as a transfer of goods. Alienation only ends when hu-
man labor is not “thing-ified,”10 reduced to pure instrument, but is considered an 
integral part of the man who is doing it. Giving one’s work means—exactly as 
for the savage—giving something of one’s self, giving a hau that evokes human 
9. Quaderni piacentini. Italian trimestral journal (1962–1984) on culture and politics, 
with Franco Fortini as one of its main collaborators. —Trans. 
10. In the Italian original: cosizzato.—Trans. 
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solidarity, that demands a return that is equal to the gift; a kind of exchange, 
thus, that does not allow pure “thingification.” 
In a certain sense, the exchange model exists prior to all the rest, and is 
the categorial form in which man thinks of himself socially. Wherever society 
comes into being, the category also comes into being: it is not possible to re-
construct its origin from a combination of scattered elements. Therefore, even 
Mauss’ attempt to explain the gift through his particular interpretation of a 
given group ends up betraying the a priori and irreducible nature of exchange. 
As Lévi-Strauss (1987: 58–59) observes: “exchange is not a complex edifice 
built on the obligations of giving, receiving and returning, with the help of some 
emotional-mystical cement. It is a synthesis immediately given to, and given by, 
symbolic thought, which, in exchange as in any other forms of communication, 
surmounts the contradiction inherent in it; that is the contradiction of perceiv-
ing things as elements of dialogue, in respect of self and others simultaneously, 
and destined by nature to pass from the one to the other. The fact that those 
things may be the one’s or the other’s represents a situation which is derivative 
from the initial relational aspect.”
But the conclusions of the “Essai sur le don” suggest a further consideration, 
particularly important at the methodological level. 
The total social fact cannot be understood, for Mauss, other than in individual 
elements, in tangible social blocks. The total social fact, that is, exists socially, 
but it is through concrete experience that one is guaranteed to perceive it. “In 
society there are not merely ideas and rules, but also men and groups and their 
behaviors” (Mauss 1969: 78). 
Here, it seems we can go further than Mauss and argue that what is consoli-
dated in social relationships needs also to be rediscovered in the individual who 
lives in them, being one of their poles. Taking it even further, we could perhaps 
add that the relationships forming the total social fact have to be related, through 
systematized rules of transformation, to the individual investigating them. As 
Wiener and Lévi-Strauss have highlighted with regard to the social sciences, the 
observer is part and parcel of the object studied. “To call the social fact total is not 
merely to signify that everything observed is part of the observation, but also, and 
above all, that in a science in which the observer is of the same nature of his ob-
ject of study, the observer himself is part of his observation” (Lévi-Strauss 1987: 29).
The observer, in fact, is not only in a theoretical relationship with his object: 
he is in a concrete relationship with it, as the conditions of observation make 
him part of the object itself. 
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Recently, Gurvitch, once again, set this interpretation against the fact that 
“Mauss was a partisan of collective conscience and experience”.11 Gurvitch’s 
observation questions Mauss’ interpretation of “collective representations.” In 
actual fact, the assertion that it is necessary to find the total social fact at the in-
dividual, or concrete, level does not necessarily imply a complete abandonment 
of the differentiation between collective and individual psychology. Examin-
ing an individual as a specimen in whom the total social fact concretizes itself 
doesn’t mean examining individual, and not social, psychological phenomena. 
Certainly, though, Lévi-Strauss has provided an interpretation of Mauss which 
is, at the same time, one step ahead, this being justified however by the fact that 
the strict Durkheimian separation between collective and individual representa-
tions is not shared by Mauss without “nuances.”
The essay “Real and practical relationships between psychology and so-
ciology” (published for the first time in the Journal de psychologie normale et 
pathologique, 1924),12 part three of the collection Sociologie et anthropologie, 
clearly demonstrates this. 
Here, Mauss states that certain discoveries in psychology (for example the 
notions of “mental vigor,” “psychosis,” “symbol,” “instinct”) are essential for un-
derstanding social facts, and that this convergence between psychology and so-
ciology is made possible by the common “totalizing” approach to their object. 
Addressing psychologists, Mauss makes this important observation: all 
these advances “derive from your consideration not of such and such a mental 
function, but rather of the mentality of the individual as a whole. You will see 
that those of the facts that we can submit to your reflections in exchange belong 
to the same order” (Mauss 1979: 18).
The marked separation between psychology and sociology is here overcome: 
the two sciences collaborate in their common objective of considering man in 
his totality. In this sense, it seems to us that Mauss is indeed on the track of 
Lévi-Strauss, despite Gurvitch’s claim to the contrary. 
The essay’s conclusions confirm this. Although Mauss starts by stating that 
psychology is the study of individual consciousness, while sociology is the com-
bined study of collective and community consciousness (and not, as McDougall 
thought, an extension of psychology), he ends by asserting that: “whether we 
11. In Bastide (1965: 125).
12. Published in English as Part I of the volume Sociology and psychology: Essays (1979). 
—Trans. 
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study special facts or general facts, it is always the complete man that we are 
primarily dealing with, as I have already said. For example, rhythms and sym-
bols bring into play not just the aesthetic or imaginative faculties of man but his 
whole body and his whole soul simultaneously. In society itself, when we study 
a special fact it is with the total psychophysiological complex that we are deal-
ing” (ibid.: 27). The sociologist has to ask of the psychologist for “a theory of the 
relations between the various compartments of the mentality and those between 
these compartments and the organism” (ibid.).
The assertion that “sociology is only a part of biology just like psychology” 
(ibid.: 5) will thus be justified. The current separation between sociology and 
psychology is destined to fade increasingly until the day comes when Mauss’ 
hoped-for theory is formulated. Anthropology, intended as that body of re-
search that tendentially and knowingly approaches this unification, “belongs to 
the human sciences, as its name adequately proclaims; but while it resigns itself 
to making its purgatory beside the social sciences, it surely does not despair of 
awakening among the natural sciences at the hour of the last judgment” (Lévi-
Strauss 1966: 118).
This tendency of Mauss to consider man’s social being as integrated and re-
alized in his physical being, becomes more accentuated over the years. Evidence 
of this can be found in the last three essays in Sociologie et anthropologie: “The 
physical effect on the individual of the idea of death suggested by the collectiv-
ity” (1926); “A category of the human mind: The notion of person, the notion of 
self ” (1938) and especially “Techniques of the body” (1934).13
These works also clarify why a thorough study of the total social fact implies 
the observation of concrete individuals. If the fact needs to be reconstructed in 
all its dimensions, bridging the gap between social and physiological facts, then 
it will be necessary to see how representations and social relationships condition 
man’s corporeal being and how the latter, in turn, makes the former possible. 
But the corporeal being is an eminently concrete fact; it is the human body, 
which needs to be studied, and the explanatory model extracted from it can only 
be compared with an individual body, not with something collective consisting 
of a set of relationships. 
This body’s physiological processes, though, are inexplicable without those 
sign relations that connect them to others. Proof of this is given in the first es-
say: “Physical effect of theidea of death,” which studies information gathered 
13. Parts II, III, and IV respectively of Sociology and psychology: Essays (1979). —Trans. 
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in Australia and New Zealand that corroborates the existence of a direct link 
between the physiological-psychological and the social. 
Mauss analyzes the rapid death of individuals that are considered and de-
clared as “dying subjects” by society, despite being physiologically healthy and 
sound. The individual “believes, for precise collective causes, that he is in a state 
close to death . . . [he] believes himself to be bewitched or at fault and dies for 
this reason” (Mauss 1979: 38).
The actual physiological explanation for these events was not given until 
much later, by Cannon. Once again, Mauss anticipated more recent discover-
ies by posing the problem in the correct way. In these phenomena—he de-
clares—man’s social nature immediately catches up with his biological nature. 
This is thus a particularly significant example of a total social fact and of how 
the phenomena it generates span from the pure individuality of the single 
body where physiological facts take place, to the collectivity that provokes 
them. 
The essay on the notion of person also covers the whole spectrum, from the 
social to the “bodily”: “it is clear . . . that there has never been a human being 
without the sense not only of his body, but also of his simultaneously mental and 
physical individuality” (61). 
Mauss reconstructs the evolution of this concept, from its most primitive 
forms to modern philosophy, explaining the relationship between mask and 
person, suggested immediately by the Latin term “persona.”
Also from this sociological study, moral conclusions can be drawn. The evo-
lution of the concept of the person, which up to the nineteenth century was 
identified with rational and cognizant activities, is now reacquiring its more 
vast archaic meaning. Although until not so long ago the “person” as mask, the 
social being, had superseded natural man, de-naturalizing him completely, many 
present-day phenomena make us think that a slow reaction to this tendency 
may be taking place. In this sense, we are rediscovering a problem that is vaster 
than the person itself. How are we anchored to the world? Is our person only 
form, categorization, discursivity, and thought that shapes the world? Or is it 
itself produced by the world, by “nature”—not in the sense of a set of concepts 
that define what is natural, but in the sense of something that is the actual con-
dition for conceptualization, but that also escapes it?
The last essay, on the techniques of the body, is something like a program for 
the new anthropology that Mauss dreamed of. The techniques of the body are 
“the ways in which from society to society men know how to use their bodies” 
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(97). The human body is an immensely vast and unexplored ethnological field: 
it is “man’s first and most natural instrument” (104).
To orient research, Mauss thus proposes a classification of these “physio-
psycho-sociological assemblages of series of actions” (120).14 
Sadly, this field has been left largely unexplored, despite Lévi-Strauss pro-
posing the creation of “International Archives of Body Techniques,” “providing 
an inventory of all the possibilities of the human body and of the methods 
of apprenticeship and training employed to build up each technique” (Lévi-
Strauss 1987: 8). 
Experience teaches how useful is it for Europeans to study “savage” tech-
niques, techniques made necessary by work conditions similar to those in which 
primitive man developed them. 
It is with this revitalization of the “total” man—“total” at the level of the 
individual, from his conscious being to his physical being, “total” at the level of 
humanity, spanning the whole arc of space and time of civilization—that the 
oeuvre of Mauss closes and the new anthropology begins. 
The ethnologist’s journey, as any other journey, ends with a return. The 
knowledge of a world different to ours corresponds to a better knowledge of 
ourselves, to the wish to be in a new relationship with the savage that is now 
more familiar to us, because he is part of us. 
As Remo Cantoni (1963: 252) writes: “the problem of our times . . . is to 
explore without preconceptions the real breadth of man, the real breadth of 
history.” 
Our very language brings us to classify the phenomena of non-western soci-
eties with the term “primitive,” evaluating them through the diachronic opposi-
tion of “before” and “after,” in parallel with those moments of development of 
western civilization that for us constitute the necessary order of progress. This 
simply exposes how much our mental categories, our so called “historic” cat-
egories (where the magic word “history” becomes the panacea of the lazy), are 
tainted by ethnocentrism. They are not able to admit, synchronically, simultane-
ously to us, historical developments and forms of civilization radically different 
from ours. Our language is impotent (because our history and our experience 
is impotent) when faced with a so-called primitive civilization. The only place 
it has found, in our classificatory terms, has been the myth of the past and of 
the primeval that the West—with a secret and perennial dissatisfaction—has 
14. Cf. Mauss’ Manuel d’ethnographie (1947).
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dragged with it through all its history: the golden age, the paradise lost, the 
Garden of Eden, the state of nature. Primeval moments that always presuppose 
two contradictory evaluations of our civilization: liberation from a primeval 
state of barbarism and wilderness, or decadence from a primeval state of good-
ness and perfection. 
The only thing that Western civilization—closed in the magic bottle of its 
own apparent self-confidence and its firm belief in its “magnificent and progres-
sive destiny”15—held on to in this myth of the primeval was a secret remorse, the 
possibility of a radical overturning of values, of total critique of the direction in 
which it moved. This myth was like a limit concept, from which the direction of 
our civilization’s progress could be observed and evaluated. And it is significant 
that it is precisely in these terms that Rousseau intended it. 
But when “primitive” peoples, those civilizations different to ours, have pre-
sented themselves to us with a direct impact, the myth of the primitive has 
served only to chase them back into the confusion of the primeval and indistinct 
state, into the “tourbillon mistique,” so that we could relate to them not as terms 
of comparison or as possibilities for evaluating our own values, but as extrane-
ous, necessarily overtaken by the West’s millenarian development. Behind this 
attitude lies a specific metaphysics of history, a secret anguish and a fear of 
comparison with others. 
Marx and Engels also attempted to make “other” civilizations fall within the 
metaphysical limbo of our primitive, of our past, in the timid steps of the first 
day of Creation. But “other” civilizations are other men that are living here and 
now on this earth, with us: they are not “primitive societies,” they do not belong 
to our past, but to our present, and to the common future of humanity that is on 
the road of rediscovering itself in all its parts. 
15. Valeri is here evoking Giacomo Leopardi’s bitterly ironic critique of the 
Enlightenment’s scientific optimism and progressivism in his poem “La ginestra.” 
—Trans.
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